| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
616 |
| A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
194 |
1 |
12 |
28 |
665 |
| A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
210 |
2 |
8 |
22 |
878 |
| A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
4 |
15 |
167 |
| A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
111 |
| A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
195 |
| A Reputation for Honesty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
5 |
23 |
46 |
| A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
546 |
| A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
1 |
5 |
16 |
214 |
| AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
213 |
| Adjusting to Change in Complex Systems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
20 |
| Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
181 |
| Adversarial forecasters, surprises and randomization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
20 |
| Altruism and Self Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
261 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
212 |
| An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
71 |
| An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
308 |
| An Easier Way to Calibrate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
122 |
0 |
6 |
13 |
568 |
| An Easier Way to Calibrate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
8 |
14 |
85 |
| An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
70 |
| An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
254 |
| An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
78 |
| An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
71 |
| Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
175 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
520 |
| Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure |
1 |
1 |
12 |
12 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
12 |
| Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
49 |
| Competing Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
19 |
90 |
| Competing Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
99 |
| Competing Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
0 |
6 |
17 |
118 |
| Competing Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
296 |
| Complexity and Misspecification |
0 |
0 |
8 |
8 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
| Conditional Universal Consistency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
76 |
| Conditional Universal Consistency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
332 |
| Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
483 |
| Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
73 |
| Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
212 |
| Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
9 |
18 |
99 |
| Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
147 |
| Customer Poaching and Brand Switching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
7 |
31 |
2,543 |
| Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
132 |
| Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
4 |
22 |
86 |
| Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion |
0 |
1 |
2 |
47 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
67 |
| Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion |
1 |
1 |
3 |
50 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
106 |
| EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
240 |
| Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
94 |
| Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
570 |
| Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
287 |
0 |
7 |
12 |
622 |
| Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
291 |
| Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
126 |
| Endogenous Attention and the Spread of False News |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
78 |
| Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
177 |
| Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
136 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
265 |
| Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
306 |
| Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
84 |
| Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
80 |
| Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
63 |
| Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
253 |
| Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
120 |
| Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
198 |
| Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
83 |
| Friend or Foe: Delegating to an AI Whose Alignment is Unknown |
0 |
2 |
31 |
31 |
0 |
8 |
33 |
33 |
| Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
76 |
| Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
56 |
| How Flexible is that Functional Form? Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
1 |
7 |
17 |
44 |
| Imitation Processes with Small Mutations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
177 |
| Imitation Processes with Small Mutations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
75 |
| Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities |
0 |
0 |
1 |
161 |
2 |
3 |
19 |
360 |
| Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
95 |
| Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information |
0 |
3 |
15 |
1,450 |
2 |
9 |
32 |
3,143 |
| Interim Correlated Rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
0 |
8 |
22 |
88 |
| Interim Correlated Rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
273 |
| Interim Rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
0 |
4 |
15 |
207 |
| Interim Rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
226 |
| It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
78 |
| Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
109 |
1 |
6 |
12 |
705 |
| Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
71 |
| Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
7 |
12 |
82 |
| Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons |
0 |
0 |
1 |
98 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
86 |
| Learning Mixed Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
152 |
| Learning Mixed Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
628 |
| Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
347 |
| Learning and Belief Based Trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
167 |
| Learning and Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
133 |
| Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
64 |
| Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
49 |
| Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
84 |
| Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
109 |
| Learning in Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
33 |
1 |
14 |
35 |
201 |
| Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
62 |
| Learning to Play Bayesian Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
268 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
774 |
| Learning to Play Bayesian Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
236 |
0 |
6 |
14 |
582 |
| Learning to Play Bayesian Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
70 |
| Learning to Play Bayesian Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
331 |
| Learning with Recency Bias |
0 |
0 |
2 |
145 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
154 |
| Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games |
0 |
1 |
2 |
79 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
149 |
| Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
161 |
| Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
86 |
| Limit Games and Limit Equilibria |
1 |
1 |
1 |
180 |
1 |
5 |
18 |
468 |
| Limit Games and Limit Equilibria |
1 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
72 |
| Limit Games and Limit Equilibria |
1 |
1 |
1 |
49 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
182 |
| Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
285 |
| Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
29 |
| MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
504 |
| Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
167 |
| Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
358 |
| Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
198 |
| Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed |
0 |
3 |
4 |
201 |
1 |
13 |
35 |
591 |
| Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
60 |
| Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
210 |
| Measuring the Completeness of Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
3 |
7 |
15 |
69 |
| Model Restrictiveness in Functional and Structural Settings |
0 |
1 |
7 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
| Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
192 |
| Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
55 |
| Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
513 |
| NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
30 |
| Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
201 |
| Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
296 |
| Non-Equilibrium Learning with Heterogeneous Priors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
38 |
| Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
555 |
| Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
161 |
| Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
14 |
584 |
| Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
| Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
20 |
| On Concave Functions over Lotteries |
1 |
1 |
1 |
103 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
22 |
| On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
344 |
| On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments |
1 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
2 |
6 |
18 |
137 |
| On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
3 |
44 |
152 |
| On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
311 |
| On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
210 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
512 |
| On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
84 |
| Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
674 |
| Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
55 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
75 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
17 |
835 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
330 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
1 |
1 |
138 |
0 |
5 |
17 |
483 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
185 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
1,042 |
| Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
535 |
| Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
311 |
| Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
136 |
| Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
78 |
| Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
251 |
| Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient |
0 |
0 |
0 |
220 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
527 |
| Phenotype Switching and Mutations in Random Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
41 |
| Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
48 |
| Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
0 |
4 |
16 |
193 |
| Predation Without Reputation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
396 |
| Predicting and Understanding Initial Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
43 |
| Predicting and Understanding Initial Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
44 |
| Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
1,188 |
| Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
58 |
| Random matching in adaptive dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
141 |
| Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
312 |
| Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
131 |
| Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
242 |
| Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
100 |
| Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
66 |
| Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
6 |
19 |
54 |
| Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
228 |
| Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
71 |
| Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
48 |
| Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
49 |
| Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
25 |
| Repeated Games with Frequent Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
202 |
| Repeated Games with Frequent Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
5 |
13 |
82 |
| Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
14 |
356 |
| Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players |
0 |
1 |
1 |
330 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
640 |
| Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
94 |
| Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
47 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
21 |
263 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
2 |
10 |
20 |
346 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player |
0 |
0 |
1 |
100 |
2 |
12 |
26 |
331 |
| Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
36 |
| Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
105 |
| Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
73 |
| Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
161 |
| Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
225 |
| Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
247 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
543 |
| Rules of Thumb for Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
8 |
19 |
155 |
| Rules of Thumb for Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
5 |
16 |
135 |
| Rules of Thumb for Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
22 |
343 |
| Rules of Thumb for Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
19 |
346 |
| Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
295 |
| Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
16 |
217 |
| Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
1 |
6 |
21 |
278 |
| Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
6 |
19 |
138 |
| Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
208 |
| Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
141 |
| Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
1,347 |
| Sins of Omission and Commission in Complex Systems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
68 |
| Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
166 |
| Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
4 |
16 |
117 |
| Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
0 |
5 |
20 |
374 |
| Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi |
0 |
0 |
1 |
63 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
661 |
| Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
64 |
| Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
364 |
| Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
177 |
| Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
62 |
| Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games |
0 |
1 |
1 |
472 |
1 |
6 |
17 |
1,232 |
| Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
17 |
33 |
| Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
5 |
16 |
115 |
| Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
23 |
| Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
74 |
| Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
411 |
| Superstition and Rational Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
227 |
0 |
5 |
37 |
1,951 |
| Superstition and Rational Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
5 |
16 |
118 |
| Superstition and Rational Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
1,005 |
| Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
109 |
| THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
24 |
478 |
| Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
56 |
| Tail probabilities for triangular arrays |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
63 |
| Testing the Drift-Diffusion Model |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
58 |
| The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
326 |
| The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
77 |
| The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
94 |
| The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
233 |
1 |
13 |
24 |
859 |
| The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
255 |
0 |
8 |
25 |
943 |
| The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
2 |
4 |
16 |
229 |
| The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
269 |
| The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
100 |
| The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
556 |
| The Theory of Learning in Games |
1 |
10 |
20 |
909 |
4 |
37 |
75 |
1,974 |
| The Transfer Performance of Economic Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
50 |
| Timing and Self-Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
144 |
| Timing and Self-Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
76 |
| Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
245 |
1 |
8 |
21 |
119 |
| Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift? |
1 |
1 |
3 |
42 |
3 |
13 |
48 |
293 |
| Topologies on Type |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
325 |
| Topologies on Types |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
909 |
| Topologies on Types |
0 |
0 |
0 |
144 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
422 |
| Topologies on Types |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
59 |
| Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship |
0 |
0 |
1 |
49 |
0 |
5 |
14 |
53 |
| Unobserved punishment supports cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
31 |
| Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks |
0 |
1 |
7 |
382 |
0 |
7 |
29 |
1,129 |
| When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
280 |
| When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
5 |
14 |
91 |
| When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
437 |
| When is Reputation Bad |
0 |
0 |
0 |
235 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
630 |
| When is Reputation Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
461 |
| When is Reputation Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
287 |
| When is Reputation Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
102 |
| When is Reputation Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
144 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
403 |
| Whither Game Theory? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
271 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
167 |
| Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
203 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
169 |
| Winners Don't Punish |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
0 |
7 |
19 |
198 |
| Word of Mouth Learning |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
243 |
| Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning |
1 |
1 |
2 |
88 |
2 |
9 |
36 |
391 |
| Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
193 |
| Total Working Papers |
10 |
36 |
161 |
15,986 |
95 |
891 |
3,328 |
69,166 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation |
1 |
1 |
7 |
647 |
2 |
9 |
44 |
2,031 |
| A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
170 |
4 |
16 |
39 |
695 |
| A Theory of Exit in Duopoly |
0 |
1 |
4 |
403 |
1 |
2 |
28 |
981 |
| A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents |
0 |
0 |
6 |
583 |
3 |
8 |
40 |
3,026 |
| A reputation for honesty |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
1 |
4 |
23 |
48 |
| Active learning with a misspecified prior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
7 |
19 |
75 |
| Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
499 |
| An Easier Way to Calibrate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
137 |
| An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
54 |
| An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
196 |
| Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
329 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
659 |
| Competing Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
477 |
| Conditional Universal Consistency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
5 |
17 |
169 |
| Consistency and cautious fictitious play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
3 |
35 |
342 |
| Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
201 |
0 |
9 |
19 |
631 |
| Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
165 |
| Customer Poaching and Brand Switching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
31 |
1,404 |
| Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
5 |
23 |
79 |
| Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
114 |
| Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
1 |
309 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
534 |
| Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
29 |
| Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
274 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
832 |
| Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
185 |
1 |
2 |
15 |
378 |
| Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
1 |
3 |
20 |
221 |
| Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
49 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
236 |
| Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
2 |
5 |
18 |
84 |
| Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
145 |
| How Flexible is that Functional Form? Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
| Imitation processes with small mutations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
5 |
42 |
194 |
| Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities |
0 |
0 |
2 |
105 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
282 |
| Indirect reciprocity with simple records |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
38 |
| Interim correlated rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
308 |
| Intervention with limited information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
28 |
| It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
80 |
| Justified Communication Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
104 |
| Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
784 |
| Learning Mixed Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
352 |
0 |
7 |
20 |
645 |
| Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
115 |
| Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
31 |
| Learning and Belief-Based Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
122 |
| Learning and Equilibrium |
0 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
165 |
| Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
88 |
| Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
6 |
17 |
106 |
| Learning from private information in noisy repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
4 |
23 |
216 |
| Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
9 |
20 |
| Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria |
1 |
2 |
5 |
25 |
1 |
4 |
25 |
112 |
| Learning in games |
0 |
1 |
7 |
204 |
2 |
17 |
48 |
598 |
| Learning to play Bayesian games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
235 |
2 |
7 |
21 |
633 |
| Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance |
1 |
2 |
10 |
448 |
1 |
9 |
29 |
1,360 |
| Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
5 |
13 |
31 |
82 |
| Limit games and limit equilibria |
1 |
1 |
2 |
62 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
190 |
| Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
141 |
| Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed |
0 |
0 |
1 |
248 |
1 |
4 |
20 |
564 |
| Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
214 |
| Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
158 |
| Measuring the Completeness of Economic Models |
0 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
3 |
7 |
29 |
109 |
| Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
134 |
| Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
621 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
1,458 |
| Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
232 |
| Noise-Tolerant Community Enforcement and the Strength of Small Stakes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
15 |
| Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
24 |
| On concave functions over lotteries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
20 |
| On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
7 |
15 |
174 |
| On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
400 |
| On the robustness of equilibrium refinements |
0 |
0 |
1 |
154 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
374 |
| Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
154 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
368 |
| Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
33 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
85 |
0 |
5 |
17 |
269 |
| Payoff information and learning in signaling games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
1 |
7 |
25 |
44 |
| Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium |
1 |
1 |
5 |
1,853 |
3 |
9 |
23 |
3,590 |
| Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
231 |
| Philipp Strack, 2024 Clark Medalist |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
35 |
42 |
| Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
32 |
| Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models |
0 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
0 |
5 |
24 |
47 |
| Predicting and Understanding Initial Play |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
264 |
| Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology |
4 |
8 |
24 |
376 |
7 |
13 |
62 |
1,066 |
| Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races |
0 |
0 |
5 |
635 |
4 |
8 |
39 |
1,320 |
| Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
48 |
| Random matching in adaptive dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
94 |
| Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
227 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
654 |
| Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
2 |
3 |
16 |
283 |
| Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
391 |
| Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
3 |
20 |
77 |
| Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1 |
8 |
14 |
42 |
| Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
36 |
| Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
147 |
| Repeated Games with Frequent Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
257 |
| Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players |
0 |
0 |
2 |
174 |
1 |
6 |
39 |
469 |
| Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
88 |
| Report of the Search Committee for the Editor of the AEJ: Microeconomics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
31 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player |
0 |
2 |
6 |
411 |
3 |
16 |
41 |
1,167 |
| Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
341 |
| Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
1 |
7 |
33 |
184 |
| Rules of Thumb for Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
3 |
681 |
0 |
7 |
32 |
2,444 |
| Selective-Memory Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
26 |
| Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
1 |
3 |
153 |
1 |
4 |
26 |
591 |
| Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
246 |
| Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information |
0 |
2 |
8 |
569 |
1 |
9 |
34 |
1,037 |
| Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,133 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
2,852 |
| Simplicity and Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
56 |
| Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World |
0 |
1 |
1 |
54 |
0 |
5 |
15 |
339 |
| Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
7 |
16 |
291 |
| Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
152 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
642 |
| Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
67 |
| Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
5 |
20 |
271 |
| Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games |
0 |
0 |
4 |
233 |
0 |
4 |
29 |
551 |
| Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
176 |
| Superstition and Rational Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
4 |
18 |
394 |
| Testing the drift-diffusion model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
29 |
| The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look |
2 |
5 |
14 |
3,153 |
4 |
9 |
54 |
8,203 |
| The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information |
0 |
2 |
3 |
1,143 |
2 |
19 |
47 |
2,742 |
| The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information |
0 |
0 |
3 |
470 |
1 |
17 |
40 |
1,286 |
| The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
178 |
| The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
561 |
| The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
118 |
| Timing and Self‐Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
288 |
| Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
6 |
27 |
111 |
| Topologies on types |
0 |
0 |
1 |
157 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
633 |
| Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
6 |
24 |
208 |
| Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
345 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
930 |
| Unobserved punishment supports cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
195 |
| Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks |
0 |
0 |
4 |
254 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
856 |
| When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
238 |
| When is reputation bad? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
112 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
324 |
| Which misspecifications persist? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
8 |
22 |
34 |
| Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
6 |
25 |
190 |
| Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
3 |
27 |
211 |
| Winners don’t punish |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
20 |
43 |
| Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,216 |
0 |
5 |
28 |
4,459 |
| Word-of-mouth learning |
0 |
1 |
2 |
320 |
0 |
2 |
22 |
927 |
| Working to learn |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
35 |
| “I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
79 |
| Total Journal Articles |
12 |
35 |
181 |
22,339 |
99 |
561 |
2,589 |
69,040 |