| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
70 |
| A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
7 |
70 |
| A Micro- Foundation for Non-Deterministic Contests of the Logit Form |
0 |
1 |
1 |
45 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
164 |
| ALL-PAY AUCTION EQUILIBRIA IN CONTESTS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
5 |
8 |
11 |
387 |
| Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
52 |
| Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
43 |
| Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
61 |
| Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
63 |
| All-Pay Auctions with Extra Prize: A Partial Exclusion Principle |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
41 |
| All-pay auction equilibria in contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
8 |
11 |
15 |
100 |
| Biased Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
12 |
14 |
15 |
327 |
| Competition for Procurement Shares |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
7 |
12 |
17 |
87 |
| Competition for Procurement Shares |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
8 |
15 |
21 |
165 |
| Competition for procurement shares |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
5 |
8 |
10 |
119 |
| Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
5 |
8 |
10 |
74 |
| Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
5 |
5 |
6 |
62 |
| Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
18 |
19 |
49 |
| Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
8 |
20 |
107 |
| Dual Sourcing with Price Discovery |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
3 |
7 |
12 |
146 |
| Foundations for contest success functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
175 |
6 |
11 |
13 |
486 |
| Foundations for contest success functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
74 |
| Free Mobility and Taste-Homogeneity of Jurisdiction Structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
37 |
| How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
65 |
| How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
185 |
| How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
79 |
| Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
478 |
| Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
12 |
19 |
20 |
314 |
| Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
151 |
| Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
101 |
| Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
7 |
10 |
12 |
103 |
| On the Complete Information First--Price Auction and its Intuitive Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
4 |
7 |
11 |
159 |
| Refugee Resettlement and Solidarity |
1 |
5 |
16 |
16 |
2 |
11 |
32 |
32 |
| Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
79 |
| Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
6 |
9 |
9 |
294 |
| Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
162 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
1,356 |
| Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
15 |
27 |
| TULLOCK AND HIRSHLEIFER: A MEETING OF THE MINDS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
286 |
| The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
173 |
| The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
30 |
| The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
70 |
| The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
4 |
6 |
11 |
89 |
| The Political Economy of Interest Groups: Pressure and Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
216 |
4 |
4 |
8 |
818 |
| The political economy of interest groups: pressure and information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
4 |
7 |
9 |
320 |
| Trials, Tricks and Transparency: How Disclosure Rules Affect Clinical Knowledge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
7 |
8 |
10 |
346 |
| Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
4 |
4 |
5 |
90 |
| Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
142 |
| Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
64 |
| Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
3 |
7 |
9 |
151 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
6 |
19 |
1,914 |
186 |
326 |
466 |
8,786 |