Access Statistics for Mostapha Diss

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Geometric Examination of Majorities Based on Difference in Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
A Note on the Likelihood of the Absolute Majority Paradoxes 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 22
A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support 0 0 0 17 1 1 1 27
A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 23
An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30
Analyse économique du système électoral confessionnel au Liban 1 1 1 21 1 1 2 67
Another perspective on Borda's paradox 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 18
Another perspective on Borda's paradox 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Another perspective on Borda's paradox 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16
Another perspective on Borda’s paradox 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 50
Assessing Available Care Time and Nursing Shortage in a Hospital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assessing available care time and nursing shortage in a hospital 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 7
Assessing available care time and nursing shortage in a hospital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Borda rule as an almost first-order stochastic dominance rule 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 17
Borda rule as an almost first-order stochastic dominance rule 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Borda rule as an almost first-order stochastic dominance rule 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 15
Borda's Paradox with weighted scoring rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
Brexit et transfert des agences européennes: Pourquoi l’Agence européenne des médicaments ira-t-elle à Amsterdam et l'Autorité bancaire européenne à Paris ? 0 0 1 7 0 0 1 23
Brexit et transfert des agences européennes: Pourquoi l’Agence européenne des médicaments ira-t-elle à Amsterdam et l’Autorité bancaire européenne à Paris ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Combining diversity and excellence in multi winner elections 0 0 1 5 0 0 5 14
Combining diversity and excellence in multiwinner elections 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 46
Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 27
Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 26
Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on differences 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on differences 0 0 0 13 1 1 1 25
Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on differences 0 0 0 20 1 1 1 36
Cooperative games with diversity constraints 0 0 4 4 2 3 8 9
Cooperative games with diversity constraints 1 2 2 2 1 2 4 4
Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting 0 1 2 26 1 3 10 51
Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 33
Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Fuzzy social choice theory, Michael B. Gibilisco et al, Springer: A review 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games 0 0 0 26 0 1 1 67
Introduction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 23
Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules 0 0 1 11 1 1 3 15
Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 24
Modeling medical material shortage using Markov processes 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
Modeling medical material shortage using Markov processes 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 19
Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes 0 0 1 23 1 2 8 56
Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 23
Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes 0 0 0 22 0 1 2 37
Multiwinner elections with diversity constraints on individual preferences 0 0 2 3 0 0 15 18
Multiwinner elections with diversity constraints on individual preferences 0 1 1 1 0 1 9 10
New axiomatisations of the Diversity Owen and Shapley values 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
New axiomatizations of the Diversity Owen and Shapley values 0 0 3 3 0 4 5 5
On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 28
On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 19
On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 3
On the price of diversity for multiwinner elections under (weakly) separable scoring rules 0 0 0 4 0 0 5 9
On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 97
Paradoxes, stabilité et efficience des classements par points 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 29
Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 22
Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 12
Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees 0 0 0 4 1 2 2 23
Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 31
Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees 0 0 0 28 0 1 1 43
Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 5
Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule 0 0 0 23 0 0 2 49
Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 3
Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 21
Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 67
Strategic manipulability of self-­selective social choice rules 0 0 0 22 1 1 2 55
The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 35
The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency 0 0 1 6 1 3 12 112
The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 67
The Distribution of Power in the Lebanese Parliament Revisited 0 0 0 10 1 1 5 51
The Distribution of Power in the Lebanese Parliament Revisited 0 0 0 10 1 2 3 30
The Distribution of Power in the Lebanese Parliament Revisited 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 20
The Distribution of Power in the Lebanese Parliament Revisited 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
The True Impact of Voting Rule Selection on Condorcet Efficiency 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 25
The True Impact of Voting Rule Selection on Condorcet Efficiency 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
The effect of close elections on the likelihood of voting paradoxes: Further results in three-candidate elections 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
Une étude de la répartition du pouvoir confessionnel au Liban 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 58
Une étude de la répartition du pouvoir confessionnel au parlement libanais 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 34
When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total Working Papers 2 6 21 549 21 46 155 1,984
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on the Likelihood of the Absolute Majority Paradoxes 0 0 2 23 0 0 5 105
A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 17
An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules 0 0 0 19 0 1 1 79
Another perspective on Borda’s paradox 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 20
Assessing Available Care Time and Nursing Shortage in a Hospital 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
Borda’s Paradox with weighted scoring rules 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 60
Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 20
Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 10
Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences 0 0 0 2 0 2 3 8
Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5
Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 39
On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle 0 0 0 5 0 2 4 24
On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 75
Probabilities of Consistent Election Outcomes with Majorities Based on Difference in Support 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 15
Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 4
Social acceptability of Condorcet committees 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 15
Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 29
The True Impact of Voting Rule Selection on Condorcet Efficiency 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 45
Une étude de la répartition du pouvoir confessionnel au Liban 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 42
When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality 0 1 1 2 0 4 5 10
Total Journal Articles 0 1 3 130 2 16 31 624

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Introduction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4
The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 4
Total Chapters 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 18

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03