Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
541 |
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
142 |
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
206 |
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
158 |
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
215 |
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
148 |
Conditional versus Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
183 |
Conditional versus Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
791 |
Credence Goods Monopolists |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
69 |
Credence Goods Monopolists |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
379 |
Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
583 |
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
303 |
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
392 |
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
196 |
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
641 |
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation |
1 |
1 |
1 |
63 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
387 |
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
109 |
GOOD TIMES, BAD TIMES, AND VERTICAL UPSTREAM INTEGRATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
369 |
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
109 |
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
143 |
Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
443 |
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
442 |
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
155 |
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
227 |
Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
179 |
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
134 |
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal |
0 |
0 |
1 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
828 |
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
51 |
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
111 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
30 |
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
101 |
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
37 |
Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1,270 |
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
174 |
Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
131 |
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
479 |
Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
761 |
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
39 |
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
45 |
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
248 |
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
802 |
The Economics of Advice |
1 |
2 |
24 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
7 |
The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
308 |
The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees |
0 |
0 |
1 |
201 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
799 |
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
77 |
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model |
1 |
1 |
1 |
341 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
1,711 |
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model |
0 |
1 |
3 |
202 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
892 |
The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
226 |
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
167 |
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
337 |
The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
251 |
The market for used cars: A new test of the lemons model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
871 |
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version] |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
239 |
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
199 |
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
Total Working Papers |
3 |
5 |
36 |
2,797 |
12 |
29 |
104 |
19,726 |
Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
141 |
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
126 |
Asset prices and public information: An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
98 |
Conditional versus contingent fees |
0 |
0 |
2 |
69 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
394 |
Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts |
2 |
2 |
3 |
170 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
643 |
Credence goods monopolists |
0 |
1 |
5 |
152 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
402 |
Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
55 |
Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort |
0 |
0 |
2 |
52 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
150 |
Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
263 |
Holler, Manfred und Illing, Gerhard: Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer‐Verlag 1991. 366 S. DM 49.80 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
70 |
Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz |
1 |
1 |
1 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
130 |
Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
220 |
On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
132 |
On the Limitation of Warranty Duration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
328 |
Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
60 |
PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO-STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
279 |
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
117 |
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
Strategic communication with reporting costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
314 |
The Theory of Warranty Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
349 |
The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
37 |
The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon |
0 |
0 |
5 |
82 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
296 |
The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
156 |
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
172 |
US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
230 |
Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem |
0 |
0 |
1 |
95 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
427 |
Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
44 |
Total Journal Articles |
3 |
5 |
24 |
1,197 |
6 |
29 |
106 |
6,240 |