Access Statistics for Marc Escrihuela-Villar

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion 0 0 0 72 1 8 11 437
CARTEL SUSTAINABILITY AND CARTEL STABILITY 0 0 0 60 1 4 11 180
Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability 0 1 1 413 0 3 5 1,188
Does cartel leadership facilitate collusion? 0 0 0 121 2 8 10 222
Endogenous Horizontal Mergers in Homogeneous Goods Industries with Bertrand Competition 0 0 0 21 1 7 16 28
Innovation and market concentration with asymmetric firms 0 0 1 13 3 8 14 61
MERGERS IN A PARTIALLY CARTELIZED MARKET 0 0 0 33 1 6 10 131
MERGERS IN ASYMMETRIC STACKELBERG MARKETS 0 0 0 52 1 3 5 111
Mergers in Asymmetric Stackelberg Markets 0 0 0 107 0 2 6 241
On merger profitability and the intensity of rivalry 0 0 0 24 2 6 10 66
On the Relationship between Market Concentration and Bank Risk Taking 0 0 0 136 0 4 9 350
On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking 0 0 0 21 0 1 2 88
On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking 0 0 0 83 2 19 20 276
On the Relationship between Market Power and Bank Risk Taking 0 0 1 17 1 4 12 133
On the Role of Bargaining Power in Nash-in-Nash Bargaining: When More is Less 1 2 5 40 2 10 23 57
Partial collusion in an asymmetric duopoly 0 0 1 116 1 4 11 178
Total Working Papers 1 3 9 1,329 18 97 175 3,747

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on the Equivalence of the Conjectural Variations Solution and the Coefficient of Cooperation 0 0 0 15 0 14 18 90
A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion 0 0 0 31 0 3 8 113
A note on the privatization neutrality result with colluding private firms 0 0 0 13 0 7 12 90
Asymmetric input contracts under price leadership 0 0 0 2 1 9 10 19
Horizontal Mergers in a Dynamic Cournot Market: Solving the Free Riding Issue Without Efficiency Gains 0 0 2 13 3 13 20 52
INNOVATION AND MARKET CONCENTRATION WITH ASYMMETRIC FIRMS 0 0 0 22 2 9 13 103
Imperfect collusion in an asymmetric duopoly 0 0 0 8 0 7 12 32
Innovation and Competition in a Mixed Oligopoly 0 0 1 15 2 8 15 60
Mergers in asymmetric Stackelberg markets 0 0 0 21 2 6 9 80
ON THE EFFECT OF IMPERFECT COLLUSION ON PROFITABILITY AND R&D 0 0 3 3 3 8 15 23
ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF COLLUSION IN A DIFFERENTIATED OLIGOPOLY WITH A CARTEL AND A FRINGE 0 0 0 6 4 8 10 63
ON WELFARE EFFECTS OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS WITH PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 0 0 1 39 0 6 9 174
On Collusion and Industry Size 0 0 0 71 3 12 17 320
On Cournot and Bertrand competition in collusive mixed oligopolies 0 0 2 2 2 7 20 20
On Merger Profitability and the Intensity of Rivalry 0 0 0 8 1 7 12 84
On Mergers in a Stackelberg Market with Asymmetric Convex Costs 0 0 0 3 1 3 7 34
On competition and welfare enhancing policies in a mixed oligopoly 0 0 1 10 1 9 17 60
On endogenous cartel size under tacit collusion 1 1 1 49 3 8 11 161
On merger in a collusive Stackelberg market 0 0 1 35 0 5 9 118
On the Relationship Between Innovation and Product Market Competition 0 0 0 4 1 10 15 43
On the price effects of collusion and the number of firms 0 0 3 15 3 7 14 108
On the relationship between market power and bank risk taking 0 0 0 9 2 8 9 74
Partial coordination and mergers among quantity-setting firms 0 0 0 48 1 2 10 144
Supply function competition in a mixed electric power market 0 0 1 4 1 5 7 22
Total Journal Articles 1 1 16 446 36 181 299 2,087

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Statistics updated 2026-04-09