Access Statistics for Drew Fudenberg

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Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 1 135 2 6 8 610
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 194 8 11 15 650
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 209 6 9 17 867
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 1 14 2 5 11 162
A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays 0 0 0 44 1 1 1 108
A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games 0 0 0 96 1 3 5 189
A Reputation for Honesty 0 0 0 13 9 9 11 33
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 0 0 1 3 6 9 540
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 0 1 39 3 8 11 207
AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 3 5 6 208
Adjusting to Change in Complex Systems 0 1 1 20 2 5 6 19
Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics" 0 0 0 45 8 11 13 175
Adversarial forecasters, surprises and randomization 0 0 1 2 2 5 8 16
Altruism and Self Control 0 0 0 261 5 7 11 207
An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk 0 0 0 22 9 12 12 69
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 0 0 0 93 2 6 6 305
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 1 4 1 3 6 75
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 122 3 5 9 561
An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 0 0 0 10 1 1 1 67
An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 0 0 0 132 9 12 13 248
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 23 2 2 4 69
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 53 2 3 6 75
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 175 3 4 6 514
Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events 0 0 0 35 6 9 10 45
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 65 4 9 10 292
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 4 3 3 3 93
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 62 2 4 7 108
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 0 8 13 17 86
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 80 5 8 10 331
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 6 1 2 3 75
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 0 0 83 4 6 9 479
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 0 1 7 3 8 9 68
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 65 5 7 8 207
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 6 3 4 4 85
Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 0 4 6 8 142
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 0 0 0 2 8 15 23 2,531
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags 0 0 0 49 1 3 8 125
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags 0 0 0 38 4 6 10 74
Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion 0 0 1 46 0 2 4 62
Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion 0 0 1 48 3 4 10 96
EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 236
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 140 3 5 5 567
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 287 3 3 4 614
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 23 1 5 6 86
Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 4 7 8 286
Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations 0 0 3 47 2 7 11 121
Endogenous Attention and the Spread of False News 0 0 0 3 1 3 10 73
Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' 0 0 0 88 2 4 6 173
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 0 1 2 136 3 8 10 256
Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks 0 0 0 46 6 11 11 81
Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks 0 0 0 0 4 7 11 306
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 0 6 3 6 11 76
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 0 64 1 5 9 248
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 61
Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 1 3 7 115
Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 70 4 7 8 195
Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems 1 1 2 10 3 10 12 81
Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play 0 0 0 20 3 7 8 72
Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play 0 0 0 3 5 8 8 46
How Flexible is that Functional Form? Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories 1 1 2 6 4 6 10 35
Imitation Processes with Small Mutations 0 1 1 32 2 8 10 174
Imitation Processes with Small Mutations 0 0 0 10 5 11 12 69
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 0 15 2 7 9 91
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 1 1 161 6 11 13 354
Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information 1 6 25 1,443 4 11 39 3,128
Interim Correlated Rationalizability 0 0 1 7 5 7 14 78
Interim Correlated Rationalizability 0 0 0 117 3 6 7 268
Interim Rationalizability 0 0 0 97 8 10 10 202
Interim Rationalizability 0 0 0 81 3 4 5 226
It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games 0 0 0 86 1 5 9 72
Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 109 0 1 3 696
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 4 3 6 7 69
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 8 3 5 6 75
Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons 1 1 1 98 5 7 8 80
Learning Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 69 2 5 6 149
Learning Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 623
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 342
Learning and Belief Based Trading 0 0 0 44 6 7 8 166
Learning and Equilibrium 0 0 0 32 2 2 5 128
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games 0 0 0 39 5 8 8 61
Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games 0 0 0 2 3 4 7 47
Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 33 0 3 6 81
Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 55 4 5 6 109
Learning in Games 0 0 1 32 5 11 19 181
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments 1 1 2 11 3 4 8 58
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 236 4 6 7 574
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 2 9 2 3 9 66
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 268 5 8 9 770
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 76 3 6 7 330
Learning with Recency Bias 1 1 4 145 4 7 14 148
Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games 1 1 1 78 2 3 6 144
Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis 0 0 1 81 0 0 2 155
Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms 0 0 0 7 1 3 4 80
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 16 1 4 4 65
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 48 4 5 5 178
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 179 6 9 11 459
Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents 0 0 0 94 7 10 11 283
Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents 0 0 0 6 3 4 7 27
MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 504
Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent 0 0 0 50 3 8 8 166
Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent 0 0 0 73 5 6 6 357
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 0 2 4 4 193
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 197 8 10 13 569
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 2 6 8 10 50
Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 1 39 5 6 10 206
Measuring the Completeness of Theories 0 0 0 27 1 4 7 59
Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets 0 0 0 53 6 7 8 190
Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations 0 0 0 3 3 5 6 51
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts 0 0 0 0 4 8 14 510
NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 7 2 4 6 29
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 197
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 1 1 4 7 291
Non-Equilibrium Learning with Heterogeneous Priors 0 0 0 0 3 4 4 34
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 0 4 7 8 577
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 72 3 3 4 156
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 3 2 4 5 552
Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models 0 0 1 13 4 4 6 12
Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models 0 0 0 1 2 4 6 19
On Concave Functions over Lotteries 0 0 0 102 2 6 8 15
On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 4 9 10 343
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 1 17 19 22 26 133
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 0 21 6 6 9 128
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 210 4 8 12 511
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 66 4 7 8 306
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 9 4 7 13 79
Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players 0 0 0 151 4 6 7 670
Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games 0 0 0 34 3 7 8 46
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 185 4 8 10 1,037
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 137 5 6 9 474
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 3 5 12 826
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 5 2 4 6 70
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 2 5 7 324
Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 6 8 15 532
Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note 0 0 0 0 4 6 7 310
Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 0 28 6 8 9 130
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 0 0 52 3 4 5 247
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 0 1 5 0 0 2 72
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient 0 0 0 220 5 8 11 524
Phenotype Switching and Mutations in Random Environments 0 0 0 2 3 3 4 38
Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium 0 0 0 39 3 6 12 46
Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation 0 0 0 40 4 4 9 185
Predation Without Reputation 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 394
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play 0 0 0 11 1 3 6 39
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play 0 0 0 16 2 4 5 40
Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good 0 0 0 4 3 6 10 1,183
Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics 0 0 0 12 3 4 4 55
Random matching in adaptive dynamics 0 0 0 60 3 5 5 138
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 1 5 5 308
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty 0 0 0 49 3 3 5 125
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 0 20 2 6 9 97
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 238
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction 0 0 0 16 3 6 7 63
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium 0 0 0 19 2 5 9 44
Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries 0 0 0 55 1 2 3 221
Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 17 4 5 6 67
Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem 0 0 0 6 1 3 3 45
Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem 0 0 0 6 4 6 7 46
Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 20
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 91 2 4 7 197
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 14 4 4 4 73
Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 347
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 0 0 13 2 3 5 92
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 0 0 329 4 4 6 634
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal 0 0 0 1 7 11 15 44
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player 0 0 0 0 3 9 11 253
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 0 91 5 6 9 334
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 1 100 5 9 14 318
Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 101
Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 33
Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents 0 0 0 32 3 3 4 71
Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents 0 0 0 0 4 6 8 159
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales 0 0 0 0 1 6 7 221
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs 0 0 0 247 3 5 8 538
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 13 2 6 11 127
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 39 5 7 9 144
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 0 2 9 12 333
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 0 1 7 11 335
Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 0 0 0 98 3 7 9 293
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 4 6 8 209
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 69 3 7 10 267
Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 0 0 0 15 9 10 10 129
Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers 0 0 0 0 3 3 7 206
Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 0 56 2 2 2 132
Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships 0 0 0 0 6 10 16 1,343
Sins of Omission and Commission in Complex Systems 0 0 2 33 5 8 13 63
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World 0 0 1 37 4 8 14 161
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices 0 0 0 39 7 11 11 112
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 113 7 11 12 366
Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi 0 1 1 63 3 7 8 657
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility 0 0 1 11 3 5 6 60
Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality 0 0 4 99 6 8 13 359
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 40 7 10 12 173
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 2 3 4 7 52
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games 0 0 0 471 3 7 10 1,224
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 0 3 5 8 24
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 0 3 7 10 20
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 1 1 17 4 6 12 109
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 78 3 5 5 405
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 8 3 4 7 72
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 19 5 7 10 111
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 146 5 9 11 1,003
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 227 10 23 29 1,940
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 104
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 3 9 10 464
Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays 0 0 0 6 1 4 4 52
Tail probabilities for triangular arrays 0 0 0 3 7 9 11 60
Testing the Drift-Diffusion Model 0 0 2 5 1 3 6 52
The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 4 6 9 323
The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 8 5 7 8 72
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 21 3 4 5 90
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 1 255 5 10 17 933
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 0 233 3 5 8 843
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games 0 0 0 32 9 10 12 224
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 0 0 76 3 4 8 268
The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 0 0 8 3 4 5 94
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry 0 0 0 1 2 4 6 551
The Theory of Learning in Games 2 3 11 896 10 15 35 1,926
The Transfer Performance of Economic Models 0 0 0 21 4 8 14 43
Timing and Self-Control 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 73
Timing and Self-Control 0 0 0 89 4 5 6 141
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics 0 0 0 245 5 7 11 107
Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift? 1 1 1 40 10 14 17 262
Topologies on Type 0 0 0 61 5 9 14 323
Topologies on Types 0 0 0 144 4 9 12 419
Topologies on Types 0 0 0 2 2 4 6 55
Topologies on Types 0 0 0 91 4 9 9 905
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship 0 0 1 49 1 4 6 45
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation 0 0 0 2 3 4 4 29
Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks 0 1 8 381 5 12 25 1,119
When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 28 3 4 6 274
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 4 6 7 8 85
When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible 0 0 0 64 3 6 6 431
When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 235 2 2 2 626
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 144 4 4 10 400
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 108 4 7 10 458
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 58 0 2 2 283
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 10 3 6 6 97
Whither Game Theory? 0 0 0 271 4 6 10 162
Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics 0 0 0 203 3 7 11 163
Winners Don't Punish 1 2 2 35 7 9 10 188
Word of Mouth Learning 0 0 1 60 6 12 15 239
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 0 1 2 87 5 16 32 377
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 1 1 1 30 4 7 9 190
Total Working Papers 12 27 104 15,880 862 1,483 2,113 67,692
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation 1 1 4 644 7 18 30 2,012
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 1 1 1 170 9 15 26 676
A Theory of Exit in Duopoly 0 1 3 402 6 16 29 976
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 3 6 582 7 16 34 3,017
A reputation for honesty 0 0 3 5 7 11 25 43
Active learning with a misspecified prior 0 0 0 6 1 3 6 62
Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics 0 0 2 33 2 3 11 497
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 30 4 4 8 130
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 1 8 2 3 7 47
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information 0 0 1 58 3 5 11 189
Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility 0 0 0 329 4 6 10 655
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 172 4 7 8 471
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 53 2 6 10 162
Consistency and cautious fictitious play 0 0 1 76 14 19 22 327
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 201 2 4 12 621
Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" 0 0 0 49 1 3 4 162
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 0 0 0 1 7 13 23 1,391
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags 0 0 0 4 7 13 15 71
Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion 0 0 1 20 2 3 8 104
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 2 309 0 1 5 532
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations 1 3 5 8 2 10 15 28
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 0 0 1 274 6 11 16 828
Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks 0 0 0 185 3 7 13 373
Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions 0 0 0 56 3 10 15 216
Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems 0 1 2 49 4 11 17 232
Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach 0 0 1 13 7 8 12 77
Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play 0 0 0 27 6 12 14 141
Imitation processes with small mutations 0 0 1 21 26 31 38 186
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 2 104 1 5 16 278
Indirect reciprocity with simple records 0 0 1 3 6 9 13 31
Interim correlated rationalizability 0 0 0 90 2 11 14 305
Intervention with limited information 0 0 1 8 3 3 7 25
It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games 0 0 1 6 9 11 24 76
Justified Communication Equilibrium 0 0 0 28 5 8 14 101
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 0 1 112 5 5 9 777
Learning Mixed Equilibria 1 1 3 352 5 9 16 637
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria 0 0 1 36 4 5 10 113
Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment 0 0 0 2 2 5 6 26
Learning and Belief-Based Trade 0 0 0 20 5 6 8 117
Learning and Equilibrium 0 0 1 29 4 5 10 159
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games 0 0 1 8 6 6 11 84
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory 0 0 0 21 5 7 9 97
Learning from private information in noisy repeated games 0 0 0 50 7 11 11 204
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 13
Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria 0 1 3 22 7 11 15 100
Learning in games 0 0 10 201 6 15 42 572
Learning to play Bayesian games 0 0 2 235 3 6 16 624
Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance 1 3 9 445 3 10 22 1,347
Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning 0 2 2 15 3 11 20 68
Limit games and limit equilibria 0 1 2 61 3 4 10 184
Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents 0 0 0 30 1 5 8 138
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 2 248 6 9 15 558
Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 211
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 1 5 6 9 154
Measuring the Completeness of Economic Models 0 1 4 19 6 9 20 97
Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations 0 0 0 27 4 8 13 129
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts 0 0 2 621 4 6 10 1,452
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games 0 0 0 98 3 6 11 231
Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models 0 0 0 1 4 8 12 19
On concave functions over lotteries 0 0 0 1 1 5 9 14
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 0 20 1 3 7 163
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games 0 0 0 172 4 7 9 397
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements 0 1 1 154 2 3 9 371
Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players 0 0 1 154 6 6 10 362
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs 0 0 1 3 5 8 13 25
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 85 2 7 12 262
Payoff information and learning in signaling games 0 1 3 6 3 5 16 34
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium 0 1 5 1,849 1 4 13 3,574
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 0 0 88 3 4 8 226
Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium 0 0 1 4 4 9 12 28
Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models 0 0 4 11 4 11 19 39
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play 0 1 1 47 1 6 12 259
Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology 1 7 14 366 10 20 46 1,045
Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races 0 2 10 635 8 18 42 1,310
Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry 0 0 1 21 4 7 11 45
Random matching in adaptive dynamics 0 0 0 17 4 5 8 88
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 1 227 3 4 8 651
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction 0 0 0 47 3 5 10 277
Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty 0 0 0 172 4 7 10 387
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium 0 0 0 11 1 6 8 64
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs 0 0 0 3 2 3 6 33
Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies 0 0 0 2 5 9 17 35
Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown 0 0 0 19 4 5 7 142
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 36 3 7 16 251
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 1 3 173 6 13 24 447
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal 0 0 0 13 5 8 12 81
Report of the Search Committee for the Editor of the AEJ: Microeconomics 0 0 1 9 3 3 5 26
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 1 406 5 11 19 1,142
Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents 0 0 0 114 7 8 13 337
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs 0 0 0 26 9 11 17 166
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 1 3 4 681 7 13 19 2,430
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 2 152 6 11 14 579
Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique 0 0 0 64 7 8 12 244
Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information 1 2 8 565 6 11 28 1,021
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships 0 0 1 1,133 11 16 22 2,845
Simplicity and Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk 0 0 1 20 5 6 8 55
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World 0 0 2 53 4 7 13 333
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices 0 0 0 39 2 4 12 281
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 1 152 2 9 14 636
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility 0 0 0 4 3 5 9 59
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 33 6 10 21 263
Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games 1 2 5 232 11 14 22 541
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 36 4 4 5 171
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 65 7 8 12 386
Testing the drift-diffusion model 0 0 1 3 4 6 8 28
The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look 0 3 16 3,146 8 22 57 8,183
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 0 0 1 1,141 7 16 26 2,717
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 2 468 6 10 22 1,262
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 1 41 5 6 9 172
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry 0 0 0 0 8 9 18 558
The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring 0 0 0 15 3 3 9 115
Timing and Self‐Control 0 0 0 61 8 9 11 284
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics 0 0 0 11 10 14 19 101
Topologies on types 0 0 1 157 3 8 14 628
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship 0 0 0 25 6 10 16 199
Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization 0 0 1 345 5 9 13 929
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation 0 0 0 26 7 10 14 194
Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks 0 0 5 253 4 8 15 851
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 35 3 7 12 237
When is reputation bad? 0 0 1 112 4 6 13 318
Which misspecifications persist? 0 0 1 3 7 9 13 24
Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games 0 0 0 39 4 7 12 175
Whither game theory? Towards a theory oflearning in games 0 0 0 0 4 6 8 9
Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics 0 0 0 40 10 12 18 198
Winners don’t punish 0 0 0 3 4 7 14 35
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 0 2 3 1,216 7 14 32 4,451
Word-of-mouth learning 0 0 1 318 9 13 21 923
Working to learn 0 0 0 5 5 9 10 29
“I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games 0 0 1 9 4 4 8 75
Total Journal Articles 9 45 191 22,271 627 1,082 1,904 67,973
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Game Theory 0 0 0 0 24 72 202 3,656
The Theory of Learning in Games 0 0 0 0 13 26 57 1,413
Total Books 0 0 0 0 37 98 259 5,069

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 0 0 0 1 1 5 6 16
Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring 0 0 0 0 4 4 6 26
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 3 17 25 28 57
FINITE PLAYER APPROXIMATIONS TO A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 17
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 119
MAINTAINING A REPUTATION AGAINST A LONG-LIVED OPPONENT 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 15
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 2 2 3 4 38
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview 0 0 1 661 3 10 14 1,717
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 3 8 9 14 48
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players 0 0 0 15 0 0 2 62
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 23
REPUTATION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH A PATIENT PLAYER 0 0 0 5 6 8 11 75
Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games 0 1 2 14 26 44 48 88
THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 0 1 3 14 5 14 22 105
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 1 8 4 9 16 54
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 0 2 2 3 4 23
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 23
When is reputation bad? 0 0 0 4 4 5 8 32
Total Chapters 0 2 7 737 84 148 203 2,538

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