Access Statistics for Winand Emons

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 73 1 4 16 557
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures 0 0 0 16 2 5 12 155
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures 0 0 0 43 4 5 10 157
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures 0 0 0 21 4 6 14 220
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 35 5 5 15 188
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 20 0 0 10 158
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 50 1 6 14 229
Conditional versus Contingent Fees 0 0 0 151 4 4 12 803
Conditional versus Contingent Fees 0 0 0 36 2 3 7 194
Credence Goods Monopolists 0 0 0 16 1 2 7 83
Credence Goods Monopolists 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 386
Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts 0 0 0 0 0 2 14 608
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 43 3 4 13 410
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 1 28 4 7 16 214
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 41 1 6 11 317
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 0 3 3 9 118
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 63 4 4 11 400
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 650
GOOD TIMES, BAD TIMES, AND VERTICAL UPSTREAM INTEGRATION 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 374
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 26 2 3 8 151
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 18 5 5 10 119
Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 450
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 39
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 0 2 3 9 13
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 68 3 5 12 458
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 163
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 30 3 5 15 118
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 8 2 8 15 74
Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade 0 0 0 0 3 3 9 236
Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality 0 0 0 53 2 5 11 153
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 64 1 5 14 149
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 99 1 1 3 836
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 12 1 2 4 87
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 38 3 3 9 188
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality 0 0 1 16 0 2 13 64
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 26 1 6 24 56
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 113 2 4 13 81
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence 0 0 1 4 1 6 11 50
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence 0 0 1 18 2 7 20 136
Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony 0 0 0 70 2 3 6 1,278
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 38 3 4 10 186
Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 22 2 3 9 140
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 80 1 1 6 488
Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 0 2 2 8 769
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions 0 0 0 14 3 6 14 55
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions 0 0 0 30 2 2 7 38
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 1 1 17 0 3 8 45
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 5 2 4 18 63
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 6 3 4 14 38
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 22 1 2 8 256
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 78 3 4 8 812
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 7
The Economics of Advice 0 0 1 29 2 3 10 21
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 1 2 10 14
The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees 0 0 0 53 3 5 11 319
The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees 0 0 0 202 2 4 8 809
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion 0 0 0 29 0 3 8 75
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion 0 0 0 49 2 7 13 93
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 1 5 6 10 98
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 341 5 12 16 1,735
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 204 3 6 14 909
The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony 0 0 0 33 2 17 27 253
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony 0 0 0 24 3 15 18 356
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony 0 0 0 15 2 2 8 176
The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 257
The market for used cars: A new test of the lemons model 0 0 0 108 2 6 13 887
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 1 1 3 1 3 6 28
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version] 0 0 0 3 1 2 3 18
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 1 1 1 58 3 3 15 259
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 12 1 2 10 97
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 30 0 1 8 210
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 20 3 4 8 49
Total Working Papers 1 3 8 2,825 148 295 767 20,680
3 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995 0 0 0 4 1 1 3 73
A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders 0 0 0 36 4 5 14 157
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 3 2 4 8 29
An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts 0 0 0 59 0 0 4 131
Asset prices and public information: An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles 0 0 0 27 3 3 7 105
Conditional versus contingent fees 0 0 0 70 3 3 10 409
Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts 0 1 7 183 2 5 62 727
Credence goods monopolists 0 1 2 163 3 4 18 435
Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals 0 0 0 29 2 2 3 85
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders 0 0 1 17 0 2 10 89
Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort 0 0 0 52 2 3 9 164
Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 7 2 2 8 69
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 59 0 0 10 273
Holler, Manfred und Illing, Gerhard: Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer‐Verlag 1991. 366 S. DM 49.80 0 0 0 2 1 3 6 10
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 11
Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 14 1 4 9 81
Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz 0 0 0 27 0 1 6 139
Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade 0 0 0 3 1 3 10 62
Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung 0 0 0 11 1 2 6 56
Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality 0 0 0 22 5 7 10 250
On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical 0 0 0 28 2 4 12 145
On the Limitation of Warranty Duration 0 0 0 49 0 0 6 338
Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 7 2 2 10 78
PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO-STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 0 0 2 4 6 7 22 76
Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony 0 0 0 2 2 5 10 290
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 19 1 1 6 124
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 0 3 3 4 123
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations 0 0 0 0 3 4 5 9
Strategic communication with reporting costs 0 0 1 7 6 6 15 36
Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 34 1 1 8 322
The Economics of Advice 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 6
The Theory of Warranty Contracts 0 0 0 0 7 9 16 375
The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion 0 0 1 16 2 4 12 67
The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon 0 0 2 91 9 16 33 355
The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design 0 0 0 46 1 1 5 164
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 13 4 4 11 105
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 8 5 6 10 182
US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services 0 0 2 54 2 3 16 257
Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem 0 0 2 99 1 2 11 445
Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts 0 0 0 3 2 13 23 70
Total Journal Articles 0 2 21 1,269 95 148 460 6,922
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Swiss Competition Policy in the Last Decade 0 0 0 0 2 5 12 19
The optimal amount of distorted testimony when the arbiter can and cannot commit 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 15
Total Chapters 0 0 0 2 4 7 16 34

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06