| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Further Justification for the Negligence Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,880 |
| A SIGNALLING MODEL OF NOMINAL PRICE INERTIA |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
315 |
| A Signalling Model of Nominal Price Inertia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
| Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
206 |
| Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,312 |
| Causation and Incentives with Updating Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Choosing ADR or litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Contractual Design with Correlated Information Under Limited Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
370 |
| Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
129 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,297 |
| Customary versus Technological Advancement Tests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
| Deterrence vs Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof |
0 |
0 |
1 |
71 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
621 |
| Deterrence vs Judicial Error: a Comparative View of Standards of Proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
520 |
| Do factor shares reflect technology? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
187 |
| Governance: Who controls matters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
198 |
| Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious |
0 |
0 |
0 |
466 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
2,906 |
| Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious |
0 |
0 |
0 |
191 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,120 |
| Implicit vs. Explicit Incentives: Theory and a Case Study |
0 |
0 |
1 |
239 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2,642 |
| Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
| Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits |
0 |
0 |
1 |
69 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
285 |
| Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits in a Globalized World |
0 |
1 |
3 |
103 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
153 |
| Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
120 |
| Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
144 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
654 |
| Incentive contracts and efficient unemployment benefits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
| Inequity Aversion in Tournament |
0 |
0 |
1 |
135 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
570 |
| Inequity Aversion in Tournaments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
183 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
664 |
| Inquisitorial and Adversarial Procedure in a Criminal Court Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Institutional competition, political process and holdup |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
201 |
| Institutions, bargaining power and labor shares |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
255 |
| Interpreting contracts: the purposive approach and non-comprehensive incentive contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2,768 |
| Limiting Court Behavior: A Case for High Minimum Sentences and Low Maximum Ones |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,653 |
| Managerial Husbandry and the Dynamics of Ongoing Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
957 |
| Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,765 |
| Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements? |
0 |
0 |
3 |
800 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
2,934 |
| Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Limited Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,465 |
| Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
| Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
389 |
| Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
312 |
| Output and wages with inequality averse agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Overwhelmed by Routine Tasks: A Multi-Tasking Principle Agent Perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
19 |
| Prepondeance of the Evidence: Tort Rules and the Efficient Standard of Proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
251 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2,826 |
| Preponderance of Evidence |
0 |
1 |
2 |
167 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2,509 |
| Preponderance of Evidence |
0 |
1 |
2 |
82 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1,090 |
| Preponderance of Evidence |
0 |
1 |
2 |
208 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3,655 |
| Privatization, Risk Taking and the Communist Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
384 |
| Privatization, Risk-Taking and the Communist Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
460 |
| Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
146 |
| Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
263 |
| Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
| Procedural vs. Substantive Approaches in Non-Comprehensive Contracts |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
| Public Safety, Altruism and Redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,625 |
| Ranking of Information Systems in Agency Models: An Integral Condition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
210 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,912 |
| Regulation of Environmental Quality under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
| Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
281 |
| Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
429 |
| Should We Have or Should We Have Not, and Who Should Have Paid? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
96 |
| Society Versus Jury: A Case for Limiting Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1,192 |
| Technological choice under organizational diseconomies of scale |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
202 |
| The Determinants of Salary and Bonus for Rank and File Employees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
270 |
| The Nexus between Contract Duration and the Use of Formal and Informal Incentive Pay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
| The division of ownership in new ventures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
465 |
| Économie des procédures judiciaires |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Total Working Papers |
6 |
10 |
23 |
4,850 |
8 |
22 |
74 |
46,794 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism for a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection |
0 |
0 |
2 |
68 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
373 |
| A further justification for the negligence rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
164 |
| Autonomie der Universität und Professionalisierung ihrer Leitungsstrukturen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Capitation taxes and the regulation of professional services |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
18 |
| Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
431 |
| Causation and Incentives with Updating Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
| Choosing ADR or litigation |
0 |
0 |
4 |
65 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
188 |
| Class Actions, Compliance and Moral Cost |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
| Contractual Design with Correlated Information under Limited Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
286 |
| Credibility and Monitoring: Outsourcing as a Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
85 |
| Customary versus technological advancement tests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
| Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An institutional explanation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
321 |
| Deterrence versus Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
223 |
| Do factor shares reflect technology? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
115 |
| Efficient Budget Balancing Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
245 |
| Eliteuniversitäten: Stärkung des Forschungs- und Wirtschaftsstandorts Deutschland? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
194 |
| Entrepreneurship and the Division of Ownership in New Ventures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
131 |
| Excess burden of criminality and redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
127 |
| INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
216 |
| Individual versus collective bargaining under relative income concerns |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
| Interpreting contracts: the purposive approach and non-comprehensive incentive contracts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
60 |
| Introduction: CESifo Conference in Law and Economics - Munich, May 2010 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
| Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
125 |
| Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA |
1 |
1 |
1 |
128 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
938 |
| Legal competition, political process and irreversible investment decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
116 |
| Limiting court behavior: a case for high minimum sentences and low maximum ones |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
226 |
| Managerial husbandry and the dynamics of ongoing hierarchies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
| Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
289 |
| Monitoring versus incentives |
0 |
1 |
1 |
187 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
449 |
| Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
| Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| Nuclear accidents liability and a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
| Output and wages with inequality averse agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| Output and wages with inequality averse agents |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
366 |
| Overwhelmed by routine tasks: A multitasking principal agent perspective |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
22 |
| Preponderance of evidence |
0 |
1 |
1 |
97 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
627 |
| Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
180 |
| Privatizing profits and socializing losses with smoothly operating capital markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
93 |
| Property Rights and Regulation of Environmental Quality under Asymmetric Information/Eigentumsrechte und Regulierung der Umweltqualität bei asymmetrischer Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| Property Rights and Regulation of Environmental Quality under Asymmetric Information/Eigentumsrechte und Regulierung der Umweltqualität bei asymmetrischer Information |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
| Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
560 |
| Relative Income Concerns, Dismissal, and the Use of Pay-for-Performance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
13 |
| Relative income concerns and the Easterlin Paradox: A theoretical framework |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
16 |
| Rules of proof, courts, and incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
217 |
| Technology adoption under hidden information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
60 |
| The Inquisitorial and the Adversarial Procedure in a Criminal Court Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
218 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
817 |
| The Nexus between Contract Duration and the Use of Formal and Informal Incentive Pay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| Third-Party Financing of Litigation: Legal Approaches and a Formal Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
35 |
| Toward a Theory of Motion Practice and Settlement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| Ärzte unterschiedlicher Sorgfaltswaltung, fehlerhafte Gerichte und der Fahrlässigkeitsstandard: Korreferat zum Beitrag von Anja Olbrich: "Der Einfluss von Haftungsunsicherheit auf den Sorgfaltsstandard" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
169 |
| Économie des procédures judiciaires |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
56 |
| Total Journal Articles |
3 |
5 |
22 |
1,748 |
12 |
29 |
129 |
8,909 |
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