Access Statistics for Mikhail Drugov

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium 0 0 0 17 0 5 16 55
Biased contests for symmetric players 0 0 0 25 1 2 18 95
Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment 0 0 1 48 0 6 12 130
Competition in Bureaucracy and Corruption 0 0 2 126 0 3 21 464
Dynamic Recommendation Bias 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Dynamic Recommendation Bias 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dynamic Recommendation Bias 0 23 23 23 0 4 4 4
Financing experimentation 0 0 0 1 1 4 7 37
How noise affects effort in tournaments 0 0 0 2 1 3 17 40
How noise affects effort in tournaments 0 0 0 8 0 1 15 42
Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests 0 0 0 17 0 1 10 61
Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests 0 0 1 10 1 5 54 97
Information and Delay in an Agency Model 0 0 0 38 0 4 14 188
Intermediaries in Corruption: An Experiment 0 0 0 67 0 3 16 210
Intra-firm bargaining and learning in a market equilibrium 0 0 0 28 0 0 4 56
Learning and Microlending 0 0 0 80 0 3 6 318
Optimal Patronage 0 0 0 19 0 2 13 97
Optimal Tournaments 0 0 0 31 0 1 10 66
Robust Tournaments 0 0 9 9 0 3 21 21
Score Disclosure 0 0 0 4 0 2 11 23
Score Disclosure 1 1 2 8 1 5 22 40
Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard 0 0 0 3 1 3 10 18
Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard 0 0 1 16 0 3 13 26
Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard 0 0 0 16 0 0 7 30
Selecting the Best: The Persistent Effects of Luck 0 0 1 1 1 2 18 19
Selecting the Best: The Persistent Effects of Luck 0 0 0 0 0 2 17 20
Selecting the Best: The Persistent Effects of Luck 0 0 3 15 0 5 28 58
Selecting the best when selection is hard 0 0 0 14 1 5 14 38
The shape of luck and competition in tournaments 0 0 0 56 0 5 18 139
The shape of luck and competition in tournaments 0 0 0 20 0 0 8 66
Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails 0 0 0 22 3 4 19 75
Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails 0 0 0 19 0 6 8 56
Tournament rewards and heavy tails 0 0 2 188 0 2 15 383
Tournaments 0 0 0 61 0 1 9 108
Tournaments with Reserve Performance 0 0 0 2 0 1 7 14
Tournaments with a Standard 0 0 0 6 0 3 16 25
Tournaments with reserve performance 0 0 0 23 1 3 5 26
Vague Lies: How to Advise Consumers When They Complain 0 0 0 19 0 3 11 102
Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice 0 0 0 17 0 2 13 42
Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice 0 0 0 32 0 5 32 95
Winner-Take-All Tournaments 0 0 2 66 0 1 34 158
Total Working Papers 1 24 47 1,157 12 114 594 3,543

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bargaining with informational and payoff externalities 0 0 0 0 1 4 10 26
Biased contests for symmetric players 0 0 1 9 1 6 21 82
Competition in bureaucracy and corruption 0 0 0 71 0 1 7 278
Financing Experimentation 0 0 0 14 0 1 5 106
How noise affects effort in tournaments 0 0 2 15 0 1 12 58
Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests 0 0 2 2 1 4 19 19
Information and delay in an agency model 0 0 0 15 0 1 12 117
Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment 0 1 5 52 1 8 27 231
Score Disclosure 0 0 2 2 1 4 19 24
The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments 0 0 0 8 0 2 11 54
Tournament rewards and heavy tails 0 0 1 8 0 2 14 53
Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice 0 0 0 0 0 2 13 37
Total Journal Articles 0 1 13 196 5 36 170 1,085

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Statistics updated 2026-07-10