Access Statistics for Jeffrey Ely

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Model of Price Discrimination under Loss Aversion and State-Contingent Reference Points 0 0 0 41 4 5 9 87
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma 0 0 0 204 3 3 10 845
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 170 3 3 9 497
Bad Reputation 0 0 0 318 2 4 11 723
Bad Reputation 0 0 0 534 1 3 9 1,359
Bad Reputation 0 0 0 16 1 1 7 87
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 61 3 5 12 213
Common Learning 0 0 0 24 1 3 12 146
Common Learning 0 0 0 63 2 3 13 213
Common Learning 0 0 0 89 2 3 7 320
Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence 0 0 0 15 2 2 12 91
Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring 0 0 0 106 2 2 5 433
Critical Types 0 0 0 6 2 3 8 35
Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 161 4 5 11 455
Evolution of Preferences 0 0 0 405 3 8 29 1,160
Evolution with Diverse Preferences 0 0 1 54 0 0 5 307
Evolution with diverse preferences 0 0 0 58 1 4 10 260
Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design 0 1 2 432 2 7 14 1,139
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 0 81 2 3 14 301
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 0 134 5 8 15 728
Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 1 170 2 4 16 600
HIERARCHIES OF BELIEF AND INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY 0 0 0 34 3 6 13 97
Implementation with Near-Complete Information 0 0 0 86 3 6 16 420
Kludged 0 0 0 2 1 2 5 31
Kludged 0 0 0 55 1 2 10 151
Kludged 0 0 0 0 2 2 13 38
Local Conventions 0 0 0 8 3 3 11 46
Local Conventions 0 0 0 171 2 4 12 740
Mechanism Design Without Revenue Equivalence 0 0 2 18 1 3 15 87
Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences 0 0 0 213 0 1 7 702
Optimal Contracts for Loss Averse Consumers 0 0 0 24 2 4 8 90
Overbooking 0 0 2 48 2 4 17 165
Rationalizabilty and Approximate Common-Knowledge 0 0 0 59 1 1 5 170
Sniping and squatting in auction markets 0 0 0 13 8 20 32 167
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 15 4 5 6 109
Torture 0 0 0 84 0 0 4 263
Torture 0 0 0 31 2 3 9 188
When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 235 1 3 5 629
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 108 0 2 12 460
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 144 1 2 8 402
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 58 3 3 5 286
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 10 4 5 11 102
Total Working Papers 0 1 8 4,558 91 160 462 15,342
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma 0 0 0 191 3 5 12 454
A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points 0 0 0 9 2 4 12 110
Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets 0 0 0 21 2 5 12 129
Bad Reputation 1 2 10 499 2 4 33 1,387
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games 0 0 0 180 2 4 16 587
Common Learning 0 0 0 94 2 4 15 295
Common learning with intertemporal dependence 0 0 0 6 1 1 8 47
Critical Types 0 0 0 7 2 4 11 62
Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory 0 0 0 73 3 4 17 191
Evolution of Preferences -super-1 0 0 0 103 1 6 19 324
Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 0 116 4 6 14 491
Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability 0 0 0 97 0 2 11 330
Implementation with Near-Complete Information 0 0 0 69 2 2 8 365
Kludged 0 0 0 16 4 6 17 162
Local Conventions 0 0 2 95 1 2 14 398
Mechanism design without revenue equivalence 0 0 2 28 2 5 20 139
Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a Memory Kludge 0 0 0 21 1 1 7 170
Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences 0 0 0 66 3 3 8 234
Note on unawareness: Negative Introspection versus AU Introspection (and KU Introspection) 0 0 0 6 5 5 8 67
Sniping and Squatting in Auction Markets 0 0 2 85 2 6 25 381
Suspense and Surprise 0 3 11 183 2 11 51 668
Torture and the Commitment Problem 0 0 0 16 1 2 11 130
When is reputation bad? 0 0 1 112 0 5 16 323
Total Journal Articles 1 5 28 2,093 47 97 365 7,444

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06