Access Statistics for James W Friedman

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly 0 0 0 75 4 4 6 228
A modified folk theorem for time-dependent supergames 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 354
An Experimental Research in Oligopoly 0 0 0 99 1 4 5 580
An Experimental Study in Oligopoly 0 0 0 52 3 5 5 218
An Experimental Study of Cooperative Duopoly 0 1 1 64 8 13 16 207
An Extension of the " Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 223
An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 1 1 4 5 10 10
An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 1 3 4 5 7 33
An Informal Aggregative Socio-Economic Simulation of a Latin American Country 0 0 0 12 1 1 2 154
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach 0 0 3 25 3 6 10 606
Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: a probabilistic choice approach 0 0 0 3 2 4 6 40
CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS IN DUOPOLIES 0 0 0 0 2 4 6 207
Collusion and antitrust detection 0 0 0 2 2 4 6 21
Equal Profits as a Fair Division 0 0 0 19 3 4 4 142
Infinite horizon spatial duopoly with collusive pricing and noncollusive location choice 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 226
On Uncertain Lifetimes 0 0 0 9 3 10 11 69
Partial collusion fosters minimum product differentiation 0 0 0 2 4 4 10 53
SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 474
Sustainable Collusion in Oligopoly with Free Entry 0 0 0 0 4 5 6 671
Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry 0 0 0 6 3 6 7 40
Total Working Papers 0 1 6 372 56 92 129 4,556

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A MARKET WITH A SOCIAL CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITY* 0 0 0 29 2 4 5 83
A Modification of the Folk Theorem to Apply to Time-Dependent Supergames 0 0 0 17 2 2 4 83
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames 0 7 42 1,692 9 24 104 4,200
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames: A Correction 0 1 5 15 1 8 20 283
A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly 0 0 0 105 2 3 6 263
A Note on the Turnpike Properties of Time Dependent Supergames [Non-Cooperative Equilibria in Time Dependent Supergames] 0 0 0 20 2 2 3 140
A positive approach to non-cooperative games 0 0 0 21 1 2 3 125
Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection 0 0 0 47 2 3 6 285
Advertising and Oligopolistic Equilibrium 1 2 5 270 8 11 19 1,283
An Extension of the Folk Theorem with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 27 1 2 7 94
Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations 0 0 0 82 1 4 6 224
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach 0 0 3 122 5 7 14 335
COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 27
COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 24
Comments on "A Simulation Analysis of Alternative Pricing Strategies for Dynamic Environments." 0 0 0 71 1 1 1 270
Concavity of Production Functions and Non-Increasing Returns to Scale 0 0 0 197 1 2 2 729
Continuous Reaction Functions in Duopolies 0 0 0 26 1 2 4 89
Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames 1 1 2 94 5 8 12 171
Duality Principles in the Theory of Cost and Production Revisited 0 0 0 159 1 2 3 688
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in n Person Games without Quasi-Concavity 0 0 1 171 3 5 7 451
Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 71
James Friedman, Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England (1986), p. 262 1 3 6 316 5 11 18 890
Learning in Games by Random Sampling 0 1 1 160 3 6 6 633
Limit price entry prevention when complete information is lacking 0 0 0 25 2 4 5 116
Limit pricing and entry 0 0 0 11 1 4 5 49
Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets 0 0 1 14 0 1 2 47
Membership Diversity in Club Decisions 0 0 0 35 1 1 1 264
Middlemen as guarantors of quality 0 1 4 415 1 3 11 801
Non-Cooperative Equilibria for Exit Supergames 0 0 0 28 3 3 3 186
Non-Cooperative Equilibria in Time-Dependent Supergames 0 0 0 23 1 2 2 130
On Experimental Research in Oligopoly 0 0 0 44 1 3 3 168
On Reaction Function Equilibria 0 0 0 19 5 6 6 100
On Uncertain Lifetimes 0 0 0 66 4 6 8 217
On the Strategic Importance of Prices versus Quantities 0 0 2 98 3 3 6 267
Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product Differentiation 0 0 1 135 4 10 11 562
Price Signaling in Experimental Oligopoly 1 1 1 101 3 4 5 454
REVIEWS AND COMMENTS 0 0 0 7 1 2 3 39
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games 0 0 0 50 3 9 11 154
Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly 0 0 0 3 4 8 12 33
Reaction Functions as Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 72 3 3 7 225
Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions 0 0 0 33 3 7 9 123
Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry 0 0 0 140 1 3 4 417
The Interaction between Game Theory and Theoretical Industrial Economics 0 0 0 0 4 5 9 302
The legacy of Augustin Cournot 0 1 2 19 1 5 7 73
Views on the Relevance of Game Theory 0 0 0 5 1 2 4 10
Total Journal Articles 4 18 76 4,998 108 206 390 16,178

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Oligopoly Theory 0 0 0 0 3 10 31 591
Total Books 0 0 0 0 3 10 31 591

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Oligopoly theory 0 1 5 716 4 7 18 2,400
The Role of Beliefs, Knowledge, and Rationality in Non-Cooperative Games 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
The ‘Folk Theorem’ and Continuous Reaction Functions: A Synthesis 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 4
To trade, or not to trade; that is the question 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Total Chapters 0 1 5 716 5 11 24 2,407

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Statistics updated 2026-02-12