| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
4 |
7 |
11 |
370 |
| A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
96 |
| A Theory of Fair CEO Pay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
18 |
| A theory of fair CEO pay |
0 |
1 |
13 |
13 |
7 |
12 |
20 |
20 |
| Applying Economics – Not Gut Feel – To ESG |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
27 |
| Blockholders and Corporate Governance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
4 |
8 |
9 |
193 |
| Blockholders and Corporate Governance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
3 |
9 |
10 |
155 |
| Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence |
0 |
2 |
5 |
142 |
6 |
18 |
25 |
358 |
| CEO Compensation: Evidence From the Field |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
4 |
4 |
7 |
30 |
| CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Field |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
57 |
| CEO compensation: evidence from the field |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
4 |
7 |
9 |
17 |
| CEO compensation: evidence from the field |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
4 |
12 |
16 |
26 |
| Contracting With Synergies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
4 |
4 |
7 |
89 |
| Contracting With Synergies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
74 |
| Contracting With Synergies |
0 |
1 |
2 |
35 |
4 |
9 |
18 |
93 |
| Contracting with Synergies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
50 |
| Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
3 |
3 |
11 |
148 |
| Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
4 |
10 |
23 |
62 |
| Do Investment Banks Have Skill? Performance Persistence of M&A Advisors |
0 |
0 |
1 |
35 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
184 |
| Does improved information improve incentives? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
10 |
13 |
35 |
| Does the Carbon Premium Reflect Risk or Mispricing? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
13 |
| Dynamic Incentive Accounts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
4 |
9 |
13 |
426 |
| Dynamic Incentive Accounts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
123 |
| Dynamic Incentive Accounts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
85 |
| Dynamic Incentive Accounts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
3 |
8 |
12 |
175 |
| Employee Satisfaction, Labor Market Flexibility, and Stock Returns Around The World |
1 |
1 |
4 |
40 |
7 |
11 |
30 |
178 |
| Employee Satisfaction, Labor Market Flexibility, and Stock Returns Around The World |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
9 |
17 |
31 |
229 |
| Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia |
1 |
1 |
3 |
54 |
7 |
14 |
23 |
195 |
| Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
171 |
| Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
79 |
142 |
146 |
429 |
| Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
19 |
25 |
| Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
3 |
7 |
14 |
182 |
| Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
5 |
7 |
13 |
155 |
| Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence |
0 |
0 |
3 |
46 |
3 |
6 |
11 |
152 |
| Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence |
0 |
2 |
6 |
145 |
7 |
13 |
26 |
379 |
| Executive compensation: a survey of theory and evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
| Feedback Effects and the Limits to Arbitrage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
58 |
| Feedback Effects and the Limits to Arbitrage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
98 |
| Feedback Effects and the Limits to Arbitrage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
121 |
| Financing Through Asset Sales |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
6 |
11 |
16 |
101 |
| Financing Through Asset Sales |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
4 |
6 |
10 |
94 |
| Financing through Asset Sales |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
13 |
17 |
45 |
| Governance and Comovement Under Common Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
5 |
6 |
8 |
66 |
| Governance and Comovement Under Common Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
54 |
| How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
45 |
| How should performance signals affect contracts? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
| Music Sentiment and Stock Returns Around the World |
0 |
1 |
1 |
36 |
10 |
14 |
20 |
137 |
| Music Sentiment and Stock Returns Around the World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
90 |
| Risk and CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
59 |
| Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
3 |
7 |
10 |
132 |
| Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
169 |
| Socially Responsible Divestment |
0 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
5 |
8 |
19 |
40 |
| Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
122 |
| Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
134 |
| Strategic news releases in equity vesting months |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
8 |
22 |
| The Effect of Liquidity on Governance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
3 |
6 |
11 |
72 |
| The Effect of Liquidity on Governance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
164 |
| The Generalized Informativeness Principle |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
111 |
| The Generalized Informativeness Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
105 |
| The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
73 |
| The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
5 |
7 |
8 |
55 |
| The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
7 |
12 |
134 |
| The Purpose of a Finance Professor |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
7 |
12 |
| The Real Costs of Disclosure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
3 |
8 |
10 |
107 |
| The Real Costs of Disclosure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
109 |
| The Real Effects of Financial Markets |
0 |
2 |
6 |
232 |
8 |
18 |
44 |
1,035 |
| The Value of Informativeness for Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
50 |
| The Value of Informativeness for Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
39 |
| The informativeness principle without the first-order approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
10 |
22 |
| The value of informativeness for contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
6 |
| Tractability in Incentive Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
4 |
10 |
13 |
120 |
| Tractability in Incentive Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
156 |
| Tractability in Incentive Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
7 |
7 |
62 |
| Tractability in Incentive Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
68 |
| When Is (Performance-Sensitive) Debt Optimal? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
19 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
13 |
64 |
2,209 |
322 |
634 |
964 |
9,142 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
294 |
| A Theory of Fair CEO Pay |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
8 |
17 |
26 |
26 |
| Applying Economics—Not Gut Feel—to ESG |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
7 |
14 |
22 |
| Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia |
0 |
1 |
2 |
89 |
5 |
15 |
31 |
427 |
| Blockholders and Corporate Governance |
0 |
1 |
4 |
92 |
12 |
22 |
38 |
454 |
| CEO compensation: Evidence from the field |
1 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
10 |
27 |
43 |
90 |
| Company purpose and profit need not be in conflict if we ‘grow the pie’ |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
4 |
5 |
11 |
31 |
| Do Investment Banks Matter for M&A Returns? |
0 |
1 |
5 |
97 |
1 |
9 |
33 |
373 |
| Does improved information improve incentives? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
153 |
| Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity prices |
1 |
5 |
21 |
361 |
16 |
45 |
128 |
1,635 |
| Dynamic CEO Compensation |
0 |
1 |
2 |
42 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
157 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
31 |
| Employee Satisfaction, Labor Market Flexibility, and Stock Returns Around the World |
3 |
3 |
8 |
11 |
18 |
29 |
50 |
59 |
| Equity Vesting and Investment |
2 |
6 |
9 |
59 |
3 |
15 |
28 |
344 |
| Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer |
0 |
0 |
1 |
56 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
240 |
| Feedback Effects, Asymmetric Trading, and the Limits to Arbitrage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
3 |
8 |
14 |
232 |
| Financing Through Asset Sales |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
75 |
| Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders |
0 |
1 |
4 |
38 |
6 |
15 |
37 |
312 |
| Governance Under Common Ownership |
0 |
0 |
2 |
29 |
2 |
6 |
16 |
137 |
| How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
24 |
| How great companies deliver both purpose and profit |
0 |
1 |
7 |
11 |
2 |
5 |
26 |
41 |
| Inside Debt |
0 |
1 |
2 |
61 |
3 |
6 |
11 |
283 |
| Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
42 |
| Learnings From 1000 Rejections |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
33 |
47 |
57 |
57 |
| Music sentiment and stock returns around the world |
0 |
0 |
3 |
38 |
12 |
25 |
45 |
162 |
| Rational sustainability |
1 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
5 |
10 |
22 |
31 |
| Short-term termination without deterring long-term investment: A theory of debt and buyouts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
7 |
10 |
12 |
204 |
| Sports Sentiment and Stock Returns |
2 |
9 |
17 |
305 |
16 |
45 |
85 |
1,091 |
| Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
102 |
| Sustainable Finance |
2 |
3 |
5 |
20 |
13 |
20 |
29 |
86 |
| The Effect of Liquidity on Governance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
4 |
6 |
12 |
295 |
| The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
4 |
4 |
12 |
128 |
| The Long‐Term Consequences of Short‐Term Incentives |
0 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
7 |
23 |
41 |
73 |
| The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency When Some Information Is Soft |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
2 |
5 |
14 |
83 |
| The Real Effects of Financial Markets |
0 |
2 |
13 |
202 |
9 |
30 |
71 |
820 |
| The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices on Takeovers |
1 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
5 |
18 |
30 |
67 |
| The end of ESG |
1 |
4 |
19 |
70 |
12 |
32 |
91 |
251 |
| The informativeness principle without the first-order approach |
0 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
7 |
12 |
14 |
42 |
| The purpose of a finance professor |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
16 |
| The source of information in prices and investment-price sensitivity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
3 |
10 |
15 |
218 |
| Tractability in Incentive Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
236 |
| Total Journal Articles |
15 |
48 |
149 |
2,044 |
262 |
563 |
1,132 |
9,444 |
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