Access Statistics for Franz Dietrich

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 56
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 22 0 1 3 14
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 28
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 4
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 5
A Joint Characterization of Belief Revision Rules 0 0 0 7 3 3 4 62
A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence 0 0 0 80 1 3 3 619
A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 76
A Theory Of Bayesian Groups 0 1 1 38 0 1 1 38
A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation 0 0 1 94 1 2 7 472
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 91
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 1 15 2 2 7 146
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 40
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 11
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 35 0 0 3 90
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 64 1 1 3 286
A response to Baltag, Girard, and White 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
A response to Baltag, Girard, and White 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 21
A theory of Bayesian groups 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 21
A theory of Bayesian groups 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4
A theory of Bayesian groups 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2
Abstract rationality: the 'logical' structure of attitudes 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 10
Abstract rationality: the 'logical' structure of attitudes 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4
Abstract rationality: the 'logical' structure of attitudes 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 13
Aggregating causal judgements 0 0 0 16 1 1 1 117
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 6
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Aggregation and the relevance of some issues for others 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 91
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 7
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 15 1 1 3 18
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 4 1 2 3 42
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 9
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 122
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 11
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 13
Anti-terrorism politics and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 37 1 1 3 171
Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation 0 0 0 161 0 0 2 664
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 111
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 30 0 0 2 139
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 24
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 0 0 0 30 1 1 1 90
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 20
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 29 1 1 2 89
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 28
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 34
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 0 0 0 14 0 2 2 12
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
Belief revision generalized: a joint characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 23
Beyond Belief: Logic in Multiple Attitudes 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 9
Beyond Belief: Logic in Multiple Attitudes 0 0 0 3 0 1 3 19
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 9 0 1 1 7
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 6
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 6
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 7 2 2 4 5
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 15 0 1 2 15
Categorical versus graded beliefs 0 0 0 5 0 1 3 7
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 10
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 20
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 7
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 10
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 10
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 40 0 2 2 71
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 20 0 1 2 24
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 31 0 0 1 46
Decision Under Normative uncertainty 0 0 0 21 0 0 2 51
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 7
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Decision under normative uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3
Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3
Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds 0 0 1 9 3 3 4 13
Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds 0 3 5 5 2 5 11 13
Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds 0 0 0 11 2 2 2 20
Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds 0 0 0 8 1 2 3 6
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 10
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 0 0 0 18 3 3 3 23
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 11
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 62
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 17 0 2 4 109
Expected Value Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 23
Expected Value Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9
From degrees of belief to beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 36 0 0 1 59
From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5
From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 15
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 13 1 1 1 9
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 5 1 2 2 26
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 16
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 13 0 3 3 40
Fully Bayesian Aggregation 0 0 0 6 0 2 2 15
Independent opinions? 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 104
Independent opinions? On the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 25
Independent opinions? On the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Independent opinions? on the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems 0 0 0 21 0 0 2 45
Introduction to the special issue "Beliefs in Groups" of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Introduction to the special issue "Beliefs in Groups" of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 8
Introduction to the special issue "Beliefs in Groups" of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Judgement Aggregation in Search for the Truth 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 86
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 15 2 2 4 104
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 18
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 13
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 19
Judgment aggregation and the discursive dilemma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Judgment aggregation and the discursive dilemma 0 0 0 18 0 0 1 44
Judgment aggregation and the discursive dilemma 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 8
Judgment aggregation by quota rules 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 238
Judgment aggregation in general logics 0 0 0 106 2 2 4 646
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 10
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 28
Judgment aggregation on restricted domains 0 0 0 20 1 1 1 126
Judgment aggregation under constraints 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 73
Judgment aggregation with consistency alone 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 54
Judgment aggregation without full rationality 0 0 0 22 1 1 1 140
Judgment aggregation without full rationality 0 0 0 17 2 2 2 117
Jury Theorems 1 1 1 27 1 1 2 40
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 19
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3
Majority voting on restricted domains 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 32
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 10
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 0 87 0 0 0 32
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective 0 0 0 111 2 3 7 223
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective 0 0 0 43 3 4 4 86
Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework 0 0 0 22 1 1 1 143
Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 22
Opinion Pooling under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 97 0 0 1 353
Opinion pooling on general agendas 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 30
Opinion pooling on general agendas" 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 153
Possible worlds in modal logic 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8
Possible worlds in modal logic 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9
Possible worlds in modal logic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling 1 3 6 31 2 5 11 107
Probabilistic opinion pooling 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17
Probabilistic opinion pooling 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
Probabilistic opinion pooling 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 38
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 13 1 2 2 39
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 14 1 1 3 28
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 13
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 15 0 0 2 26
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: general agendas 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 19
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 7 0 3 3 17
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 15
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: the premise-based approach 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 23
Propositionwise judgment aggregation 0 0 0 54 1 1 1 98
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 15
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 18
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 10
Reason-Based Rationalization 1 1 1 31 1 1 3 63
Reason-Based Rationalization 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 63
Reason-Based Rationalization 0 0 0 9 0 1 2 43
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 52 1 2 5 27
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 19
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 10
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 50 0 1 3 82
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: an explanatory framework 0 0 0 77 1 2 3 50
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 4 2 3 4 5
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 1 10 0 0 2 21
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Reasoning in attitudes 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 5
Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 110
Reasons for (prior) belief in bayesian epistemology 0 0 0 32 1 2 4 99
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 1 1 5 2 5 6 14
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 1 1 18 1 4 5 38
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 0 12 1 2 4 13
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 0 16 0 1 2 34
Savage's response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 13 0 1 3 83
Savage's response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 12 0 1 2 33
Savage's response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 24 1 1 2 41
Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 11
Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 35 1 1 1 65
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
Social Epistemology 0 0 0 22 1 1 2 27
Social Epistemology 0 0 1 27 0 1 2 123
Social Epistemology 0 0 0 35 0 2 5 29
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 53 1 2 2 310
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 90
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 42
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 152
Terrorism Prevention: A General Model 0 0 0 259 1 2 4 828
The Premiss-Based Approach to Judgment Aggregation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
The Premiss-Based Approach to Logical Aggregation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33
The Rational Group 0 0 0 12 0 1 4 20
The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6
The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
The Relation between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory 0 0 0 44 1 1 1 187
The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 8
The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation 0 0 1 3 0 1 4 6
The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation 0 0 7 7 0 0 5 5
The impossibility of unbiased judgement aggregation 0 0 0 232 1 1 1 1,168
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation 0 0 0 19 0 1 1 109
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation (updated version) 0 0 0 37 0 0 1 198
The possibility of judgment aggregation for network agendas 0 0 1 20 0 0 1 159
The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 35
The premises of condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified 0 0 0 37 1 2 4 219
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 43
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 150
The premiss-based approach to logical aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 125
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 0 5 1 1 1 6
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 0 27 2 2 3 242
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 0 17 1 2 4 28
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l'agrégation logique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l’agrégation logique 0 0 0 38 0 1 2 128
Welfare vs. Utility 0 0 10 10 0 1 14 14
Welfarism, Preferencism, Judgmentism 0 0 0 73 0 0 0 316
What are Social Norms? 0 0 41 42 0 0 35 37
What matters and how it matters: A choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 29 0 1 3 56
What matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 8
What matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12
What matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 21
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 1 4 4 6 50
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 108
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 100 1 1 1 193
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 13 1 1 2 93
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
Where do preferences come from? A summary 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 23
Where do preferences come from? A summary 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7
Total Working Papers 3 11 81 3,853 115 203 475 15,043
12 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A generalised model of judgment aggregation 0 0 0 36 3 3 4 154
A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 137
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 59
Abstract rationality: the ‘logical’ structure of attitudes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 1 3 0 0 4 43
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 48
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 31 1 1 3 170
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution 0 0 0 10 0 0 2 60
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 33
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Jeffrey's rules 0 0 0 8 1 1 3 48
Decision under normative uncertainty 1 1 3 4 1 1 3 13
Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds 0 1 2 2 1 3 5 5
Dynamically rational judgment aggregation 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 4
EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY WITH DEFENSIBLE PREMISES1 0 0 0 4 1 2 3 35
Fully Bayesian aggregation 0 0 0 6 1 2 3 20
General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 61
How to reach legitimate decisions when the procedure is controversial 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 50
Introduction to the special issue “Beliefs in Groups” of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 13
Judgment Aggregation By Quota Rules 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 21
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 5 2 3 4 50
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 41
Judgment aggregation without full rationality 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 75
Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems 0 0 0 22 1 2 2 104
MENTALISM VERSUS BEHAVIOURISM IN ECONOMICS: A PHILOSOPHY-OF-SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 0 0 2 10 0 0 3 47
Majority voting on restricted domains 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 87
Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 64
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: general agendas 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 21
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: the premise-based approach 0 0 0 1 3 4 6 29
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 38
REASON-BASED CHOICE AND CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE: AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 35
STRATEGY-PROOF JUDGMENT AGGREGATION* 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 80
Savage's theorem under changing awareness 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 47
Savage’s response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 0 3 1 1 3 18
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 2 2 2 5 31
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 50
The limiting distribution of the t-ratio for the unit root test in an AR(1) 0 0 0 15 3 3 4 1,086
The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 56
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 80
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l'agrégation logique 0 0 0 6 1 2 5 58
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 16 0 0 2 86
Total Journal Articles 1 2 9 310 28 39 102 3,159

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Statistics updated 2025-11-08