Access Statistics for Umut Mert Dur

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem 0 0 0 89 4 10 11 193
Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism 0 0 0 16 8 12 14 55
Explicit vs. Statistical Preferential Treatment in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago's Exam Schools 0 0 0 45 1 3 5 73
Explicit vs. Statistical Preferential Treatment in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago’s Exam Schools 0 0 2 67 3 9 16 265
Improving the Deferred Acceptance with Minimal Compromise 0 0 0 9 2 3 5 24
Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools 0 3 18 215 8 25 64 475
Rematching with Contracts under Labor Mobility Restrictions: Theory and Application 4 26 26 26 13 25 25 25
School Assignment by Match Quality 0 0 1 22 2 4 9 52
Sequential School Choice with Public and Private Schools 0 1 2 57 4 6 10 230
The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice 0 0 0 81 7 11 13 247
Turkiye'de Kredi Karti Sektorunde Yasal Duzenlemeler ve Rekabet 0 0 2 81 5 5 11 301
Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange 0 0 1 207 5 6 14 382
Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange: Tuition and Worker Exchanges 0 0 1 22 1 3 9 102
Total Working Papers 4 30 53 937 63 122 206 2,424

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem 0 0 1 1 2 10 16 19
Capacity design in school choice 0 0 2 5 5 9 21 27
Competitive equilibria in school assignment 0 0 1 12 2 3 5 48
Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets 0 0 0 11 2 5 7 39
Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism 0 0 0 0 8 8 12 35
Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools 0 0 0 15 4 6 11 66
Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves 0 0 0 2 22 30 30 37
Family ties: school assignment with siblings 0 0 0 4 4 4 8 16
Identifying the Harm of Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms 0 0 0 31 5 7 11 164
Incompatibility between stability and consistency 0 0 1 14 6 7 15 77
Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system 0 0 0 0 6 7 10 15
Many-to-one matchings without substitutability 0 0 2 14 2 3 9 78
Rawlsian Matching 0 0 2 7 3 5 11 20
Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones 0 0 2 20 2 3 8 111
Responsiveness to priority‐based affirmative action policy in school choice 0 0 2 8 2 6 11 19
School Choice with Hybrid Schedules 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 24
School choice under partial fairness 0 0 0 8 1 3 7 56
School choice with neighbors 0 1 4 17 4 7 13 66
Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab 0 0 2 11 5 9 14 55
Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications 1 2 4 50 6 11 21 168
Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible? 0 0 1 3 4 7 9 14
The Secure Boston Mechanism: theory and experiments 0 0 2 16 6 11 18 105
The modified Boston mechanism 0 2 5 42 4 8 17 110
Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange 0 0 1 16 5 9 17 121
What you don't know can help you in school assignment 0 0 0 6 4 5 6 42
When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful? 0 0 0 5 6 7 13 56
Total Journal Articles 1 5 32 319 121 192 322 1,588

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2026-02-12