Access Statistics for Winand Emons

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 73 0 0 0 541
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 142
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 147
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 206
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 35 0 3 4 163
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 215
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 148
Conditional versus Contingent Fees 0 0 0 151 0 0 0 791
Conditional versus Contingent Fees 0 0 0 36 0 0 3 187
Credence Goods Monopolists 0 0 1 16 0 0 3 73
Credence Goods Monopolists 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 380
Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 589
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 196
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 43 0 1 3 396
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 41 0 0 1 304
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 387
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 109
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 643
GOOD TIMES, BAD TIMES, AND VERTICAL UPSTREAM INTEGRATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 369
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 143
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 109
Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 443
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 157
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 68 0 0 2 444
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 59
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 102
Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 227
Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality 0 0 0 53 0 1 3 142
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 1 99 0 0 3 832
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 179
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 81
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 64 0 0 1 135
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 51
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 1 26 0 0 1 31
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 1 113 0 0 2 65
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 38
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 17 0 3 11 113
Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony 0 0 0 70 0 0 0 1,270
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 175
Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 131
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 480
Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 761
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions 0 0 1 30 0 0 2 30
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 40
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 45
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 37
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 23
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 248
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 78 0 0 1 803
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
The Economics of Advice 0 1 3 28 0 1 3 11
The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 308
The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees 0 0 0 201 0 0 0 799
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion 0 0 0 29 0 0 3 65
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion 0 0 0 49 0 0 2 79
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 341 0 1 4 1,716
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 1 204 0 0 2 895
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 84
The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 226
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 167
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony 0 0 1 24 0 0 1 338
The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 253
The market for used cars: A new test of the lemons model 0 0 0 108 0 0 1 872
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 21
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version] 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 15
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 1 1 56 0 1 1 240
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 199
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 87
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 40
Total Working Papers 0 2 11 2,813 1 18 86 19,836
3 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 65
A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders 0 0 0 36 0 0 1 142
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 20
An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 126
Asset prices and public information: An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 98
Conditional versus contingent fees 0 0 1 70 0 0 1 398
Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts 1 1 3 174 1 2 11 658
Credence goods monopolists 0 0 5 159 0 0 9 414
Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals 0 0 1 28 0 0 1 78
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders 0 0 0 16 0 0 10 77
Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort 0 0 0 52 0 0 2 153
Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 61
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 263
Holler, Manfred und Illing, Gerhard: Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer‐Verlag 1991. 366 S. DM 49.80 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 14 0 0 2 72
Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 130
Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 52
Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung 0 0 1 11 0 0 1 49
Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality 0 0 0 22 0 1 7 231
On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 133
On the Limitation of Warranty Duration 0 0 1 48 0 1 2 331
Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 6 0 0 3 64
PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO-STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 52
Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 279
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 117
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 119
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
Strategic communication with reporting costs 1 1 2 6 2 2 3 21
Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 314
The Theory of Warranty Contracts 0 0 0 0 1 3 8 357
The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion 0 1 4 11 0 1 11 48
The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon 0 0 6 88 1 3 18 317
The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design 0 0 1 46 0 0 3 159
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 13 0 1 1 93
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 172
US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services 0 0 2 51 0 2 6 236
Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem 0 0 1 96 0 0 1 429
Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 46
Total Journal Articles 3 4 30 1,233 9 21 110 6,384
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Swiss Competition Policy in the Last Decade 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 7
The optimal amount of distorted testimony when the arbiter can and cannot commit 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 11
Total Chapters 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 18

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Statistics updated 2024-09-04