Access Statistics for Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auctions where incomes are private information and preferences (non quasi-linear) are common knowledge 0 0 0 34 0 2 3 122
COMPARING COURNOT AND BERTRAND IN A HOMOGENEOUS PRODUCT MARKET 2 2 5 10 2 7 21 48
Corruption in a Model of Vertical Linkage between Formal and Informal Credit Sources and Credit Subsidy Policy 0 0 0 98 0 4 7 218
Corruption in union leadership 0 0 2 46 0 8 19 538
DEBT FINANCING WITH LIMITED LIABILITY AND QUANTITY COMPETITION 0 0 0 5 0 1 2 9
In many emerging economies corruption, poor quality of information and poor governance lead to restricted entry. In this paper we analyze the determinants of the.height.of entry barrier in a developing economy where established.rms often use dubious means to deter entry of other.rms. We analyse this scenario in a three-stage game of entry deterrence. The incumbent has incomplete information about the entrant.s costs but can increase this cost by resorting to unfair means (for example, bribing a politician who harms the entrant). Higher is the bribe, higher will be the entry cost and hence lower will be the incentive to enter. In our set-up bribe serves as a proxy for.height.of entry barrier. The entrant observes its cost and decides whether or not to enter. We completely characterise the optimal bribe and show that this depends on the market size, the.di¤erentiation.parameter (whether goods are substitutes or complement) and the extent of uncertainty. Uncertainty seems to increase bribe and decrease market quality. We also show that zero bribe need not maximise total surplus and market quality. Our results seem to be compatible with anecdotal evidences from an emerging economy like India 1 1 9 38 3 7 24 61
Nature of competition and new technology adoption 0 0 3 73 0 4 13 79
Scoring auctions with non-quasilinear scoring rules 1 1 1 34 1 2 6 51
Vertical Linkage between Formal and Informal Credit Markets, Corruption and Credit Subsidy policy: A Note 0 0 1 39 0 3 9 103
Total Working Papers 4 4 21 377 6 38 104 1,229


Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Basic auction theory revisited 0 0 3 20 0 2 5 45
Bertrand equilibrium with subadditive costs 1 1 3 35 1 2 8 96
Collusive outcomes in price competition 1 1 1 30 1 2 5 100
Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a Homogeneous Product Market 1 1 2 223 2 6 10 599
Corruption in a model of vertical linkage between formal and informal credit sources and credit subsidy policy 0 0 0 16 0 1 5 92
Corruption in delegated public procurement auctions 0 0 6 46 2 6 29 134
Corruption, Efficiency Wage and Union Leadership 0 0 0 10 0 3 9 34
Endogenous price leadership in a duopoly: Equal products, unequal technology 0 0 1 29 0 0 2 86
Existence of Bertrand equilibrium revisited 1 1 1 48 1 2 2 84
Introduction to the Special Issue of Pacific Economic Review on Market Quality Economics 0 0 0 12 0 1 5 37
Is a Unique Cournot Equilibrium Locally Stable? 1 1 1 67 1 1 3 155
Nature of Competition and New Technology Adoption 0 0 1 3 0 1 6 16
ON THIRD‐DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN OLIGOPOLY* 1 1 1 67 1 2 4 177
Oligopoly and financial structure revisited 1 1 1 15 1 4 6 50
On Stackelberg games in a homogeneous product market 1 1 4 129 1 2 9 341
On procurement auctions with fixed budgets 0 0 0 36 0 3 9 138
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Bertrand Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 3 10 40 969
Quantity versus Price in a Homogeneous Product Duopoly 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 251
Reciprocal dumping and trade policy 0 0 1 23 1 3 5 403
Scoring Auctions 0 0 2 29 0 0 7 58
Total Journal Articles 8 8 28 838 15 51 172 3,865


Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Oligopoly, Auctions and Market Quality 0 0 0 0 1 6 10 10
Total Books 0 0 0 0 1 6 10 10


Statistics updated 2020-03-04