| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
63 |
| A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
61 |
| A Micro- Foundation for Non-Deterministic Contests of the Logit Form |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
155 |
| ALL-PAY AUCTION EQUILIBRIA IN CONTESTS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
109 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
371 |
| Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
34 |
| Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
29 |
| Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
51 |
| Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
52 |
| All-Pay Auctions with Extra Prize: A Partial Exclusion Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
| All-pay auction equilibria in contests |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
81 |
| Biased Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
2 |
5 |
31 |
296 |
| Competition for Procurement Shares |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
141 |
| Competition for Procurement Shares |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
69 |
| Competition for procurement shares |
0 |
0 |
1 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
107 |
| Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
| Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
62 |
| Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
| Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
81 |
| Dual Sourcing with Price Discovery |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
127 |
| Foundations for contest success functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
173 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
465 |
| Foundations for contest success functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
66 |
| Free Mobility and Taste-Homogeneity of Jurisdiction Structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
| How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
58 |
| How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
175 |
| How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
72 |
| Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure |
0 |
0 |
2 |
118 |
1 |
3 |
20 |
458 |
| Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
2 |
3 |
28 |
270 |
| Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
2 |
14 |
132 |
| Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
69 |
| Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
5 |
14 |
58 |
| On the Complete Information First--Price Auction and its Intuitive Solution |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
143 |
| Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
69 |
| Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
161 |
1 |
4 |
23 |
1,326 |
| Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
282 |
| Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
| TULLOCK AND HIRSHLEIFER: A MEETING OF THE MINDS |
0 |
0 |
1 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
270 |
| The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible |
0 |
1 |
6 |
38 |
4 |
5 |
17 |
158 |
| The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
61 |
| The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
24 |
| The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules |
1 |
1 |
4 |
28 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
67 |
| The Political Economy of Interest Groups: Pressure and Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
216 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
807 |
| The political economy of interest groups: pressure and information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
53 |
3 |
6 |
21 |
286 |
| Trials, Tricks and Transparency: How Disclosure Rules Affect Clinical Knowledge |
0 |
0 |
2 |
71 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
332 |
| Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
64 |
| Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
130 |
| Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
59 |
| Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
138 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
2 |
27 |
1,862 |
22 |
46 |
321 |
7,970 |
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