Access Statistics for Drew Fudenberg

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 135 0 1 14 617
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 1 2 211 0 3 24 881
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 194 0 2 28 667
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 14 0 1 13 168
A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays 0 0 0 44 1 1 5 112
A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games 0 0 0 96 0 0 10 195
A Reputation for Honesty 0 0 0 13 0 1 24 47
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 0 1 39 0 1 17 215
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 0 0 1 0 0 12 546
AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 214
Adjusting to Change in Complex Systems 0 0 1 20 0 0 6 20
Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics" 0 0 0 45 0 0 18 181
Adversarial forecasters, surprises and randomization 0 0 0 2 0 1 10 21
Altruism and Self Control 0 0 0 261 0 0 13 212
An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk 0 0 0 22 0 2 16 73
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 0 0 0 93 1 2 11 310
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 122 2 2 14 570
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 4 0 1 14 86
An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 0 0 0 10 0 0 4 70
An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 0 0 0 132 0 0 19 254
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 23 1 2 6 73
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 53 1 3 10 81
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 175 0 0 11 520
Bayesian Persuasion with Selective Disclosure 0 0 12 12 1 2 14 14
Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events 0 0 0 35 0 1 15 50
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 4 1 3 12 102
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 65 0 0 13 296
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 62 1 2 18 120
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 1 19 91
Complexity and Misspecification 0 0 8 8 0 2 8 8
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 6 0 0 3 76
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 80 0 0 10 332
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 0 1 8 1 2 15 75
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 0 0 83 0 0 10 483
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 6 0 0 18 99
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 65 0 1 13 213
Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 147
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 0 0 0 2 0 3 31 2,546
Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags 0 0 0 49 0 1 13 133
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags 0 0 0 38 0 0 21 86
Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion 0 0 2 50 0 0 16 106
Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion 0 0 1 47 0 0 8 67
EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 240
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 140 1 1 9 571
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 287 0 0 12 622
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 23 0 3 16 97
Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 291
Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations 1 1 1 48 1 1 14 127
Endogenous Attention and the Spread of False News (Extended Cut) 0 0 1 4 1 3 11 81
Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' 0 0 0 88 1 1 9 178
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 0 1 2 137 0 2 19 267
Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 306
Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks 0 0 0 46 1 1 15 85
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 64
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 0 6 0 0 11 80
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 0 64 0 2 12 255
Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 121
Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 70 0 0 11 198
Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems 0 0 1 10 0 1 13 84
Friend or Foe: Delegating to an AI Whose Alignment is Unknown 0 0 31 31 1 2 35 35
Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play 0 0 0 20 0 0 11 76
Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play 0 0 0 3 0 1 19 57
How Flexible is that Functional Form? Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories 0 0 1 6 0 1 16 45
Imitation Processes with Small Mutations 0 0 1 32 0 1 12 178
Imitation Processes with Small Mutations 0 0 0 10 0 0 17 75
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 0 15 0 0 12 95
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 1 161 0 1 19 361
Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information 0 2 16 1,452 0 4 32 3,147
Interim Correlated Rationalizability 0 0 0 117 0 0 11 273
Interim Correlated Rationalizability 0 0 0 7 1 2 21 90
Interim Rationalizability 0 0 0 81 0 1 6 227
Interim Rationalizability 0 0 0 97 0 0 15 207
It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games 0 0 0 86 0 0 12 78
Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 109 0 2 14 707
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 4 0 1 10 72
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 8 1 1 13 83
Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons 0 0 1 98 0 1 15 87
Learning Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 629
Learning Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 69 0 0 9 152
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 347
Learning and Belief Based Trading 0 0 0 44 1 1 10 168
Learning and Equilibrium 0 0 0 32 2 3 12 136
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games 0 0 0 39 0 1 12 65
Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games 0 0 0 2 0 3 9 52
Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 33 0 1 7 85
Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 55 0 0 5 109
Learning in Games 0 0 2 33 1 2 35 203
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments 0 0 1 11 0 0 10 62
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 76 1 2 10 333
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 9 0 1 9 71
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 236 1 3 17 585
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 0 0 268 0 1 14 775
Learning with Recency Bias 0 0 2 145 0 0 15 154
Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games 0 1 3 80 0 3 12 152
Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis 0 0 0 81 1 2 9 163
Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms 0 0 0 7 0 0 9 86
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 1 49 0 1 10 183
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 1 2 18 0 2 13 74
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 1 180 1 1 19 469
Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents 0 0 0 94 0 0 13 285
Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents 0 0 0 6 1 1 7 30
MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 505
Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent 0 0 0 50 0 0 9 167
Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent 0 0 0 73 0 0 7 358
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 4 201 0 2 36 593
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 198
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 2 1 4 23 64
Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games 0 1 1 40 0 1 12 211
Measuring the Completeness of Theories 0 0 0 27 0 2 16 71
Model Restrictiveness in Functional and Structural Settings 0 0 7 7 0 2 7 7
Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets 0 0 0 53 0 1 10 193
Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations 0 0 0 3 0 0 10 55
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts 0 0 0 0 1 2 15 515
NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 7 0 0 5 30
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 203
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 1 0 1 11 297
Non-Equilibrium Learning with Heterogeneous Priors 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 38
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 0 0 1 15 585
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 3 1 1 8 556
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 72 0 0 8 161
Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models 0 0 0 1 0 1 6 21
Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models 0 0 0 13 1 3 8 16
On Concave Functions over Lotteries 0 0 1 103 0 1 15 23
On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 344
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 1 22 0 1 18 138
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 0 17 0 0 43 152
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 210 1 2 12 514
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 9 0 2 15 86
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 66 0 1 13 312
Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players 0 0 0 151 1 1 12 675
Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games 0 0 0 34 0 0 16 55
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 185 0 0 13 1,042
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 138 0 0 15 483
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 0 2 17 837
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 6 0 0 10 75
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 1 2 14 332
Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 0 1 15 536
Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 311
Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 0 28 0 1 16 137
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 0 0 52 0 1 10 252
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 0 0 5 0 1 7 79
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient 0 0 0 220 0 2 14 529
Phenotype Switching and Mutations in Random Environments 0 0 0 2 0 0 7 41
Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium 0 0 0 39 0 1 11 49
Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation 0 0 1 41 0 1 15 194
Predation Without Reputation 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 398
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play 0 0 0 11 0 1 11 45
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play 0 0 0 16 1 3 10 46
Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good 0 0 0 4 0 3 16 1,191
Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics 0 0 0 12 0 1 8 59
Random matching in adaptive dynamics 0 0 0 60 0 0 8 141
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty 0 0 0 49 0 1 11 132
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 313
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 0 20 0 0 9 100
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 242
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction 0 0 0 16 0 0 9 66
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium 0 0 0 19 0 0 16 54
Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries 1 1 1 56 1 4 13 232
Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 17 0 1 10 72
Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem 0 0 0 6 0 1 8 50
Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem 0 0 0 6 1 1 10 49
Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 25
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 91 0 0 9 202
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 0 0 14 0 0 13 82
Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 0 1 14 357
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 0 1 330 0 3 14 643
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 0 0 13 0 0 6 94
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal 0 0 0 1 0 0 14 47
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player 0 0 0 0 1 1 22 264
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 1 1 92 2 6 25 352
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 0 100 0 1 25 332
Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 105
Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants 0 0 0 3 1 1 5 37
Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents 0 0 0 32 0 1 6 74
Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 161
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 225
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs 0 0 0 247 0 0 12 543
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 343
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 39 0 2 20 157
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 13 0 1 15 136
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 346
Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 0 0 0 98 1 2 12 297
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 217
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 69 3 4 23 282
Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 0 0 1 16 1 1 20 139
Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 208
Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 0 56 0 0 11 141
Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships 0 0 0 0 1 2 17 1,349
Sins of Omission and Commission in Complex Systems 0 0 0 33 0 0 14 68
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World 0 1 2 39 0 2 15 168
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices 0 0 0 39 0 1 17 118
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 113 1 3 22 377
Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi 0 0 1 63 0 0 11 661
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility 0 0 0 11 1 2 11 66
Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality 0 0 0 99 0 1 15 365
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 40 0 1 16 178
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 2 0 0 17 62
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games 0 0 1 472 0 0 15 1,232
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 23
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 0 0 1 15 34
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 1 17 0 3 19 118
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 78 1 1 12 412
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 8 0 0 7 74
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 19 2 2 18 120
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 146 0 0 12 1,005
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 227 0 1 38 1,952
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 15 0 1 7 110
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 1 4 27 482
Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays 0 0 0 6 0 0 8 56
Tail probabilities for triangular arrays 0 0 0 3 0 0 13 63
Testing the Drift-Diffusion Model 0 0 1 5 0 1 11 59
The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 327
The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 8 0 0 12 77
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information 0 0 0 21 0 1 10 95
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 0 233 0 1 23 860
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 1 1 1 256 2 4 26 947
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games 0 0 0 32 0 1 16 230
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 0 0 76 0 0 5 269
The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 0 0 8 1 2 13 102
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry 0 0 0 1 0 0 9 556
The Theory of Learning in Games 4 10 27 919 8 22 89 1,996
The Transfer Performance of Economic Models 0 0 0 21 0 0 16 50
Timing and Self-Control 0 0 0 89 1 2 10 146
Timing and Self-Control 0 0 0 8 0 1 6 77
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics 0 0 0 245 0 2 22 121
Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift? 0 0 3 42 4 7 53 300
Topologies on Type 0 0 0 61 0 0 12 325
Topologies on Types 0 0 0 2 1 1 9 60
Topologies on Types 0 0 0 91 0 1 14 910
Topologies on Types 0 0 0 144 0 1 14 423
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship 0 0 0 49 1 3 15 56
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 31
Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks 0 0 3 382 3 5 28 1,134
When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 28 0 0 10 280
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 4 0 1 15 92
When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible 0 0 0 64 0 1 13 438
When is Reputation Bad 0 0 0 235 0 1 7 631
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 10 0 0 11 102
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 108 1 2 15 463
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 144 0 0 8 403
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 0 58 1 2 8 289
Whither Game Theory? 0 0 0 271 0 1 14 168
Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics 0 0 0 203 0 0 15 169
Winners Don't Punish 0 0 2 35 1 1 20 199
Word of Mouth Learning 0 0 1 60 1 2 20 245
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 0 0 1 30 1 2 12 195
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 0 0 2 88 2 3 36 394
Total Working Papers 7 22 163 16,008 84 290 3,418 69,456
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation 0 1 7 648 3 8 50 2,039
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 1 170 0 1 37 696
A Theory of Exit in Duopoly 1 1 3 404 3 6 29 987
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 0 4 583 2 3 33 3,029
A reputation for honesty 0 0 1 6 1 1 21 49
Active learning with a misspecified prior 0 0 0 6 2 3 20 78
Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics 0 0 0 33 1 5 10 504
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 0 30 1 2 13 139
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk 0 0 0 8 0 3 14 57
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information 0 0 0 58 0 0 13 196
Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility 0 1 1 330 0 1 11 660
Competing Auctions 0 0 0 172 0 1 14 478
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 0 53 0 1 15 170
Consistency and cautious fictitious play 0 0 0 76 0 2 37 344
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 201 2 3 20 634
Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" 0 0 0 49 0 0 6 165
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 0 0 0 1 2 6 34 1,410
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags 0 1 1 5 0 1 22 80
Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion 0 0 0 20 0 0 14 114
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 309 0 1 4 535
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations 0 0 3 8 0 1 13 30
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 0 0 0 274 0 1 17 833
Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks 0 0 0 185 0 2 14 380
Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions 0 0 0 56 1 2 19 223
Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems 0 0 1 49 0 2 18 238
Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach 0 0 0 13 0 0 15 84
Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play 0 0 0 27 0 1 17 146
How Flexible is that Functional Form? Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 8
Imitation processes with small mutations 0 0 0 21 0 1 41 195
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 0 2 105 0 2 14 284
Indirect reciprocity with simple records 0 0 0 3 0 0 18 38
Interim correlated rationalizability 0 0 0 90 0 3 18 311
Intervention with limited information 0 0 0 8 1 2 10 30
It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games 0 1 1 7 1 3 19 83
Justified Communication Equilibrium 0 0 1 29 1 1 15 105
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 0 0 112 1 4 16 788
Learning Mixed Equilibria 1 1 2 353 3 4 22 649
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 36 1 1 8 116
Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment 0 0 0 2 0 1 11 32
Learning and Belief-Based Trade 0 0 0 20 0 0 13 122
Learning and Equilibrium 0 0 1 30 0 1 12 166
Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games 0 0 0 8 1 1 12 89
Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory 0 0 0 21 1 1 17 107
Learning from private information in noisy repeated games 0 0 0 50 0 0 23 216
Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments 0 0 1 2 0 4 13 24
Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria 0 0 4 25 0 4 27 116
Learning in games 0 0 5 204 0 3 46 601
Learning to play Bayesian games 1 2 2 237 2 3 20 636
Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance 0 1 7 449 1 8 31 1,368
Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning 0 0 2 15 1 4 31 86
Limit games and limit equilibria 0 0 2 62 1 1 13 191
Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents 0 0 0 30 0 1 10 142
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 248 0 1 18 565
Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 214
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 1 0 1 11 159
Measuring the Completeness of Economic Models 1 2 4 21 1 4 26 113
Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations 0 0 0 27 0 1 16 135
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts 0 0 0 621 0 1 14 1,459
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games 0 0 0 98 0 1 8 233
Noise-Tolerant Community Enforcement and the Strength of Small Stakes 0 0 0 0 2 3 17 18
Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models 0 0 0 1 0 1 16 25
On concave functions over lotteries 0 0 0 1 0 0 12 20
On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments 0 0 0 20 0 2 17 176
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games 0 0 0 172 1 1 12 401
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements 0 0 1 154 0 4 10 378
Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players 0 0 0 154 2 2 15 370
Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs 0 0 0 3 1 1 18 34
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 85 0 2 16 271
Payoff information and learning in signaling games 1 1 2 7 1 5 24 49
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium 1 1 6 1,854 1 2 24 3,592
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 0 0 88 0 2 11 233
Philipp Strack, 2024 Clark Medalist 0 0 0 2 0 1 33 43
Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium 0 0 0 4 0 2 15 34
Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models 0 0 2 11 0 1 23 48
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play 0 0 1 47 0 3 15 267
Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology 0 4 25 380 3 12 62 1,078
Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races 1 1 3 636 1 2 32 1,322
Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry 0 0 0 21 1 1 11 49
Random matching in adaptive dynamics 0 1 1 18 0 2 14 96
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 0 227 1 1 8 655
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction 0 0 0 47 0 0 12 283
Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty 0 0 0 172 0 1 12 392
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium 0 0 0 11 0 0 19 77
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs 0 1 2 5 0 5 18 47
Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies 0 0 0 2 0 0 12 36
Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown 0 0 0 19 0 1 12 148
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 0 1 1 37 0 1 14 258
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 0 2 174 0 0 35 469
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal 0 0 0 13 0 0 15 88
Report of the Search Committee for the Editor of the AEJ: Microeconomics 0 0 0 9 0 2 11 33
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 0 6 411 1 4 44 1,171
Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents 0 0 0 114 0 3 17 344
Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs 0 0 0 26 1 2 33 186
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 3 681 1 3 30 2,447
Selective-Memory Equilibrium 0 1 4 5 1 2 17 28
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 2 2 3 155 2 9 32 600
Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique 0 0 0 64 0 1 13 247
Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information 2 4 10 573 2 10 38 1,047
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships 0 0 0 1,133 1 4 28 2,856
Simplicity and Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk 0 0 0 20 1 2 10 58
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World 0 0 1 54 0 4 17 343
Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices 0 1 1 40 0 3 17 294
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 152 1 2 19 644
Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility 0 0 0 4 0 2 16 69
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations 0 0 0 33 0 1 20 272
Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games 1 2 5 235 2 5 29 556
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 0 36 0 0 9 176
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 0 65 0 1 18 395
Testing the drift-diffusion model 0 0 0 3 1 1 8 30
The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look 1 2 14 3,155 1 6 54 8,209
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 0 3 6 1,146 1 12 56 2,754
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 0 3 470 1 5 42 1,291
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 0 41 0 2 16 180
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry 0 0 0 0 1 3 16 564
The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring 0 0 0 15 0 0 9 118
Timing and Self‐Control 0 0 0 61 2 9 22 297
Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics 0 0 0 11 0 2 28 113
Topologies on types 0 0 0 157 1 1 16 634
Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship 0 0 0 25 0 1 22 209
Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization 0 1 1 346 0 3 15 933
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation 0 0 0 26 0 1 12 196
Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks 0 1 3 255 2 6 20 862
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 35 0 1 11 239
When is reputation bad? 0 0 0 112 0 1 15 325
Which misspecifications persist? 0 0 0 3 1 1 20 35
Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games 0 0 0 39 0 3 27 193
Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics 0 0 0 40 0 0 25 211
Winners don’t punish 0 0 0 3 0 0 18 43
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 0 0 2 1,216 0 1 25 4,460
Word-of-mouth learning 0 0 2 320 2 3 25 930
Working to learn 0 0 0 5 0 2 18 37
“I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games 0 0 0 9 1 3 11 82
Total Journal Articles 13 38 166 22,377 75 307 2,600 69,347
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Game Theory 0 0 0 0 6 31 256 3,830
The Theory of Learning in Games 0 0 0 0 4 14 75 1,458
Total Books 0 0 0 0 10 45 331 5,288

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 16
Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 33
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 1 1 4 0 2 32 61
FINITE PLAYER APPROXIMATIONS TO A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS 0 0 1 4 1 1 5 22
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 123
MAINTAINING A REPUTATION AGAINST A LONG-LIVED OPPONENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 18
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 1 3 0 0 6 41
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview 0 1 2 663 1 2 17 1,724
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 0 0 3 0 1 13 51
Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players 0 0 0 15 0 1 7 68
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 28
REPUTATION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN GAMES WITH A PATIENT PLAYER 0 0 0 5 2 4 17 82
Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games 0 0 1 14 0 0 62 104
THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 0 0 2 15 0 2 27 117
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 8 0 1 18 61
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 0 2 0 0 7 27
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 25
When is reputation bad? 0 0 0 4 1 1 10 37
Total Chapters 0 2 8 743 5 17 260 2,638

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