Access Statistics for Mikhail Drugov

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium 0 0 0 17 1 7 11 49
Biased contests for symmetric players 0 0 0 25 5 9 15 91
Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment 0 0 0 47 1 4 7 123
Competition in Bureaucracy and Corruption 0 0 1 125 4 12 17 460
Financing experimentation 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 32
How noise affects effort in tournaments 0 0 0 8 1 10 15 40
How noise affects effort in tournaments 0 0 0 2 3 8 15 37
Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests 0 0 0 17 1 5 10 59
Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests 0 0 1 10 15 37 42 83
Information and Delay in an Agency Model 0 0 0 38 1 8 12 184
Intermediaries in Corruption: An Experiment 0 0 0 67 0 9 16 207
Intra-firm bargaining and learning in a market equilibrium 0 0 0 28 1 4 4 56
Learning and Microlending 0 0 0 80 1 3 3 315
Optimal Patronage 0 0 0 19 0 8 10 94
Optimal Tournaments 0 0 0 31 6 7 9 65
Robust Tournaments 0 0 9 9 2 12 18 18
Score Disclosure 0 1 1 7 1 9 15 33
Score Disclosure 0 0 0 4 4 8 8 20
Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard 0 0 0 16 2 4 8 29
Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard 0 0 0 3 1 6 6 14
Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard 0 0 1 16 0 7 10 23
Selecting the Best: The Persistent Effects of Luck 0 3 3 15 2 18 24 52
Selecting the Best: The Persistent Effects of Luck 0 0 0 0 3 14 16 17
Selecting the Best: The Persistent Effects of Luck 0 1 1 1 2 11 15 15
Selecting the best when selection is hard 0 0 0 14 1 7 9 32
The shape of luck and competition in tournaments 0 0 0 20 2 5 8 66
The shape of luck and competition in tournaments 0 0 0 56 3 12 14 133
Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails 0 0 0 19 1 2 3 50
Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails 0 0 0 22 2 9 13 68
Tournament rewards and heavy tails 0 0 2 188 1 8 17 380
Tournaments 0 0 0 61 0 2 9 106
Tournaments with Reserve Performance 0 0 0 2 0 5 6 12
Tournaments with a Standard 0 0 0 6 1 10 15 21
Tournaments with reserve performance 0 0 0 23 1 2 3 23
Vague Lies: How to Advise Consumers When They Complain 0 0 0 19 1 7 8 99
Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice 0 0 0 32 9 23 27 89
Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice 0 0 0 17 5 10 11 40
Winner-Take-All Tournaments 0 0 2 66 8 24 31 151
Total Working Papers 0 5 21 1,131 92 347 482 3,386

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bargaining with informational and payoff externalities 0 0 0 0 2 4 6 22
Biased contests for symmetric players 0 0 1 9 2 6 16 75
Competition in bureaucracy and corruption 0 0 0 71 1 3 6 276
Financing Experimentation 0 0 0 14 1 3 5 105
How noise affects effort in tournaments 1 2 3 15 2 4 10 54
Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests 0 2 2 2 0 10 14 14
Information and delay in an agency model 0 0 0 15 0 7 11 116
Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment 1 2 6 51 2 10 26 222
Score Disclosure 0 1 2 2 2 6 18 18
The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments 0 0 0 8 0 3 8 49
Tournament rewards and heavy tails 0 0 1 8 0 4 10 49
Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice 0 0 0 0 1 6 10 33
Total Journal Articles 2 7 15 195 13 66 140 1,033

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04