| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
43 |
| (Il)legal assignments in school choice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
33 |
| (Minimally) 'epsilon'-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
90 |
| (Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
79 |
| Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
145 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
305 |
| Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
66 |
| An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-Linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
73 |
| An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
85 |
| An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
40 |
| An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
4 |
7 |
9 |
46 |
| Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
461 |
| Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments, METEOR Research memorandum |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,212 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
3,542 |
| Arrow's theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
715 |
| Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings |
0 |
0 |
1 |
259 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
457 |
| Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Stable Maximum Matchings |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
42 |
| Assigning refugees to landlords in Sweden: stable maximum matchings |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
38 |
| Blocking Pairs versus Blocking Students: Stability Comparisons in School Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
40 |
| Blocking pairs versus blocking students: Stability comparisons in school choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
52 |
| Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
150 |
| Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
147 |
| Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability |
0 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
51 |
| Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
245 |
| Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
120 |
| Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
42 |
| Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
187 |
| Consistent House Allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
180 |
| Consistent House Allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
35 |
| Consistent house allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
4 |
4 |
5 |
151 |
| Continuity and Incentive Compatibility in Cardinal Voting Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
69 |
| Continuity and incentive compatibility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
40 |
| Cooperation and equity in the river sharing problem |
0 |
0 |
1 |
165 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
362 |
| Corrigendum to "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
113 |
| Dynamic Refugee Matching |
0 |
0 |
5 |
270 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
601 |
| Dynamic Refugee Matching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
45 |
| Dynamic refugee matching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
39 |
| EXTERNALITIES, POTENTIAL, VALUE AND CONSISTENCY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
157 |
| Efficient Priority Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
58 |
| Efficient Priority Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
246 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1,509 |
| Efficient Priority Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
241 |
| Efficient Priority Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
215 |
| Externalities and the Nucleolus |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
| Externalities and the nucleolus |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
| Externalities, Potential, Value and Consistency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
50 |
| Externalities, Potential, Value and Consistency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
181 |
| Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
48 |
| Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
56 |
| Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
98 |
| Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
54 |
| Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
600 |
| Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
50 |
| Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
24 |
| Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
22 |
| House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
49 |
| House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
7 |
9 |
52 |
| House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance (N.B.: This paper has been extended and results are now contained in working paper 14.08.) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
88 |
| In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
521 |
| In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
194 |
| Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
65 |
| Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
55 |
| Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
207 |
| Manipulation via Capacities Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
7 |
9 |
74 |
| Manipulation via Capacities Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
7 |
8 |
69 |
| Matching Markets under (In)complete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
79 |
| Matching Markets under (In)complete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
161 |
| Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
340 |
| Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
376 |
| Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
33 |
| Normative properties for object allocation problems: Characterizations and trade-offs |
0 |
0 |
2 |
84 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
184 |
| Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
62 |
| Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
131 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
385 |
| Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
38 |
| Oligarchies in Spatial Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
65 |
| Oligarchies in Spatial Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
| Oligarchies in spatial environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
110 |
| On (constrained) Efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment |
0 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
2 |
3 |
16 |
21 |
| On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
131 |
| On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
151 |
| Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
61 |
| Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
23 |
| Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
107 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
326 |
| Organizing time banks: Lessons from matching markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
34 |
| Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
141 |
| Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
201 |
| Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
259 |
| Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
235 |
| Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
78 |
| Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
74 |
| Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
63 |
| Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
221 |
| Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
172 |
| Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
161 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
715 |
| Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
81 |
| Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools |
0 |
0 |
2 |
96 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
283 |
| Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets: A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
69 |
| Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
83 |
| Robust design in monotonic matching markets: A case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
28 |
| Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
31 |
| School Choice with Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
71 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
198 |
| School Choice with Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
68 |
| School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
207 |
| School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
153 |
| School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
200 |
| School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds versus Soft Bounds |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
117 |
| Sharing a River among Satiable Countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
71 |
| Sharing a River among Satiable Countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
228 |
| Sharing a river among satiable countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
307 |
| Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
61 |
| Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
68 |
| Strategy-Proof and Envy-Free Random Assignment |
1 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
16 |
| Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
65 |
| Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
58 |
| Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
101 |
| Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
72 |
| Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
6 |
9 |
14 |
22 |
| Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
38 |
| The impact of price disclosure on dynamic shopping decisions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
316 |
| Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
14 |
| Throughput rate optimization in high multiplicity sequencing problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
272 |
| Top Trading with Fixed Tie-Breaking in Markets with Indivisible Goods |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
1 |
7 |
10 |
119 |
| Top Trading with Fixed Tie-Breaking in Markets with Indivisible Goods |
0 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
89 |
| Top-Cycle Rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
172 |
| Top-Cycle Rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
43 |
| Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
114 |
| Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
88 |
| Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
4 |
7 |
8 |
108 |
| Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A mechanism design approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
52 |
| Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
59 |
| Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems |
0 |
0 |
2 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
94 |
| Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
116 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
368 |
| Total Working Papers |
1 |
3 |
40 |
6,162 |
136 |
388 |
697 |
22,875 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
3 |
9 |
23 |
78 |
| A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
56 |
| An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
| Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
3 |
5 |
12 |
125 |
| Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient, Stable, and Maximum Matchings |
1 |
1 |
3 |
20 |
7 |
12 |
16 |
54 |
| Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
5 |
17 |
23 |
245 |
| Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
250 |
| Choosing wisely: the natural multi-bidding mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
5 |
7 |
11 |
118 |
| Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
278 |
| Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems |
0 |
0 |
2 |
38 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
148 |
| Consistent House Allocation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
111 |
| Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
53 |
| Corrigendum to “Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems” |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
52 |
| Efficient assignment respecting priorities |
1 |
1 |
1 |
119 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
267 |
| Efficient priority rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
170 |
| En sundhedsøkonomisk analyse af antallet af røntgenundersøgelser af lænderyggen hos 20-49 årige henvist fra primærsektoren |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
10 |
| Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
| Externalities, potential, value and consistency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
154 |
| Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
69 |
| Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
| In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
98 |
| Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
178 |
| Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
96 |
| Indifference and the uniform rule |
0 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
90 |
| Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities |
0 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
71 |
| Manipulation via capacities revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
100 |
| Matching markets under (in)complete information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
98 |
| Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
8 |
| Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
134 |
| Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
163 |
| Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
4 |
4 |
6 |
179 |
| Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
54 |
| Oligarchies in spatial environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
119 |
| On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
66 |
| Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
35 |
| Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
125 |
| Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
58 |
| Regulation via the Polluter‐pays Principle |
0 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
3 |
5 |
10 |
84 |
| Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
371 |
| Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
131 |
| Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
19 |
| School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds |
1 |
3 |
10 |
97 |
3 |
11 |
36 |
354 |
| Sharing a river among satiable agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
259 |
| Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
| Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
125 |
| Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
212 |
| Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
12 |
| Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
208 |
| Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
70 |
| Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
54 |
| Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
89 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
304 |
| Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: District-based versus school-based admissions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
| Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
| Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
103 |
| Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
13 |
45 |
| Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A market design approach |
0 |
1 |
3 |
47 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
126 |
| Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems |
0 |
1 |
3 |
82 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
216 |
| Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules |
0 |
0 |
1 |
114 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
234 |
| Total Journal Articles |
4 |
12 |
39 |
1,874 |
94 |
212 |
425 |
6,874 |
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