Access Statistics for Drew Fudenberg

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 209 0 8 14 867
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 1 135 1 6 9 611
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 194 2 10 17 652
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 1 14 0 4 10 162
A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays 0 0 0 44 2 3 3 110
A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games 0 0 0 96 1 4 5 190
A Reputation for Honesty 0 0 0 13 6 15 17 39
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 0 0 1 1 6 10 541
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 0 1 39 2 6 12 209
AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 208
Adjusting to Change in Complex Systems 0 1 1 20 1 6 7 20
Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics" 0 0 0 45 1 9 13 176
Adversarial forecasters, surprises and randomization 0 0 1 2 0 3 7 16
Altruism and Self Control 0 0 0 261 1 7 11 208
An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk 0 0 0 22 0 11 12 69
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 0 0 0 93 0 3 6 305
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 122 0 4 8 561
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 1 4 1 2 6 76
An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 0 0 0 10 1 2 2 68
An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 0 0 0 132 4 16 17 252
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 23 0 2 4 69
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 53 2 4 8 77
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 175 3 6 9 517
Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events 0 0 0 35 1 9 11 46
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 13 17 86
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 65 1 10 10 293
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 62 0 3 7 108
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 4 0 3 3 93
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 80 0 6 10 331
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 6 1 3 3 76
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 0 0 83 1 6 9 480
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 0 1 7 0 6 9 68
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 65 1 7 9 208
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 6 5 9 9 90
Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 0 2 8 10 144
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 0 0 0 2 3 15 25 2,534
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags 0 0 0 49 0 1 8 125
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags 0 0 0 38 5 11 15 79
Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion 0 0 1 48 3 6 13 99
Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion 0 0 1 46 1 2 5 63
EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 2 4 6 238
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 287 1 4 5 615
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 140 3 7 8 570
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 23 3 6 9 89
Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 1 6 9 287
Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations 0 0 3 47 4 9 15 125
Endogenous Attention and the Spread of False News 0 0 0 3 1 4 11 74
Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' 0 0 0 88 1 3 6 174
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 0 0 1 136 3 8 11 259
Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks 0 0 0 0 0 6 10 306
Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks 0 0 0 46 3 12 14 84
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 62
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 0 64 2 5 9 250
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 0 6 0 4 8 76
Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 116
Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 70 1 5 9 196
Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems 0 1 1 10 0 8 11 81
Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play 0 0 0 20 2 7 10 74
Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play 0 0 0 3 6 12 14 52
How Flexible is that Functional Form? Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories 0 1 2 6 1 7 11 36
Imitation Processes with Small Mutations 0 0 1 32 1 6 11 175
Imitation Processes with Small Mutations 0 0 0 10 3 13 15 72
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 1 1 161 1 11 14 355
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 0 15 2 8 11 93
Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information 3 6 21 1,446 5 12 36 3,133
Interim Correlated Rationalizability 0 0 0 117 1 7 8 269
Interim Correlated Rationalizability 0 0 1 7 1 7 13 79
Interim Rationalizability 0 0 0 97 1 11 11 203
Interim Rationalizability 0 0 0 81 0 4 5 226
It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games 0 0 0 86 1 4 8 73
Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 109 3 4 6 699
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 4 0 6 7 69
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 8 0 5 6 75
Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons 0 1 1 98 2 7 10 82
Learning Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 624
Learning Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 69 0 4 6 149
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 343
Learning and Belief Based Trading 0 0 0 44 0 7 8 166
Learning and Equilibrium 0 0 0 32 2 4 6 130
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games 0 0 0 39 0 6 8 61
Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games 0 0 0 2 1 4 7 48
Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 33 0 1 5 81
Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 55 0 5 6 109
Learning in Games 0 0 1 32 3 11 21 184
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments 0 1 2 11 1 5 9 59
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 76 0 6 7 330
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 236 1 6 8 575
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 9 0 3 6 66
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 268 0 7 9 770
Learning with Recency Bias 0 1 3 145 1 7 14 149
Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games 0 1 1 78 2 4 7 146
Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis 0 0 0 81 1 1 2 156
Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms 0 0 0 7 1 2 5 81
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 16 2 5 6 67
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 179 1 9 11 460
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 48 1 6 6 179
Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents 0 0 0 94 0 9 11 283
Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents 0 0 0 6 1 5 6 28
MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 504
Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent 0 0 0 50 0 4 8 166
Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent 0 0 0 73 0 6 6 357
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 197 6 15 19 575
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 193
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 2 7 14 17 57
Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 1 39 0 5 8 206
Measuring the Completeness of Theories 0 0 0 27 2 4 9 61
Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets 0 0 0 53 0 7 7 190
Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations 0 0 0 3 1 6 7 52
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts 0 0 0 0 0 7 12 510
NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 7 0 4 6 29
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 197
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 1 1 5 8 292
Non-Equilibrium Learning with Heterogeneous Priors 0 0 0 0 1 5 5 35
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 0 1 6 8 578
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 72 2 5 6 158
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 3 0 3 5 552
Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models 0 0 1 13 0 4 6 12
Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models 0 0 0 1 0 3 6 19
On Concave Functions over Lotteries 0 0 0 102 1 6 9 16
On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 0 6 10 343
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 1 17 12 31 38 145
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 0 21 3 9 12 131
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 66 1 6 9 307
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 9 1 8 13 80
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 210 0 6 12 511
Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players 0 0 0 151 0 5 7 670
Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games 0 0 0 34 5 10 13 51
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 5 0 3 5 70
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 185 1 8 11 1,038
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 1 5 12 827
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 137 1 7 9 475
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 2 5 9 326
Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 0 7 15 532
Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note 0 0 0 0 1 5 8 311
Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 0 28 2 9 11 132
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 0 1 5 2 2 4 74
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 0 0 52 0 3 5 247
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient 0 0 0 220 0 7 11 524
Phenotype Switching and Mutations in Random Environments 0 0 0 2 1 4 5 39
Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium 0 0 0 39 0 4 11 46
Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation 1 1 1 41 3 7 11 188
Predation Without Reputation 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 394
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play 0 0 0 11 0 3 6 39
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play 0 0 0 16 0 3 5 40
Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good 0 0 0 4 0 3 9 1,183
Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics 0 0 0 12 2 6 6 57
Random matching in adaptive dynamics 0 0 0 60 2 7 7 140
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 309
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty 0 0 0 49 4 7 9 129
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 0 20 1 6 9 98
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 3 3 5 241
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction 0 0 0 16 0 4 6 63
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium 0 0 0 19 4 7 13 48
Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries 0 0 0 55 2 3 5 223
Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 17 0 5 6 67
Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem 0 0 0 6 0 5 7 46
Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem 0 0 0 6 1 4 4 46
Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 22
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 91 1 5 8 198
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 14 2 6 6 75
Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 347
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 0 0 13 0 2 5 92
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 0 0 329 0 4 6 634
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal 0 0 0 1 1 10 13 45
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player 0 0 0 0 0 5 11 253
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 1 100 0 6 13 318
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 0 91 0 5 9 334
Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants 0 0 0 3 1 2 3 34
Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 101
Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents 0 0 0 32 1 4 5 72
Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 159
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 222
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs 0 0 0 247 3 6 11 541
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 0 1 5 13 334
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 39 3 10 11 147
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 13 2 5 11 129
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 0 1 5 9 336
Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 0 0 0 98 0 5 9 293
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 69 2 8 12 269
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 1 6 9 210
Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 0 0 0 15 2 12 12 131
Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 206
Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 0 56 3 5 5 135
Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships 0 0 0 0 0 7 14 1,343
Sins of Omission and Commission in Complex Systems 0 0 2 33 3 10 16 66
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World 0 0 1 37 0 6 14 161
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices 0 0 0 39 0 8 11 112
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 113 2 13 14 368
Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi 0 0 1 63 0 5 8 657
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility 0 0 1 11 1 5 7 61
Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality 0 0 2 99 3 10 14 362
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 2 7 11 14 59
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 40 0 10 12 173
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games 0 0 0 471 1 4 11 1,225
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 0 4 9 12 28
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 1 1 17 0 6 12 109
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 0 1 6 11 21
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 8 0 4 7 72
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 78 1 6 6 406
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 19 2 8 11 113
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 227 4 26 32 1,944
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 146 1 9 12 1,004
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 15 1 1 2 105
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 464
Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays 0 0 0 6 1 3 5 53
Tail probabilities for triangular arrays 0 0 0 3 0 8 10 60
Testing the Drift-Diffusion Model 0 0 2 5 1 3 7 53
The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 2 7 11 325
The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 8 1 6 9 73
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 21 2 6 7 92
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 0 233 1 6 9 844
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 1 255 1 9 16 934
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games 0 0 0 32 0 9 12 224
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 0 0 76 1 4 7 269
The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 0 0 8 1 4 6 95
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry 0 0 0 1 1 5 7 552
The Theory of Learning in Games 2 5 12 898 5 19 37 1,931
The Transfer Performance of Economic Models 0 0 0 21 2 10 15 45
Timing and Self-Control 0 0 0 89 1 5 7 142
Timing and Self-Control 0 0 0 8 1 2 3 74
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics 0 0 0 245 1 6 12 108
Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift? 0 1 1 40 5 19 22 267
Topologies on Type 0 0 0 61 1 7 14 324
Topologies on Types 0 0 0 144 0 8 11 419
Topologies on Types 0 0 0 2 0 3 6 55
Topologies on Types 0 0 0 91 1 10 10 906
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship 0 0 1 49 2 5 8 47
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation 0 0 0 2 1 4 5 30
Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks 0 0 8 381 1 9 24 1,120
When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 28 0 4 6 274
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 4 0 7 8 85
When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible 0 0 0 64 2 6 8 433
When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 235 1 3 3 627
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 108 1 5 11 459
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 144 1 5 8 401
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 58 0 0 2 283
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 10 0 5 6 97
Whither Game Theory? 0 0 0 271 1 6 11 163
Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics 0 0 0 203 0 4 11 163
Winners Don't Punish 0 2 2 35 2 11 12 190
Word of Mouth Learning 0 0 1 60 0 8 15 239
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 0 0 2 87 3 14 31 380
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 0 1 1 30 1 6 10 191
Total Working Papers 6 25 94 15,886 311 1,518 2,316 68,003
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation 2 3 6 646 6 19 36 2,018
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 0 1 1 170 1 13 25 677
A Theory of Exit in Duopoly 0 1 3 402 1 17 29 977
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 1 3 7 583 1 11 33 3,018
A reputation for honesty 0 0 3 5 1 10 24 44
Active learning with a misspecified prior 0 0 0 6 3 4 9 65
Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics 0 0 1 33 1 3 10 498
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 30 2 6 10 132
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 1 8 1 3 8 48
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information 0 0 1 58 2 5 12 191
Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility 0 0 0 329 1 7 11 656
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 172 1 7 9 472
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 53 2 5 12 164
Consistency and cautious fictitious play 0 0 1 76 8 22 29 335
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 201 0 3 11 621
Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" 0 0 0 49 1 3 5 163
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 0 0 0 1 2 12 22 1,393
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags 0 0 0 4 1 11 16 72
Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion 0 0 1 20 5 8 12 109
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 1 309 2 2 5 534
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations 0 1 5 8 0 5 15 28
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 0 0 1 274 2 10 17 830
Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks 0 0 0 185 2 8 14 375
Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions 0 0 0 56 1 9 16 217
Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems 0 1 2 49 1 10 17 233
Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach 0 0 1 13 1 8 13 78
Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play 0 0 0 27 1 8 14 142
Imitation processes with small mutations 0 0 1 21 2 31 38 188
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 1 104 1 3 15 279
Indirect reciprocity with simple records 0 0 0 3 3 10 15 34
Interim correlated rationalizability 0 0 0 90 0 5 14 305
Intervention with limited information 0 0 1 8 1 4 7 26
It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games 0 0 1 6 2 13 25 78
Justified Communication Equilibrium 1 1 1 29 1 8 15 102
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 0 1 112 4 9 13 781
Learning Mixed Equilibria 0 1 2 352 1 6 16 638
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria 0 0 1 36 1 6 11 114
Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment 0 0 0 2 1 5 7 27
Learning and Belief-Based Trade 0 0 0 20 0 6 8 117
Learning and Equilibrium 0 0 1 29 1 5 9 160
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games 0 0 1 8 1 7 11 85
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory 0 0 0 21 1 6 10 98
Learning from private information in noisy repeated games 0 0 0 50 4 12 15 208
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 13
Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria 0 1 2 22 6 15 19 106
Learning in games 1 1 10 202 4 14 45 576
Learning to play Bayesian games 0 0 2 235 1 5 15 625
Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance 1 3 10 446 1 8 23 1,348
Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning 0 1 2 15 1 7 19 69
Limit games and limit equilibria 0 1 1 61 3 7 12 187
Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents 0 0 0 30 0 2 8 138
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 2 248 2 10 17 560
Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 212
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 1 2 7 11 156
Measuring the Completeness of Economic Models 0 0 4 19 4 10 24 101
Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations 0 0 0 27 1 7 13 130
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts 0 0 2 621 3 9 12 1,455
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games 0 0 0 98 0 5 10 231
Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models 0 0 0 1 4 12 16 23
On concave functions over lotteries 0 0 0 1 1 6 8 15
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 0 20 2 3 9 165
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games 0 0 0 172 2 7 10 399
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements 0 0 1 154 0 2 8 371
Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players 0 0 1 154 2 8 12 364
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs 0 0 1 3 1 7 14 26
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 85 1 5 12 263
Payoff information and learning in signaling games 0 0 3 6 1 5 17 35
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium 1 1 4 1,850 3 6 13 3,577
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 0 0 88 2 6 9 228
Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium 0 0 1 4 1 8 12 29
Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models 0 0 4 11 1 11 20 40
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play 0 0 1 47 3 6 15 262
Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology 0 7 14 366 1 18 46 1,046
Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races 0 0 9 635 2 12 42 1,312
Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry 0 0 0 21 3 9 13 48
Random matching in adaptive dynamics 0 0 0 17 4 8 12 92
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 1 227 1 5 9 652
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction 0 0 0 47 2 6 12 279
Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty 0 0 0 172 1 7 11 388
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium 0 0 0 11 6 11 14 70
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs 0 0 0 3 0 3 5 33
Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies 0 0 0 2 0 7 17 35
Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown 0 0 0 19 2 6 9 144
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 36 3 9 18 254
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 0 3 173 1 11 22 448
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal 0 0 0 13 4 11 14 85
Report of the Search Committee for the Editor of the AEJ: Microeconomics 0 0 1 9 1 4 6 27
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 2 2 3 408 7 16 25 1,149
Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents 0 0 0 114 2 10 15 339
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs 0 0 0 26 6 16 22 172
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 2 4 681 4 15 23 2,434
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 2 152 7 18 21 586
Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique 0 0 0 64 0 8 12 244
Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information 2 3 9 567 2 10 28 1,023
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships 0 0 1 1,133 3 17 24 2,848
Simplicity and Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk 0 0 1 20 0 5 8 55
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World 0 0 2 53 0 4 13 333
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices 0 0 0 39 2 6 13 283
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 1 152 3 7 17 639
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility 0 0 0 4 2 6 10 61
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 33 1 11 20 264
Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games 1 2 5 233 3 16 23 544
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 36 0 4 5 171
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 65 2 9 13 388
Testing the drift-diffusion model 0 0 1 3 0 5 8 28
The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look 0 0 15 3,146 3 17 59 8,186
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 0 0 1 1,141 0 11 24 2,717
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 2 468 3 11 24 1,265
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 1 41 3 9 12 175
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry 0 0 0 0 1 9 18 559
The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring 0 0 0 15 0 3 9 115
Timing and Self‐Control 0 0 0 61 0 8 11 284
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics 0 0 0 11 2 15 21 103
Topologies on types 0 0 1 157 2 8 16 630
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship 0 0 0 25 2 10 18 201
Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization 0 0 1 345 0 7 13 929
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation 0 0 0 26 0 9 14 194
Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks 1 1 6 254 2 8 16 853
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 35 0 6 12 237
When is reputation bad? 0 0 1 112 3 7 15 321
Which misspecifications persist? 0 0 1 3 2 9 15 26
Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games 0 0 0 39 2 7 14 177
Whither game theory? Towards a theory oflearning in games 0 0 0 0 1 6 9 10
Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics 0 0 0 40 5 15 22 203
Winners don’t punish 0 0 0 3 1 6 15 36
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 0 0 3 1,216 2 12 31 4,453
Word-of-mouth learning 0 0 1 318 1 10 22 924
Working to learn 0 0 0 5 2 9 12 31
“I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games 0 0 1 9 2 6 9 77
Total Journal Articles 13 37 189 22,284 241 1,097 2,055 68,214
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Game Theory 0 0 0 0 14 74 198 3,670
The Theory of Learning in Games 0 0 0 0 7 30 58 1,420
Total Books 0 0 0 0 21 104 256 5,090

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 0 0 0 1 0 2 6 16
Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring 0 0 0 0 1 5 7 27
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 3 0 20 28 57
FINITE PLAYER APPROXIMATIONS TO A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS 0 0 0 3 1 1 3 18
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 119
MAINTAINING A REPUTATION AGAINST A LONG-LIVED OPPONENT 0 0 0 0 3 4 7 18
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 2 0 3 4 38
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview 0 0 1 661 1 7 14 1,718
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 3 1 10 14 49
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players 0 0 0 15 0 0 2 62
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 24
REPUTATION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH A PATIENT PLAYER 0 0 0 5 0 7 11 75
Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games 0 0 2 14 11 54 59 99
THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 0 0 3 14 1 10 23 106
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 1 8 3 9 19 57
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 0 2 0 3 4 23
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 23
When is reputation bad? 0 0 0 4 0 4 7 32
Total Chapters 0 0 7 737 23 143 223 2,561

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