| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Further Justification for the Negligence Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
11 |
1,891 |
| A SIGNALLING MODEL OF NOMINAL PRICE INERTIA |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
317 |
| A Signalling Model of Nominal Price Inertia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
18 |
| Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
210 |
| Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
1,317 |
| Causation and Incentives with Updating Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Choosing ADR or litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
| Contractual Design with Correlated Information Under Limited Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Contractual Design with Correlated Information Under Limited Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
379 |
| Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
129 |
2 |
10 |
13 |
1,310 |
| Customary versus Technological Advancement Tests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
| Deterrence vs Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
626 |
| Deterrence vs Judicial Error: a Comparative View of Standards of Proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
528 |
| Do factor shares reflect technology? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
195 |
| Governance: Who controls matters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
1 |
8 |
14 |
211 |
| Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious |
0 |
0 |
0 |
466 |
0 |
6 |
11 |
2,914 |
| Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious |
0 |
0 |
1 |
192 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
1,127 |
| Implicit vs. Explicit Incentives: Theory and a Case Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
239 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
2,646 |
| Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
12 |
| Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
289 |
| Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits in a Globalized World |
0 |
0 |
1 |
103 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
159 |
| Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
7 |
10 |
128 |
| Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
144 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
661 |
| Incentive contracts and efficient unemployment benefits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
5 |
14 |
20 |
120 |
| Inequity Aversion in Tournament |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
575 |
| Inequity Aversion in Tournaments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
183 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
670 |
| Inquisitorial and Adversarial Procedure in a Criminal Court Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
| Institutional competition, political process and holdup |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
1 |
8 |
9 |
210 |
| Institutions, bargaining power and labor shares |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
1 |
12 |
17 |
272 |
| Interpreting contracts: the purposive approach and non-comprehensive incentive contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
| Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2,770 |
| Limiting Court Behavior: A Case for High Minimum Sentences and Low Maximum Ones |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
0 |
9 |
10 |
1,663 |
| Managerial Husbandry and the Dynamics of Ongoing Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
961 |
| Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
1,774 |
| Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements? |
0 |
1 |
3 |
803 |
3 |
8 |
16 |
2,949 |
| Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Limited Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
1,471 |
| Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
23 |
| Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
6 |
6 |
318 |
| Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
8 |
11 |
400 |
| Output and wages with inequality averse agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
7 |
12 |
| Overwhelmed by Routine Tasks: A Multi-Tasking Principle Agent Perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
5 |
14 |
19 |
37 |
| Prepondeance of the Evidence: Tort Rules and the Efficient Standard of Proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
251 |
0 |
8 |
12 |
2,837 |
| Preponderance of Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
208 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
3,664 |
| Preponderance of Evidence |
0 |
1 |
2 |
168 |
0 |
6 |
7 |
2,515 |
| Preponderance of Evidence |
1 |
2 |
3 |
84 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
1,096 |
| Privatization, Risk Taking and the Communist Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
392 |
| Privatization, Risk-Taking and the Communist Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
470 |
| Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
152 |
| Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
7 |
8 |
271 |
| Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
13 |
42 |
| Procedural vs. Substantive Approaches in Non-Comprehensive Contracts |
0 |
0 |
14 |
14 |
1 |
6 |
15 |
15 |
| Public Safety, Altruism and Redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
1,631 |
| Ranking of Information Systems in Agency Models: An Integral Condition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
210 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
1,919 |
| Regulation of Environmental Quality under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
71 |
| Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
1 |
8 |
9 |
438 |
| Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
285 |
| Should We Have or Should We Have Not, and Who Should Have Paid? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
100 |
| Society Versus Jury: A Case for Limiting Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
1,199 |
| Technological choice under organizational diseconomies of scale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
205 |
| The Determinants of Salary and Bonus for Rank and File Employees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
275 |
| The Nexus between Contract Duration and the Use of Formal and Informal Incentive Pay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
6 |
| The division of ownership in new ventures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
474 |
| Économie des procédures judiciaires |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
4 |
26 |
4,866 |
50 |
325 |
483 |
47,255 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism for a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
377 |
| A further justification for the negligence rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
167 |
| Autonomie der Universität und Professionalisierung ihrer Leitungsstrukturen |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Capitation taxes and the regulation of professional services |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
6 |
13 |
30 |
| Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
438 |
| Causation and Incentives with Updating Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
16 |
| Choosing ADR or litigation |
1 |
1 |
1 |
66 |
2 |
9 |
18 |
204 |
| Class Actions, Compliance and Moral Cost |
1 |
1 |
1 |
33 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
89 |
| Contractual Design with Correlated Information under Limited Liability |
0 |
0 |
1 |
49 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
290 |
| Credibility and Monitoring: Outsourcing as a Commitment Device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
90 |
| Customary versus technological advancement tests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
9 |
11 |
72 |
| Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An institutional explanation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
112 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
329 |
| Deterrence versus Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
227 |
| Do factor shares reflect technology? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
123 |
| Efficient Budget Balancing Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
251 |
| Eliteuniversitäten: Stärkung des Forschungs- und Wirtschaftsstandorts Deutschland? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
198 |
| Entrepreneurship and the Division of Ownership in New Ventures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
8 |
10 |
141 |
| Excess burden of criminality and redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
130 |
| INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
224 |
| Individual versus collective bargaining under relative income concerns |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
6 |
11 |
| Interpreting contracts: the purposive approach and non-comprehensive incentive contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
7 |
12 |
71 |
| Introduction: CESifo Conference in Law and Economics - Munich, May 2010 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
37 |
| Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
133 |
| Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA |
0 |
0 |
1 |
128 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
944 |
| Legal competition, political process and irreversible investment decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
123 |
| Limiting court behavior: a case for high minimum sentences and low maximum ones |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
231 |
| Managerial husbandry and the dynamics of ongoing hierarchies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
105 |
| Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
297 |
| Monitoring versus incentives |
0 |
1 |
3 |
189 |
0 |
8 |
14 |
462 |
| Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
18 |
| Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
6 |
7 |
22 |
| Nuclear accidents liability and a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
10 |
10 |
15 |
| Output and wages with inequality averse agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
9 |
13 |
| Output and wages with inequality averse agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
374 |
| Overwhelmed by routine tasks: A multitasking principal agent perspective |
1 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
5 |
12 |
24 |
44 |
| Preponderance of evidence |
0 |
1 |
2 |
98 |
2 |
10 |
19 |
642 |
| Privatization, risk-taking, and the communist firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
2 |
10 |
13 |
193 |
| Privatizing profits and socializing losses with smoothly operating capital markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
16 |
24 |
117 |
| Property Rights and Regulation of Environmental Quality under Asymmetric Information/Eigentumsrechte und Regulierung der Umweltqualität bei asymmetrischer Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
| Property Rights and Regulation of Environmental Quality under Asymmetric Information/Eigentumsrechte und Regulierung der Umweltqualität bei asymmetrischer Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
| Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
567 |
| Relative Income Concerns, Dismissal, and the Use of Pay-for-Performance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
17 |
| Relative income concerns and the Easterlin Paradox: A theoretical framework |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
6 |
13 |
29 |
| Rules of proof, courts, and incentives |
0 |
0 |
1 |
64 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
222 |
| Technology adoption under hidden information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
67 |
| The Inquisitorial and the Adversarial Procedure in a Criminal Court Setting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
219 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
826 |
| The Nexus between Contract Duration and the Use of Formal and Informal Incentive Pay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
28 |
| Third-Party Financing of Litigation: Legal Approaches and a Formal Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
44 |
| Toward a Theory of Motion Practice and Settlement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| Ärzte unterschiedlicher Sorgfaltswaltung, fehlerhafte Gerichte und der Fahrlässigkeitsstandard: Korreferat zum Beitrag von Anja Olbrich: "Der Einfluss von Haftungsunsicherheit auf den Sorgfaltsstandard" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
173 |
| Économie des procédures judiciaires |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
61 |
| Total Journal Articles |
3 |
6 |
17 |
1,760 |
34 |
251 |
426 |
9,306 |
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