Access Statistics for Winand Emons

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 73 0 2 4 545
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures 0 0 0 16 1 1 3 145
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures 0 0 0 43 0 1 1 148
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures 0 0 0 21 2 3 5 211
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 50 0 1 1 216
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 20 1 3 5 153
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 35 0 1 5 177
Conditional versus Contingent Fees 0 0 0 151 0 1 2 793
Conditional versus Contingent Fees 0 0 0 36 1 1 1 188
Credence Goods Monopolists 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 381
Credence Goods Monopolists 0 0 0 16 0 0 4 78
Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 596
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 1 1 1 28 1 4 7 203
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 41 1 2 3 308
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 43 1 1 3 399
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 112
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 63 0 0 1 389
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 643
GOOD TIMES, BAD TIMES, AND VERTICAL UPSTREAM INTEGRATION 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 371
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 18 0 1 1 110
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 26 1 1 1 144
Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 447
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 35
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 5
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 68 1 1 1 447
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 160
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 59
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 30 2 2 4 106
Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 229
Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality 0 0 0 53 1 2 2 144
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 99 2 2 3 835
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 64 1 1 2 137
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 38 0 0 1 180
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 83
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality 0 1 1 16 1 4 5 56
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 113 0 0 6 71
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 26 2 2 3 35
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence 0 0 1 4 0 1 2 41
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence 0 0 1 18 3 5 8 122
Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony 0 0 0 70 0 0 3 1,273
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 38 2 2 3 178
Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 22 3 3 3 134
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 80 1 2 3 484
Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 764
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions 0 0 0 30 2 3 5 35
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions 0 0 1 14 4 4 5 45
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 5 6 9 10 55
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 16 2 2 2 39
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 6 5 6 7 31
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 78 3 3 4 807
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 22 0 1 1 249
The Economics of Advice 1 1 1 29 1 1 1 12
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 8
The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees 0 0 0 53 1 2 2 310
The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees 0 0 1 202 0 1 3 803
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion 0 0 0 49 0 1 2 82
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion 0 0 0 29 0 1 2 68
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 204 0 1 3 898
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 90
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 341 0 1 4 1,720
The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony 0 0 0 33 2 2 2 228
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony 0 0 0 15 1 3 3 171
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony 0 0 0 24 0 1 1 339
The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 254
The market for used cars: A new test of the lemons model 0 0 0 108 0 3 3 877
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 2 0 2 3 24
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version] 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 16
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 1 57 1 1 8 248
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 30 0 1 7 206
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 12 2 3 3 90
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 20 0 2 4 44
Total Working Papers 2 3 9 2,822 73 124 218 20,086
3 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 70
A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders 0 0 0 36 1 1 4 146
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 22
An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts 0 0 0 59 2 2 4 130
Asset prices and public information: An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles 0 0 0 27 1 2 2 100
Conditional versus contingent fees 0 0 0 70 1 3 4 402
Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts 0 1 4 179 3 6 18 677
Credence goods monopolists 0 0 0 161 1 4 6 422
Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals 0 0 1 29 0 0 4 83
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders 1 1 1 17 3 5 7 84
Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort 0 0 0 52 0 1 2 156
Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 7 1 2 3 64
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 59 1 1 3 266
Holler, Manfred und Illing, Gerhard: Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer‐Verlag 1991. 366 S. DM 49.80 0 0 1 2 0 0 5 7
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 7
Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 14 1 1 3 75
Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz 0 0 0 27 2 2 5 135
Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade 0 0 0 3 1 3 4 56
Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung 0 0 0 11 1 1 3 52
Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality 0 0 0 22 0 0 3 241
On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical 0 0 0 28 0 4 6 139
On the Limitation of Warranty Duration 0 0 1 49 1 1 2 333
Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 1 7 2 5 9 73
PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO-STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 0 1 2 4 3 4 11 63
Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 283
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 19 1 1 2 119
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 119
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Strategic communication with reporting costs 0 1 1 7 2 3 6 27
Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 34 1 3 4 318
The Economics of Advice 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
The Theory of Warranty Contracts 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 362
The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion 0 0 2 16 1 1 9 60
The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon 1 2 3 91 3 5 13 332
The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design 0 0 0 46 2 3 3 162
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 13 3 3 4 97
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 173
US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services 0 0 1 52 0 1 5 242
Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem 0 0 2 98 0 2 6 439
Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 48
Total Journal Articles 2 7 21 1,260 40 77 179 6,589
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Swiss Competition Policy in the Last Decade 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 9
The optimal amount of distorted testimony when the arbiter can and cannot commit 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 12
Total Chapters 0 0 0 2 1 2 3 21

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06