Access Statistics for Lars Ehlers

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice 0 0 0 33 0 2 18 58
(Il)legal assignments in school choice 0 0 0 32 0 0 15 43
(Minimally) 'epsilon'-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities 0 0 0 25 0 0 15 103
(Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities 0 0 0 16 0 0 16 91
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 9 0 1 14 74
Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities 0 0 1 146 0 1 9 309
An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-Linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities 0 0 0 28 0 0 8 79
An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities 0 0 0 12 0 1 13 93
An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities 0 0 0 25 1 1 12 50
An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities 0 0 0 35 0 0 14 53
Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments 0 0 0 91 0 0 5 463
Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments, METEOR Research memorandum 0 1 1 1,213 0 1 12 3,552
Arrow's theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences 0 0 0 114 0 0 7 720
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings 0 0 0 259 0 1 16 467
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings 0 0 0 29 0 2 9 50
Assigning refugees to landlords in Sweden: stable maximum matchings 0 0 0 23 1 1 15 50
Blocking Pairs versus Blocking Students: Stability Comparisons in School Choice 0 0 0 8 0 0 13 49
Blocking pairs versus blocking students: Stability comparisons in school choice 0 0 0 11 0 0 11 60
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability 0 0 0 41 0 0 6 153
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability 0 0 1 9 0 2 15 61
Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability 0 0 0 37 0 0 16 158
Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice 0 0 0 37 0 0 10 253
Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice 0 0 0 21 1 1 8 126
Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism 0 0 0 39 0 0 8 193
Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism 0 0 0 2 5 5 12 51
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 0 2 0 0 9 41
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 0 40 0 0 10 186
Consistent house allocation 0 0 0 27 1 2 11 158
Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms 0 0 0 26 0 0 9 74
Continuity and incentive compatibility 0 0 0 16 2 3 12 52
Cooperation and equity in the river sharing problem 0 0 1 166 0 1 16 374
Corrigendum to "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems" 0 0 0 38 0 0 17 126
Dynamic Refugee Matching 1 2 4 274 3 7 28 625
Dynamic Refugee Matching 0 0 0 11 1 1 9 51
Dynamic refugee matching 0 0 0 6 1 2 9 44
EXTERNALITIES, POTENTIAL, VALUE AND CONSISTENCY 0 0 0 60 0 0 9 163
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 25 0 1 8 222
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 1 7 0 0 8 64
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 246 0 0 8 1,515
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 0 40 0 1 11 251
Externalities and the Nucleolus 0 0 0 19 0 0 4 36
Externalities and the nucleolus 0 0 0 11 0 1 4 18
Externalities, Potential, Value and Consistency 0 0 0 7 0 1 7 55
Externalities, Potential, Value and Consistency 0 0 0 90 0 1 21 199
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 0 0 0 1 0 0 10 66
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 0 0 0 7 0 1 8 53
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 0 0 0 66 0 0 2 602
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 0 0 0 2 0 0 10 61
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 0 0 0 19 0 2 8 105
Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses 0 0 0 11 0 1 9 32
Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses 0 0 0 24 0 2 13 63
Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses 0 0 0 2 0 0 18 33
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance 0 0 0 34 0 0 12 57
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance 0 0 0 21 0 2 10 57
House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (N.B.: This paper has been extended and results are now contained in working paper 14.08.) 1 1 1 30 1 1 9 95
In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets 0 0 0 33 0 0 6 200
In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets 0 0 0 47 1 2 11 531
Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets 0 0 0 7 0 0 11 64
Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets 0 0 0 12 0 2 51 112
Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities 0 0 0 81 0 0 6 212
Manipulation via Capacities Revisited 0 0 0 14 1 1 14 76
Manipulation via Capacities Revisited 0 0 0 8 0 0 9 76
Matching Markets under (In)complete Information 0 0 0 75 1 2 14 174
Matching Markets under (In)complete Information 0 0 0 14 0 1 8 86
Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 346
Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle 0 0 0 82 0 0 7 383
Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices 0 0 0 13 0 1 10 37
Normative properties for object allocation problems: Characterizations and trade-offs 0 0 1 85 0 3 11 193
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics 0 0 0 131 1 1 13 396
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics 0 0 0 19 0 0 2 64
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics 0 0 0 6 0 1 15 49
Oligarchies in Spatial Environments 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 39
Oligarchies in Spatial Environments 0 0 0 10 0 2 10 72
Oligarchies in spatial environments 0 0 0 14 0 0 8 115
On (constrained) Efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment 0 0 1 13 0 0 16 34
On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods 0 0 0 15 0 0 12 161
On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 136
Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets 0 0 0 107 0 1 12 333
Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets 0 0 0 5 0 0 12 33
Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets 0 0 0 26 0 0 45 105
Organizing time banks: Lessons from matching markets 0 0 0 20 0 0 35 66
Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks 0 0 0 74 0 1 14 154
Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 211
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules 0 0 0 37 1 1 17 273
Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle 0 0 0 28 0 2 12 90
Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle 0 0 1 15 0 0 11 84
Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle 0 0 1 63 0 1 18 249
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation 0 0 0 7 1 1 16 74
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 0 34 0 0 14 232
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 0 161 0 1 18 730
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 0 13 0 0 9 180
Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools 0 0 0 15 0 0 5 85
Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools 0 0 1 97 1 1 16 294
Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets: A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance 0 0 0 30 0 1 16 82
Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism 0 0 0 29 0 1 9 88
Robust design in monotonic matching markets: A case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance 0 0 0 10 0 1 14 41
Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism 0 0 0 9 0 1 13 42
School Choice with Control 0 0 0 71 1 3 11 206
School Choice with Control 0 0 0 55 0 1 15 78
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 0 28 0 1 40 242
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 0 5 0 0 19 165
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 0 12 0 0 10 124
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds 0 0 0 13 0 0 19 214
Sharing a River among Satiable Countries 0 0 0 9 0 0 13 83
Sharing a River among Satiable Countries 0 0 0 67 0 0 11 236
Sharing a river among satiable countries 0 0 0 66 0 0 8 313
Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking 0 0 0 16 0 1 12 76
Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking 0 0 0 11 1 2 11 68
Strategy-Proof and Envy-Free Random Assignment 0 0 2 11 2 3 17 30
Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 13 0 1 16 74
Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores Revisited 0 0 0 47 0 0 6 62
Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 18 0 0 14 83
Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities 0 0 0 19 0 1 10 108
Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff 0 0 3 15 0 0 22 35
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited 0 0 0 64 0 0 14 50
The impact of price disclosure on dynamic shopping decisions 0 0 0 85 0 0 3 317
Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems 0 0 0 1 0 2 14 22
Throughput rate optimization in high multiplicity sequencing problems 0 0 0 49 0 0 10 278
Top Trading with Fixed Tie-Breaking in Markets with Indivisible Goods 0 0 1 24 0 2 17 100
Top Trading with Fixed Tie-Breaking in Markets with Indivisible Goods 0 0 0 23 2 4 19 131
Top-Cycle Rationalizability 0 0 0 11 0 0 5 48
Top-Cycle Rationalizability 0 0 0 39 0 0 16 184
Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach 0 0 0 39 0 0 13 127
Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 48 0 1 8 94
Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 39 1 2 17 118
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A mechanism design approach 0 0 0 19 0 0 14 62
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design 0 0 0 31 1 1 8 65
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems 0 0 0 116 0 0 22 385
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems 0 0 0 30 0 0 15 108
Total Working Papers 2 4 21 6,180 32 104 1,638 24,125

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice 0 0 0 15 0 0 18 87
A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality 0 0 0 11 0 2 14 66
An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities 0 0 0 3 0 0 16 22
Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences 0 0 0 18 1 1 18 138
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings 0 0 2 21 0 0 19 61
Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability 0 0 0 70 1 3 38 266
Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice 0 0 0 47 1 4 14 262
Choosing wisely: the natural multi-bidding mechanism 0 0 0 23 2 3 14 125
Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation 0 0 0 108 0 1 8 284
Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems 0 0 2 40 0 2 13 160
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 0 25 2 2 18 124
Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms 0 0 0 11 0 0 12 64
Corrigendum to “Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems” 0 0 0 14 0 0 9 58
Efficient assignment respecting priorities 0 0 2 120 0 0 17 283
Efficient priority rules 0 0 1 54 0 0 6 176
En sundhedsøkonomisk analyse af antallet af røntgenundersøgelser af lænderyggen hos 20-49 årige henvist fra primærsektoren 0 0 0 0 0 1 15 21
Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games 0 0 0 0 0 1 15 18
Externalities, potential, value and consistency 0 0 0 53 0 1 15 162
Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule 0 0 0 16 0 0 12 79
Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses 0 0 0 1 0 0 9 12
In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm 0 0 0 32 1 1 12 106
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 77 0 1 8 185
Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options 0 0 0 24 0 0 14 105
Indifference and the uniform rule 1 1 2 23 3 3 11 95
Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities 0 0 1 15 0 3 17 82
Manipulation via capacities revisited 0 0 0 33 1 2 14 110
Matching markets under (in)complete information 0 0 0 21 0 1 15 111
Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance 0 0 0 1 0 1 9 13
Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems 0 0 0 47 0 1 10 141
Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle 0 0 0 46 1 2 16 176
Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules 0 0 0 45 1 1 10 185
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics 0 0 0 14 1 2 15 67
Oligarchies in spatial environments 0 0 0 17 0 0 12 129
On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods 0 0 0 13 0 0 12 77
Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets 0 0 0 5 1 1 12 43
Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences 0 0 1 32 1 2 15 134
Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules 0 0 0 11 0 0 5 63
Regulation via the Polluter‐pays Principle 0 0 3 17 1 1 20 99
Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked 0 0 0 21 0 0 8 377
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems 0 0 0 26 0 2 17 147
Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism 0 1 1 7 6 8 19 35
School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds 0 1 4 98 2 9 37 380
Sharing a river among satiable agents 0 0 0 83 0 0 8 266
Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 14
Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences 0 0 1 37 0 1 12 137
Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued 0 0 0 24 1 3 13 221
Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment 0 0 1 4 0 0 12 21
Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain 0 0 0 92 0 2 8 214
Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities 0 0 0 10 0 1 13 80
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited 0 0 0 11 1 1 16 66
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems 1 1 1 90 1 1 15 315
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: District-based versus school-based admissions 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 12
Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 19
Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems 0 0 0 13 0 1 8 110
Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods 0 0 0 3 1 1 20 56
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A market design approach 0 0 1 47 0 0 14 136
Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems 0 0 1 82 0 2 9 223
Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules 0 0 0 114 0 0 15 244
Total Journal Articles 2 4 24 1,886 31 77 800 7,462
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