Access Statistics for James W Friedman

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly 0 0 0 75 0 5 6 229
A modified folk theorem for time-dependent supergames 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 355
An Experimental Research in Oligopoly 0 0 0 99 0 2 6 581
An Experimental Study in Oligopoly 0 0 0 52 2 5 7 220
An Experimental Study of Cooperative Duopoly 0 0 1 64 1 10 18 209
An Extension of the " Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 225
An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 1 3 0 5 8 34
An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 1 1 0 4 9 10
An Informal Aggregative Socio-Economic Simulation of a Latin American Country 0 0 0 12 1 3 3 156
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach 0 0 2 25 0 4 10 607
Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: a probabilistic choice approach 0 0 0 3 1 5 9 43
CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS IN DUOPOLIES 0 0 0 0 0 6 9 211
Collusion and antitrust detection 0 0 0 2 1 4 8 23
Equal Profits as a Fair Division 0 0 0 19 0 4 5 143
Infinite horizon spatial duopoly with collusive pricing and noncollusive location choice 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 226
On Uncertain Lifetimes 0 0 0 9 0 3 11 69
Partial collusion fosters minimum product differentiation 0 0 0 2 1 5 9 54
SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 475
Sustainable Collusion in Oligopoly with Free Entry 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 671
Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry 0 0 0 6 1 4 8 41
Total Working Papers 0 0 5 372 8 82 147 4,582

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A MARKET WITH A SOCIAL CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITY* 0 0 0 29 1 3 6 84
A Modification of the Folk Theorem to Apply to Time-Dependent Supergames 0 0 0 17 1 5 6 86
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames 3 5 39 1,697 16 31 113 4,222
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames: A Correction 0 0 5 15 3 7 23 289
A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly 0 0 0 105 0 3 7 264
A Note on the Turnpike Properties of Time Dependent Supergames [Non-Cooperative Equilibria in Time Dependent Supergames] 0 0 0 20 0 2 2 140
A positive approach to non-cooperative games 0 0 0 21 0 1 3 125
Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection 0 0 0 47 2 4 8 287
Advertising and Oligopolistic Equilibrium 2 4 7 273 2 12 20 1,287
An Extension of the Folk Theorem with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 27 0 2 6 95
Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations 0 0 0 82 0 3 8 226
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach 0 0 3 122 1 7 15 337
COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 24
COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 27
Comments on "A Simulation Analysis of Alternative Pricing Strategies for Dynamic Environments." 0 0 0 71 0 3 3 272
Concavity of Production Functions and Non-Increasing Returns to Scale 0 0 0 197 0 1 2 729
Continuous Reaction Functions in Duopolies 0 0 0 26 1 6 9 94
Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames 0 1 2 94 1 6 12 172
Duality Principles in the Theory of Cost and Production Revisited 0 0 0 159 2 4 6 691
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in n Person Games without Quasi-Concavity 0 0 1 171 2 5 9 453
Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements 0 0 0 8 0 1 3 72
James Friedman, Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England (1986), p. 262 0 1 6 316 0 6 16 891
Learning in Games by Random Sampling 0 1 2 161 0 5 8 635
Limit price entry prevention when complete information is lacking 0 0 0 25 0 3 6 117
Limit pricing and entry 0 0 0 11 1 3 6 51
Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets 0 0 1 14 0 0 2 47
Membership Diversity in Club Decisions 0 0 0 35 0 2 2 265
Middlemen as guarantors of quality 0 0 2 415 0 2 7 802
Non-Cooperative Equilibria for Exit Supergames 0 0 0 28 0 3 3 186
Non-Cooperative Equilibria in Time-Dependent Supergames 0 0 0 23 0 3 4 132
On Experimental Research in Oligopoly 0 0 0 44 0 2 4 169
On Reaction Function Equilibria 0 0 0 19 0 6 7 101
On Uncertain Lifetimes 0 0 0 66 1 5 9 218
On the Strategic Importance of Prices versus Quantities 0 1 2 99 1 5 6 269
Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product Differentiation 1 1 2 136 1 7 14 565
Price Signaling in Experimental Oligopoly 0 1 1 101 0 3 5 454
REVIEWS AND COMMENTS 0 0 0 7 0 2 3 40
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games 0 0 0 50 1 6 13 157
Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly 0 0 0 3 0 5 13 34
Reaction Functions as Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 72 1 4 6 226
Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions 0 0 0 33 1 4 10 124
Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry 0 0 0 140 0 1 4 417
The Interaction between Game Theory and Theoretical Industrial Economics 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 302
The legacy of Augustin Cournot 0 2 3 21 2 7 12 79
Views on the Relevance of Game Theory 0 0 0 5 0 1 4 10
Total Journal Articles 6 17 76 5,011 41 197 434 16,267

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Oligopoly Theory 0 0 0 0 1 4 25 592
Total Books 0 0 0 0 1 4 25 592

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Oligopoly theory 0 0 3 716 2 7 16 2,403
The Role of Beliefs, Knowledge, and Rationality in Non-Cooperative Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
The ‘Folk Theorem’ and Continuous Reaction Functions: A Synthesis 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5
To trade, or not to trade; that is the question 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
Total Chapters 0 0 3 716 4 11 24 2,413

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Statistics updated 2026-04-09