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File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
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12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
209 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
861 |
| A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
135 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
608 |
| A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
194 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
642 |
| A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
160 |
| A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
107 |
| A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
96 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
188 |
| A Reputation for Honesty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
| A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
537 |
| A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents |
0 |
1 |
1 |
39 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
204 |
| AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
205 |
| Adjusting to Change in Complex Systems |
1 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
17 |
| Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics" |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
167 |
| Adversarial forecasters, surprises and randomization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
14 |
| Altruism and Self Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
261 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
202 |
| An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
60 |
| An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
303 |
| An Easier Way to Calibrate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
122 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
558 |
| An Easier Way to Calibrate |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
74 |
| An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
| An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
132 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
239 |
| An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
67 |
| An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
73 |
| Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
175 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
511 |
| Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
39 |
| Competing Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
106 |
| Competing Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
| Competing Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
5 |
5 |
6 |
288 |
| Competing Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
9 |
78 |
| Conditional Universal Consistency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
74 |
| Conditional Universal Consistency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
326 |
| Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
65 |
| Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
475 |
| Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
202 |
| Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
82 |
| Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
138 |
| Customer Poaching and Brand Switching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
16 |
2,523 |
| Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
124 |
| Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
70 |
| Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
62 |
| Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
93 |
| EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
235 |
| Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
85 |
| Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
140 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
564 |
| Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
287 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
611 |
| Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
282 |
| Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations |
0 |
0 |
3 |
47 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
119 |
| Endogenous Attention and the Spread of False News |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
72 |
| Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
171 |
| Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games |
0 |
1 |
2 |
136 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
253 |
| Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
302 |
| Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
75 |
| Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
247 |
| Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
73 |
| Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
60 |
| Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
114 |
| Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
191 |
| Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
5 |
7 |
9 |
78 |
| Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
69 |
| Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
41 |
| How Flexible is that Functional Form? Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
31 |
| Imitation Processes with Small Mutations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
5 |
6 |
8 |
64 |
| Imitation Processes with Small Mutations |
0 |
1 |
1 |
32 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
172 |
| Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities |
1 |
1 |
1 |
161 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
348 |
| Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
89 |
| Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information |
2 |
6 |
30 |
1,442 |
3 |
9 |
45 |
3,124 |
| Interim Correlated Rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
265 |
| Interim Correlated Rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
73 |
| Interim Rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
194 |
| Interim Rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
223 |
| It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
71 |
| Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
109 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
696 |
| Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
66 |
| Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
72 |
| Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
75 |
| Learning Mixed Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
621 |
| Learning Mixed Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
147 |
| Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
341 |
| Learning and Belief Based Trading |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
160 |
| Learning and Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
126 |
| Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
56 |
| Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
44 |
| Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
81 |
| Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
105 |
| Learning in Games |
0 |
1 |
1 |
32 |
3 |
8 |
16 |
176 |
| Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
55 |
| Learning to Play Bayesian Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
268 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
765 |
| Learning to Play Bayesian Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
236 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
570 |
| Learning to Play Bayesian Games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
64 |
| Learning to Play Bayesian Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
327 |
| Learning with Recency Bias |
0 |
1 |
4 |
144 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
144 |
| Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
142 |
| Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
81 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
155 |
| Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
79 |
| Limit Games and Limit Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
64 |
| Limit Games and Limit Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
179 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
453 |
| Limit Games and Limit Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
174 |
| Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
276 |
| Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
24 |
| MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
502 |
| Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
163 |
| Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
352 |
| Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed |
0 |
0 |
0 |
197 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
561 |
| Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
191 |
| Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
44 |
| Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
201 |
| Measuring the Completeness of Theories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
58 |
| Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
184 |
| Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
48 |
| Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
506 |
| NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
27 |
| Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
196 |
| Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
290 |
| Non-Equilibrium Learning with Heterogeneous Priors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
31 |
| Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
153 |
| Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
550 |
| Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
573 |
| Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
| Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
17 |
| On Concave Functions over Lotteries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
13 |
| On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
339 |
| On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
122 |
| On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
114 |
| On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
75 |
| On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
302 |
| On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
210 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
507 |
| Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
666 |
| Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
43 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
322 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
68 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
469 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
185 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
1,033 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
823 |
| Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
526 |
| Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
306 |
| Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
124 |
| Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
244 |
| Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
72 |
| Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient |
0 |
0 |
0 |
220 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
519 |
| Phenotype Switching and Mutations in Random Environments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
35 |
| Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
43 |
| Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
181 |
| Predation Without Reputation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
394 |
| Predicting and Understanding Initial Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
38 |
| Predicting and Understanding Initial Play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
38 |
| Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
1,180 |
| Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
52 |
| Random matching in adaptive dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
135 |
| Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
307 |
| Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
122 |
| Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
3 |
4 |
7 |
95 |
| Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
238 |
| Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
60 |
| Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
42 |
| Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
220 |
| Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
63 |
| Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
42 |
| Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
44 |
| Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
19 |
| Repeated Games with Frequent Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
| Repeated Games with Frequent Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
195 |
| Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
345 |
| Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
329 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
630 |
| Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
90 |
| Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
37 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
8 |
250 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
329 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player |
0 |
0 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
313 |
| Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
101 |
| Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
| Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
68 |
| Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
155 |
| Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
220 |
| Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
247 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
535 |
| Rules of Thumb for Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
139 |
| Rules of Thumb for Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
334 |
| Rules of Thumb for Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
10 |
331 |
| Rules of Thumb for Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
125 |
| Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
290 |
| Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
264 |
| Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
205 |
| Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
120 |
| Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
203 |
| Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
| Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
1,337 |
| Sins of Omission and Commission in Complex Systems |
0 |
0 |
2 |
33 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
58 |
| Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
157 |
| Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
105 |
| Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
4 |
4 |
5 |
359 |
| Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi |
0 |
1 |
1 |
63 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
654 |
| Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
57 |
| Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality |
0 |
0 |
4 |
99 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
353 |
| Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
166 |
| Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
49 |
| Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
471 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
1,221 |
| Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
17 |
| Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
21 |
| Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations |
1 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
105 |
| Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
402 |
| Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
69 |
| Superstition and Rational Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
106 |
| Superstition and Rational Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
998 |
| Superstition and Rational Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
227 |
12 |
16 |
21 |
1,930 |
| Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
104 |
| THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
461 |
| Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
51 |
| Tail probabilities for triangular arrays |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
53 |
| Testing the Drift-Diffusion Model |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
51 |
| The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
319 |
| The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
67 |
| The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
87 |
| The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
255 |
3 |
7 |
12 |
928 |
| The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
233 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
840 |
| The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
215 |
| The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
265 |
| The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
91 |
| The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
549 |
| The Theory of Learning in Games |
1 |
2 |
10 |
894 |
4 |
9 |
29 |
1,916 |
| The Transfer Performance of Economic Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
4 |
5 |
11 |
39 |
| Timing and Self-Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
73 |
| Timing and Self-Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
137 |
| Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
245 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
102 |
| Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
252 |
| Topologies on Type |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
318 |
| Topologies on Types |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
53 |
| Topologies on Types |
0 |
0 |
0 |
144 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
415 |
| Topologies on Types |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
5 |
5 |
5 |
901 |
| Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship |
0 |
0 |
1 |
49 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
44 |
| Unobserved punishment supports cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
| Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks |
0 |
2 |
8 |
381 |
3 |
8 |
21 |
1,114 |
| When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
271 |
| When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
79 |
| When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
428 |
| When is Reputation Bad |
0 |
0 |
0 |
235 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
624 |
| When is Reputation Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
283 |
| When is Reputation Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
0 |
6 |
6 |
454 |
| When is Reputation Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
144 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
396 |
| When is Reputation Bad? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
94 |
| Whither Game Theory? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
271 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
158 |
| Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
203 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
160 |
| Winners Don't Punish |
1 |
1 |
1 |
34 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
181 |
| Word of Mouth Learning |
0 |
1 |
1 |
60 |
2 |
8 |
9 |
233 |
| Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
186 |
| Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning |
0 |
1 |
2 |
87 |
6 |
14 |
28 |
372 |
| Total Working Papers |
7 |
23 |
103 |
15,868 |
345 |
792 |
1,320 |
66,830 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation |
0 |
2 |
3 |
643 |
6 |
16 |
23 |
2,005 |
| A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
169 |
3 |
8 |
17 |
667 |
| A Theory of Exit in Duopoly |
1 |
1 |
3 |
402 |
10 |
12 |
24 |
970 |
| A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents |
2 |
3 |
6 |
582 |
3 |
14 |
30 |
3,010 |
| A reputation for honesty |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
2 |
8 |
18 |
36 |
| Active learning with a misspecified prior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
61 |
| Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics |
0 |
0 |
2 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
495 |
| An Easier Way to Calibrate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
126 |
| An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
45 |
| An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
186 |
| Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
329 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
651 |
| Competing Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
467 |
| Conditional Universal Consistency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
160 |
| Consistency and cautious fictitious play |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
313 |
| Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
201 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
619 |
| Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
161 |
| Customer Poaching and Brand Switching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
16 |
1,384 |
| Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
64 |
| Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
102 |
| Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players |
0 |
0 |
2 |
309 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
532 |
| Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations |
0 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
3 |
9 |
13 |
26 |
| Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
274 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
822 |
| Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks |
0 |
0 |
2 |
185 |
3 |
4 |
13 |
370 |
| Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
5 |
9 |
12 |
213 |
| Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems |
1 |
1 |
2 |
49 |
5 |
8 |
13 |
228 |
| Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
70 |
| Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
135 |
| Imitation processes with small mutations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
3 |
6 |
12 |
160 |
| Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities |
0 |
1 |
2 |
104 |
1 |
7 |
15 |
277 |
| Indirect reciprocity with simple records |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
25 |
| Interim correlated rationalizability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
3 |
10 |
13 |
303 |
| Intervention with limited information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
22 |
| It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
67 |
| Justified Communication Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
96 |
| Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
112 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
772 |
| Learning Mixed Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
3 |
351 |
0 |
5 |
14 |
632 |
| Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
109 |
| Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
24 |
| Learning and Belief-Based Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
112 |
| Learning and Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
155 |
| Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
78 |
| Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
92 |
| Learning from private information in noisy repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
197 |
| Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
| Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria |
1 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
93 |
| Learning in games |
0 |
2 |
11 |
201 |
4 |
11 |
38 |
566 |
| Learning to play Bayesian games |
0 |
0 |
2 |
235 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
621 |
| Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance |
1 |
2 |
10 |
444 |
4 |
7 |
21 |
1,344 |
| Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning |
1 |
2 |
2 |
15 |
3 |
10 |
17 |
65 |
| Limit games and limit equilibria |
1 |
1 |
2 |
61 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
181 |
| Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
137 |
| Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed |
0 |
0 |
2 |
248 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
552 |
| Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
209 |
| Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
149 |
| Measuring the Completeness of Economic Models |
0 |
2 |
4 |
19 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
91 |
| Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
125 |
| Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
621 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
1,448 |
| Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
228 |
| Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
15 |
| On concave functions over lotteries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
13 |
| On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
162 |
| On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
393 |
| On the robustness of equilibrium refinements |
0 |
1 |
2 |
154 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
369 |
| Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players |
0 |
0 |
1 |
154 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
356 |
| Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
20 |
| Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
85 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
260 |
| Payoff information and learning in signaling games |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
31 |
| Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium |
0 |
1 |
6 |
1,849 |
2 |
5 |
13 |
3,573 |
| Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient |
0 |
0 |
0 |
88 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
223 |
| Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
24 |
| Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models |
0 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
6 |
10 |
16 |
35 |
| Predicting and Understanding Initial Play |
0 |
1 |
1 |
47 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
258 |
| Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology |
6 |
10 |
14 |
365 |
7 |
19 |
38 |
1,035 |
| Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races |
0 |
2 |
11 |
635 |
2 |
12 |
36 |
1,302 |
| Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
41 |
| Random matching in adaptive dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
84 |
| Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
2 |
227 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
648 |
| Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
274 |
| Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
383 |
| Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
63 |
| Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
31 |
| Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
12 |
30 |
| Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
138 |
| Repeated Games with Frequent Signals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
3 |
4 |
13 |
248 |
| Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players |
0 |
1 |
3 |
173 |
4 |
7 |
19 |
441 |
| Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
76 |
| Report of the Search Committee for the Editor of the AEJ: Microeconomics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
23 |
| Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player |
0 |
1 |
1 |
406 |
4 |
10 |
14 |
1,137 |
| Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
330 |
| Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
157 |
| Rules of Thumb for Social Learning |
1 |
2 |
3 |
680 |
4 |
6 |
12 |
2,423 |
| Self-Confirming Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
2 |
152 |
5 |
5 |
8 |
573 |
| Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
237 |
| Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information |
0 |
1 |
7 |
564 |
2 |
6 |
22 |
1,015 |
| Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,133 |
3 |
6 |
11 |
2,834 |
| Simplicity and Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
50 |
| Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World |
0 |
0 |
2 |
53 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
329 |
| Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
279 |
| Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
152 |
2 |
9 |
12 |
634 |
| Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
56 |
| Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
4 |
5 |
16 |
257 |
| Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games |
0 |
1 |
4 |
231 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
530 |
| Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
167 |
| Superstition and Rational Learning |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
379 |
| Testing the drift-diffusion model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
24 |
| The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look |
0 |
5 |
18 |
3,146 |
6 |
20 |
55 |
8,175 |
| The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1,141 |
4 |
12 |
19 |
2,710 |
| The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information |
0 |
1 |
2 |
468 |
2 |
7 |
16 |
1,256 |
| The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
167 |
| The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
550 |
| The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
112 |
| Timing and Self‐Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
276 |
| Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
91 |
| Topologies on types |
0 |
0 |
1 |
157 |
3 |
7 |
11 |
625 |
| Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
193 |
| Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
345 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
924 |
| Unobserved punishment supports cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
187 |
| Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks |
0 |
1 |
5 |
253 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
847 |
| When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
234 |
| When is reputation bad? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
112 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
314 |
| Which misspecifications persist? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
17 |
| Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
171 |
| Whither game theory? Towards a theory oflearning in games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
| Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
188 |
| Winners don’t punish |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
6 |
10 |
31 |
| Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning |
0 |
2 |
3 |
1,216 |
3 |
9 |
27 |
4,444 |
| Word-of-mouth learning |
0 |
0 |
1 |
318 |
0 |
9 |
13 |
914 |
| Working to learn |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
24 |
| “I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
71 |
| Total Journal Articles |
15 |
54 |
198 |
22,262 |
229 |
619 |
1,334 |
67,346 |