Access Statistics for Winand Emons

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 73 0 1 17 558
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures 0 0 0 16 1 1 12 156
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures 0 0 0 43 0 0 10 157
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures 0 0 0 21 0 1 15 221
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 35 0 1 14 189
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 50 0 0 14 229
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 20 0 1 9 159
Conditional versus Contingent Fees 0 0 0 36 0 0 7 194
Conditional versus Contingent Fees 0 0 0 151 1 2 13 805
Credence Goods Monopolists 0 0 0 16 0 1 6 84
Credence Goods Monopolists 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 386
Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts 0 0 0 0 1 4 18 612
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 41 0 1 12 318
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 1 28 1 1 17 215
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 43 1 2 15 412
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 63 0 1 12 401
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 118
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 651
GOOD TIMES, BAD TIMES, AND VERTICAL UPSTREAM INTEGRATION 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 375
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 18 0 0 10 119
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 26 0 0 8 151
Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 451
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 41
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 14
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 164
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 68 0 0 12 458
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 30 0 0 15 118
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 8 0 0 15 74
Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 236
Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality 0 0 0 53 0 0 11 153
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 99 0 1 4 837
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 38 0 0 8 188
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 12 0 0 4 87
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 64 0 0 13 149
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality 0 0 1 16 0 0 12 64
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 113 1 2 12 83
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 26 0 2 26 58
Optional Fee-Shifting 14 14 14 14 3 3 3 3
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 4 0 1 11 51
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 18 0 1 20 137
Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony 0 0 0 70 0 1 7 1,279
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 38 0 0 10 186
Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 22 0 1 10 141
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 80 0 1 7 489
Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 770
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions 0 0 0 14 0 1 15 56
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions 0 0 0 30 0 1 7 39
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 1 17 0 1 9 46
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 6 0 1 15 39
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 5 0 0 17 63
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 22 0 0 8 256
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 78 0 2 10 814
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 14
The Economics of Advice 0 0 1 29 1 2 12 23
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7
The Economics of Litigation Financing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees 0 0 0 53 0 2 13 321
The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees 0 0 0 202 0 1 9 810
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion 0 0 0 49 0 0 13 93
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion 0 0 0 29 0 0 8 75
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 341 0 0 16 1,735
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 204 0 2 15 911
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 1 0 1 11 99
The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony 0 0 0 33 0 1 28 254
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony 0 0 0 15 0 1 9 177
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony 0 0 0 24 0 0 18 356
The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 257
The market for used cars: A new test of the lemons model 0 0 0 108 0 0 13 887
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 1 3 0 0 6 28
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version] 0 1 1 4 0 1 3 19
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 1 58 0 0 13 259
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 20 0 0 7 49
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 30 0 1 6 211
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 12 0 0 10 97
Total Working Papers 14 15 21 2,840 10 56 792 20,736
3 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995 0 0 0 4 1 1 4 74
A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders 0 0 0 36 0 0 12 157
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 3 0 1 9 30
An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts 0 0 0 59 0 0 3 131
Asset prices and public information: An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles 0 0 0 27 1 3 10 108
Conditional versus contingent fees 0 0 0 70 1 4 14 413
Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts 0 0 6 183 1 2 60 729
Credence goods monopolists 0 1 3 164 1 4 22 439
Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals 0 0 0 29 1 4 6 89
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders 0 0 1 17 0 0 10 89
Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort 0 0 0 52 0 1 10 165
Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 7 0 0 8 69
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 59 1 1 9 274
Holler, Manfred und Illing, Gerhard: Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer‐Verlag 1991. 366 S. DM 49.80 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 10
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 15
Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 14 0 0 7 81
Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz 0 0 0 27 0 0 6 139
Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade 0 0 0 3 0 1 11 63
Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung 0 0 0 11 0 2 7 58
Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality 0 0 0 22 0 2 12 252
On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical 0 0 0 28 1 1 11 146
On the Limitation of Warranty Duration 0 0 0 49 1 1 7 339
Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 7 0 1 11 79
PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO-STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 0 0 1 4 0 1 19 77
Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony 0 0 0 2 1 5 13 295
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 19 0 0 6 124
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 123
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 11
Strategic communication with reporting costs 0 0 1 7 0 0 13 36
Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 34 0 0 8 322
The Economics of Advice 0 0 1 1 0 0 6 6
The Theory of Warranty Contracts 0 0 0 0 0 1 16 376
The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion 0 0 0 16 1 4 12 71
The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon 1 1 3 92 3 4 34 359
The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design 0 0 0 46 1 1 6 165
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 13 1 2 13 107
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 8 0 2 11 184
US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services 0 0 2 54 0 0 16 257
Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem 0 0 1 99 0 1 10 446
Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts 0 0 0 3 0 2 25 72
Total Journal Articles 1 2 19 1,271 17 58 482 6,980
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Swiss Competition Policy in the Last Decade 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 19
The optimal amount of distorted testimony when the arbiter can and cannot commit 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 15
Total Chapters 0 0 0 2 0 0 15 34

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-08-07