Access Statistics for Vincent Feltkamp

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
- A BAYESIAN APPROACH TO UNCERTAINTY AVERSION 0 0 0 32 2 6 7 159
A Bayesian Approach to Uncentainty Aversion 0 0 0 83 1 6 9 336
A Bayesian Approach to Uncentainty Aversion 0 0 0 29 3 16 21 249
A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion 0 0 0 147 2 9 13 429
A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion 0 0 0 235 1 9 11 819
Alternative Axiomatic Characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf Values 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 237
Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values 0 0 0 9 0 3 3 32
Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 4
Bird's tree allocations revisited 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3
Bird's tree allocations revisited 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Bird's tree allocations revisited 0 0 0 6 0 4 6 19
Cloud Enabled Business Model Innovation: Gaining Strategic Competitive Advantage as the Market Emerges 0 0 0 55 0 6 14 222
Coalitional Games with Veto Players: Myopic and Rational Behavior 0 0 0 41 0 2 4 129
Controlled communication networks 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 5
Controlled communication networks 0 0 1 3 0 4 7 50
Implementing with veto players: a simple non cooperative game 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9
Linear Production with Transport of Products, Resources and Technology 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 12
Linear Production with Transport of Products, Resources and Technology 0 0 0 1 0 7 9 10
Linear Production with Transport of Products, Resources and Technology 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 136
Linear production with transport of products, resources and technology 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 10
Minimum cost spanning extension problems: The proportional rule and the decentralized rule 0 0 0 1 2 5 7 30
Minimum cost spanning extension problems: The proportional rule and the decentralized rule 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 10
On monotonic core allocations for coalitional games whith veto players 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
On the irreducible core and the equal remaining obligations rule of minimum cost spanning extension problems 0 0 0 15 0 4 8 76
On the irreducible core and the equal remaining obligations rule of minimum cost spanning extension problems 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 8
Politieke machtsverhoudingen 0 0 0 4 0 3 5 23
The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 9
The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games 0 0 0 2 0 2 3 19
Vertix Weighted Steiner Tree Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Working Papers 0 0 1 665 13 111 164 3,052

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion 0 0 0 221 1 10 18 751
A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players 0 0 0 0 0 8 10 46
Alternative Axiomatic Characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf Values 0 0 0 0 2 7 8 295
Coalitional games with veto players: Consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes 0 0 0 19 2 5 5 99
Coalitional games: Monotonicity and core 0 0 0 5 1 7 9 43
Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: The weighted Coalitional Lorenz Solutions 0 0 0 24 0 5 7 177
Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games 0 0 0 20 0 2 2 66
The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 464
Total Journal Articles 0 0 0 289 6 45 62 1,941

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-03-04