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12 months |
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12 months |
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| A Note On Optimal Insurance in an Information Constrained Federal Economy with Incomplete Degree of Enforceability and Negotiation Costs Abstract: This paper studies the constrained efficient intergovernmental transfer contract between the central government and the states in a federal economy. We consider an environment with moral hazard, incomplete enforceability and date 0 negotiation costs. The interaction of moral hazard and incomplete enforceability may imply that when the state’s resources are ”low enough”, it is constrained efficient that the state gets a lower utility level than in autarky. When negotiation costs are considered, the state might not accept the contract. More importantly, the possibility of whether accepting or not is not monotonically determined by the state’s fiscal situation |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
| A Note On Optimal Insurance in an Information Constrained Federal Economy with Incomplete Degree of Enforceability and Negotiation Costs Abstract: This paper studies the constrained efficient intergovernmental transfer contract between the central government and the states in a federal economy. We consider an environment with moral hazard, incomplete enforceability and date 0 negotiation costs. The interaction of moral hazard and incomplete enforceability may imply that when the state’s resources are ”low enough”, it is constrained efficient that the state gets a lower utility level than in autarky. When negotiation costs are considered, the state might not accept the contract. More importantly, the possibility of whether accepting or not is not monotonically determined by the state’s fiscal situation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
36 |
| Asset Trading Volume in a Production Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
269 |
| Automatic Stabilization and Fiscal Policy: Some Quantitative Implications for Latin America and the Caribbean |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
83 |
| Designing Unemployment Insurance for Developing Countries |
0 |
0 |
1 |
80 |
3 |
3 |
15 |
200 |
| Domestic Policies and Sovereign Default |
1 |
3 |
25 |
376 |
4 |
9 |
61 |
788 |
| Equilibrium Portfolios in the Neoclassical Growth Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
217 |
| Equilibrium Portfolios in the Neoclassical Growth Model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
1 |
7 |
27 |
187 |
| Informality and Productivity: The Role of Unemployment Insurance Schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
51 |
| Investment and Bilateral Insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
36 |
| Investment and Insurance in an Economic Union |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
52 |
| Normative Fiscal Policy and Growth: Some Quantitative Implications for the Chilean Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
24 |
| Normative Fiscal Policy and Growth: Some Quantitative Implications for the Chilean Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
105 |
| Occasionally Binding Collateral Constraints in RBC Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
23 |
1,456 |
| Occasionally Binding Collateral Constraints in RBC Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
16 |
651 |
| On Ramsey's Conjecture: Efficient Allocations in the Neoclassical Growth Model with Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
3 |
13 |
29 |
527 |
| On the Implications of Taxation for Investment, Savings and Growth: Evidence from Brazil, Chile and Mexico |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
57 |
| Policy Rules and Large Crises in Emerging Markets |
1 |
2 |
14 |
108 |
2 |
5 |
41 |
191 |
| Short-Term Momentum and Long-Term Reversal of Returns under Limited Enforceability and Belief Heterogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
50 |
| Short-Term Momentum and Long-Term Reversal of Returns under Limited Enforceability and Belief Heterogeneity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
3 |
3 |
15 |
57 |
| Short-Term Momentum and LongTerm Reversal of Returns under Limited Enforceability and Belief Heterogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
26 |
| The Dynamics of Efficient Asset Trading with Heterogeneous Beliefs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
4 |
6 |
15 |
163 |
| Too Big to Cheat: Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
147 |
| Too Good to Be True: Asset Pricing Implications of Pessimism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
15 |
30 |
| Too big to cheat: Efficiency and Investment in Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
5 |
8 |
14 |
257 |
| Unemployment Insurance in High Informality Countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
30 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
5 |
42 |
1,236 |
60 |
115 |
403 |
5,699 |
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