Access Statistics for Jeffrey Ely

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Model of Price Discrimination under Loss Aversion and State-Contingent Reference Points 0 0 0 41 1 3 5 83
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma 0 0 0 204 0 2 7 842
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 170 0 5 6 494
Bad Reputation 0 0 0 318 2 2 9 721
Bad Reputation 0 0 0 16 0 5 6 86
Bad Reputation 0 0 0 534 1 5 7 1,357
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 0 3 7 208
Common Learning 0 0 0 63 1 9 11 211
Common Learning 0 0 0 24 0 5 9 143
Common Learning 0 0 0 89 1 5 5 318
Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence 0 0 0 15 0 9 10 89
Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring 0 0 0 106 0 2 3 431
Critical Types 0 0 1 6 0 4 7 32
Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 161 1 6 9 451
Evolution of Preferences 0 0 0 405 2 13 24 1,154
Evolution with Diverse Preferences 0 0 1 54 0 3 6 307
Evolution with diverse preferences 0 0 0 58 2 5 8 258
Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design 0 0 3 431 3 4 13 1,135
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 0 81 0 11 11 298
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 1 170 2 8 14 598
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 0 134 2 8 9 722
HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 0 0 0 34 0 4 7 91
Implementation with Near-Complete Information 0 0 0 86 2 11 12 416
Kludged 0 0 0 0 0 9 11 36
Kludged 0 0 0 55 1 9 9 150
Kludged 0 0 0 2 1 3 4 30
Local Conventions 0 0 0 171 2 9 10 738
Local Conventions 0 0 0 8 0 6 8 43
Mechanism Design Without Revenue Equivalence 0 0 2 18 2 8 14 86
Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences 0 0 0 213 1 4 7 702
Optimal Contracts for Loss Averse Consumers 0 0 0 24 2 4 6 88
Overbooking 0 1 2 48 0 7 13 161
Rationalizabilty and Approximate Common-Knowledge 0 0 0 59 0 4 4 169
Sniping and squatting in auction markets 0 0 0 13 4 15 17 151
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 15 1 1 2 105
Torture 0 0 0 84 0 1 4 263
Torture 0 0 0 31 1 6 7 186
When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 235 1 3 3 627
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 144 1 5 8 401
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 58 0 0 2 283
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 108 1 5 11 459
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 10 0 5 6 97
Total Working Papers 0 1 10 4,557 38 236 351 15,220
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma 0 0 3 191 0 4 12 449
A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points 0 0 0 9 1 4 9 107
Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets 0 0 0 21 1 5 8 125
Bad Reputation 0 0 9 497 1 5 34 1,384
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 180 2 12 14 585
Common Learning 0 0 0 94 0 6 11 291
Common learning with intertemporal dependence 0 0 0 6 0 4 7 46
Critical Types 0 0 1 7 1 2 10 59
Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory 0 0 0 73 1 9 14 188
Evolution of Preferences -super-1 0 0 0 103 2 7 17 320
Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 0 116 0 4 9 485
Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability 0 0 0 97 1 8 10 329
Implementation with Near-Complete Information 0 0 0 69 0 6 6 363
Kludged 0 0 0 16 2 12 13 158
Local Conventions 0 0 2 95 1 7 15 397
Mechanism design without revenue equivalence 0 0 2 28 0 5 15 134
Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a Memory Kludge 0 0 0 21 0 3 6 169
Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences 0 0 0 66 0 3 7 231
Note on unawareness: Negative Introspection versus AU Introspection (and KU Introspection) 0 0 0 6 0 1 4 62
Sniping and Squatting in Auction Markets 0 0 2 85 2 10 22 377
Suspense and Surprise 1 3 12 181 3 13 54 660
Torture and the Commitment Problem 0 0 0 16 1 4 13 129
When is reputation bad? 0 0 1 112 3 7 15 321
Total Journal Articles 1 3 32 2,089 22 141 325 7,369

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-03-04