| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
187 |
| A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
| A theory of sequential reciprocity |
0 |
2 |
3 |
56 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
414 |
| ABC on Deals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
| Admissibility and Common Knowledge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
| Admissibility and Common Knowledge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| Admissibility and common belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
517 |
| Admission and Common Knowledge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
272 |
| Amissibility and Common Belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
434 |
| An Experimental Test of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity in Case of Complete and Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| An experimental test of direct and indirect reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
| An experimental test of direct and indirect reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
237 |
| Banking on Experiments? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
82 |
| Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory |
0 |
1 |
7 |
108 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
208 |
| Blowing the Whistle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
738 |
| Blowing the Whistle |
0 |
1 |
1 |
185 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
790 |
| Blowing the Whistle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
189 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
987 |
| Broken Promises: An Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
104 |
| Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment on Speculation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
386 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
924 |
| Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment on Speculation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
173 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
517 |
| Co-Financing Agreements and Reciprocity: When 'No Deal' is a Good Deal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
| Co-financing agreements and reciprocity: When 'no deal' is a good deal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
51 |
| Deception: The Role of Guilt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
142 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
232 |
| Deductive reasoning in extensive games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
125 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
973 |
| Direct versus indirect reciprocity: An experiment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
35 |
| Discrimination by Gender and Social Distance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
499 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
3,586 |
| Dynamic Psychological Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
285 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,310 |
| Dynamic Psychological Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
623 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3,102 |
| Efficiency, Reciprocity and Expectations in an Experimental Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
34 |
| Efficiency, Reciprocity and Expectations in an Experimental Game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Evolutionary Selection Dynamics and Irrational Survivors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| Frustration and Anger in Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
105 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
109 |
| Frustration and Anger in Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
147 |
| Gender in Committees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
278 |
| Guilt Aversion: Eve versus Adam |
0 |
0 |
1 |
91 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
67 |
| Honesty and Informal Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
89 |
| Honesty and Informal Agreements |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
73 |
| Honesty and Informal Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
49 |
| Honesty in the City |
0 |
1 |
1 |
41 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
26 |
| Honesty in the City |
0 |
0 |
1 |
125 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
186 |
| Honesty in the city |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
| Ideal Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Multicriteria Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
353 |
| Inconsistencies in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
| Incorporating Belief-Dependent Motivation in Games Abstract:Psychological game theory (PGT), introduced by Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti (1989) and significantly generalized by Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2009), extends the standard gametheoretic framework by letting players' utility at endnodes depend on their interactive beliefs. While it is understood that a host of applications that model and/or test the role of emotional and other psychological forces find their home in PGT, the framework is abstract andcomprises complex mathematical objects, such as players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. Thus,PGT provides little guidance on how to model specific belief-dependent motivations and usethem in game theoretic analysis. This paper takes steps to fill this gap. Some aspects are simplified - e.g., which beliefs matter - but others are refined and brought closer to applications by providing more structure. We start with belief-dependent motivations and showhow to embed them in game forms to obtain psychological games. We emphasize the role oftime and of the perception of players' intentions. We take advantage of progress made on the foundations of game theory to expand and improve on PGT solution concepts.JEL classification:C72; C73; D81; D82; D92. Keywords:Psychological game theory; Belief-dependent motivation; Intentions; Time;Rationalizability; Self-confirming equilibrium; Bayesian sequential equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
305 |
| Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
251 |
| Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
| Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
| Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1,096 |
| Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
354 |
| Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
| Keeping Researchers Honest: The Case for Sealed-Envelope-Submissions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
| King of the Hill: Giving Backward Induction its Best Shot |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
62 |
| Legalizing Bribe Giving |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
103 |
| Legalizing Bribe Giving |
0 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
123 |
| Legalizing Bribes |
0 |
0 |
1 |
86 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
329 |
| Legalizing Bribes |
0 |
0 |
2 |
98 |
1 |
3 |
31 |
445 |
| Lies in Disguise - A Theoretical Analysis of Cheating |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
| Manufacturing investment and taxation in the Nordic countries |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
| Mean Markets or Kind Commerce? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
99 |
| Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
132 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
492 |
| Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
70 |
| Partial Norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
90 |
| Partial Norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
118 |
| Partial Norms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
222 |
| Play to Learn? An Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
136 |
| Price Competition and Market COncentration: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
410 |
| Price Competition and Market Concentration: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
326 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,317 |
| Price Competition and Market Concentration: An experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
2 |
312 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
1,266 |
| Price Floors and Competition |
0 |
0 |
1 |
279 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
2,544 |
| Price competition and market concentration: An experimental study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Price competition and market concentration: An experimental study |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
| Procurement and Information Feedback |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
716 |
| Promises & Partnership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
355 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1,103 |
| Promises & Partnership |
0 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
186 |
| Promises and Partner-Switch |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
| Promises and Partner-Switch |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
49 |
| Promises and Partnership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
262 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
727 |
| Promises or Agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
| Promises or Agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
23 |
| Promises, Expectations & Causation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
| Promises, Expectations & Causation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
94 |
| Promises, expectations & causation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
| Psychological Game Theory |
0 |
1 |
8 |
382 |
1 |
6 |
28 |
844 |
| Rational Reasoning and Rationalizable Sets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
438 |
| Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
| Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
| Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
| Reciprocity and Wage Undercutting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
597 |
| Reciprocity and wage undercutting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
| Social Norms and Moral Hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
501 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2,820 |
| Social Norms and Moral Hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
1,323 |
| Some Relationships Between Evolutionary Stability Criteria in Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
519 |
| Tax Evasion with a Conscience |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
115 |
| Teaching Cournot without Derivatives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
120 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
509 |
| Thanks but No Thanks: A New Policy to Avoid Land Conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
86 |
| Thanks but No Thanks: A New Policy to Reduce Land Conflict |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
75 |
| Thanks but No Thanks: A New Policy to Reduce Land Conflict |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
88 |
| The Consistency Principle for Set-Valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
274 |
| The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
404 |
| The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
195 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
481 |
| The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
183 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
628 |
| The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play |
0 |
0 |
1 |
133 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
275 |
| The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Strategic Choice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
216 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
707 |
| The Psychological Game of Trust |
0 |
0 |
0 |
197 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
990 |
| The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
| The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for the theory of equilibrium refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
| The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for the theory of equilibrium refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
| The framing of games and the psychology of strategic choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
33 |
| The sound of silence: A license to be selfish |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
| Time Consistent Matrimony with Endogenous Trust |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,042 |
| Tra i Leoni: Revealing the Preferences Behind a Superstition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
63 |
| When Order matters for Iterated Strict Dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
504 |
| Why do you hate me? - On the survival of spite - |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
184 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
10 |
57 |
9,383 |
33 |
80 |
344 |
43,755 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A theory of sequential reciprocity |
3 |
3 |
13 |
595 |
3 |
5 |
33 |
1,693 |
| Admissibility and common belief |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
225 |
| Agreements with reciprocity: Co-financing and MOUs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
28 |
| Bare promises: An experiment |
1 |
1 |
4 |
120 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
308 |
| Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory |
0 |
2 |
16 |
41 |
0 |
6 |
27 |
83 |
| Blowing the Whistle |
0 |
0 |
1 |
183 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
562 |
| Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment |
0 |
1 |
2 |
208 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
646 |
| Deception: The role of guilt |
1 |
2 |
3 |
65 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
181 |
| Deductive Reasoning in Extensive Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
848 |
| Dynamic psychological games |
0 |
0 |
11 |
418 |
1 |
5 |
26 |
1,401 |
| Epiphany in the Game of 21 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
58 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
181 |
| Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
230 |
| Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games |
0 |
0 |
3 |
33 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
134 |
| Gender composition in teams |
0 |
0 |
3 |
72 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
226 |
| Generosity, anonymity, gender |
0 |
1 |
2 |
107 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
296 |
| Guilt in Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
257 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
854 |
| HOLD-UP: WITH A VENGEANCE |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
72 |
| Honesty and informal agreements |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
53 |
| Honesty in the city |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
| How Werner Güth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior |
0 |
0 |
2 |
72 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
270 |
| Ideal equilibria in noncooperative multicriteria games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
| Incorporating belief-dependent motivation in games |
0 |
0 |
3 |
31 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
98 |
| Indirect evolution vs. strategic delegation: a comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
69 |
| Information disclosure in auctions: an experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
166 |
| Introduction to special issue on psychological game theory |
0 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
44 |
| King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
| LEGALIZING BRIBE GIVING |
1 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
82 |
| Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating |
1 |
2 |
4 |
46 |
1 |
5 |
18 |
217 |
| Marital investments, time consistency and emotions |
0 |
7 |
16 |
89 |
0 |
13 |
30 |
200 |
| Mean markets or kind commerce? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game |
0 |
1 |
11 |
248 |
0 |
7 |
33 |
752 |
| Modeling Bounded Rationality, Ariel Rubinstein. MIT Press, 1998, xii + 208 pages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
| Modelling kindness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
52 |
| Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
4 |
107 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
343 |
| Participation |
0 |
1 |
3 |
66 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
259 |
| Peter Bohm: Father of field experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
213 |
| Peter Diamond and Hannu Vartiainen, Editors, Behavioral Economics and Its Applications, Princeton University Press, USA (2007), p. xvi+312 ISBN-13: 978-0-691-12284-7, $45.00 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
123 |
| Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study |
0 |
0 |
1 |
243 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
656 |
| Price floors and competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
207 |
| Promises and Partnership |
1 |
1 |
7 |
445 |
2 |
5 |
29 |
1,317 |
| Promises and partner-switch |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
| Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
| Promises, expectations & causation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
| Reciprocity and wage undercutting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
228 |
| Reciprocity networks and the participation problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
29 |
| Sealed Envelope Submissions Foster Research Integrity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
| Social Norms and Moral Hazard |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
440 |
| Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments |
1 |
2 |
2 |
13 |
5 |
7 |
13 |
48 |
| Some relationships between evolutionary stability criteria in games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
27 |
| Tax evasion with a conscience |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
22 |
| Teaching Cournot Without Derivatives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
34 |
| Thanks but no thanks: A new policy to reduce land conflict |
0 |
0 |
6 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
115 |
| The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
| The framing of games and the psychology of play |
0 |
0 |
4 |
110 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
408 |
| The sound of silence: A license to be selfish |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
| Tra i Leoni: Revealing the preferences behind a superstition |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
29 |
| Why do you hate me?: On the survival of spite |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
79 |
| Total Journal Articles |
10 |
26 |
137 |
4,168 |
42 |
108 |
443 |
14,740 |
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