Access Statistics for Franz Dietrich

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 10
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 22 1 1 7 21
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 9
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 22 0 1 8 64
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 14 1 1 4 32
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
A Joint Characterization of Belief Revision Rules 0 0 0 7 1 1 13 72
A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence 0 0 0 80 0 0 11 628
A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change 0 0 0 10 0 0 7 82
A Theory Of Bayesian Groups 0 0 1 38 1 2 15 52
A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 94 1 1 15 486
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 12
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 8
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 23 0 0 7 98
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 15 0 0 6 150
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 64 0 0 12 297
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 19
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 29
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 2 0 0 7 46
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 35 0 0 11 101
A response to Baltag, Girard, and White 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 8
A response to Baltag, Girard, and White 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 27
A theory of Bayesian groups 0 0 0 0 0 1 13 32
A theory of Bayesian groups 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6
A theory of Bayesian groups 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 12
Abstract rationality: the 'logical' structure of attitudes 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6
Abstract rationality: the 'logical' structure of attitudes 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 14
Abstract rationality: the 'logical' structure of attitudes 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 18
Aggregating causal judgements 0 0 0 16 0 0 13 129
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 10
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 6
Aggregation and the relevance of some issues for others 0 0 0 9 0 0 5 96
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 15 0 1 9 26
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 8 0 0 4 13
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 4 0 0 18 58
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 28 0 1 5 127
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 0 1 2 12 18
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 28
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 11
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 16
Anti-terrorism politics and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 37 0 0 11 181
Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation 0 0 1 162 0 0 6 670
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 30 0 0 8 147
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 1 1 1 10 34
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 39 0 1 10 121
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 0 0 0 30 0 1 7 96
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 26
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 27 0 1 16 44
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 23
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 29 0 1 8 96
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 0 0 0 28 0 1 8 42
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 0 0 0 14 0 0 3 15
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 9
Belief revision generalized: a joint characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules 0 0 0 12 0 0 6 29
Beyond Belief: Logic in Multiple Attitudes 0 0 0 2 0 1 8 17
Beyond Belief: Logic in Multiple Attitudes 0 0 0 3 1 1 6 25
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 5 0 1 5 12
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 10
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 7 1 2 7 10
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 15 0 0 3 18
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 8
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 9 0 0 6 13
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 11 0 0 3 9
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 15
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 25
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 10
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 31 1 2 5 51
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 5 0 0 10 20
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 13 0 0 9 19
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 40 0 0 7 77
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 20 0 1 11 35
Decision Under Normative uncertainty 0 0 0 21 1 1 9 60
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 23
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 4
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 13
Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds 0 0 0 9 0 0 8 18
Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds 0 0 0 11 0 1 13 31
Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds 0 0 0 1 1 1 8 10
Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds 0 0 0 8 1 1 12 16
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 0 0 0 3 0 2 10 21
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 0 0 0 18 0 0 10 30
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 0 0 0 3 0 0 8 18
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 2 0 1 15 76
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 34
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 17 0 1 13 121
Expected Value Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 11
Expected Value Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 1 2 3 11 33
From degrees of belief to beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 36 0 1 10 69
From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7
From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 10
From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 24
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 8 1 1 55 71
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 6 1 1 6 20
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 13 1 1 8 16
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 4 1 2 7 22
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 5 1 1 8 33
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 13 0 0 7 47
Independent opinions? 0 0 0 16 0 0 11 115
Independent opinions? On the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 19
Independent opinions? On the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 34
Independent opinions? on the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems 0 0 0 21 0 1 10 55
Introduction to the special issue "Beliefs in Groups" of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 17
Introduction to the special issue "Beliefs in Groups" of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 9
Introduction to the special issue "Beliefs in Groups" of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7
Judgement Aggregation in Search for the Truth 0 0 0 12 0 0 41 127
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 29
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 21
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 21
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 1 16 2 5 19 121
Judgment aggregation and the discursive dilemma 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 17
Judgment aggregation and the discursive dilemma 0 0 0 18 1 1 9 53
Judgment aggregation and the discursive dilemma 0 0 0 0 1 1 12 21
Judgment aggregation by quota rules 0 0 0 59 1 1 7 245
Judgment aggregation in general logics 0 0 0 106 0 1 13 657
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 0 1 1 13 23
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 30
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 0 3 3 10 15
Judgment aggregation on restricted domains 0 0 0 20 1 1 7 132
Judgment aggregation under constraints 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 75
Judgment aggregation with consistency alone 0 0 0 7 0 0 7 61
Judgment aggregation without full rationality 0 0 0 22 1 2 11 150
Judgment aggregation without full rationality 0 0 0 17 1 1 14 129
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 22
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 8
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 10
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 12
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 9
Jury Theorems 0 1 2 28 1 3 26 65
Majority voting on restricted domains 0 0 0 4 1 1 10 41
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 0 87 1 2 10 42
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 15
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 19
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective 0 0 0 43 1 2 22 104
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective 0 0 1 112 1 1 29 249
Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework 0 0 0 22 0 0 13 155
Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 28
Opinion Pooling under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 97 0 0 13 366
Opinion pooling on general agendas 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 36
Opinion pooling on general agendas" 0 0 0 24 0 0 6 159
Possible worlds in modal logic 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 11
Possible worlds in modal logic 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 13
Possible worlds in modal logic 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 10
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling 1 2 6 34 1 6 29 131
Probabilistic opinion pooling 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 45
Probabilistic opinion pooling 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 22
Probabilistic opinion pooling 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 18
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 13 2 2 11 49
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized Part two: The premise-based approach 1 1 1 15 2 3 11 38
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 0 1 1 30 43
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 17
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 15 1 2 7 33
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: general agendas 0 0 0 11 0 0 10 29
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 7 1 1 9 24
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 10
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 11 0 0 5 20
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: the premise-based approach 0 0 0 13 0 0 12 35
Propositionwise judgment aggregation 0 0 0 54 9 9 15 112
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 24
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 20
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 30
Reason-Based Rationalization 0 0 0 9 0 0 7 50
Reason-Based Rationalization 0 0 1 31 1 1 10 72
Reason-Based Rationalization 0 0 0 2 0 1 8 70
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 52 0 1 40 65
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 50 2 3 12 94
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 25 1 2 12 31
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 19
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: an explanatory framework 0 0 0 77 1 2 17 65
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 10 0 0 3 24
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 3 0 0 5 10
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 4 1 1 10 13
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 6
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 12
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5
Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 19
Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 114
Reasons for (prior) belief in bayesian epistemology 0 0 0 32 0 1 10 107
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 0 5 0 2 10 22
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 0 16 8 8 19 52
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 2 19 2 3 11 47
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 0 12 0 0 9 20
Savage's response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 12 1 1 6 39
Savage's response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 24 2 5 14 54
Savage's response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 13 1 2 8 91
Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 14
Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 18
Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 16
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 35 2 8 40 104
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 13
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 11
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 1 38 44
Social Epistemology 0 0 0 27 1 2 7 130
Social Epistemology 0 0 0 22 0 1 11 37
Social Epistemology 0 0 0 35 0 1 9 38
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 53 0 0 8 316
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 98
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 1 0 1 9 50
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 16 1 3 12 164
Terrorism Prevention: A General Model 0 0 0 259 0 1 11 838
The Premiss-Based Approach to Judgment Aggregation 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 24
The Premiss-Based Approach to Logical Aggregation 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 38
The Rational Group 0 0 0 12 0 0 15 34
The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 11
The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 10
The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 10
The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory 0 0 1 45 0 0 13 199
The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation 0 0 0 7 0 1 7 12
The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation 0 0 0 3 1 2 8 14
The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation 0 0 0 3 0 0 5 13
The impossibility of unbiased judgement aggregation 0 0 0 232 0 0 13 1,180
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation 0 0 0 19 0 1 17 125
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation (updated version) 0 0 0 37 0 1 5 203
The possibility of judgment aggregation for network agendas 0 0 0 20 0 0 8 167
The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 44
The premises of condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified 0 0 1 38 0 1 13 231
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation 0 0 0 1 0 0 11 53
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation 0 0 0 48 0 1 5 155
The premiss-based approach to logical aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 2 10 134
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 0 27 0 0 11 251
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 0 5 0 1 7 12
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 0 17 0 0 12 38
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l'agrégation logique 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 30
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l’agrégation logique 0 0 0 38 0 1 9 137
Welfare vs. Utility 0 0 22 22 1 1 14 14
Welfare vs. Utility 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 3
Welfare vs. Utility 0 0 21 21 0 0 6 6
Welfare vs. Utility 0 0 0 10 0 0 13 27
Welfarism, Preferencism, Judgmentism 0 0 0 73 0 1 13 329
What are Social Norms? 0 0 2 44 0 1 9 46
What are Social Norms? 0 0 25 25 0 0 15 15
What matters and how it matters: A choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 29 0 0 26 81
What matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 18
What matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 29
What matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 13
Where do preferences come from? 0 1 2 15 0 2 19 111
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 14 2 2 9 117
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 26
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 100 0 1 29 221
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 1 1 1 15 61
Where do preferences come from? A summary 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 12
Where do preferences come from? A summary 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 26
Total Working Papers 2 5 90 3,930 101 192 2,301 17,178
17 registered items for which data could not be found


Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A generalised model of judgment aggregation 0 0 0 36 2 3 15 166
A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 18 0 0 9 146
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 9 0 1 6 65
Abstract rationality: the ‘logical’ structure of attitudes 0 0 1 1 0 0 10 12
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 1 4 1 1 13 56
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 52
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 31 0 0 12 181
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution 0 0 0 10 0 0 9 69
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 4 0 1 7 40
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Jeffrey's rules 0 0 0 8 0 1 8 55
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 1 4 0 1 12 24
Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds 0 0 2 3 0 0 16 18
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 0 0 0 1 1 1 14 18
EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY WITH DEFENSIBLE PREMISES1 0 0 0 4 0 0 8 42
Fully Bayesian aggregation 0 0 0 6 1 1 8 26
General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 64
How to reach legitimate decisions when the procedure is controversial 0 0 0 10 0 0 3 53
Introduction to the special issue “Beliefs in Groups” of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 3 1 1 7 19
Judgment Aggregation By Quota Rules 0 0 0 2 0 0 11 31
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 5 0 1 8 55
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 6 2 3 29 70
Judgment aggregation without full rationality 0 0 0 13 0 2 8 83
Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems 0 0 0 22 0 0 8 111
MENTALISM VERSUS BEHAVIOURISM IN ECONOMICS: A PHILOSOPHY-OF-SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 0 0 1 11 1 2 13 60
Majority voting on restricted domains 0 0 0 15 0 2 27 114
Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework 0 0 0 4 0 0 6 69
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: general agendas 0 0 0 0 1 1 25 46
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: the premise-based approach 0 0 0 1 0 0 10 36
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 42
REASON-BASED CHOICE AND CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE: AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK 0 0 0 5 0 1 11 46
STRATEGY-PROOF JUDGMENT AGGREGATION* 0 0 0 4 0 0 15 95
Savage's theorem under changing awareness 0 0 0 9 1 1 14 61
Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 3 0 0 17 34
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 2 0 1 9 38
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation 0 0 0 2 0 1 8 58
The limiting distribution of the t-ratio for the unit root test in an AR(1) 0 0 0 15 0 1 18 1,101
The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications 0 0 0 4 0 1 16 71
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation 0 0 0 10 0 2 14 94
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l'agrégation logique 0 0 0 6 0 2 11 68
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 16 1 1 6 92
Total Journal Articles 0 0 6 314 12 33 455 3,581


Statistics updated 2026-09-10