Access Statistics for Kohei Daido

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Abstention by Loss-Averse Voters 0 0 1 75 0 4 8 172
At the Crossroad of Research: The Impact of Projection Bias on the Decision to Explore or Exploit Ideas 0 1 3 16 1 8 16 47
Distributive policy with labor mobility and the Samaritan fs dilemma 0 0 0 45 2 5 7 147
Evolution of Information Projection Bias through Costly Communication in Overlapping Generations Organizations 1 3 4 19 2 10 16 43
Hidden Cost of Sanctions in a Dynamic Principal-Agent Model: Reactance to Controls and Restoration of Freedom 0 0 4 46 0 5 15 98
Incentives, Identity, and Organizational Forms 0 0 0 50 12 22 22 149
Information Projection and Timing Decisions: A Rationale for Second Thoughts 0 0 1 55 1 6 7 94
Loss Aversion, Stochastic Compensation, and Team Incentives 0 0 0 69 2 7 9 134
Organizational Modes within Firms and Productivity Growth 0 0 0 53 0 5 7 152
Peer Pressure and Incentives 0 0 0 9 0 3 6 956
Public Infrastructures, Production Organizations, and Economic Development 0 0 0 55 2 6 11 157
Skill-Biased Technological Change, Organizational Change, and Wage Inequality 0 0 0 78 3 11 13 208
Social Norms on Working Hours, Work-Life Balance, and Fertility Choice 0 0 7 258 5 17 37 699
Task Assignment under Agent Loss Aversion 0 0 0 52 0 4 7 182
Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences 0 0 0 0 0 9 10 43
Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences 0 0 0 144 2 4 8 457
The Effects of Corporate Finance on Firm Risk-taking and Performance: Theory and Evidence 0 0 1 193 0 5 7 760
The Effects of Peer Pressure and Risk Sharing on Incentives 0 0 0 10 1 3 6 5,022
The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking 1 1 2 37 1 6 12 77
The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking 0 0 0 15 0 5 8 27
The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences 0 1 1 271 0 2 3 1,863
The Pygmalion and Galatea Effects: An Agency Model with Reference-Dependent Preferences and Applications to Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 0 1 12 320 26 71 209 3,027
Total Working Papers 2 7 36 1,870 60 218 444 14,514

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Formal and relational incentives in a multitask model 0 0 0 38 1 6 6 150
Impact of Information Concerning the Popularity of Candidates on Loss-Averse Voters’ Abstention 0 0 0 2 1 3 3 14
Incentive Effects of Peer Pressure in Organizations 0 0 0 65 0 4 5 427
Peer Pressure and Incentives 0 0 1 68 0 2 7 299
Public infrastructure, production organization, and economic development 1 1 1 40 1 8 11 161
Risk-averse agents with peer pressure 0 0 2 72 1 8 10 305
Task assignment under agent loss aversion 0 0 0 13 0 7 10 89
Team Incentives and Reference‐Dependent Preferences 0 0 1 10 0 5 14 65
Total Journal Articles 1 1 5 308 4 43 66 1,510

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-03-04