Access Statistics for Matthias Dahm

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting 0 0 0 18 0 0 1 65
A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 64
A Micro- Foundation for Non-Deterministic Contests of the Logit Form 0 0 1 44 0 0 2 159
ALL-PAY AUCTION EQUILIBRIA IN CONTESTS 0 0 0 111 1 2 3 378
Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides 0 0 1 14 0 2 5 46
Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides 0 0 0 7 0 1 3 34
Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 55
Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes 0 0 0 15 0 1 2 55
All-Pay Auctions with Extra Prize: A Partial Exclusion Principle 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 33
All-pay auction equilibria in contests 0 0 0 9 0 1 1 86
Biased Contests 0 0 0 75 0 0 1 313
Competition for Procurement Shares 0 0 0 56 1 2 4 146
Competition for Procurement Shares 0 0 0 12 0 2 3 72
Competition for procurement shares 0 0 0 59 0 1 3 111
Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation 0 0 1 13 0 0 2 56
Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 30
Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation 0 0 0 20 0 1 1 65
Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation 0 0 0 11 1 1 2 88
Dual Sourcing with Price Discovery 0 0 0 21 0 1 4 136
Foundations for contest success functions 0 0 0 175 0 0 2 473
Foundations for contest success functions 0 0 0 9 0 1 2 69
Free Mobility and Taste-Homogeneity of Jurisdiction Structures 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 33
How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 60
How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose 0 0 0 32 0 0 1 179
How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 74
Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure 0 0 0 118 0 0 5 473
Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure 0 0 1 41 0 0 4 294
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 95
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 145
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 27 0 0 1 91
On the Complete Information First--Price Auction and its Intuitive Solution 0 0 0 41 0 1 1 149
Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies 0 0 0 4 2 2 2 72
Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform 0 0 1 162 0 1 2 1,352
Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform 0 0 0 51 0 0 1 285
Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 13
TULLOCK AND HIRSHLEIFER: A MEETING OF THE MINDS 0 0 0 87 0 1 1 279
The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible 0 0 2 41 0 2 4 168
The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 27
The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules 0 0 0 33 0 0 2 66
The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules 0 0 1 30 0 3 6 81
The Political Economy of Interest Groups: Pressure and Information 0 0 0 216 0 3 4 813
The political economy of interest groups: pressure and information 0 0 0 56 0 0 3 311
Trials, Tricks and Transparency: How Disclosure Rules Affect Clinical Knowledge 0 0 1 72 0 1 2 337
Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge 1 1 1 5 1 1 12 86
Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit 0 0 0 13 0 1 2 61
Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 139
Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit 0 0 0 35 1 1 2 143
Total Working Papers 1 1 10 1,896 8 36 104 8,360

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 57
Affirmative action through extra prizes 0 1 1 14 0 2 4 56
Biased contests 0 0 0 17 0 0 2 92
Competition for procurement shares 0 0 0 17 0 1 2 98
Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis and Subjective Evaluation 0 0 3 16 0 1 7 62
Dual sourcing with price discovery 0 0 0 3 1 2 5 39
Foundations for contest success functions 0 0 0 82 0 0 7 210
Free mobility and taste-homogeneity of jurisdiction structures 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 93
How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 64
Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure 0 0 0 33 0 1 6 144
ON THE COMPLETE INFORMATION FIRST-PRICE AUCTION AND ITS INTUITIVE SOLUTION 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 21
On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement 0 0 2 5 1 5 11 20
Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result 0 1 2 143 0 1 5 504
Semi-targeted all-pay auctions: A partial exclusion principle 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 34
Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 389
The enforcement of mandatory disclosure rules 0 0 1 8 0 2 5 56
Trials, tricks and transparency: How disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge 0 0 0 17 0 0 5 155
Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds 0 0 0 25 0 1 3 123
Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit 0 0 2 16 0 1 3 69
Total Journal Articles 0 2 11 473 3 19 71 2,286

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2025-06-06