Access Statistics for Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auctions where incomes are private information and preferences (non quasi-linear) are common knowledge 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 124
COMPARING COURNOT AND BERTRAND IN A HOMOGENEOUS PRODUCT MARKET 0 0 2 17 0 0 3 66
Corruption in a Model of Vertical Linkage between Formal and Informal Credit Sources and Credit Subsidy Policy 0 0 0 98 1 1 1 225
Corruption in union leadership 0 1 5 55 1 6 16 585
DEBT FINANCING WITH LIMITED LIABILITY AND QUANTITY COMPETITION 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 12
FCPA and Market Quality in Emerging Economies 0 0 2 9 0 1 5 29
In many emerging economies corruption, poor quality of information and poor governance lead to restricted entry. In this paper we analyze the determinants of the.height.of entry barrier in a developing economy where established.rms often use dubious means to deter entry of other.rms. We analyse this scenario in a three-stage game of entry deterrence. The incumbent has incomplete information about the entrant.s costs but can increase this cost by resorting to unfair means (for example, bribing a politician who harms the entrant). Higher is the bribe, higher will be the entry cost and hence lower will be the incentive to enter. In our set-up bribe serves as a proxy for.height.of entry barrier. The entrant observes its cost and decides whether or not to enter. We completely characterise the optimal bribe and show that this depends on the market size, the.di¤erentiation.parameter (whether goods are substitutes or complement) and the extent of uncertainty. Uncertainty seems to increase bribe and decrease market quality. We also show that zero bribe need not maximise total surplus and market quality. Our results seem to be compatible with anecdotal evidences from an emerging economy like India 0 0 0 45 1 3 9 106
Market Size and Number of Firms with New Technology 0 0 19 19 1 2 10 10
Nature of competition and new technology adoption 0 0 0 75 0 0 0 109
Scoring auctions with non-quasilinear scoring rules 0 0 1 37 0 0 1 65
Vertical Linkage between Formal and Informal Credit Markets, Corruption and Credit Subsidy policy: A Note 0 0 1 41 0 0 3 115
Total Working Papers 0 1 30 438 4 13 48 1,446

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Basic auction theory revisited 0 1 2 25 0 1 4 57
Bertrand equilibrium with subadditive costs 0 0 1 36 2 2 6 106
Collusive outcomes in price competition 0 0 0 31 0 0 1 107
Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a Homogeneous Product Market 0 0 1 228 0 0 1 618
Corruption in a model of vertical linkage between formal and informal credit sources and credit subsidy policy 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 100
Corruption in delegated public procurement auctions 0 0 2 54 0 0 5 210
Corruption, Efficiency Wage and Union Leadership 0 1 1 11 0 1 1 39
Corruption, market quality, and entry deterrence in emerging economies 0 0 1 4 0 0 2 10
Cronyism and corruption in India: A game theoretic analysis 0 2 4 4 0 2 8 8
Endogenous price leadership in a duopoly: Equal products, unequal technology 0 0 0 31 0 0 1 103
Existence of Bertrand equilibrium revisited 0 1 1 53 0 1 1 95
Introduction to the Special Issue of Pacific Economic Review on Market Quality Economics 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 40
Is a Unique Cournot Equilibrium Locally Stable? 0 0 0 69 0 0 1 165
Market size, entry costs and free entry Cournot equilibrium 0 1 4 4 2 6 16 16
Nature of Competition and New Technology Adoption 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 31
ON THIRD‐DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN OLIGOPOLY* 0 0 0 75 0 0 2 195
Oligopoly and financial structure revisited 0 0 2 18 0 1 6 67
On Stackelberg games in a homogeneous product market 0 0 0 131 0 1 3 352
On procurement auctions with fixed budgets 0 0 1 37 0 0 3 146
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Bertrand Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 2 6 13 1,047
Quantity versus Price in a Homogeneous Product Duopoly 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 254
Reciprocal dumping and trade policy 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 408
Scoring Auctions 0 0 0 31 0 0 2 70
Total Journal Articles 0 6 20 899 6 21 82 4,244

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Oligopoly, Auctions and Market Quality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Total Books 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Allocation of Scarce Resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5
Effects of Corruption and Incompetence in the Quality Monitoring Process 0 0 0 0 2 5 10 13
Introduction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
On Some Aspects of Scoring Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Some Specific Market Quality Issues in Emerging Economies 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 2 5 15 31

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Statistics updated 2023-05-07