Access Statistics for Drew Fudenberg

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 135 0 4 12 615
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 1 1 210 0 9 20 876
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 194 3 12 27 664
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 1 14 0 5 15 167
A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays 0 0 0 44 0 1 4 111
A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games 0 0 0 96 1 5 10 195
A Reputation for Honesty 0 0 0 13 1 7 23 46
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 0 1 39 1 4 15 213
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 0 0 1 0 4 13 545
AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 3 4 10 212
Adjusting to Change in Complex Systems 0 0 1 20 0 0 7 20
Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics" 0 0 0 45 1 5 18 181
Adversarial forecasters, surprises and randomization 0 0 0 2 1 4 10 20
Altruism and Self Control 0 0 0 261 0 3 13 211
An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk 0 0 0 22 0 2 14 71
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 0 0 0 93 0 3 9 308
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 4 0 9 14 85
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 122 0 7 14 568
An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 0 0 0 10 1 2 4 70
An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 0 0 0 132 0 2 19 254
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 53 0 1 9 78
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 23 0 1 5 70
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 175 0 3 12 520
Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure 0 0 11 11 0 3 11 11
Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events 0 0 0 35 1 3 14 49
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 4 19 90
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 62 0 10 17 118
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 4 1 6 9 99
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 65 0 3 13 296
Complexity and Misspecification 0 8 8 8 1 5 6 6
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 6 0 0 3 76
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 80 0 1 11 332
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 1 2 8 1 5 14 73
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 0 0 83 1 3 11 483
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 65 0 4 13 212
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 6 2 9 18 99
Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 3 13 147
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 0 0 0 2 2 8 31 2,542
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags 0 0 0 49 0 7 14 132
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags 0 0 0 38 0 7 22 86
Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion 0 1 2 49 0 6 19 105
Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion 1 1 2 47 1 3 8 66
EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 239
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 23 0 5 13 94
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 140 0 0 8 570
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 287 0 7 12 622
Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 1 4 13 291
Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations 0 0 2 47 0 1 15 126
Endogenous Attention and the Spread of False News 0 1 1 4 0 3 14 77
Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' 0 0 0 88 0 3 8 177
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 0 0 1 136 0 5 16 264
Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 306
Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks 0 0 0 46 0 0 14 84
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 0 64 1 2 11 252
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 63
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 0 6 1 4 11 80
Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 118
Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 70 0 2 11 198
Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems 0 0 1 10 0 2 13 83
Friend or Foe: Delegating to an AI Whose Alignment is Unknown 0 2 31 31 2 9 33 33
Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play 0 0 0 20 0 2 12 76
Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play 0 0 0 3 1 4 18 56
How Flexible is that Functional Form? Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories 0 0 2 6 1 7 16 43
Imitation Processes with Small Mutations 0 0 1 32 0 2 13 177
Imitation Processes with Small Mutations 0 0 0 10 0 3 18 75
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 1 161 0 3 17 358
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 0 15 0 2 13 95
Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information 2 4 17 1,450 5 8 32 3,141
Interim Correlated Rationalizability 0 0 1 7 1 9 22 88
Interim Correlated Rationalizability 0 0 0 117 3 4 12 273
Interim Rationalizability 0 0 0 81 0 0 5 226
Interim Rationalizability 0 0 0 97 1 4 15 207
It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games 0 0 0 86 1 3 11 76
Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 109 0 5 11 704
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 4 1 2 9 71
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 8 1 7 13 82
Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons 0 0 1 98 0 4 14 86
Learning Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 627
Learning Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 69 1 3 9 152
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 346
Learning and Belief Based Trading 0 0 0 44 0 1 9 167
Learning and Equilibrium 0 0 0 32 0 3 9 133
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games 0 0 0 39 0 3 11 64
Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games 0 0 0 2 0 1 7 49
Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 33 1 3 8 84
Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 55 0 0 5 109
Learning in Games 0 1 2 33 1 16 34 200
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments 0 0 1 11 0 3 11 62
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 76 0 1 8 331
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 268 3 4 13 774
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 9 0 3 8 69
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 236 2 7 14 582
Learning with Recency Bias 0 0 3 145 1 4 15 153
Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games 1 1 2 79 1 3 9 149
Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis 0 0 0 81 0 5 7 161
Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms 0 0 0 7 1 5 10 86
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 179 0 7 17 467
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 48 0 2 8 181
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 16 0 4 10 71
Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents 0 0 0 94 0 2 13 285
Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents 0 0 0 6 0 1 7 29
MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 504
Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent 0 0 0 50 0 0 8 166
Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent 0 0 0 73 0 1 7 358
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 4 4 201 2 15 34 590
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 197
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 2 0 3 20 60
Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 1 39 0 2 10 208
Measuring the Completeness of Theories 0 0 0 27 0 5 13 66
Model Restrictiveness in Functional and Structural Settings 0 7 7 7 0 5 5 5
Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets 0 0 0 53 0 2 9 192
Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations 0 0 0 3 0 3 10 55
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts 0 0 0 0 1 2 14 512
NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 7 0 1 5 30
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 201
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 1 2 4 11 296
Non-Equilibrium Learning with Heterogeneous Priors 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 38
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 72 0 3 8 161
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 0 1 6 14 584
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 3 0 3 8 555
Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models 0 0 0 13 0 1 6 13
Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models 0 0 0 1 0 1 6 20
On Concave Functions over Lotteries 0 0 0 102 1 5 13 21
On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 344
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 1 17 0 6 44 151
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 0 21 2 4 16 135
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 9 1 3 15 83
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 66 1 3 12 310
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 210 0 1 12 512
Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players 0 0 0 151 0 3 10 673
Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games 0 0 0 34 1 3 16 54
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 0 4 13 330
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 1 1 1 6 2 5 10 75
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 2 8 18 835
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 1 1 1 138 1 8 17 483
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 185 0 4 14 1,042
Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 1 3 18 535
Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 311
Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 0 28 1 3 14 135
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 0 1 5 0 4 7 78
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 0 0 52 3 3 8 250
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient 0 0 0 220 1 3 13 527
Phenotype Switching and Mutations in Random Environments 0 0 0 2 0 2 7 41
Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium 0 0 0 39 1 2 12 48
Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation 0 0 1 41 0 5 16 193
Predation Without Reputation 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 396
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play 0 0 0 11 1 5 11 44
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play 0 0 0 16 1 3 7 43
Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good 0 0 0 4 1 4 13 1,187
Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics 0 0 0 12 0 1 7 58
Random matching in adaptive dynamics 0 0 0 60 0 1 8 141
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty 0 0 0 49 0 2 11 131
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 312
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 242
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 0 20 0 2 10 100
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction 0 0 0 16 0 3 9 66
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium 0 0 0 19 2 5 18 53
Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries 0 0 0 55 1 5 10 228
Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 17 0 3 8 70
Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem 0 0 0 6 0 2 9 48
Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem 0 0 0 6 1 3 7 49
Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown 0 0 0 0 1 3 8 25
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 14 0 7 13 82
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 91 0 4 9 202
Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 2 8 13 355
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 0 0 13 0 2 7 94
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 1 1 330 1 6 12 640
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal 0 0 0 1 0 2 15 47
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player 0 0 0 0 0 9 20 262
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 0 91 1 10 18 344
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 1 100 0 11 24 329
Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 105
Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants 0 0 0 3 1 2 4 36
Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents 0 0 0 32 0 1 5 73
Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 160
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales 0 0 0 0 0 3 11 225
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs 0 0 0 247 0 2 13 543
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 0 0 8 17 344
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 0 0 8 21 342
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 13 0 6 16 135
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 39 2 8 19 155
Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 0 0 0 98 1 1 10 294
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 69 1 8 20 277
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 0 6 15 216
Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 0 1 1 16 1 7 19 138
Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 208
Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 0 56 1 6 11 141
Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships 0 0 0 0 0 3 16 1,346
Sins of Omission and Commission in Complex Systems 0 0 1 33 0 2 17 68
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World 0 1 1 38 2 4 16 165
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices 0 0 0 39 1 5 16 117
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 113 0 6 20 374
Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi 0 0 1 63 0 4 11 661
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility 0 0 1 11 0 2 9 63
Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality 0 0 0 99 0 2 14 364
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 2 0 3 17 62
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 40 1 3 14 176
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games 0 1 1 472 0 6 16 1,231
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 0 1 5 17 33
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 0 0 2 13 23
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 1 17 2 6 16 115
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 8 0 2 9 74
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 78 0 5 11 411
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 146 1 1 13 1,005
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 227 3 7 38 1,951
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 19 3 4 15 117
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 15 0 4 6 109
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 2 13 23 477
Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays 0 0 0 6 0 3 8 56
Tail probabilities for triangular arrays 0 0 0 3 0 3 13 63
Testing the Drift-Diffusion Model 0 0 2 5 1 5 12 58
The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 326
The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 8 1 4 13 77
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 21 0 1 8 93
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 1 255 0 9 25 943
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 0 233 1 14 23 858
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games 0 0 0 32 1 3 14 227
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 0 0 76 0 0 6 269
The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 0 0 8 2 5 11 100
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry 0 0 0 1 0 4 11 556
The Theory of Learning in Games 6 10 20 908 10 39 73 1,970
The Transfer Performance of Economic Models 0 0 0 21 1 4 17 49
Timing and Self-Control 0 0 0 89 0 2 9 144
Timing and Self-Control 0 0 0 8 0 2 5 76
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics 0 0 0 245 3 10 20 118
Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift? 0 1 2 41 0 23 45 290
Topologies on Type 0 0 0 61 0 1 14 325
Topologies on Types 0 0 0 91 0 3 13 909
Topologies on Types 0 0 0 144 0 3 14 422
Topologies on Types 0 0 0 2 1 4 9 59
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship 0 0 1 49 2 6 14 53
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation 0 0 0 2 0 1 6 31
Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks 0 1 8 382 1 9 30 1,129
When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 28 0 6 11 280
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 4 0 6 14 91
When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible 0 0 0 64 0 3 11 436
When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 235 1 3 6 630
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 58 1 4 6 287
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 144 0 1 8 402
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 108 1 2 13 461
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 10 0 5 11 102
Whither Game Theory? 0 0 0 271 1 4 14 167
Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics 0 0 0 203 3 5 16 168
Winners Don't Punish 0 0 2 35 2 8 19 198
Word of Mouth Learning 0 0 1 60 0 4 18 243
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 0 0 1 30 0 2 11 193
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 0 0 2 87 1 9 35 389
Total Working Papers 12 50 163 15,976 148 1,035 3,263 69,071
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation 0 0 6 646 3 11 44 2,029
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 1 170 3 14 36 691
A Theory of Exit in Duopoly 0 1 4 403 0 3 28 980
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 0 6 583 1 5 37 3,023
A reputation for honesty 0 0 1 5 2 3 22 47
Active learning with a misspecified prior 0 0 0 6 0 8 17 73
Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics 0 0 1 33 0 0 9 498
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 30 1 4 13 136
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 8 0 6 13 54
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information 0 0 0 58 1 5 14 196
Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility 0 0 0 329 1 3 14 659
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 172 0 3 12 475
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 53 2 5 17 169
Consistency and cautious fictitious play 0 0 1 76 0 7 36 342
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 201 2 10 19 631
Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" 0 0 0 49 1 2 6 165
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 0 0 0 1 2 10 30 1,403
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags 0 0 0 4 0 7 23 79
Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion 0 0 1 20 0 5 17 114
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 1 309 0 0 4 534
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations 0 0 5 8 0 1 16 29
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 0 0 1 274 1 2 19 832
Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks 0 0 0 185 0 2 14 377
Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions 0 0 0 56 0 3 19 220
Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems 0 0 2 49 1 2 17 235
Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach 0 0 1 13 1 4 16 82
Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play 0 0 0 27 0 2 16 144
How Flexible is that Functional Form? Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories 0 0 0 0 1 5 5 5
Imitation processes with small mutations 0 0 0 21 2 5 41 193
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 1 2 105 1 3 17 282
Indirect reciprocity with simple records 0 0 0 3 0 3 18 37
Interim correlated rationalizability 0 0 0 90 2 3 17 308
Intervention with limited information 0 0 1 8 0 2 9 28
It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games 0 0 0 6 0 2 24 80
Justified Communication Equilibrium 0 0 1 29 0 2 17 104
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 0 1 112 1 3 15 784
Learning Mixed Equilibria 0 0 1 352 1 7 20 645
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 36 0 1 10 115
Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment 0 0 0 2 1 4 11 31
Learning and Belief-Based Trade 0 0 0 20 1 5 13 122
Learning and Equilibrium 1 1 1 30 3 4 11 164
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games 0 0 1 8 0 3 13 88
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory 0 0 0 21 2 7 16 105
Learning from private information in noisy repeated games 0 0 0 50 0 8 23 216
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments 0 1 1 2 0 4 6 17
Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria 0 2 4 24 0 5 24 111
Learning in games 1 2 9 204 1 20 55 596
Learning to play Bayesian games 0 0 1 235 1 6 19 631
Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance 0 1 9 447 3 11 29 1,359
Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning 0 0 2 15 2 8 26 77
Limit games and limit equilibria 0 0 1 61 0 2 13 189
Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents 0 0 0 30 0 3 10 141
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 1 248 0 3 19 563
Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 213
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 1 0 2 13 158
Measuring the Completeness of Economic Models 0 0 4 19 1 5 27 106
Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations 0 0 0 27 0 4 17 134
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts 0 0 1 621 0 3 14 1,458
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games 0 0 0 98 0 1 9 232
Noise-Tolerant Community Enforcement and the Strength of Small Stakes 0 0 0 0 1 5 14 15
Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models 0 0 0 1 0 1 17 24
On concave functions over lotteries 0 0 0 1 1 4 11 19
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 0 20 0 8 15 173
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games 0 0 0 172 0 0 10 399
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements 0 0 1 154 1 3 9 374
Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players 0 0 0 154 0 4 14 368
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs 0 0 1 3 2 7 20 33
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 85 0 6 17 269
Payoff information and learning in signaling games 0 0 2 6 2 8 24 43
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium 0 2 4 1,852 1 10 21 3,587
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 0 0 88 0 3 11 231
Philipp Strack, 2024 Clark Medalist 0 0 2 2 1 6 36 41
Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium 0 0 1 4 0 3 14 32
Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models 0 0 3 11 2 7 25 47
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play 0 0 1 47 0 2 16 264
Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology 3 6 20 372 3 13 57 1,059
Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races 0 0 6 635 1 4 39 1,316
Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry 0 0 0 21 0 0 13 48
Random matching in adaptive dynamics 0 0 0 17 0 2 13 94
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 0 227 0 2 10 654
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction 0 0 0 47 1 2 14 281
Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty 0 0 0 172 0 1 11 389
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium 0 0 0 11 0 5 19 75
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs 1 1 1 4 4 8 13 41
Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies 0 0 0 2 0 1 17 36
Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown 0 0 0 19 0 3 12 147
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 36 0 3 18 257
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 1 3 174 1 20 39 468
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal 0 0 0 13 0 2 16 87
Report of the Search Committee for the Editor of the AEJ: Microeconomics 0 0 1 9 0 4 10 31
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 3 6 411 3 15 38 1,164
Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents 0 0 0 114 1 2 17 341
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs 0 0 0 26 2 11 33 183
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 3 681 1 10 32 2,444
Selective-Memory Equilibrium 0 0 3 4 2 5 17 25
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 1 3 153 0 4 25 590
Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique 0 0 0 64 1 2 14 246
Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information 0 2 8 569 1 13 35 1,036
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships 0 0 0 1,133 0 4 26 2,852
Simplicity and Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk 0 0 0 20 0 1 8 56
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World 0 1 1 54 1 6 16 339
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices 0 0 0 39 2 7 19 290
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 152 0 3 17 642
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility 0 0 0 4 0 4 13 65
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 33 2 7 21 271
Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games 0 0 4 233 3 7 29 551
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 36 1 5 10 176
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 65 0 6 18 394
Testing the drift-diffusion model 0 0 1 3 0 1 9 29
The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look 2 5 13 3,151 3 13 53 8,199
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 2 2 3 1,143 6 23 46 2,740
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 2 4 470 3 20 40 1,285
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 1 41 1 3 15 178
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry 0 0 0 0 0 1 13 560
The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring 0 0 0 15 0 3 11 118
Timing and Self‐Control 0 0 0 61 0 4 15 288
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics 0 0 0 11 0 8 27 111
Topologies on types 0 0 1 157 1 3 16 633
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship 0 0 0 25 1 7 25 208
Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization 0 0 0 345 0 1 12 930
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation 0 0 0 26 0 1 14 195
Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks 0 0 5 254 0 3 18 856
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 35 0 1 11 238
When is reputation bad? 0 0 1 112 1 3 16 324
Which misspecifications persist? 0 0 1 3 2 8 22 34
Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games 0 0 0 39 3 12 24 189
Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics 0 0 0 40 1 7 26 210
Winners don’t punish 0 0 0 3 1 4 17 40
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 0 0 2 1,216 0 6 30 4,459
Word-of-mouth learning 0 2 3 320 1 3 23 927
Working to learn 0 0 0 5 0 4 16 35
“I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games 0 0 0 9 0 2 10 79
Total Journal Articles 10 37 182 22,327 110 672 2,567 68,941
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Game Theory 0 0 0 0 40 113 244 3,783
The Theory of Learning in Games 0 0 0 0 6 18 65 1,438
Total Books 0 0 0 0 46 131 309 5,221

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 16
Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring 0 0 0 0 1 6 12 33
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 3 0 1 29 58
FINITE PLAYER APPROXIMATIONS TO A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS 1 1 1 4 1 3 5 21
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 1 0 4 5 123
MAINTAINING A REPUTATION AGAINST A LONG-LIVED OPPONENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 18
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 1 1 1 3 1 3 6 41
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview 0 1 2 662 1 4 17 1,722
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 3 0 0 13 49
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players 0 0 0 15 0 5 7 67
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 0 0 1 0 3 7 27
REPUTATION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH A PATIENT PLAYER 0 0 0 5 0 3 14 78
Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games 0 0 1 14 1 5 63 104
THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 1 1 4 15 3 9 30 115
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 1 8 0 3 20 60
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 0 2 3 4 8 27
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 24
When is reputation bad? 0 0 0 4 1 3 8 35
Total Chapters 3 4 10 741 13 57 265 2,618

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-06-04