| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
72 |
| A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
75 |
| A Micro- Foundation for Non-Deterministic Contests of the Logit Form |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
5 |
5 |
10 |
169 |
| ALL-PAY AUCTION EQUILIBRIA IN CONTESTS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
388 |
| Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
54 |
| Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
4 |
7 |
16 |
50 |
| Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
65 |
| Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
66 |
| All-Pay Auctions with Extra Prize: A Partial Exclusion Principle |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
43 |
| All-pay auction equilibria in contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
8 |
22 |
108 |
| Biased Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
328 |
| Competition for Procurement Shares |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
92 |
| Competition for Procurement Shares |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
2 |
2 |
22 |
167 |
| Competition for procurement shares |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
2 |
9 |
17 |
128 |
| Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
75 |
| Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
16 |
35 |
65 |
| Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
64 |
| Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
6 |
26 |
113 |
| Dual Sourcing with Price Discovery |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
149 |
| Foundations for contest success functions |
1 |
1 |
1 |
176 |
3 |
13 |
26 |
499 |
| Foundations for contest success functions |
1 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
77 |
| Free Mobility and Taste-Homogeneity of Jurisdiction Structures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
9 |
41 |
| How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
68 |
| How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
190 |
| How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
83 |
| Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
3 |
10 |
30 |
324 |
| Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
479 |
| Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
154 |
| Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
13 |
108 |
| Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
107 |
| On the Complete Information First--Price Auction and its Intuitive Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
2 |
7 |
17 |
166 |
| Refugee Resettlement and Solidarity |
0 |
1 |
17 |
17 |
0 |
6 |
38 |
38 |
| Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
5 |
14 |
84 |
| Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
5 |
11 |
20 |
305 |
| Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
162 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
1,358 |
| Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
19 |
32 |
| TULLOCK AND HIRSHLEIFER: A MEETING OF THE MINDS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
2 |
5 |
12 |
291 |
| The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible |
0 |
1 |
1 |
42 |
4 |
9 |
14 |
182 |
| The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
4 |
7 |
15 |
96 |
| The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
33 |
| The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
74 |
| The Political Economy of Interest Groups: Pressure and Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
216 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
821 |
| The political economy of interest groups: pressure and information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
325 |
| Trials, Tricks and Transparency: How Disclosure Rules Affect Clinical Knowledge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
348 |
| Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
94 |
| Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
143 |
| Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit |
1 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
66 |
| Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
154 |
| Total Working Papers |
3 |
5 |
24 |
1,919 |
93 |
225 |
659 |
9,011 |