| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
557 |
| Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
155 |
| Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
157 |
| Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
5 |
14 |
220 |
| Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
229 |
| Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
6 |
16 |
189 |
| Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
159 |
| Conditional versus Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
194 |
| Conditional versus Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
803 |
| Credence Goods Monopolists |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
84 |
| Credence Goods Monopolists |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
386 |
| Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
16 |
610 |
| Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
411 |
| Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
318 |
| Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
0 |
6 |
16 |
214 |
| Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
118 |
| Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
651 |
| Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
401 |
| GOOD TIMES, BAD TIMES, AND VERTICAL UPSTREAM INTEGRATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
375 |
| Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
119 |
| Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
151 |
| Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
451 |
| Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
41 |
| Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
14 |
| Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
458 |
| Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
164 |
| Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
118 |
| Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
5 |
15 |
74 |
| Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
236 |
| Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
153 |
| Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
837 |
| Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
87 |
| Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
188 |
| Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
149 |
| Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
64 |
| Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
56 |
| Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
81 |
| Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
51 |
| Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
136 |
| Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
1,279 |
| Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
186 |
| Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
141 |
| Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
489 |
| Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
770 |
| Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
55 |
| Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
38 |
| Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs |
0 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
46 |
| Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
4 |
18 |
63 |
| Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
39 |
| Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
813 |
| Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
256 |
| The Economics of Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
14 |
| The Economics of Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
| The Economics of Advice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
22 |
| The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
320 |
| The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
202 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
810 |
| The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
75 |
| The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
93 |
| The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
98 |
| The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
204 |
1 |
5 |
15 |
910 |
| The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
341 |
0 |
8 |
16 |
1,735 |
| The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
7 |
27 |
253 |
| The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
4 |
18 |
356 |
| The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
177 |
| The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
257 |
| The market for used cars: A new test of the lemons model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
887 |
| Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
28 |
| Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version] |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
18 |
| Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
1 |
1 |
58 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
259 |
| Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
49 |
| Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
210 |
| Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
97 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
2 |
8 |
2,825 |
29 |
238 |
786 |
20,709 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| 12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
73 |
| A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
157 |
| Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
30 |
| An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
131 |
| Asset prices and public information: An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
107 |
| Conditional versus contingent fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
2 |
5 |
12 |
411 |
| Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts |
0 |
0 |
7 |
183 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
727 |
| Credence goods monopolists |
1 |
1 |
3 |
164 |
3 |
6 |
21 |
438 |
| Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
87 |
| Escalating penalties for repeat offenders |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
89 |
| Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
165 |
| Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
69 |
| Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
273 |
| Holler, Manfred und Illing, Gerhard: Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer‐Verlag 1991. 366 S. DM 49.80 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
| Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
14 |
| Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
81 |
| Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
139 |
| Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
63 |
| Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
58 |
| Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
9 |
12 |
252 |
| On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
145 |
| On the Limitation of Warranty Duration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
338 |
| Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
79 |
| PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO-STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
1 |
8 |
22 |
77 |
| Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
291 |
| Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
124 |
| Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
123 |
| Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
10 |
| Strategic communication with reporting costs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
6 |
15 |
36 |
| Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
322 |
| The Economics of Advice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
6 |
| The Theory of Warranty Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
16 |
376 |
| The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
2 |
6 |
14 |
69 |
| The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon |
0 |
0 |
2 |
91 |
0 |
11 |
33 |
355 |
| The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
164 |
| Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
106 |
| Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
7 |
12 |
184 |
| US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services |
0 |
0 |
2 |
54 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
257 |
| Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem |
0 |
0 |
2 |
99 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
445 |
| Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
9 |
25 |
72 |
| Total Journal Articles |
1 |
1 |
22 |
1,270 |
31 |
150 |
483 |
6,953 |
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