Access Statistics for Jeffrey Ely

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Model of Price Discrimination under Loss Aversion and State-Contingent Reference Points 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 78
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma 0 0 0 204 0 0 1 835
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 170 0 0 1 488
Bad Reputation 0 0 0 318 0 0 1 712
Bad Reputation 0 0 1 534 0 0 1 1,350
Bad Reputation 0 0 0 16 0 0 7 80
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 0 0 1 201
Common Learning 0 0 0 24 0 0 2 134
Common Learning 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 200
Common Learning 0 0 0 89 0 0 1 313
Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence 0 0 0 15 0 0 2 79
Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring 0 0 0 106 0 1 3 429
Critical Types 0 1 1 6 0 1 5 27
Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 161 0 1 3 444
Evolution of Preferences 0 0 0 405 1 1 3 1,132
Evolution with Diverse Preferences 0 1 3 54 0 2 4 303
Evolution with diverse preferences 0 0 0 58 0 0 2 250
Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design 0 0 4 430 0 1 11 1,125
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 0 169 0 0 1 584
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 1 134 0 0 2 713
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 0 81 0 0 1 287
HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 0 0 0 34 0 1 1 85
Implementation with Near-Complete Information 0 0 0 86 0 0 0 404
Kludged 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 26
Kludged 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 25
Kludged 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 141
Local Conventions 0 0 0 171 0 0 0 728
Local Conventions 0 0 0 8 1 1 2 36
Mechanism Design Without Revenue Equivalence 0 0 0 16 0 1 6 73
Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences 0 0 0 213 0 0 0 695
Optimal Contracts for Loss Averse Consumers 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 82
Overbooking 0 0 0 46 0 1 1 149
Rationalizabilty and Approximate Common-Knowledge 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 165
Sniping and squatting in auction markets 0 0 0 13 0 1 5 136
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 103
Torture 0 0 0 31 0 0 4 179
Torture 0 0 0 84 0 2 3 261
When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 235 0 0 0 624
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 281
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 108 0 0 0 448
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 144 0 1 4 394
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 91
Total Working Papers 0 2 10 4,551 2 15 80 14,890
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma 0 3 6 191 0 3 8 442
A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 98
Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets 0 0 0 21 0 0 1 117
Bad Reputation 3 5 19 493 3 11 36 1,362
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 180 0 1 1 572
Common Learning 0 0 0 94 0 0 1 280
Common learning with intertemporal dependence 0 0 0 6 0 1 2 40
Critical Types 0 1 2 7 2 4 7 53
Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory 0 0 0 73 0 0 6 174
Evolution of Preferences -super-1 0 0 0 103 0 1 4 305
Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 2 116 0 2 6 478
Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability 0 0 0 97 1 2 3 321
Implementation with Near-Complete Information 0 0 0 69 0 0 2 357
Kludged 0 0 0 16 1 1 2 146
Local Conventions 0 0 0 93 0 1 2 384
Mechanism design without revenue equivalence 0 1 2 27 0 2 4 121
Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a Memory Kludge 0 0 0 21 1 1 3 164
Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences 0 0 0 66 0 1 4 226
Note on unawareness: Negative Introspection versus AU Introspection (and KU Introspection) 0 0 1 6 0 1 6 60
Sniping and Squatting in Auction Markets 0 0 0 83 1 2 3 357
Suspense and Surprise 0 1 20 172 3 9 50 623
Torture and the Commitment Problem 0 0 0 16 1 3 8 120
When is reputation bad? 0 0 1 111 0 2 7 308
Total Journal Articles 3 11 53 2,070 13 48 168 7,108

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Statistics updated 2025-07-04