Access Statistics for Francoise Forges

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Pareto Optimality in Differential Information Economies 0 0 0 6 1 6 8 187
A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting 0 0 0 3 0 4 5 32
A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 26
A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 17
A note on the incentive compatible core 0 0 0 1 3 10 13 154
A note on the incentive compatible core 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 16
Afriat's Theorem for General Budget Sets 0 0 2 100 6 18 25 336
Afriat's Theorem for Indivisible Goods 0 0 0 27 2 10 13 117
Afriat's theorem for generalized budget sets 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 54
Afriat's theorem for indivisible goods 0 0 0 30 0 1 6 58
Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets 0 0 0 157 0 7 9 919
An Approach to Communication Equilibrium 0 0 0 43 4 11 20 123
An approach to communication equilibria 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 25
An approach to communication equilibria 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 71
Appariement: des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth 0 0 0 38 1 3 5 77
Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations 0 0 0 52 1 4 5 183
Bayesian repeated games and reputation 0 0 0 0 0 6 9 26
Bayesian repeated games and reputation 0 0 1 62 0 5 13 126
Can sunspots replace a mediator ? 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 47
Can sunspots replace a mediator? 0 0 0 3 0 4 5 25
Collusion dans les enchères: quelques apports de jeux coopératifs 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 20
Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types 0 0 0 70 4 9 12 224
Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 1) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 39
Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 2) 0 0 0 0 4 5 7 58
Communication devices in repeated games with incomplete information (Part 3) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 32
Communication equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information 0 0 0 1 1 3 3 13
Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees 0 0 0 34 1 1 2 177
Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems 0 0 0 56 2 3 5 90
Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems 0 1 2 5 1 6 10 41
Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems 0 1 1 174 1 6 6 358
Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 9
Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 131
Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values 0 0 0 0 1 8 9 32
Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values 0 0 0 15 2 8 11 51
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 39
Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 29
Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information 0 0 0 12 0 3 7 29
Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: a model with verifiable types 0 0 0 1 2 4 4 16
Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium 0 0 0 0 1 9 9 60
Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium 0 0 0 4 2 6 7 26
Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited 0 0 0 96 0 6 7 203
Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 27
Correlated equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 113
Corrigendum to “Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations” 0 0 0 1 0 7 8 25
Différences d'information, solutions concurrentielles et stratégies révélatrices 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 11
Différences d’information, solutions concurentielles et stratégies révélatrices 0 0 0 1 1 4 5 34
Equilibria with communication in a job market example 0 0 0 12 0 4 6 37
Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization 0 0 0 22 0 4 5 117
Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization 0 0 0 13 1 6 8 66
Ex Post Individually Rational Trading Mechanisms 0 0 0 2 0 6 9 424
Ex post individually rational trading mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 188
Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 39
Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games 0 0 0 14 0 8 9 44
Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 14
Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments 0 0 0 0 4 5 6 18
Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information 1 2 5 107 2 8 16 545
Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete informations 0 0 0 12 2 5 10 58
Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games 0 0 0 4 1 3 5 20
Games and Incentives 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 15
Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion 0 0 0 0 1 5 10 45
Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case 0 0 0 20 3 6 10 104
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case 0 0 0 0 1 6 8 23
Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 368
Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economies 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 279
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies 0 0 0 2 2 9 9 21
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies 0 0 0 0 0 5 9 118
Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey 0 0 0 223 0 7 9 646
Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey 0 0 0 49 0 3 7 171
Infinitely repeated games of incomplete information: symmetric case with random signals 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 20
Infinitely repeated games with incomplete information 0 0 0 0 0 5 8 1,190
Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists 0 0 0 0 2 16 23 47
J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012): Des jeux répétés a l'analyse "coùt-bénéfice" 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 13
J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012): des jeux répétés à l'analyse "coût-bénéfice" 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 30
Le coeur d'une economie d'echange en information asymetrique 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 664
Le cœur d'une économie d'échange en information asymétrique 0 0 0 26 0 1 7 281
Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la théorie des mécanismes 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 12
Long Persuasion Games 0 0 0 76 2 8 13 307
Long Persuasion Games 0 0 0 132 1 5 9 712
Long persuasion games 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 40
Long persuasion games 0 0 0 0 1 7 11 17
Multistage communication with and without verifiable types 0 0 0 0 1 6 8 35
Multistage communication with and without verifiable types 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 12
Multistage communication with and without verifiable types 0 0 0 74 1 4 6 235
Negotiation without a deadline:a job market example 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 61
Non-zero sum repeated games and information transmission 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 672
Note on Nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information 0 0 0 4 0 3 3 24
On Strategic Equilibria and Rational Choice 0 0 0 4 1 1 3 187
Posterior efficiency 0 0 0 2 0 3 6 25
Posterior efficiency 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 41
Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 6 8 416
Rational Choice in Strategic Environments: Further Observations 0 0 0 0 1 9 10 89
Rational choice in strategic environments: further observations 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 26
Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero sum 0 0 0 9 2 6 6 57
Repeated games of incomplete information: non-zero-sum 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 529
Repeated games with incomplete information 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 17
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 671
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations 0 0 0 9 1 2 2 81
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 324
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 4 2 8 10 58
Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 136
Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 277
Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation 0 0 0 20 4 10 13 69
Sender-receiver games with cooperation 0 0 0 22 0 3 8 40
Some Thoughts on Efficiency and Information 0 0 0 0 0 10 13 228
Sunspot eqilibrium as a game-theoretical solution concept 0 0 0 0 1 4 7 54
Sunspot equilibrium as a game-theoretical solution concept 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 254
Tenable Threats when Nash Equilibrium is the Norm 0 0 1 1 9 15 20 21
The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities 0 0 0 63 0 2 3 294
The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects 0 0 0 79 0 7 9 340
The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game 0 0 0 25 1 2 2 124
The Incentive Compatible Core of a Quasi-Linear Economy 0 0 0 40 1 5 6 226
The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects 0 0 0 10 6 9 12 313
Trading Games With Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 39 4 13 14 137
Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification 0 0 0 0 3 6 7 12
Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification 0 0 0 0 2 6 7 27
Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification (Strategic Information Transmission and Certification) 0 0 0 73 1 3 6 302
Universal mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 99
Universal mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 37
Total Working Papers 1 4 12 2,224 126 564 799 17,749
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core 0 0 0 23 0 10 13 99
A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 39 0 2 3 99
A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting 0 0 0 32 3 7 9 108
A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment 0 0 1 35 0 3 6 209
A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies 0 0 0 12 0 4 5 75
Afriat's theorem for general budget sets 0 0 3 109 2 8 17 339
Afriat’s theorem for indivisible goods 0 0 0 8 0 2 7 76
An Approach to Communication Equilibria 0 0 0 211 2 3 6 620
Appariement: des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth 0 0 0 15 0 2 4 71
Bayesian repeated games and reputation 0 0 0 12 0 3 7 95
COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS 0 0 2 8 0 6 14 59
Can sunspots replace a mediator? 0 0 1 55 1 2 9 122
Collusion dans les enchères. Quelques apports des jeux coopératifs 0 0 0 6 0 2 4 63
Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types 0 0 0 64 1 7 9 214
Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques 0 0 0 4 4 5 7 24
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values 0 0 0 22 4 13 18 125
Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values 0 0 0 0 1 5 10 38
Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 1 4 9 304
Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited 0 0 1 135 0 5 10 284
Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 0 0 0 1 1 3 8 601
Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example 0 0 0 146 2 8 15 534
Essential data, budget sets and rationalization 0 0 0 1 0 7 11 63
Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games 0 0 0 1 0 7 14 55
Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments 0 0 1 11 2 3 5 71
Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion 0 1 3 62 1 3 10 149
INTERVIEW WITH JEAN-FRANÇOIS MERTENS (1946–2012) 0 0 1 22 3 9 13 74
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case 0 0 0 40 4 10 17 215
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies 0 0 0 31 3 13 15 242
Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey 0 0 1 77 8 16 23 254
Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists 0 0 0 19 2 6 9 86
J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012): des jeux répétés à l'analyse « coût-bénéfice » 0 0 0 5 0 2 3 30
Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la Théorie des Mécanismes 0 0 0 37 1 6 7 146
Long persuasion games 0 0 0 44 1 5 10 187
MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES 0 0 0 5 2 4 5 40
Posterior Efficiency 0 0 1 33 1 6 12 95
Rational Choice in Strategic Environments: Further Observations 0 0 0 2 0 4 4 13
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations 0 0 0 51 0 5 7 161
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games 0 0 0 26 0 3 6 123
Sender–receiver games with cooperation 0 0 0 4 1 5 10 45
The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects 0 0 0 37 4 11 12 406
The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game 0 0 0 27 0 6 10 112
Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification 0 1 1 4 0 2 4 13
Universal Mechanisms 0 0 0 191 0 5 6 754
Total Journal Articles 0 2 16 1,667 55 242 403 7,493
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum 0 0 0 310 2 7 8 862
Total Chapters 0 0 0 310 2 7 8 862

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04