Access Statistics for Marc Escrihuela-Villar

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion 0 0 0 72 3 3 4 429
CARTEL SUSTAINABILITY AND CARTEL STABILITY 0 0 0 60 3 5 7 176
Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability 0 0 0 412 0 1 3 1,185
Does cartel leadership facilitate collusion? 0 0 0 121 2 2 3 214
Endogenous Horizontal Mergers in Homogeneous Goods Industries with Bertrand Competition 0 0 0 21 1 7 9 21
Innovation and market concentration with asymmetric firms 0 0 2 13 4 4 7 53
MERGERS IN A PARTIALLY CARTELIZED MARKET 0 0 0 33 0 3 4 125
MERGERS IN ASYMMETRIC STACKELBERG MARKETS 0 0 0 52 0 2 3 108
Mergers in Asymmetric Stackelberg Markets 0 0 0 107 0 3 4 239
On merger profitability and the intensity of rivalry 0 0 0 24 1 3 5 60
On the Relationship between Market Concentration and Bank Risk Taking 0 0 0 136 2 2 7 346
On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking 0 0 0 83 1 1 1 257
On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking 0 1 1 17 2 4 8 129
On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking 0 0 0 21 1 1 3 87
On the Role of Bargaining Power in Nash-in-Nash Bargaining: When More is Less 0 1 6 38 3 9 17 47
Partial collusion in an asymmetric duopoly 0 0 1 116 5 5 7 174
Total Working Papers 0 2 10 1,326 28 55 92 3,650

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on the Equivalence of the Conjectural Variations Solution and the Coefficient of Cooperation 0 0 0 15 1 4 4 76
A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion 0 0 0 31 0 2 5 110
A note on the privatization neutrality result with colluding private firms 0 0 0 13 1 2 5 83
Asymmetric input contracts under price leadership 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 10
Horizontal Mergers in a Dynamic Cournot Market: Solving the Free Riding Issue Without Efficiency Gains 0 2 2 13 0 3 7 39
INNOVATION AND MARKET CONCENTRATION WITH ASYMMETRIC FIRMS 0 0 0 22 2 3 5 94
Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly 0 0 0 8 2 3 5 25
Innovation and Competition in a Mixed Oligopoly 0 0 1 15 1 4 8 52
Mergers in asymmetric Stackelberg markets 0 0 0 21 1 3 3 74
ON THE EFFECT OF IMPERFECT COLLUSION ON PROFITABILITY AND R&D 0 1 3 3 0 4 7 15
ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF COLLUSION IN A DIFFERENTIATED OLIGOPOLY WITH A CARTEL AND A FRINGE 0 0 0 6 1 1 2 55
ON WELFARE EFFECTS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS WITH PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 0 0 1 39 1 1 4 168
On Collusion and Industry Size 0 0 0 71 2 3 6 308
On Cournot and Bertrand competition in collusive mixed oligopolies 0 0 2 2 1 5 13 13
On Merger Profitability and the Intensity of Rivalry 0 0 0 8 1 5 5 77
On Mergers in a Stackelberg Market with Asymmetric Convex Costs 0 0 0 3 1 2 4 31
On competition and welfare enhancing policies in a mixed oligopoly 0 1 2 10 3 6 10 51
On endogenous cartel size under tacit collusion 0 0 0 48 2 3 4 153
On merger in a collusive Stackelberg market 0 1 1 35 1 4 6 113
On the Relationship Between Innovation and Product Market Competition 0 0 0 4 2 5 5 33
On the price effects of collusion and the number of firms 0 3 3 15 2 7 9 101
On the relationship between market power and bank risk taking 0 0 0 9 0 1 1 66
Partial coordination and mergers among quantity-setting firms 0 0 0 48 4 6 9 142
Supply function competition in a mixed electric power market 0 0 1 4 0 0 2 17
Total Journal Articles 0 8 16 445 29 77 130 1,906

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Statistics updated 2026-01-09