Access Statistics for James W Friedman

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly 0 0 0 75 0 0 6 230
A modified folk theorem for time-dependent supergames 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 355
An Experimental Research in Oligopoly 0 0 0 99 0 1 10 586
An Experimental Study in Oligopoly 0 0 0 52 0 0 8 221
An Experimental Study of Cooperative Duopoly 0 0 1 64 0 0 17 210
An Extension of the " Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 228
An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 1 1 0 0 6 10
An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 1 3 0 0 8 34
An Informal Aggregative Socio-Economic Simulation of a Latin American Country 0 0 0 12 0 0 6 159
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach 0 0 0 25 0 0 13 612
Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: a probabilistic choice approach 0 0 0 3 0 0 13 49
CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS IN DUOPOLIES 0 0 0 0 0 1 16 218
Collusion and antitrust detection 0 0 0 2 0 1 11 27
Equal Profits as a Fair Division 0 0 0 19 1 1 8 146
Infinite horizon spatial duopoly with collusive pricing and noncollusive location choice 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 229
On Uncertain Lifetimes 0 0 0 9 0 0 14 72
Partial collusion fosters minimum product differentiation 0 0 0 2 0 1 10 59
SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 477
Sustainable Collusion in Oligopoly with Free Entry 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 672
Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry 0 0 0 6 0 0 9 43
Total Working Papers 0 0 3 372 2 8 181 4,637

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A MARKET WITH A SOCIAL CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITY* 0 0 0 29 0 0 7 85
A Modification of the Folk Theorem to Apply to Time-Dependent Supergames 0 0 0 17 0 0 7 87
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames 5 13 40 1,724 11 34 122 4,294
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames: A Correction 0 0 3 17 4 6 27 301
A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly 0 0 0 105 0 0 7 265
A Note on the Turnpike Properties of Time Dependent Supergames [Non-Cooperative Equilibria in Time Dependent Supergames] 0 0 0 20 0 0 3 141
A positive approach to non-cooperative games 0 0 0 21 0 1 8 131
Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection 0 1 1 48 0 2 8 290
Advertising and Oligopolistic Equilibrium 0 2 7 275 0 3 21 1,292
An Extension of the Folk Theorem with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 27 0 0 6 97
Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations 0 0 0 82 1 1 7 227
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach 0 0 1 122 0 1 17 343
COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION 0 0 0 2 0 1 7 30
COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION 0 0 0 4 1 1 3 29
Comments on "A Simulation Analysis of Alternative Pricing Strategies for Dynamic Environments." 0 0 0 71 0 0 5 274
Concavity of Production Functions and Non-Increasing Returns to Scale 0 0 0 197 1 2 7 734
Continuous Reaction Functions in Duopolies 0 0 0 26 0 1 9 95
Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames 0 1 2 95 0 1 13 176
Duality Principles in the Theory of Cost and Production Revisited 0 0 1 160 0 0 6 692
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in n Person Games without Quasi-Concavity 0 0 1 172 0 1 10 456
Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements 0 0 0 8 0 1 7 76
James Friedman, Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England (1986), p. 262 1 1 5 317 1 2 22 900
Learning in Games by Random Sampling 0 0 2 161 1 1 10 637
Limit price entry prevention when complete information is lacking 0 0 0 25 0 1 7 119
Limit pricing and entry 0 0 0 11 0 0 7 52
Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets 0 0 0 14 1 1 3 49
Membership Diversity in Club Decisions 0 0 0 35 0 0 4 267
Middlemen as guarantors of quality 0 1 7 420 0 1 15 812
Non-Cooperative Equilibria for Exit Supergames 0 0 0 28 1 1 8 191
Non-Cooperative Equilibria in Time-Dependent Supergames 0 0 0 23 0 0 7 135
On Experimental Research in Oligopoly 0 0 0 44 1 3 11 176
On Reaction Function Equilibria 0 0 0 19 0 3 12 106
On Uncertain Lifetimes 0 0 0 66 0 2 15 225
On the Strategic Importance of Prices versus Quantities 0 0 2 99 0 1 9 272
Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product Differentiation 0 0 1 136 1 1 18 570
Price Signaling in Experimental Oligopoly 0 0 1 101 0 0 7 457
REVIEWS AND COMMENTS 0 0 0 7 0 1 5 42
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games 0 0 0 50 1 2 15 160
Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly 0 0 0 3 0 2 15 38
Reaction Functions as Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 72 0 0 6 227
Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions 0 0 0 33 1 2 11 126
Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry 0 0 0 140 0 0 5 419
The Interaction between Game Theory and Theoretical Industrial Economics 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 302
The legacy of Augustin Cournot 0 0 3 21 1 2 17 84
Views on the Relevance of Game Theory 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 13
Total Journal Articles 6 19 77 5,052 27 82 546 16,494

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Oligopoly Theory 0 0 0 0 1 1 17 595
Total Books 0 0 0 0 1 1 17 595

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Oligopoly theory 1 1 3 717 2 3 17 2,409
The Role of Beliefs, Knowledge, and Rationality in Non-Cooperative Games 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3
The ‘Folk Theorem’ and Continuous Reaction Functions: A Synthesis 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 7
To trade, or not to trade; that is the question 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 9
Total Chapters 1 1 3 717 2 6 33 2,428

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Statistics updated 2026-10-11