Access Statistics for Winand Emons

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 73 0 2 2 543
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures 0 0 0 16 0 0 2 144
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures 0 0 0 43 1 1 1 148
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures 0 0 0 21 0 2 2 208
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 20 0 1 2 150
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 35 0 3 10 176
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 215
Conditional versus Contingent Fees 0 0 0 151 1 1 2 793
Conditional versus Contingent Fees 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 187
Credence Goods Monopolists 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 381
Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 595
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 43 0 1 2 398
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 27 0 1 3 199
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 41 1 1 2 307
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 110
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 63 0 0 2 389
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 643
GOOD TIMES, BAD TIMES, AND VERTICAL UPSTREAM INTEGRATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 369
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 109
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 143
Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 444
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 34
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 68 0 0 2 446
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 159
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 59
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 30 0 1 2 104
Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 228
Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 142
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 99 0 0 1 833
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 64 0 0 1 136
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 83
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 38 0 1 1 180
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 52
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 113 0 0 6 71
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 26 0 1 1 33
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence 0 1 1 18 1 2 4 118
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence 0 1 1 4 0 1 2 40
Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony 0 0 0 70 0 1 3 1,273
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 38 0 0 1 176
Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 131
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 80 0 0 2 482
Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 761
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions 0 0 1 14 0 0 1 41
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions 0 0 0 30 0 0 2 32
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 37
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 5 1 2 2 47
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 6 1 2 3 26
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 78 0 0 1 804
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 248
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 11
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 6
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 308
The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees 0 0 1 202 1 2 3 803
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 67
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion 0 0 0 49 0 1 1 81
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 341 0 0 3 1,719
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 88
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 204 0 2 2 897
The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 226
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 168
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 338
The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 253
The market for used cars: A new test of the lemons model 0 0 0 108 1 1 2 875
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 1 57 0 2 7 247
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 20 0 1 2 42
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 30 0 1 6 205
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 87
Total Working Papers 0 2 6 2,798 8 39 116 19,854
6 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995 0 0 0 4 0 0 5 70
A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders 0 0 0 36 0 0 3 145
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 21
An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts 0 0 0 59 0 0 2 128
Asset prices and public information: An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 98
Conditional versus contingent fees 0 0 0 70 1 1 2 400
Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts 1 3 4 179 1 5 13 672
Credence goods monopolists 0 0 1 161 0 1 3 418
Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals 0 0 1 29 0 0 5 83
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders 0 0 0 16 1 1 3 80
Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort 0 0 0 52 0 0 2 155
Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 62
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 59 0 2 2 265
Holler, Manfred und Illing, Gerhard: Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer‐Verlag 1991. 366 S. DM 49.80 0 0 1 2 0 3 5 7
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 14 0 1 2 74
Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz 0 0 0 27 0 0 3 133
Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 54
Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung 0 0 0 11 0 0 2 51
Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality 0 0 0 22 0 1 7 241
On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical 0 0 0 28 0 2 2 135
On the Limitation of Warranty Duration 0 0 1 49 0 0 1 332
Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 1 7 1 1 5 69
PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO-STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 0 1 1 3 0 4 7 59
Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony 0 0 0 2 0 2 3 282
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 118
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 119
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Strategic communication with reporting costs 1 1 1 7 1 4 4 25
Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 34 0 1 1 315
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The Theory of Warranty Contracts 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 361
The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion 0 0 4 16 0 3 10 59
The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon 0 0 1 89 1 6 10 328
The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 159
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 94
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 173
US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services 0 0 1 52 0 0 5 241
Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem 0 1 2 98 1 4 9 438
Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 47
Total Journal Articles 2 6 19 1,255 8 47 127 6,520
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Swiss Competition Policy in the Last Decade 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
The optimal amount of distorted testimony when the arbiter can and cannot commit 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 11
Total Chapters 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 19

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Statistics updated 2025-10-06