Access Statistics for Franz Dietrich

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2
A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 1 1 1 21 1 1 5 6
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 2 5 20 0 2 18 49
A Broomean model of rationality and reasoning 0 1 2 13 0 3 7 19
A Joint Characterization of Belief Revision Rules 0 0 0 6 1 1 8 54
A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence 0 0 0 78 1 1 3 605
A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change 0 0 0 10 1 2 5 69
A Theory Of Bayesian Groups 0 0 1 37 1 1 4 33
A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 93 2 6 10 457
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 6
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 1 23 1 1 4 88
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 5
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 13 1 1 7 135
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 17
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 2 1 1 6 36
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 0 0 2 4 7 7
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 1 1 35 1 2 7 80
A reason-based theory of rational choice 0 0 1 64 2 3 7 265
A response to Baltag, Girard, and White 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
A response to Baltag, Girard, and White 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 14
A theory of Bayesian groups 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
A theory of Bayesian groups 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A theory of Bayesian groups 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 17
Aggregating causal judgements 0 0 0 15 1 1 4 110
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 17
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Aggregating causal judgments 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Aggregation and the relevance of some issues for others 0 0 0 9 0 1 5 88
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 24
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 27 3 3 9 119
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 15 2 2 4 13
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 2 2 3 9 30
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 8 1 1 4 5
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 25
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Anti-terrorism politics and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 37 0 1 6 161
Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation 0 0 0 161 1 2 7 654
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 30 1 3 3 132
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 39 1 1 1 108
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 20
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 0 0 1 29 0 1 3 85
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 15
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 10
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 27 1 1 3 26
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 29 0 0 2 81
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 0 0 0 14 1 1 3 4
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 1 1 1 27 2 2 3 28
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Je¤rey's rules 0 0 0 13 1 1 3 30
Belief revision generalized: a joint characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules 0 0 0 12 1 1 5 22
Beyond Belief: Logic In Multiple Attitudes 0 0 15 15 0 1 13 13
Beyond Belief: Logic In Multiple Attitudes 0 1 5 5 0 3 6 6
Beyond Belief: Logic in multiple attitudes 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 2
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 13 0 1 4 4
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 1 40 0 2 8 60
Decision Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 3 31 0 1 7 38
Decision Under Normative uncertainty 0 0 1 19 0 1 8 36
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 2 1 2 8 46
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 17 2 2 7 104
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 0 2 3 7 26
Epistemic democracy with defensible premises 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 3
Expected Value Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 19 19 0 2 11 11
Expected Value Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 4
Expected Value Under Normative Uncertainty 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Expected Value Under Normative Uncertainty 0 1 5 5 1 5 6 6
Expected Value Under Normative Uncertainty 0 0 2 2 0 0 8 8
From degrees of belief to beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 1 36 2 2 10 54
From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
From degrees of belief to binary beliefs: Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 21
Independent opinions? 0 0 0 15 4 6 28 82
Independent opinions? On the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Independent opinions? On the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 12
Independent opinions? on the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems 0 0 0 19 1 1 5 40
Introduction to the special issue "Beliefs in Groups" of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Introduction to the special issue "Beliefs in Groups" of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Introduction to the special issue "Beliefs in Groups" of Theory and Decision 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 5
Judgement Aggregation in Search for the Truth 0 0 0 10 3 4 9 70
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 14 1 3 6 62
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 5
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 12
Judgment aggregation and the discursive dilemma 0 0 1 17 1 1 7 40
Judgment aggregation and the discursive dilemma 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 6
Judgment aggregation and the discursive dilemma 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8
Judgment aggregation by quota rules 0 0 0 59 1 4 8 227
Judgment aggregation in general logics 0 0 1 106 1 2 8 631
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 20
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 4
Judgment aggregation on restricted domains 0 1 2 20 1 3 6 122
Judgment aggregation under constraints 0 0 0 12 1 1 4 69
Judgment aggregation with consistency alone 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 51
Judgment aggregation without full rationality 0 0 0 22 2 3 7 132
Judgment aggregation without full rationality 0 0 0 17 1 2 5 112
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 5
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 1 4 8 15
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 23 1 1 6 23
Jury Theorems 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Majority voting on restricted domains 0 0 1 4 0 1 4 28
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 1 83 1 2 9 37
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 0 0 1 4 10 10
Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective 0 0 1 87 1 2 6 24
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective 0 0 1 41 1 3 15 62
Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective 0 0 1 108 2 4 12 186
Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework 0 0 0 21 0 0 4 135
Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 18
Opinion Pooling under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 97 1 1 3 347
Opinion pooling on general agendas 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 30
Opinion pooling on general agendas" 0 0 0 24 1 1 4 148
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling 0 0 0 16 0 1 6 62
Probabilistic opinion pooling 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 29
Probabilistic opinion pooling 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 5
Probabilistic opinion pooling 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 13 1 3 11 32
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 13 1 1 5 19
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 6
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: General agendas 0 0 0 15 1 2 6 20
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: general agendas 0 0 0 11 1 1 3 16
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 11 1 1 5 9
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: The premise-based approach 0 0 0 7 1 1 5 10
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: the premise-based approach 0 0 0 13 1 1 5 20
Propositionwise judgment aggregation 0 0 0 54 3 4 5 89
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 15
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 8
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 5
Reason-Based Rationalization 0 0 0 9 1 1 8 40
Reason-Based Rationalization 0 0 0 1 2 2 7 57
Reason-Based Rationalization 0 1 1 30 1 2 6 56
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 1 52 3 3 7 19
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 25 3 4 10 11
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 1 32 3 4 13 46
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: An explanatory framework 0 0 0 50 3 3 12 67
Reason-based choice and context-dependence: an explanatory framework 0 0 1 77 3 3 9 41
Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology 0 0 0 0 1 3 7 7
Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology 0 0 0 0 2 6 28 67
Reasons for (prior) belief in bayesian epistemology 0 0 1 30 1 2 11 90
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 23
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 0 16 0 0 5 26
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 4 4 0 0 6 6
Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness 0 0 0 12 0 2 5 5
Savage's response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 0 13 13 0 5 70 70
Savage's response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 0 2 11 11 1 6 11 11
Savage's response to Allais as Broomean reasoning 1 21 21 21 4 16 23 23
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 35 2 2 3 58
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 3
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 16
Social Epistemology 0 0 25 25 1 4 101 101
Social Epistemology 0 0 20 20 1 4 11 11
Social Epistemology 0 0 34 34 2 4 15 15
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 53 1 2 6 304
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 1 2 4 6 39
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 3 11 84
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation 0 0 0 15 2 3 6 137
Terrorism Prevention: A General Model 0 0 1 259 0 2 7 815
The Premiss-Based Approach to Judgment Aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 14
The Premiss-Based Approach to Logical Aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 29
The Rational Group 1 12 12 12 2 4 4 4
The Rational Group 0 0 6 6 0 1 5 5
The Rational Group 0 0 5 5 1 3 7 7
The Rational Group 0 0 26 26 0 3 12 12
The Rational Group 0 0 26 26 1 1 11 11
The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory 0 0 0 42 1 3 5 179
The impossibility of unbiased judgement aggregation 0 0 1 232 0 0 2 1,161
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation 0 0 0 19 1 1 7 104
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation (updated version) 0 0 0 37 1 1 2 192
The possibility of judgment aggregation for network agendas 0 0 0 19 1 1 7 152
The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 26
The premises of condorcet's jury theorem are not simultaneously justified 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 208
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation 0 0 0 47 2 3 5 146
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 37
The premiss-based approach to logical aggregation 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 124
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 0 21 1 15 55 83
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 1 17 0 3 6 21
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 5 5 0 1 4 4
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 8 8 0 0 4 4
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem 0 0 11 11 0 2 6 6
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l'agrégation logique 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 22
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l’agrégation logique 0 0 1 38 3 4 15 115
Welfarism, Preferencism, Judgmentism 0 0 0 73 0 1 2 310
What matters and how it matters: A choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 1 27 1 2 8 42
What matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 11
What matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
What matters and how it matters: a choice-theoretic representation of moral theories 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 5
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 9 2 2 5 79
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 5
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 14 2 2 11 103
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 1 1 3 7 14 37
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 99 3 3 32 172
Where do preferences come from? A summary 0 0 0 0 2 3 7 13
Where do preferences come from? A summary 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 4
Total Working Papers 5 47 315 3,747 198 381 1,381 13,071


Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A generalised model of judgment aggregation 0 0 0 34 1 2 6 143
A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 18 1 3 4 132
A model of non-informational preference change 0 0 0 9 1 1 4 57
Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others 0 0 0 2 2 3 7 37
Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking 0 0 0 2 0 2 10 38
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation 0 0 0 31 1 2 10 166
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution 0 0 1 10 0 1 3 52
Bayesian group belief 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 24
Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Jeffrey's rules 0 0 0 7 1 2 7 39
EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY WITH DEFENSIBLE PREMISES1 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 30
General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 56
How to reach legitimate decisions when the procedure is controversial 0 0 0 10 0 0 3 50
Introduction to the special issue “Beliefs in Groups” of Theory and Decision 0 0 1 2 1 2 5 10
Judgment Aggregation By Quota Rules 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 15
Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation 0 1 1 4 1 3 7 35
Judgment aggregation in search for the truth 0 0 0 5 1 1 2 34
Judgment aggregation without full rationality 0 0 0 13 1 3 4 68
Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems 0 0 0 21 1 1 2 96
MENTALISM VERSUS BEHAVIOURISM IN ECONOMICS: A PHILOSOPHY-OF-SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 0 0 1 6 1 3 11 35
Majority voting on restricted domains 0 0 1 14 1 1 7 78
Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 58
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: general agendas 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 17
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part two: the premise-based approach 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 20
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case 0 0 0 2 1 1 5 30
REASON-BASED CHOICE AND CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE: AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK 0 0 1 4 3 3 11 30
STRATEGY-PROOF JUDGMENT AGGREGATION* 0 0 2 4 1 2 11 74
Savage's theorem under changing awareness 0 0 0 6 0 0 8 38
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 24
The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation 0 0 0 2 1 1 5 38
The limiting distribution of the t-ratio for the unit root test in an AR(1) 0 0 0 15 0 0 3 1,079
The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications 0 0 0 4 1 1 3 47
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation 0 0 0 9 1 1 2 77
Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de l'agrégation logique 0 0 0 6 2 3 7 52
Where do preferences come from? 0 0 0 16 2 3 10 74
Total Journal Articles 0 1 8 273 32 52 178 2,853


Statistics updated 2021-01-03