Access Statistics for Jeffrey Ely

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Model of Price Discrimination under Loss Aversion and State-Contingent Reference Points 0 0 0 41 0 4 4 82
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma 0 0 0 204 2 5 7 842
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 170 2 6 6 494
Bad Reputation 0 0 0 534 4 5 6 1,356
Bad Reputation 0 0 0 318 0 5 7 719
Bad Reputation 0 0 0 16 3 5 6 86
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 2 4 7 208
Common Learning 0 0 0 63 5 9 10 210
Common Learning 0 0 0 89 4 4 5 317
Common Learning 0 0 0 24 1 6 11 143
Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence 0 0 0 15 9 9 10 89
Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring 0 0 0 106 2 2 3 431
Critical Types 0 0 1 6 3 4 8 32
Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 161 2 5 9 450
Evolution of Preferences 0 0 0 405 6 18 23 1,152
Evolution with Diverse Preferences 0 0 1 54 2 3 6 307
Evolution with diverse preferences 0 0 0 58 1 5 6 256
Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design 0 0 3 431 0 2 10 1,132
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 0 81 6 11 11 298
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 0 134 4 6 7 720
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 1 170 4 7 12 596
HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 0 0 0 34 1 6 7 91
Implementation with Near-Complete Information 0 0 0 86 7 9 10 414
Kludged 0 0 0 55 4 8 8 149
Kludged 0 0 0 2 1 3 3 29
Kludged 0 0 0 0 6 11 11 36
Local Conventions 0 0 0 8 4 6 9 43
Local Conventions 0 0 0 171 6 7 8 736
Mechanism Design Without Revenue Equivalence 0 0 2 18 6 6 12 84
Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences 0 0 0 213 2 4 6 701
Optimal Contracts for Loss Averse Consumers 0 0 0 24 1 4 4 86
Overbooking 0 2 2 48 4 9 13 161
Rationalizabilty and Approximate Common-Knowledge 0 0 0 59 3 4 4 169
Sniping and squatting in auction markets 0 0 0 13 2 11 13 147
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 104
Torture 0 0 0 31 3 6 6 185
Torture 0 0 0 84 1 1 4 263
When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 235 2 2 2 626
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 108 4 7 10 458
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 144 4 4 10 400
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 58 0 2 2 283
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 10 3 6 6 97
Total Working Papers 0 2 10 4,557 126 241 323 15,182
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma 0 0 3 191 4 7 12 449
A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points 0 0 0 9 1 5 9 106
Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets 0 0 0 21 2 5 7 124
Bad Reputation 0 2 10 497 1 8 35 1,383
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 180 4 11 12 583
Common Learning 0 0 0 94 4 7 11 291
Common learning with intertemporal dependence 0 0 0 6 3 5 7 46
Critical Types 0 0 2 7 0 1 11 58
Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory 0 0 0 73 6 11 13 187
Evolution of Preferences -super-1 0 0 0 103 4 7 15 318
Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 0 116 1 5 9 485
Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability 0 0 0 97 4 7 9 328
Implementation with Near-Complete Information 0 0 0 69 6 6 6 363
Kludged 0 0 0 16 4 10 11 156
Local Conventions 0 0 2 95 5 7 14 396
Mechanism design without revenue equivalence 0 0 3 28 4 9 16 134
Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a Memory Kludge 0 0 0 21 1 5 6 169
Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences 0 0 0 66 1 3 7 231
Note on unawareness: Negative Introspection versus AU Introspection (and KU Introspection) 0 0 0 6 1 2 4 62
Sniping and Squatting in Auction Markets 0 0 2 85 5 14 20 375
Suspense and Surprise 1 3 11 180 6 14 52 657
Torture and the Commitment Problem 0 0 0 16 2 4 13 128
When is reputation bad? 0 0 1 112 4 6 13 318
Total Journal Articles 1 5 34 2,088 73 159 312 7,347

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Statistics updated 2026-02-12