Access Statistics for Eberhard Feess

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Basel II and the Value of Bank Differentiation 0 0 0 179 1 1 5 470
Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer 0 0 0 69 0 0 3 243
Credit Scoring and Incentives for Loan Officers in a Principal Agent Model 1 1 1 445 2 2 6 1,467
Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer 1 1 7 97 3 4 19 375
Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer 0 0 3 133 1 4 21 562
The Impact Of Liability For Malpractice On The Optimal Reimbursement Schemes For Health 0 0 0 13 1 1 3 86
The Manager and the Auditor in a Double Moral Hazard Setting: Efficiency through Contingent Fees and Insurance Contracts 1 1 1 244 2 5 20 1,104
The impact of liability for malpractice on the optimal reimbursement schemes for health services 0 0 0 81 0 0 6 304
Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football 0 0 4 631 2 2 13 2,284
When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance: choking under pressure as a screening device 1 4 13 148 12 31 147 740
Total Working Papers 4 7 29 2,040 24 50 243 7,635

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation: the welfare-increasing effect of liability insurance 0 0 0 103 0 0 2 535
Delegated expertise--when are good projects bad news? 0 0 0 29 1 1 5 95
Economic Consequences of Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football 0 2 5 58 1 4 10 157
Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents With Moral Hazard 0 0 0 17 0 1 2 189
Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility&ast 0 0 0 15 0 0 5 79
Environmental liability under uncertain causation 0 0 1 43 0 1 3 127
Heterogeneity and Optimal Self-Reporting 0 0 1 28 0 0 2 83
Independent Safety Controls with Moral Hazard 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 86
International Technology Transfers and Competition* 0 0 1 13 0 1 4 60
Lender Liability for Environmental Harm: An Argument Against Negligence Based Rules 0 0 0 21 0 0 4 97
Liability and information transmission: The advantage of negligence based rules 0 0 2 18 0 0 5 82
Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values 0 0 1 33 0 1 5 137
REVENUE SHARING IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES 0 0 0 19 0 1 8 93
Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation 0 0 0 29 0 0 3 125
Reporter's Privilege and Incentives to Leak 0 0 0 6 0 0 3 55
Safety monitoring, capital structure, and "financial responsibility" 0 0 0 21 0 1 3 126
Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve 0 0 2 55 0 1 6 222
The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football* 0 0 1 144 1 1 9 404
The Impact of Truth-Telling and Limited Wealth in a Principal-Agent-Model 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 225
The role of insurance in the adjudication of multiparty accidents 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 54
Transfer fee regulations in European football 2 5 16 145 3 9 36 587
Why costless auditing may reduce social welfare 0 0 0 17 1 1 9 76
Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence 1 2 2 39 1 2 9 130
YOU ARE ONE OF US NOW! HOW DO SHARE PRICES OF RIVALS REACT TO PRIVATIZATION?* 0 0 0 21 0 0 2 123
original papers: Safety regulation and monitor liability 0 0 1 49 0 0 8 222
Total Journal Articles 3 9 33 947 8 25 147 4,169

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Statistics updated 2020-09-04