Access Statistics for Chris Edmond
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Aggregate Implications of Micro Asset Market Segmentation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
212 |
| Aggregate Implications of Micro Asset Market Segmentation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
130 |
| Aggregate implications of micro asset market segmentation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
106 |
| An Integral Equation Representation for Overlapping Generations in Continuous Time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
3 |
4 |
17 |
229 |
| Asset Prices and the Composition of Consumption |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
35 |
| Competition, Markups, and Inflation: Evidence from Australian Firm-level Data |
0 |
2 |
4 |
45 |
2 |
9 |
28 |
119 |
| Competition, Markups, and the Gains from |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
4 |
6 |
30 |
131 |
| Competition, Markups, and the Gains from |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
143 |
| Competition, Markups, and the Gains from International Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
111 |
2 |
3 |
29 |
429 |
| Competition, Markups, and the Gains from International Trade |
0 |
0 |
1 |
88 |
1 |
6 |
28 |
269 |
| Creating Confusion "Abstract: We develop a model in which a politician seeks to prevent people from making informed decisions. The politician can manipulate information at a cost, but cannot commit to an information structure. The receivers are rational and internalize the politician's incentives. In the unique equilibrium of the game, the receivers' beliefs are unbiased but endogenously noisy. We use this model to interpret the rise of social media. We argue that social media simultaneously (i) improves the underlying, intrinsic precision of the receivers' information but also (ii) reduces the politician's costs of manipulation. We show that there is a critical threshold such that if the costs of manipulation fall enough, the politician is better off and the receivers are worse off, despite the underlying improvement in their information. But if the costs of manipulation do not fall too much, and if the receivers are also sufficiently well coordinated, the manipulation backfires. In this scenario, the politician would want to invest in commitment devices that prevent them from manipulating information." |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
17 |
| How Costly Are Markups? |
0 |
0 |
3 |
82 |
3 |
5 |
39 |
481 |
| Income Dispersion and Counter-Cyclical Markups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
163 |
| Income Dispersion, Asymmetric Information and Fluctuations in Market Efficiency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
218 |
| Income dispersion, asymmetric information and fluctuations in market efficiency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
287 |
| Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change |
0 |
0 |
1 |
127 |
6 |
7 |
21 |
199 |
| Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change |
0 |
1 |
1 |
41 |
2 |
5 |
17 |
230 |
| Information Revolutions and the Overthrow of Autocratic Regimes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
299 |
| Investment and the Real Interest Rate in Business Cycle Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
106 |
| Non-Laplacian Beliefs in a Global Game with Noisy Signaling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
5 |
8 |
22 |
170 |
| On the Sluggish Response of Prices to Money in an Inventory-Theoretic Model of Money Demand |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
544 |
| Product diversification, creation and destruction: Micro evidence and aggregate implications |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
66 |
| Sluggish responses of prices and inflation to monetary shocks in an inventory model of money demand |
0 |
0 |
0 |
159 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
543 |
| Sticky Demand or Sticky Prices? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
243 |
| Unbundling Labor |
2 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
8 |
8 |
| Unbundling Labor |
0 |
0 |
1 |
82 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
252 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
7 |
15 |
1,371 |
48 |
86 |
412 |
5,629 |
|
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