| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Can Selective Immigration Policies Reduce Migrants' Quality? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
4 |
10 |
21 |
72 |
| Can selective immigration policies reduce migrants' quality? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
8 |
16 |
64 |
| Can selective immigration policies reduce migrants' quality? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
69 |
| Can selective immigration policies reduce migrants’ quality? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
113 |
| Can selective immigration policies reduce migrants’ quality? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
1 |
9 |
25 |
136 |
| Collective management of intellectual property rights |
0 |
0 |
1 |
181 |
3 |
4 |
14 |
576 |
| Compte rendu d'ouvrage - Industrial organisation and inovation (séminaire) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
| Contrats Incitatifs et Réforme des Douanes dans les PED: une Application des Modèles d'Agence Hiérarchique |
1 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
76 |
| Contrats Incitatifs et Réforme des Douanes dans les PED: une Application des Modèles d’Agence Hiérarchique |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
4 |
4 |
10 |
208 |
| Delegated Monitoring versus Arm's Length Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
486 |
| Efficient collusion in optimal auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
133 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
375 |
| Information Disclosure in Common Value Repeated Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
33 |
| Information Disclosure in Common Value Repeated Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
55 |
| Information disclosure in common value repeated auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
20 |
| International Migration, Imperfect Information and Brain Drain |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
4 |
5 |
12 |
233 |
| International Migration, Imperfect Information and Brain Drain |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
6 |
6 |
19 |
212 |
| International Migration, Imperfect Information, and Brain Drain |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
3 |
3 |
10 |
116 |
| International Migration, Imperfect Information, and Brain Drain |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
93 |
| International migration, imperfect information, and brain drain |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
10 |
47 |
| Les programmes de vérification des importations (PVI) à la lumière de la théorie de l'agence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
36 |
| Local and Consistent Centrality Measures in Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
75 |
| Local and Consistent Centrality Measures in Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
8 |
11 |
16 |
215 |
| Mechanism Design with Private Communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
132 |
| Mechanism design with private communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
4 |
5 |
15 |
304 |
| Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
98 |
| Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
43 |
| Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
177 |
| Patent Pools and the Dynamic Incentives to R&D |
0 |
0 |
0 |
150 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
429 |
| Patent Pools and the Dynamic Incentives to R&D |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
126 |
| Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
50 |
| Patent pools and the dynamic incentives to R&D |
0 |
1 |
1 |
150 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
435 |
| Ratification and veto constraints in mechanism design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
244 |
| The demand for insurance against common shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
51 |
| Théorie des jeux et applications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
10 |
79 |
| Willingness-to-pay for microinsurance and flexibility: Evidence from an agricultural investment lab-in-the-field experiment in Senegal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
89 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1,581 |
74 |
129 |
404 |
5,574 |
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