Access Statistics for Winand Emons

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 73 3 11 15 556
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures 0 0 0 16 1 6 8 151
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures 0 0 0 43 0 4 5 152
Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures 0 0 0 21 1 4 9 215
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 35 0 6 10 183
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 50 4 11 12 227
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 20 0 5 10 158
Conditional versus Contingent Fees 0 0 0 151 0 6 8 799
Conditional versus Contingent Fees 0 0 0 36 0 3 4 191
Credence Goods Monopolists 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 385
Credence Goods Monopolists 0 0 0 16 1 4 8 82
Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts 0 0 0 0 1 11 14 607
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 41 4 7 9 315
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 43 1 8 11 407
Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders 0 0 1 28 1 5 11 208
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 648
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 63 0 7 7 396
Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 115
GOOD TIMES, BAD TIMES, AND VERTICAL UPSTREAM INTEGRATION 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 373
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 18 0 4 5 114
Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 26 1 5 6 149
Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 448
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 38
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 10
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 162
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 68 0 6 7 453
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 8 3 10 10 69
Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 30 2 9 13 115
Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 233
Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality 0 0 0 53 0 4 6 148
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 99 0 0 3 835
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 64 2 9 11 146
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 38 0 5 6 185
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal 0 0 0 12 0 2 3 85
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality 0 0 1 16 2 8 13 64
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 113 0 6 11 77
Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 26 4 19 22 54
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence 0 0 1 18 3 10 18 132
Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence 0 0 1 4 2 5 7 46
Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony 0 0 0 70 0 2 3 1,275
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 38 1 5 7 183
Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 22 1 4 7 138
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 80 0 3 5 487
Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 767
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions 0 0 0 30 0 1 6 36
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions 0 0 0 14 3 7 11 52
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 5 0 4 14 59
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 16 1 4 6 43
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs 0 0 0 6 1 4 11 35
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 22 0 5 6 254
Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 78 1 2 6 809
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4
The Economics of Advice 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 12
The Economics of Advice 0 0 1 29 0 6 7 18
The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees 0 0 0 53 1 5 7 315
The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees 0 0 1 202 1 3 6 806
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion 0 0 0 49 3 7 9 89
The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion 0 0 0 29 1 5 7 73
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 341 4 7 8 1,727
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 204 2 7 10 905
The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model 0 0 0 1 1 3 5 93
The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony 0 0 0 33 10 18 20 246
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony 0 0 0 15 0 3 6 174
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony 0 0 0 24 11 13 14 352
The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 256
The market for used cars: A new test of the lemons model 0 0 0 108 4 8 11 885
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 1 1 1 3 1 2 4 26
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version] 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 16
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 1 57 0 8 15 256
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 20 0 1 4 45
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 12 0 5 8 95
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts 0 0 0 30 0 3 8 209
Total Working Papers 1 1 8 2,823 86 385 579 20,471
3 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995 0 0 0 4 0 2 2 72
A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders 0 0 0 36 1 7 11 153
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 0 0 0 3 2 5 6 27
An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts 0 0 0 59 0 1 4 131
Asset prices and public information: An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles 0 0 0 27 0 2 4 102
Conditional versus contingent fees 0 0 0 70 0 4 7 406
Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts 1 4 8 183 3 48 62 725
Credence goods monopolists 1 2 2 163 1 10 16 432
Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 83
Escalating penalties for repeat offenders 0 0 1 17 1 4 9 88
Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort 0 0 0 52 1 6 7 162
Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets 0 0 0 7 0 3 6 67
Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration 0 0 0 59 0 7 10 273
Holler, Manfred und Illing, Gerhard: Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer‐Verlag 1991. 366 S. DM 49.80 0 0 1 2 0 0 4 7
Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 9
Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians 0 0 0 14 1 3 6 78
Information, Märkte, Zitronen und Signale: Zum Nobelpreis an George Akerlof, Michael Spence und Joseph Stiglitz 0 0 0 27 0 3 5 138
Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade 0 0 0 3 1 4 8 60
Neue Regeln guter Unternehmensführung 0 0 0 11 1 3 5 55
Non-comparative versus comparative advertising of quality 0 0 0 22 0 2 4 243
On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical 0 0 0 28 0 2 8 141
On the Limitation of Warranty Duration 0 0 0 49 0 5 6 338
Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence 0 0 0 7 0 3 10 76
PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO-STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 0 0 2 4 0 6 16 69
Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony 0 0 0 2 1 3 6 286
Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees 0 0 0 19 0 4 5 123
Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 120
Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 6
Strategic communication with reporting costs 0 0 1 7 0 3 9 30
Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders 0 0 0 34 0 3 7 321
The Economics of Advice 0 0 1 1 0 4 5 5
The Theory of Warranty Contracts 0 0 0 0 1 5 8 367
The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion 0 0 2 16 0 3 10 63
The market for used cars: new evidence of the lemons phenomenon 0 0 2 91 5 12 22 344
The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design 0 0 0 46 0 1 4 163
Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 13 0 4 7 101
Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts 0 0 0 8 1 4 5 177
US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services 0 2 2 54 1 13 15 255
Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem 0 1 2 99 1 5 10 444
Why plaintiffs’ attorneys use contingent and defense attorneys fixed fee contracts 0 0 0 3 6 15 16 63
Total Journal Articles 2 9 24 1,269 29 214 353 6,803
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Swiss Competition Policy in the Last Decade 0 0 0 0 2 7 9 16
The optimal amount of distorted testimony when the arbiter can and cannot commit 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 13
Total Chapters 0 0 0 2 2 8 11 29

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04