| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| (How) Do Electoral Surprises Drive Business Cycles? Evidence from a New Dataset |
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0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
28 |
| (How) Do electoral surprises drive business cycles? Evidence from a new dataset |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
7 |
8 |
12 |
20 |
| (How) Do electoral surprises drive business cycles? Evidence from a new dataset |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
5 |
7 |
10 |
22 |
| (How) Do electoral surprises drive business cycles? Evidence from a new dataset |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
| AI-Generated Production Networks: Measurement and Applications to Global Trade |
2 |
3 |
15 |
19 |
11 |
19 |
50 |
61 |
| AI-Generated Production Networks: Measurement and Applications to Global Trade |
0 |
0 |
13 |
18 |
5 |
9 |
39 |
50 |
| AI-Generated Production Networks: Measurement and Applications to Global Trade |
0 |
0 |
13 |
14 |
9 |
15 |
43 |
48 |
| AI-Generated Production Networks: Measurement and Applications to Global Trade |
0 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
6 |
19 |
36 |
47 |
| An Urban Legend?! Power Rationing, Fertility and its Effects on Mothers |
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0 |
1 |
29 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
138 |
| An urban legend?! Power rationing, fertility and its effects on mothers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Beyond the Energy Price Guarantee. With or Without? |
1 |
3 |
6 |
14 |
2 |
5 |
13 |
16 |
| Can Workfare Programs Moderate Conflict? Evidence from India |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
54 |
| Can Workfare Programs Moderate Conflict? Evidence from India |
0 |
0 |
7 |
97 |
3 |
7 |
25 |
280 |
| Can Workfare Programs Moderate Violence? Evidence from India |
0 |
0 |
2 |
48 |
6 |
7 |
19 |
223 |
| Causal Claims in Economics |
0 |
2 |
26 |
30 |
6 |
12 |
133 |
143 |
| Causal Claims in Economics |
2 |
2 |
79 |
79 |
5 |
10 |
107 |
107 |
| Causal Claims in Economics |
1 |
1 |
7 |
18 |
5 |
12 |
28 |
39 |
| Causal Claims in Economics |
0 |
0 |
23 |
72 |
17 |
31 |
97 |
165 |
| Cohesive Institutions and Political Violence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
146 |
| Cohesive Institutions and Political Violence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
32 |
| Cohesive Institutions and Political Violence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
74 |
| Cohesive Institutions and Political Violence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
66 |
| Cohesive Institutions and Political Violence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
| Cohesive Institutions and Political Violence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
68 |
| Commercialization and the Decline of Joint Liability Microcredit |
0 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
4 |
7 |
11 |
97 |
| Commercialization and the Decline of Joint Liability Microcredit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
66 |
| Commercialization and the Decline of Joint Liability Microcredit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
38 |
| Coronavirus Perceptions And Economic Anxiety |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
314 |
| De-escalation technology: the impact of body-worn cameras on citizen-police interactions |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
30 |
| De-escalation technology: the impact of body-worn cameras on citizen-police interactions |
0 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
2 |
5 |
15 |
32 |
| De-escalation technology: the impact of body-worn cameras on citizen-police interactions |
0 |
5 |
12 |
73 |
0 |
11 |
39 |
144 |
| Did Austerity Cause Brexit? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
134 |
| Did Austerity Cause Brexit? |
1 |
1 |
3 |
254 |
4 |
9 |
25 |
1,174 |
| Did Austerity Cause Brexit? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
93 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
195 |
| Did Austerity Cause Brexit? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
338 |
| Did the policy response to the energy crisis cause crime? Evidence from England |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
30 |
| Did the policy response to the energy crisis cause crime? Evidence from England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
57 |
| Distributional and climate implications of policy responses to energy price shocks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
21 |
| Distributional and climate implications of policy responses to energy price shocks |
0 |
2 |
2 |
13 |
4 |
7 |
8 |
24 |
| Distributional and climate implications of policy responses to the energy crisis: Lessons from the UK |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
38 |
| Distributional and climate implications of policy responses to the energy crisis: Lessons from the UK |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
| Does Contact Tracing Work? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from an Excel Error in England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
70 |
| Does Contact Tracing Work? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from an Excel Error in England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
170 |
| Does Contact Tracing Work? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from an Excel Error in England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
31 |
| Does Migration Cause Extreme Voting? |
1 |
4 |
26 |
542 |
9 |
32 |
97 |
1,371 |
| Fracking Growth |
0 |
0 |
2 |
98 |
3 |
7 |
24 |
359 |
| Fracking growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
92 |
| Fracking: the boost to US manufacturing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
6 |
6 |
128 |
| Global Behaviors and Perceptions at the Onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
5 |
10 |
13 |
76 |
| Global Behaviors and Perceptions at the Onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
91 |
| Global Behaviors and Perceptions at the Onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic |
0 |
0 |
3 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
416 |
| Global Behaviors and Perceptions in the COVID-19 Pandemic |
0 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
66 |
| Group Lending Without Joint Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
129 |
| Group Lending Without Joint Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
95 |
| Group lending without joint liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
56 |
| Has Eastern European Migration Impacted UK-born Workers? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
3 |
6 |
18 |
121 |
| Has Eastern European Migration Impacted UK-born Workers? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
226 |
0 |
10 |
18 |
656 |
| Housing insecurity, homelessness and populism: Evidence from the UK |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
54 |
| Housing insecurity, homelessness and populism: Evidence from the UK |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
85 |
| Housing insecurity, homelessness and populism: Evidence from the UK |
0 |
2 |
5 |
72 |
3 |
10 |
21 |
288 |
| How Big Is the Media Multiplier? Evidence from Dyadic News Data |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
12 |
32 |
| How Big is the Media Multiplier? Evidence from Dyadic News Data |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
11 |
| How Big is the Media Multiplier? Evidence from Dyadic News Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
| How Big is the Media Multiplier? Evidence from Dyadic News Data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
18 |
| How Do Firms Cope with Economic Shocks in Real Time? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
3 |
7 |
16 |
24 |
| How Do Firms Cope with Economic Shocks in Real Time? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
1 |
9 |
15 |
26 |
| How big is the media multiplier? Evidence from dyadic news data |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
12 |
| How do firms cope with economic shocks in real time? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
5 |
8 |
10 |
19 |
| How do firms cope with economic shocks in real time? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
8 |
14 |
| How large is the energy savings potential in the UK? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
3 |
7 |
12 |
43 |
| In brief...Blackout babies: the impact of power cuts on fertility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
9 |
11 |
19 |
701 |
| Informational Boundaries of the State |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
| Informational Boundaries of the State |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
24 |
| Informational Boundaries of the State |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
| Informational Boundaries of the State |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
16 |
| Informational Boundaries of the State |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
27 |
| Insurers Monitor Shocks to Collateral: Micro Evidence from Mortgage-Backed Securities |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
| Insurers Monitor Shocks to Collateral: Micro Evidence from Mortgage-backed Securities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
| Insurers Monitor Shocks to Collateral: Micro Evidence from Mortgage-backed Securities |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
| Insurers Monitor Shocks to Collateral: Micro Evidence from Mortgage-backed Securities |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
11 |
| Insurers Monitor Shocks to Collateral: Micro Evidence from Mortgage-backed Securities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
| Local Decline and Populism |
0 |
0 |
3 |
36 |
2 |
10 |
23 |
91 |
| Local Decline and Populism |
0 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
20 |
| Local Decline and Populism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
11 |
| Local Decline and Populism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
4 |
4 |
10 |
16 |
| Local Decline and Populism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
| Losing on the Home Front? Battlefield Casualties, Media, and Public Support for Foreign Interventions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
| Losing on the Home Front? Battlefield Casualties, Media, and Public Support for Foreign Interventions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
11 |
23 |
| Losing on the Home Front? Battlefield Casualties, Media, and Public Support for Foreign Interventions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
15 |
| Losing on the Home Front? Battlefield Casualties, Media, and Public Support for Foreign Interventions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
| Losing on the Home Front? Battlefield Casualties, Media, and Public Support for Foreign Interventions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
| Losing on the Home Front? Battlefield Casualties, Media, and Public Support for Foreign Interventions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
13 |
| Losing on the Home Front? Battlefield Casualties, Media, and Public Support for Foreign Interventions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
| Losing on the home front? Battlefield casualties, media, and public support for foreign interventions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
8 |
9 |
9 |
| Losing on the home front? Battlefield casualties, media, and public support for foreign interventions |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
6 |
| Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Micro Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
118 |
| Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
118 |
| Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
| Market structure and borrower welfare in microfinance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
56 |
| Measuring the Epidemiological Impact of a False Negative: Evidence from a Natural Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
19 |
| Measuring the Epidemiological Impact of a False Negative: Evidence from a Natural Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
18 |
| Measuring the Regional Economic Cost of Brexit: Evidence up to 2019 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
4 |
7 |
11 |
38 |
| Measuring the Regional Economic Cost of Brexit: Evidence up to 2019 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
70 |
| Measuring the Regional Economic Cost of Brexit: Evidence up to 2019 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
80 |
12 |
15 |
30 |
389 |
| More than an Urban Legend: The long-term socioeconomic effects of unplanned fertility shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
124 |
| On the Comparative Advantage of U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Shale Gas Revolution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
92 |
| On the Comparative Advantage of U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Shale Gas Revolution |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
53 |
| On the Comparative Advantage of U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Shale Gas Revolution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
6 |
9 |
9 |
92 |
| On the Comparative Advantage of U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Shale Gas Revolution |
0 |
1 |
1 |
83 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
123 |
| On the comparative advantage of U.S. manufacturing: Evidence from the shale gas revolution |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
| On the comparative advantage of U.S. manufacturing: evidence from the shale gas revolution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
46 |
| On the comparative advantage of U.S. manufacturing: evidence from the shale gas revolution |
0 |
0 |
1 |
49 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
109 |
| On the comparative advantage of U.S. manufacturing:evidence from the shale gas revolution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
68 |
| On the comparative advantage of U.S. manufacturing:evidence from the shale gas revolution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
52 |
| One Kind of Lawlessness: Estimating the Welfare Cost of Somali Piracy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
42 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
205 |
| One Kind of Lawlessness: Estimating the Welfare Cost of Somali Piracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
203 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
701 |
| Opinion Polls, Turnout and the Demand for Safe Seats |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
| Opinion Polls, Turnout and the Demand for Safe Seats |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
13 |
| Opinion Polls, Turnout and the Demand for Safe Seats |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
15 |
| Pandemic Pressures and Public Health Care: Evidence from England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
27 |
| Pandemic Pressures and Public Health Care: Evidence from England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
| Pandemic Pressures and Public Health Care: Evidence from England |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
19 |
23 |
27 |
42 |
| Pandemic Pressures and Public Health Care: Evidence from England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
| Pandemic pressures and public health care: evidence from England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
21 |
29 |
43 |
| Pandemic pressures and public health care: evidence from England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
16 |
| Performative State Capacity and Climate (In) Action |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
| Performative State Capacity and Climate (In)Action |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
8 |
| Performative State Capacity and Climate (In)Action |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
7 |
| Performative State Capacity and Climate (In)Action |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
19 |
| Performative State Capacity and Climate (In)Action |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
| Regulatory Barriers to Climate Action: Evidence from Conservation Areas in England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
| Regulatory barriers to climate action: Evidence from Conservation Areas in England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
| Regulatory barriers to climate action: Evidence from Conservation Areas in England |
0 |
0 |
1 |
69 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
31 |
| Regulatory barriers to climate action: evidence from conservation areas in England |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
| Security Transitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
8 |
10 |
170 |
| Security Transitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
37 |
| Security Transitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
12 |
| Security Transitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
58 |
| Security Transitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
| Security Transitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
24 |
| Security Transitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
| Security Transitions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
30 |
| Social and Genetic Ties Drive Skewed Cross-Border Media Coverage of Disasters |
1 |
2 |
8 |
8 |
3 |
9 |
24 |
24 |
| Subsidizing the spread of COVID19: Evidence from the UK's Eat-Out-to-Help-Out scheme |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
153 |
| Subsidizing the spread of COVID19: Evidence from the UK’s Eat-Out to-Help-Out scheme |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
281 |
| Subsidizing the spread of COVID19: Evidence from the UK’s Eat-Out-to-Help-Out scheme |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
3 |
6 |
7 |
53 |
| Take What You Can: Property Rights, Contestability and Conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
6 |
7 |
10 |
48 |
| Take what you can: property rights, contestability and conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
96 |
| Take what you can: property rights, contestability and conflict |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
5 |
8 |
12 |
91 |
| Take what you can: property rights, contestability and conflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
45 |
| Take what you can: property rights, contestability andconflict |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
46 |
| Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump's Trade Wars |
0 |
1 |
5 |
80 |
2 |
8 |
17 |
169 |
| Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump’s Trade Wars |
0 |
0 |
2 |
68 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
140 |
| Tariffs and Politics: Evidence from Trump’s Trade Wars |
0 |
1 |
2 |
66 |
6 |
12 |
25 |
108 |
| Tariffs and politics: evidence from Trump's trade wars |
2 |
3 |
6 |
332 |
9 |
20 |
47 |
1,394 |
| Team Production on the Battlefield: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
2 |
6 |
14 |
19 |
| Team Production on the Battlefield: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
| Team production on the battlefield: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
| Team production on the battlefield: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
| Team production on the battlefield: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
| Team production on the battlefield: Evidence from NATO in Afghanistan |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
11 |
| Terror and Tourism: The Economic Consequences of Media Coverage |
0 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
50 |
| Terror and Tourism: The Economic Consequences of Media Coverage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
53 |
| Terror and Tourism: The Economic Consequences of Media Coverage |
0 |
0 |
3 |
50 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
174 |
| Terror and Tourism: The Economic Consequences of Media Coverage |
0 |
0 |
1 |
67 |
4 |
6 |
11 |
287 |
| The Hidden Toll of the Pandemic: Excess Mortality in non-COVID-19 Hospital Patients |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
29 |
| The Hidden Toll of the Pandemic: Excess Mortality in non-COVID-19 Hospital Patients |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
20 |
| The Hidden Toll of the Pandemic: Excess Mortality in non-COVID-19 Hospital Patients |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
3 |
3 |
11 |
32 |
| The welfare cost of lawlessness: evidence from Somali piracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
88 |
| What Drives Populist Votes? Recent Insights and Open Questions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
95 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
190 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? A Comprehensive District-Level Analysis |
0 |
0 |
2 |
218 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
619 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? A Comprehensive District-Level Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
399 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? A Comprehensive District-Level Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
206 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? Individual and Regional Data Combined |
0 |
0 |
1 |
93 |
4 |
7 |
13 |
311 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? Individual and Regional Data Combined |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
94 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? Individual and Regional Data Combined |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
5 |
9 |
20 |
103 |
| Who Voted for Brexit? Individual and Regional Data Combined |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
89 |
| Who is NOT Voting for Brexit Anymore? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
75 |
| Who is NOT voting for Brexit anymore? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
5 |
9 |
11 |
68 |
| Who voted for Brexit? A comprehensive district-Level analysis |
1 |
2 |
3 |
117 |
5 |
7 |
9 |
281 |
| Why an EU Referendum? Why in 2016? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
3 |
8 |
9 |
81 |
| Why an EU Referendum? Why in 2016? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
261 |
| Total Working Papers |
12 |
43 |
352 |
6,458 |
453 |
954 |
2,134 |
19,634 |
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