Access Statistics for Battal Dogan

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Blocking Pairs versus Blocking Students: Stability Comparisons in School Choice 0 0 0 8 0 0 13 49
Blocking pairs versus blocking students: Stability comparisons in school choice 0 0 0 11 0 0 11 60
How to Control Controlled School Choice: Comment 0 0 0 76 0 1 12 118
Lexicographic Choice Under Variable Capacity Constraints 0 0 0 9 0 1 9 25
Lexicographic Choice under Variable Capacity Constraints 0 0 0 12 0 0 11 41
Mechanism Design Approach to School Choice: One versus Many 0 0 0 7 0 1 9 18
Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance: Characterizations and an Affirmative Action Application 0 0 0 157 1 3 39 411
Responsive Affirmative Action in School Choice 0 0 1 109 0 1 13 247
Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism 0 0 0 29 0 1 9 88
Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism 0 0 0 9 0 1 13 42
Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago 0 0 0 48 0 1 11 69
Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago 0 0 0 45 0 1 13 81
When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment? 0 0 0 64 0 0 11 123
Total Working Papers 0 0 1 584 1 11 174 1,372

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism 0 0 0 6 0 2 9 76
Choice with Affirmative Action 0 1 2 5 0 3 20 32
Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism 0 0 2 7 0 0 10 31
Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems 0 0 0 9 1 1 14 61
Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents 0 0 0 1 0 1 13 39
Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems 0 0 0 5 1 2 10 38
Existence of Myopic‐Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets 0 1 1 1 1 6 10 10
How to Control Controlled School Choice: Comment 0 0 0 15 0 2 13 132
Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints 0 0 0 1 0 0 11 22
Market design with deferred acceptance: A recipe for characterizations 0 0 0 0 0 2 19 20
Maskin-monotonic scoring rules 1 1 2 21 2 2 15 88
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance 0 0 0 1 0 1 9 13
Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies 0 0 0 5 0 3 14 39
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application 0 0 0 6 0 1 12 43
On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules 0 0 0 0 0 2 15 16
Responsive affirmative action in school choice 0 0 0 21 0 0 12 104
Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism 0 1 1 7 6 8 19 35
Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 38
Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago 0 0 0 5 0 0 9 34
When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? 0 1 1 2 0 2 44 50
Widening access in university admissions 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 33
Total Journal Articles 1 5 9 119 11 38 313 954

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Statistics updated 2026-10-11