Access Statistics for Marie-Cecile Fagart

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on The Pareto Efficiency of General Oligopolistic Equilibria 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 239
Aléa moral et selection adverse sur le marché de l'assurance 0 0 3 41 0 1 7 198
Aléa moral et sélection adverse sur le marché de l’assurance 0 0 0 114 0 0 1 428
Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-Agent Analysis 0 0 0 212 0 1 1 956
Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-agent Analysis 0 0 1 211 0 0 2 865
Auditing Policies and Information Systems in a Principal-Agent Model 0 0 0 9 0 1 2 30
Auditing policies and information 0 0 0 74 0 0 1 273
Compagnies d'assurance informées et équilibre sur le marché de l'assurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 156
Companies d'assurance informees et equilibre sur le marche de l'assurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 593
Concurrence en Contrats, anti-selection et structure d'information 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 268
Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 117
Does Entry Improve Welfare ? A General Equilibrium Approach of Competition Policy 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 43
Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy 0 0 1 80 0 0 2 195
Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration 0 0 1 19 0 0 6 61
Liability Insurance under the Negligence Rule 0 0 0 128 0 0 1 1,319
Optimal Contract with Random Auditing 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 41
Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 475
Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 100
Optimal insurance under random auditing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 121
Organisation et risque moral: le role de l'information dans un modele de production jointe 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 467
Planning a Private Monopoly Under Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 178
Prises de participations et expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 68
Real Market Concentration through Partial Acquisitions 0 0 1 3 0 0 2 32
Real market concentration through partial acquisitions 0 0 0 70 0 0 1 503
Regulating a Private Monoply with Type-Dependent Reservation Profit 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1,339
Risk Aversion and Incentives 0 0 1 51 1 2 5 88
Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Market 1 1 1 16 1 1 2 61
Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Market 0 0 0 148 0 0 0 445
The First-Order Approach when the Cost of Effort is Money 0 0 1 51 0 2 3 162
Wealth Effects, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in a Principal-Agent Model 1 1 1 22 1 1 1 57
Total Working Papers 2 2 11 1,364 4 13 48 9,878

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 22
Does entry improve welfare? A general equilibrium approach to competition policy 0 0 0 32 0 0 2 126
Incentives for Partial Acquisitions and Real Market Concentration 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 121
Information sur les franchissements de seuils. Des conséquences positives sur la valorisation des entreprises 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 76
Liability insurance under the negligence rule 0 0 0 53 0 0 1 294
Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing 0 0 1 38 0 1 3 107
Prevention in insurance markets 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 15
Ranking Contingent Monitoring Systems 0 0 0 11 1 2 2 61
Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Markets 1 1 1 31 1 1 2 170
The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money 0 1 1 26 0 2 3 195
Total Journal Articles 1 2 3 246 3 7 15 1,187

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03