Access Statistics for Nicolas Drouhin

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints 0 0 0 26 0 4 82 139
A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints 0 0 0 16 1 2 6 38
A rank-dependent utility model of uncertain lifetime 0 0 0 0 1 4 14 20
A rank-dependent utility model of uncertain lifetime 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 38
A rank-dependent utility model of uncertain lifetime, time consistency and life insurance 0 0 0 5 1 5 13 45
A rank-dependent utility model of uncertain lifetime, time consistency and life insurance 0 0 0 71 0 3 7 159
Choix intertemporel et loi psychologique fondamentale 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 23
Choix intertemporel et loi psychologique fondamentale 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 19
Choix intertemporel et loi psychologique fondamentale 0 0 0 66 0 2 7 597
Choix intertemporel et loi psychologique fondamentale 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 8
Hyperbolic discounting may be time consistent 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 29
Hyperbolic discounting may be time consistent 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 16
Hyperbolic discounting may be time consistent 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 9
Inégalités face à la mort et systèmes de retraite 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 15
Inégalités face à la mort et systèmes de retraite 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 28
Non stationary additive utility and time consistency 0 0 0 75 1 2 11 45
Non-stationary additive utility and time consistency 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 32
Soft-Capacity constrained price competition with entry and a minimum firm size: Chamberlin without differentiation 0 0 0 7 0 1 8 24
Systèmes de retraite et accumulation du capital: un modèle à générations imbriquées avec durée de vie incertaine 0 0 0 31 0 2 9 142
Tacit Collusion in a One-Shot Game of Price Competition with Soft Capacity Constraints 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 11
Tacit Collusion in a One-Shot Game of Price Competition with Soft Capacity Constraints 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 39
Tacit collusion in a one-shot game of price competition with soft capacity constraints 0 0 0 3 0 2 8 40
Tacit collusion in a one-shot game of price competition with soft capacity constraints 0 0 2 94 0 5 14 185
Tacit collusion, soft capacity constraint and the number of firms 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 7
The end of the Bertrand Paradox? 0 0 0 103 1 3 20 194
The end of the Bertrand Paradox? 0 0 0 1 0 2 7 16
The end of the Bertrand Paradox? 0 0 0 87 1 4 9 82
Theoretical considerations on the retirement consumption puzzle and the optimal age of retirement 0 0 0 31 0 2 11 59
Total Working Papers 0 0 2 616 10 60 288 2,059

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints 0 0 0 6 0 3 17 45
A rank-dependent utility model of uncertain lifetime 0 0 0 6 0 5 16 94
Choix intertemporel et loi psychologique fondamentale 0 0 0 57 0 1 9 344
Hyperbolic discounting may be time consistent 0 0 0 158 1 7 14 428
Lifetime Uncertainty and Time Preference 0 0 0 75 0 3 10 266
Non-stationary additive utility and time consistency 0 0 0 5 0 2 14 48
SIDA et croissance économique: le risque d'une « trappe épidémiologique » 0 0 0 30 1 4 9 124
Tacit Collusion in a One‐Shot Game of Price Competition with Soft Capacity Constraints 0 0 0 12 1 6 18 65
Total Journal Articles 0 0 0 349 3 31 107 1,414

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-06-04