Access Statistics for José Luis Ferreira

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 141
An evaluation of public aids towards renewable energy sources in Spain 0 0 0 88 1 1 1 74
Bagwell's paradox, forward induction and outside option games 0 0 0 25 0 1 1 58
Cooperación y renegociación en juegos no cooperativos 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 30
Credible Equilibria in Games with Changing Utility 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 21
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 195
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 15
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play 0 0 0 27 1 2 3 258
Credible equilibria in non-finite games and in games without perfect recall 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35
Generalized externality games 0 0 0 73 0 1 1 340
Multiple openings of forward markets: experimental evidence 0 1 1 14 0 3 4 55
On the possibility of stable renegotiation. A note 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 11
Relación entre los mercados spot y de futuros en un contexto oligopolístico 0 0 1 6 1 1 2 19
Régimen institucional del mercado spot y del mercado de futuros en distintos países 0 1 1 2 2 3 5 39
Solidaridad social y responsabilidad individual. Primer Parte 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 20
Solidaridad social y responsabilidad individual. Segunda parte: La economía de la discriminación y el II Plan de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Mujeres 0 0 0 8 1 3 4 133
Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets 0 0 0 6 1 1 1 32
Strategic profit sharing leads to collusion in Bertrand oligopolies 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 148
The Democrat-Republican growth gap paradox 0 0 1 55 1 2 8 192
The Democrat-Republican growth gap paradox 0 1 1 10 2 4 8 39
The effect of experience in Cournot play 0 1 1 15 1 2 4 69
The no-arbitrage hypothesis and inertia in forward markets 0 1 1 8 0 2 2 7
The role of observability in futures markets 0 0 0 72 2 2 2 268
The strategic motive to sell forward: experimental evidence 0 0 0 52 1 1 1 211
Total Working Papers 0 5 7 532 17 34 56 2,410

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept 0 0 0 24 0 0 3 123
A NOTE ON BAGWELL'S PARADOX AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN THREE CLASSIC GAMES 0 0 1 2 1 3 6 13
AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC RULES 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 20
Capacity precommitment, price competition and forward markets 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 40
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play 0 0 0 21 0 0 3 108
Credible equilibria in non-finite games and ingames without perfect recall 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 12
Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Noncooperative Games 0 0 1 21 0 1 5 71
Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games 0 0 0 13 0 1 2 45
Generalized externality games 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 50
Multiple Openings and Competitiveness of Forward Markets: Experimental Evidence 0 1 1 1 1 4 4 5
On the possibility of stable renegotiation 0 0 0 6 1 1 3 47
Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets 0 0 0 95 2 3 4 205
Strategic profit sharing between firms 0 0 0 15 0 1 1 40
The Role of Observability in Futures Markets 0 0 0 50 1 2 3 184
The surprise exam paradox, rationality, and pragmatics: a simple game-theoretic analysis 0 0 0 30 0 0 2 167
Total Journal Articles 0 1 3 299 7 17 39 1,130

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06