Access Statistics for Franz Dietrich

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 0 3 3 8 12
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 22 1 1 9 65
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 22 2 3 9 23
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 14 2 3 6 34
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 0 3 4 9 14
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 4
A Joint Characterization of Belief Revision Rules 1 1 1 8 1 2 11 73
A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence 0 0 0 80 1 1 10 629
A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change 0 0 0 10 0 1 7 83
A Theory Of Bayesian Groups 0 0 0 38 1 2 15 53
A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 94 0 1 14 486
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 11
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 23 1 2 9 100
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 8
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 13
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 2 3 3 9 49
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 15 1 1 5 151
A reason-based theory of rational choice 1 1 1 65 2 2 13 299
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 0 1 2 10 31
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 0 3 3 11 22
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 1 1 36 2 3 14 104
A response to Baltag, Girard, and White 0 0 0 0 3 5 6 12
A response to Baltag, Girard, and White 0 0 0 0 2 3 8 29
A theory of Bayesian groups 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 7
A theory of Bayesian groups 0 0 0 0 2 2 10 14
A theory of Bayesian groups 0 0 0 0 2 2 13 34
Abstract rationality: the 'logical' structure of attitudes 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 19
Abstract rationality: the 'logical' structure of attitudes 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 14
Abstract rationality: the 'logical' structure of attitudes 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 7
Aggregating causal judgements 0 0 0 16 2 2 14 131
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 3 4 6 10
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 8
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 11
Aggregation and the relevance of some issues for others 0 0 0 9 4 4 9 100
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 8 1 1 5 14
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 0 2 3 13 20
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 4 1 1 17 59
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 15 1 1 9 27
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 28 0 0 5 127
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 1 1 16 29
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 16
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 11
Anti-terrorism politics and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 37 0 0 10 181
Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation 0 0 1 162 2 2 8 672
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 1 1 1 2 2 4 13 37
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 30 0 0 8 147
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 39 1 1 11 122
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 0 0 0 30 1 1 7 97
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 27
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 27 2 2 18 46
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 29 6 6 13 102
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 0 3 3 11 26
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 0 0 0 28 0 0 8 42
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 0 0 0 14 2 3 6 18
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 0 0 0 0 3 3 9 12
Belief revision generalized: a joint characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules 0 0 0 12 3 3 9 32
Beyond Belief: Logic in Multiple Attitudes 0 0 0 2 1 1 9 18
Beyond Belief: Logic in Multiple Attitudes 0 0 0 3 1 2 7 26
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 7 1 2 6 11
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 10
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 9 1 2 8 15
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 5 2 3 8 15
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 4 2 3 5 11
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 11 0 0 3 9
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 15 2 3 6 21
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 25
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 31 1 2 6 52
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 20 0 0 11 35
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 13 1 1 10 20
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 40 3 3 9 80
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 5 1 1 11 21
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 1 1 2 6 16
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 3 5 7 14
Decision Under Normative uncertainty 0 0 0 21 2 3 11 62
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 0 0 1 1 19 24
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 5
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 14
Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds 0 0 0 11 3 3 14 34
Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds 0 0 0 9 2 3 8 21
Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds 0 0 0 1 1 3 9 12
Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds 0 0 0 8 1 2 11 17
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 0 0 0 3 2 2 10 20
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 0 0 0 18 2 2 9 32
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 0 0 0 3 2 2 12 23
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 0 6 6 9 40
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 17 2 2 14 123
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 0 3 3 4 12
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 2 2 2 16 78
Expected Value Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 1 1 4 12 35
Expected Value Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 1 2 3 5 14
From degrees of belief to beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 36 2 2 12 71
From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 25
From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 8
From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 11
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 4 3 4 10 25
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 13 1 1 8 48
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 8 1 2 56 72
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 5 3 4 10 36
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 6 2 3 7 22
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 13 2 3 9 18
Independent opinions? 0 0 0 16 3 3 14 118
Independent opinions? On the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems 0 0 0 0 2 2 17 21
Independent opinions? On the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems 1 1 1 1 3 4 13 38
Independent opinions? on the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems 0 0 0 21 1 1 11 56
Introduction to the special issue "Beliefs in Groups" of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 17
Introduction to the special issue "Beliefs in Groups" of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 11
Introduction to the special issue "Beliefs in Groups" of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7
Judgement Aggregation in Search for the Truth 0 0 0 12 1 1 42 128
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 0 2 2 12 31
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 0 1 3 10 23
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 1 1 2 5 23
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 1 16 0 4 19 123
Judgment aggregation and the discursive dilemma 0 0 0 0 4 4 13 21
Judgment aggregation and the discursive dilemma 0 0 0 18 5 6 14 58
Judgment aggregation and the discursive dilemma 0 0 0 0 3 4 15 24
Judgment aggregation by quota rules 2 2 2 61 6 8 14 252
Judgment aggregation in general logics 0 0 0 106 3 3 14 660
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 33
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 0 2 3 15 25
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 0 2 5 12 17
Judgment aggregation on restricted domains 0 0 0 20 1 2 7 133
Judgment aggregation under constraints 0 0 0 12 4 5 7 80
Judgment aggregation with consistency alone 0 0 0 7 4 4 11 65
Judgment aggregation without full rationality 0 0 0 22 1 3 12 152
Judgment aggregation without full rationality 0 0 0 17 3 4 15 132
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 24
Jury Theorems 0 1 2 29 0 3 27 67
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 9
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 3 4 7 13
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 13
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 10
Majority voting on restricted domains 0 0 0 4 3 4 12 44
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 16
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 21
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 0 87 1 4 13 45
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective 1 1 2 113 3 4 29 252
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective 0 0 0 43 3 4 21 107
Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework 0 0 0 22 4 4 16 159
Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework 0 0 0 0 2 2 8 30
Opinion Pooling under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 97 1 1 14 367
Opinion pooling on general agendas 0 0 0 1 1 1 7 37
Opinion pooling on general agendas" 0 0 0 24 2 3 9 162
Possible worlds in modal logic 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 12
Possible worlds in modal logic 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 15
Possible worlds in modal logic 0 0 0 0 3 4 6 15
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling 1 2 4 35 5 8 31 138
Probabilistic opinion pooling 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 19
Probabilistic opinion pooling 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 46
Probabilistic opinion pooling 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 22
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 13 2 4 12 51
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized Part two: The premise-based approach 0 1 1 15 3 5 13 41
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 0 1 4 33 46
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 0 2 2 15 19
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 15 2 4 10 36
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: general agendas 0 0 0 11 5 5 15 34
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 11 1 1 6 21
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 0 3 5 11 14
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 7 1 2 8 25
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: the premise-based approach 0 0 0 13 2 2 14 37
Propositionwise judgment aggregation 0 0 0 54 0 9 14 112
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 25
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 0 2 2 14 32
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 0 2 2 12 22
Reason-Based Rationalization 0 0 0 31 1 2 10 73
Reason-Based Rationalization 0 0 0 9 2 2 9 52
Reason-Based Rationalization 0 0 0 2 1 1 8 71
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 25 2 3 14 33
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 20
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 52 0 0 38 65
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 50 0 4 14 96
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: an explanatory framework 0 0 0 77 1 2 16 66
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 4 2 3 10 15
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 10 2 3 6 27
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 7
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 6
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 3 1 2 7 12
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 0 2 2 10 14
Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology 0 0 0 0 2 2 8 21
Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 116
Reasons for (prior) belief in bayesian epistemology 0 0 0 32 1 1 9 108
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 0 12 1 1 8 21
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 1 19 1 3 10 48
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 0 5 0 1 9 23
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 0 16 0 8 18 52
Savage's response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 13 0 1 8 91
Savage's response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 24 2 5 16 57
Savage's response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 12 2 3 8 41
Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 17
Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 19
Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 0 2 3 12 16
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 0 2 39 45
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 35 1 3 40 105
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 12
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 2 9 14
Social Epistemology 0 0 0 35 3 4 13 42
Social Epistemology 0 0 0 22 2 2 12 39
Social Epistemology 0 0 0 27 2 3 9 132
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 16 1 2 13 165
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 53 0 0 6 316
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 1 1 1 9 51
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 2 10 100
Terrorism Prevention: A General Model 0 0 0 259 0 3 13 841
The Premiss-Based Approach to Judgment Aggregation 0 0 0 0 2 2 10 26
The Premiss-Based Approach to Logical Aggregation 0 0 0 0 3 3 8 41
The Rational Group 0 0 0 12 0 0 14 34
The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 11
The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 11
The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 11
The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory 0 0 1 45 2 2 14 201
The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation 0 0 0 3 1 1 6 14
The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation 0 0 0 7 1 1 8 13
The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation 0 0 0 3 3 4 11 17
The impossibility of unbiased judgement aggregation 0 0 0 232 0 0 12 1,180
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation 0 0 0 19 3 3 19 128
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation (updated version) 0 0 0 37 2 2 7 205
The possibility of judgment aggregation for network agendas 0 0 0 20 3 3 11 170
The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications 0 0 0 0 4 4 13 48
The premises of condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified 0 0 1 38 3 3 15 234
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation 0 0 0 48 2 2 7 157
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation 0 0 0 1 2 2 12 55
The premiss-based approach to logical aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 2 10 135
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 0 5 1 2 8 14
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 0 27 0 0 9 251
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 0 17 1 1 11 39
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l'agrégation logique 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 31
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l’agrégation logique 0 0 0 38 0 2 11 139
Welfare vs. Utility 0 0 0 10 2 4 17 31
Welfare vs. Utility 0 0 21 21 0 2 8 8
Welfare vs. Utility 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 4
Welfare vs. Utility 0 0 22 22 1 2 15 15
Welfarism, Preferencism, Judgmentism 0 0 0 73 3 3 16 332
What are Social Norms? 0 0 25 25 2 3 18 18
What are Social Norms? 0 0 2 44 3 4 13 50
What matters and how it matters: A choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 29 1 2 27 83
What matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 15
What matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 18
What matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 29
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 14 0 2 9 117
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 1 0 1 11 61
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 0 2 2 12 28
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 2 15 1 2 20 113
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 100 3 3 31 224
Where do preferences come from? A summary 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 27
Where do preferences come from? A summary 0 0 0 0 4 4 9 16
Total Working Papers 9 13 94 3,941 379 557 2,611 17,634
17 registered items for which data could not be found


Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A generalised model of judgment aggregation 0 0 0 36 3 5 15 169
A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 18 2 2 11 148
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 9 0 0 6 65
Abstract rationality: the ‘logical’ structure of attitudes 0 0 1 1 1 2 12 14
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 1 4 3 4 16 59
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 2 1 1 5 53
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 31 1 2 13 183
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution 0 0 0 10 1 1 10 70
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 4 1 2 9 42
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Jeffrey's rules 0 0 0 8 4 4 11 59
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 0 4 1 1 12 25
Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds 0 0 1 3 5 5 18 23
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 0 0 0 1 4 7 20 24
EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY WITH DEFENSIBLE PREMISES1 0 0 0 4 2 3 10 45
Fully Bayesian aggregation 0 0 0 6 1 2 7 27
General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures 0 0 0 3 4 4 7 68
How to reach legitimate decisions when the procedure is controversial 0 0 0 10 1 1 4 54
Introduction to the special issue “Beliefs in Groups” of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 3 1 2 7 20
Judgment Aggregation By Quota Rules 0 0 0 2 2 3 13 34
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 5 2 3 8 58
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 6 1 3 30 71
Judgment aggregation without full rationality 0 0 0 13 1 4 12 87
Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems 0 0 0 22 5 7 14 118
MENTALISM VERSUS BEHAVIOURISM IN ECONOMICS: A PHILOSOPHY-OF-SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 0 0 1 11 2 3 15 62
Majority voting on restricted domains 0 0 0 15 2 3 30 117
Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework 0 0 0 4 2 2 7 71
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: general agendas 1 1 1 1 1 2 26 47
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: the premise-based approach 0 0 0 1 1 1 8 37
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 2 2 2 6 44
REASON-BASED CHOICE AND CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE: AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK 0 0 0 5 0 0 11 46
STRATEGY-PROOF JUDGMENT AGGREGATION* 0 0 0 4 1 2 17 97
Savage's theorem under changing awareness 0 0 0 9 0 2 15 62
Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 3 1 1 17 35
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 2 1 1 8 39
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation 0 0 0 2 2 2 10 60
The limiting distribution of the t-ratio for the unit root test in an AR(1) 0 0 0 15 0 0 15 1,101
The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications 0 0 0 4 0 1 16 72
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation 0 0 0 10 2 4 18 98
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l'agrégation logique 0 0 0 6 2 2 12 70
Welfare vs. utility 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 16 4 6 11 97
Total Journal Articles 1 1 5 315 71 103 513 3,672


Statistics updated 2026-11-12