Access Statistics for Ahmed Doghmi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation 0 0 0 12 1 1 9 62
Double Implementation under Partially Honest and Fully Strategic Agents in Minority Coalitions 0 1 4 4 0 1 11 11
Fault Tolerant Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies 0 0 0 2 1 3 9 23
Faulty Nash Implementation in Exchange Economies with Single-peaked Preferences 0 0 0 38 3 3 7 106
Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes 0 0 0 22 3 5 8 46
Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes 0 0 0 23 3 4 12 69
Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 26
Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences 0 0 0 59 2 2 8 146
Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 30
Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 49
On Partial Honesty Nash Implementation 0 0 0 70 0 0 12 290
On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition 0 0 0 0 6 6 12 40
On reciprocal Behavior in Prisoner Dilemma game 0 0 0 68 0 3 11 130
Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 36
STRONG NASH IMPLEMENTATION AND ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 1 1 10 10 2 4 21 21
Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets 0 0 1 42 3 4 16 146
Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences 0 0 1 34 2 3 11 118
Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences 0 0 0 16 2 4 18 63
Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences 0 0 0 14 1 1 8 67
Strong Nash Implementation of the Weak Core in Simple Strong Cooperative Games 0 0 0 0 2 5 7 7
Sur la théorie de l'implémentation et ses applications économiques 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 25
Total Working Papers 1 2 16 414 35 57 203 1,511

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes 0 0 0 3 4 12 24 63
Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations 0 0 0 9 2 6 13 57
Nash Implementation in Rationing Problems with Single-Crossing Preferences 0 0 0 12 3 5 11 73
Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences 0 0 0 18 3 6 15 87
Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences 0 0 0 48 1 4 9 208
Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems 0 0 0 12 1 5 12 62
On Nash Implementability in Allotment Economies under Domain Restrictions with Indifference 0 0 0 13 5 8 16 87
On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition 0 0 0 20 3 3 7 72
Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability 0 0 0 46 2 8 21 175
Total Journal Articles 0 0 0 181 24 57 128 884

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06