| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests between Groups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
475 |
| A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
11 |
26 |
| Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
| Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
| Commitment in R&D Tournaments via Strategic Delegation to Overoptimistic Managers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
67 |
| Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
18 |
| Complementarities of HRM Practices |
0 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
67 |
| Complementarities of HRM Practices - A Case for Employing Multiple Methods and Integrating Multiple Fields |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
68 |
| Complexity and Distributive Fairness Interact in Affecting Compliance Behavior |
0 |
1 |
43 |
43 |
3 |
6 |
44 |
44 |
| Contracts and Inequity Aversion |
0 |
0 |
2 |
83 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
297 |
| Contracts and Inequity Aversion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
153 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
445 |
| Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
281 |
| Contractual and organizational structure with reciprocal agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
44 |
| Determinants and Effects of Reserve Prices in Auctions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
2 |
6 |
58 |
133 |
| Determinants and Effects of Reserve Prices in Hattrick Auctions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
3 |
6 |
47 |
453 |
| Economic Development and Resilience to Natural Catastrophes – Insurance Penetration and Institutions |
0 |
1 |
2 |
34 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
43 |
| Electoral Cycles in Savings Bank Lending |
0 |
0 |
4 |
56 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
204 |
| Electoral cycles in savings bank lending |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
59 |
| Electoral cycles in savings bank lending |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
3 |
9 |
27 |
80 |
| Electoral cycles in savings bank lending |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
41 |
| Free Riding in the Lab and in the Field |
0 |
0 |
1 |
68 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
114 |
| Free-Riding in the Lab and in the Field |
0 |
1 |
4 |
24 |
2 |
6 |
22 |
107 |
| Gift Exchange in the Lab - It is not (only) how much you give |
0 |
0 |
2 |
50 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
184 |
| Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
21 |
| Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority |
0 |
1 |
2 |
45 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
174 |
| Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
97 |
| Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
24 |
| Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries |
1 |
1 |
2 |
86 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
624 |
| Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
405 |
| Information, coordination and the industrialization of countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
20 |
| Introduction to the Symposium on Executive Pay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
19 |
| Long-Term Employment Relations When Agents are Present Biased |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
16 |
| Long-Term Employment Relations when Agents are Present Biased |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
2 |
4 |
19 |
39 |
| Managerial Optimism and Investment Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
23 |
| Managerial Payoff and Gift Exchange in the Field |
0 |
1 |
3 |
41 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
141 |
| Managerial Payoff and Gift-Exchange in the Field |
0 |
0 |
2 |
39 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
12 |
| Morale, Relationships, and Wages: An Experimental Study |
0 |
1 |
1 |
64 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
24 |
| Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
208 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
585 |
| Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent Is Free to Leave |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
201 |
| Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
85 |
| Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
81 |
| Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
36 |
| Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
53 |
| Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
13 |
85 |
| Power Politics: Electoral Cycles in German Electricity Prices |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
2 |
2 |
13 |
61 |
| Price Discontinuities in an online used Car Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
162 |
| Price Discrimination and Fairness Concerns |
1 |
2 |
6 |
164 |
2 |
4 |
38 |
331 |
| Price discontinuities in an online market for used cars |
0 |
1 |
3 |
33 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
85 |
| Reciprocity in Organisations |
0 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
2 |
6 |
23 |
67 |
| Reciprocity in Organisations - Evidence from the WERS |
0 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
65 |
142 |
| Reserve Price Formation in Online Auctions |
0 |
0 |
3 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
254 |
| Resilience to natural disasters Insurance penetration, institutions, and disaster types |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
31 |
| Size Matters - "Over"investments in a Relational Contracting Setting |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
41 |
| Size Matters - \'Over\'investments in a Relational Contracting Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
4 |
4 |
33 |
44 |
| Size Matters - “Over†investments in a Relational Contracting Setting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
28 |
| The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
124 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
734 |
| The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
124 |
7 |
7 |
9 |
610 |
| The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence From a Field Experiment |
0 |
2 |
13 |
100 |
5 |
16 |
107 |
244 |
| The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment |
0 |
1 |
3 |
64 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
49 |
| The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
3 |
17 |
38 |
| The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks – Evidence from a Field Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
149 |
| The Effects of Preference Characteristics and Overconfidence on Economic Incentives |
0 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
52 |
| The Role of Communication of Performance Schemes |
1 |
2 |
2 |
21 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
63 |
| The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
118 |
| The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
80 |
| The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
105 |
| The chopstick auction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
97 |
| Worker Characteristics and Wage Differentials: Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
37 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
156 |
| Worker characteristics and wage differentials: Evidence from a gift-exchange experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
36 |
| Worker characteristics and wage differentials: Evidence from a gift-exchange experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
39 |
| Total Working Papers |
3 |
19 |
130 |
2,721 |
87 |
193 |
1,014 |
9,890 |
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