Access Statistics for Marie-Cecile Fagart

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on The Pareto Efficiency of General Oligopolistic Equilibria 0 0 0 50 0 0 1 240
Aléa moral et selection adverse sur le marché de l'assurance 0 0 0 41 1 2 4 201
Aléa moral et sélection adverse sur le marché de l’assurance 0 1 2 116 1 2 4 432
Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-Agent Analysis 0 0 0 212 0 0 1 956
Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-agent Analysis 0 0 0 211 1 3 3 868
Auditing Policies and Information Systems in a Principal-Agent Model 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 30
Auditing policies and information 0 0 0 74 2 3 3 276
Compagnies d'assurance informées et équilibre sur le marché de l'assurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 157
Companies d'assurance informees et equilibre sur le marche de l'assurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 594
Concurrence en Contrats, anti-selection et structure d'information 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 269
Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 118
Does Entry Improve Welfare ? A General Equilibrium Approach of Competition Policy 0 0 0 5 2 2 2 45
Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy 0 0 0 80 0 2 2 197
Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration 0 0 0 19 4 4 4 65
Liability Insurance under the Negligence Rule 0 0 0 128 0 0 0 1,319
Optimal Contract with Random Auditing 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 42
Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing 0 0 0 33 0 1 1 101
Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 476
Optimal insurance under random auditing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 121
Organisation et risque moral: le role de l'information dans un modele de production jointe 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 468
Planning a Private Monopoly Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 180
Prises de participations et expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires 0 0 0 15 0 4 4 72
Real Market Concentration through Partial Acquisitions 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 33
Real market concentration through partial acquisitions 0 0 0 70 1 2 4 507
Regulating a Private Monoply with Type-Dependent Reservation Profit 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1,341
Risk Aversion and Incentives 0 0 0 51 0 2 6 92
Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Market 0 0 0 148 0 0 1 446
Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Market 0 0 1 16 2 2 4 64
The First-Order Approach when the Cost of Effort is Money 1 1 1 52 1 2 4 164
Wealth Effects, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in a Principal-Agent Model 0 0 2 23 0 2 6 62
Total Working Papers 1 2 6 1,368 19 40 71 9,936

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information 0 0 0 4 4 4 5 27
Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy 0 0 0 32 0 0 1 127
Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration 0 0 0 36 2 5 5 126
Information sur les franchissements de seuils. Des conséquences positives sur la valorisation des entreprises 0 0 0 11 1 2 3 79
Liability insurance under the negligence rule 0 0 0 53 1 2 2 296
Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing 0 0 0 38 0 1 3 109
Prevention in insurance markets 0 0 0 4 1 3 4 18
Ranking Contingent Monitoring Systems 0 0 0 11 2 3 6 65
Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Markets 0 0 1 31 0 0 1 170
The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money 0 0 1 26 1 3 8 201
Total Journal Articles 0 0 2 246 12 23 38 1,218

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06