Access Statistics for James W Friedman

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly 0 0 0 75 1 1 7 231
A modified folk theorem for time-dependent supergames 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 357
An Experimental Research in Oligopoly 0 0 0 99 1 2 11 587
An Experimental Study in Oligopoly 0 0 0 52 4 4 12 225
An Experimental Study of Cooperative Duopoly 0 0 1 64 1 1 17 211
An Extension of the " Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 229
An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 11
An Extension of the "Folk Theorem" with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 3 1 1 7 35
An Informal Aggregative Socio-Economic Simulation of a Latin American Country 0 0 0 12 2 2 8 161
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach 0 0 0 25 3 3 15 615
Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: a probabilistic choice approach 0 0 0 3 0 0 13 49
CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS IN DUOPOLIES 0 0 0 0 1 2 16 219
Collusion and antitrust detection 0 0 0 2 3 4 13 30
Equal Profits as a Fair Division 0 0 0 19 3 4 11 149
Infinite horizon spatial duopoly with collusive pricing and noncollusive location choice 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 229
On Uncertain Lifetimes 0 0 0 9 1 1 14 73
Partial collusion fosters minimum product differentiation 0 0 0 2 2 3 12 61
SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONTINUOUS REACTION FUNCTIONS 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 478
Sustainable Collusion in Oligopoly with Free Entry 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 673
Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry 0 0 0 6 1 1 10 44
Total Working Papers 0 0 1 372 30 37 203 4,667

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A MARKET WITH A SOCIAL CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITY* 0 0 0 29 2 2 8 87
A Modification of the Folk Theorem to Apply to Time-Dependent Supergames 0 0 0 17 1 1 7 88
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames 7 18 46 1,731 24 48 142 4,318
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames: A Correction 0 0 3 17 2 8 28 303
A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly 0 0 0 105 2 2 7 267
A Note on the Turnpike Properties of Time Dependent Supergames [Non-Cooperative Equilibria in Time Dependent Supergames] 0 0 0 20 1 1 4 142
A positive approach to non-cooperative games 0 0 0 21 1 1 9 132
Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection 0 1 1 48 1 2 9 291
Advertising and Oligopolistic Equilibrium 0 2 7 275 2 5 22 1,294
An Extension of the Folk Theorem with Continuous Reaction Functions 0 0 0 27 1 1 6 98
Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations 0 0 0 82 2 3 9 229
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach 0 0 0 122 1 1 16 344
COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION 0 0 0 4 2 3 5 31
COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION 0 0 0 2 0 1 7 30
Comments on "A Simulation Analysis of Alternative Pricing Strategies for Dynamic Environments." 0 0 0 71 4 4 9 278
Concavity of Production Functions and Non-Increasing Returns to Scale 0 0 0 197 0 1 7 734
Continuous Reaction Functions in Duopolies 0 0 0 26 1 1 9 96
Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames 0 1 2 95 2 3 15 178
Duality Principles in the Theory of Cost and Production Revisited 0 0 1 160 1 1 7 693
Existence of Nash Equilibrium in n Person Games without Quasi-Concavity 0 0 1 172 0 0 10 456
Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements 0 0 0 8 3 3 9 79
James Friedman, Game Theory with Applications to Economics, Oxford University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England (1986), p. 262 0 1 4 317 5 6 26 905
Learning in Games by Random Sampling 0 0 2 161 2 3 12 639
Limit price entry prevention when complete information is lacking 0 0 0 25 0 0 7 119
Limit pricing and entry 0 0 0 11 1 1 8 53
Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets 0 0 0 14 1 2 4 50
Membership Diversity in Club Decisions 0 0 0 35 2 2 6 269
Middlemen as guarantors of quality 0 0 6 420 0 0 14 812
Non-Cooperative Equilibria for Exit Supergames 0 0 0 28 0 1 8 191
Non-Cooperative Equilibria in Time-Dependent Supergames 0 0 0 23 1 1 8 136
On Experimental Research in Oligopoly 0 0 0 44 1 2 12 177
On Reaction Function Equilibria 0 0 0 19 1 3 13 107
On Uncertain Lifetimes 0 0 0 66 3 4 17 228
On the Strategic Importance of Prices versus Quantities 0 0 1 99 1 2 9 273
Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Product Differentiation 0 0 1 136 0 1 18 570
Price Signaling in Experimental Oligopoly 0 0 1 101 1 1 8 458
REVIEWS AND COMMENTS 0 0 0 7 1 1 6 43
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games 0 0 0 50 2 3 17 162
Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly 0 0 0 3 0 2 13 38
Reaction Functions as Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 72 3 3 8 230
Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions 0 0 0 33 2 3 12 128
Sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry 0 0 0 140 1 1 6 420
The Interaction between Game Theory and Theoretical Industrial Economics 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 302
The legacy of Augustin Cournot 0 0 3 21 1 2 17 85
Views on the Relevance of Game Theory 0 0 0 5 2 2 7 15
Total Journal Articles 7 23 79 5,059 84 138 606 16,578

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Oligopoly Theory 0 0 0 0 4 5 18 599
Total Books 0 0 0 0 4 5 18 599

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Oligopoly theory 1 2 3 718 5 7 21 2,414
The Role of Beliefs, Knowledge, and Rationality in Non-Cooperative Games 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 5
The ‘Folk Theorem’ and Continuous Reaction Functions: A Synthesis 0 0 0 0 2 3 7 9
To trade, or not to trade; that is the question 0 0 0 0 1 2 10 10
Total Chapters 1 2 3 718 10 15 42 2,438

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Statistics updated 2026-11-12