Access Statistics for James W Friedman

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly 0 0 0 75 1 1 3 224
A modified folk theorem for time-dependent supergames 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 353
An Experimental Research in Oligopoly 0 0 0 99 0 0 0 575
An Experimental Study in Oligopoly 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 213
An Experimental Study of Cooperative Duopoly 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 191
An Extension of the " Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 221
An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 26
An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
An Informal Aggregative Socio-Economic Simulation of a Latin American Country 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 153
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach 0 0 1 23 0 0 1 597
Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: a probabilistic choice approach 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 34
CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS IN DUOPOLIES 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 202
Collusion and antitrust detection 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 16
Equal Profits as a Fair Division 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 138
Infinite horizon spatial duopoly with collusive pricing and noncollusive location choice 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 223
On Uncertain Lifetimes 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 58
Partial collusion fosters minimum product differentiation 0 0 0 2 0 1 4 46
SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 472
Sustainable Collusion in Oligopoly with Free Entry 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 666
Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 33
Total Working Papers 0 0 1 367 3 8 21 4,443

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A MARKET WITH A SOCIAL CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITY* 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 78
A Modification of the Folk Theorem to Apply to Time-Dependent Supergames 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 80
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames 5 18 50 1,676 9 33 111 4,142
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames: A Correction 0 1 2 11 1 4 8 270
A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly 0 0 0 105 1 1 2 258
A Note on the Turnpike Properties of Time Dependent Supergames [Non-Cooperative Equilibria in Time Dependent Supergames] 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 138
A positive approach to non-cooperative games 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 122
Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection 0 0 0 47 0 0 1 279
Advertising and Oligopolistic Equilibrium 1 1 4 267 1 3 15 1,270
An Extension of the Folk Theorem with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 27 1 1 3 90
Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations 0 0 0 82 0 0 1 218
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach 0 0 0 119 0 0 4 322
COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 26
COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 22
Comments on "A Simulation Analysis of Alternative Pricing Strategies for Dynamic Environments." 0 0 0 71 0 0 0 269
Concavity of Production Functions and Non-Increasing Returns to Scale 0 0 0 197 0 0 0 727
Continuous Reaction Functions in Duopolies 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 85
Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames 0 1 1 93 1 2 4 162
Duality Principles in the Theory of Cost and Production Revisited 0 0 0 159 1 1 1 686
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in n Person Games without Quasi-Concavity 0 0 1 170 0 1 2 445
Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 69
James Friedman, Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England (1986), p. 262 1 2 11 312 1 2 20 877
Learning in Games by Random Sampling 0 0 0 159 0 0 4 627
Limit price entry prevention when complete information is lacking 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 111
Limit pricing and entry 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 45
Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 45
Membership Diversity in Club Decisions 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 263
Middlemen as guarantors of quality 0 0 7 413 0 2 13 797
Non-Cooperative Equilibria for Exit Supergames 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 183
Non-Cooperative Equilibria in Time-Dependent Supergames 0 0 0 23 0 0 1 128
On Experimental Research in Oligopoly 0 0 0 44 0 0 1 165
On Reaction Function Equilibria 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 94
On Uncertain Lifetimes 0 0 0 66 0 1 2 210
On the Strategic Importance of Prices versus Quantities 0 0 1 97 0 0 2 263
Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product Differentiation 0 1 2 135 0 1 4 552
Price Signaling in Experimental Oligopoly 0 0 3 100 0 0 3 449
REVIEWS AND COMMENTS 0 0 1 7 0 0 2 37
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games 0 0 0 50 0 0 3 144
Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 22
Reaction Functions as Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 72 0 0 2 220
Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 114
Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry 0 0 0 140 0 0 4 413
The Interaction between Game Theory and Theoretical Industrial Economics 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 297
The legacy of Augustin Cournot 0 0 1 18 0 0 4 67
Views on the Relevance of Game Theory 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 6
Total Journal Articles 7 24 84 4,959 18 54 229 15,887

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Oligopoly Theory 0 0 0 0 1 9 40 576
Total Books 0 0 0 0 1 9 40 576

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Oligopoly theory 1 1 13 714 1 3 32 2,390
The Role of Beliefs, Knowledge, and Rationality in Non-Cooperative Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
The ‘Folk Theorem’ and Continuous Reaction Functions: A Synthesis 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total Chapters 1 1 13 714 1 3 34 2,392

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Statistics updated 2025-07-04