Access Statistics for Matthias Dahm

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting 0 0 0 18 1 2 3 67
A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 64
A Micro- Foundation for Non-Deterministic Contests of the Logit Form 0 0 0 44 1 1 2 160
ALL-PAY AUCTION EQUILIBRIA IN CONTESTS 0 0 0 111 0 1 3 379
Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides 0 0 1 14 0 1 5 47
Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides 0 0 0 7 1 3 5 37
Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes 0 0 0 17 0 1 1 56
Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes 0 0 0 15 0 2 3 57
All-Pay Auctions with Extra Prize: A Partial Exclusion Principle 0 0 1 26 0 0 2 35
All-pay auction equilibria in contests 0 0 0 9 1 2 4 89
Biased Contests 0 0 0 75 0 0 1 313
Competition for Procurement Shares 0 0 0 12 2 2 6 75
Competition for Procurement Shares 0 0 0 56 1 2 8 150
Competition for procurement shares 0 0 0 59 0 0 2 111
Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation 0 0 0 13 0 0 2 57
Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 31
Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation 0 0 0 20 0 0 2 66
Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation 0 0 0 11 2 11 13 99
Dual Sourcing with Price Discovery 0 0 0 21 1 3 7 139
Foundations for contest success functions 0 0 0 175 0 2 2 475
Foundations for contest success functions 0 0 0 9 1 1 3 70
Free Mobility and Taste-Homogeneity of Jurisdiction Structures 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 34
How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose 0 0 0 32 0 1 2 180
How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 60
How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy 0 0 0 13 2 3 4 77
Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure 0 0 0 41 1 1 3 295
Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure 0 0 0 118 0 2 6 476
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 27 1 1 2 93
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 96
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 145
On the Complete Information First--Price Auction and its Intuitive Solution 0 0 0 41 1 3 4 152
Refugee Resettlement and Solidarity 2 11 11 11 7 21 21 21
Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies 0 0 0 4 1 2 4 74
Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform 0 0 1 162 0 1 3 1,353
Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 285
Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera 0 0 0 2 1 2 5 15
TULLOCK AND HIRSHLEIFER: A MEETING OF THE MINDS 0 0 0 87 0 1 3 281
The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible 0 0 0 41 1 2 4 170
The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules 0 0 1 30 1 2 6 83
The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules 0 0 0 13 0 1 2 29
The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules 0 0 0 33 1 2 3 68
The Political Economy of Interest Groups: Pressure and Information 0 0 0 216 0 1 4 814
The political economy of interest groups: pressure and information 0 0 0 56 2 2 5 313
Trials, Tricks and Transparency: How Disclosure Rules Affect Clinical Knowledge 0 0 1 72 1 1 3 338
Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge 0 0 1 5 0 0 6 86
Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 139
Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit 0 0 0 13 1 1 3 62
Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit 0 0 0 35 0 1 2 144
Total Working Papers 2 11 17 1,908 33 87 175 8,460

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting 0 0 0 9 0 1 1 58
Affirmative action through extra prizes 0 1 2 15 2 6 10 63
Biased contests 0 0 0 17 1 2 4 94
Competition for procurement shares 0 0 0 17 2 3 7 103
Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis and Subjective Evaluation 0 0 0 16 4 5 8 67
Dual sourcing with price discovery 0 0 0 3 1 1 5 41
Foundations for contest success functions 0 0 0 82 1 1 5 211
Free mobility and taste-homogeneity of jurisdiction structures 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 94
How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy 0 0 0 2 1 3 4 68
Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure 0 0 0 33 0 1 3 145
ON THE COMPLETE INFORMATION FIRST-PRICE AUCTION AND ITS INTUITIVE SOLUTION 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 22
On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement 0 0 1 5 0 1 12 25
Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result 0 0 2 144 0 2 9 511
Semi-targeted all-pay auctions: A partial exclusion principle 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 35
Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 389
The enforcement of mandatory disclosure rules 0 0 1 8 1 2 7 59
Trials, tricks and transparency: How disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge 0 0 0 17 0 0 7 157
Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds 0 0 0 25 0 1 3 124
Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit 0 0 1 16 0 0 3 70
Total Journal Articles 0 1 7 475 14 31 95 2,336

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Statistics updated 2025-11-08