| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A theory of the spoils system |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
42 |
| Agricultural Lending Decision: A Multiattribute Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
| An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons |
0 |
0 |
2 |
102 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
205 |
| Book reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
94 |
| Budget processes: Theory and experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
405 |
| Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work |
0 |
0 |
2 |
288 |
8 |
11 |
20 |
715 |
| Core and value for a public-goods economy: An example |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
425 |
| Corruption: Top Down or Bottom Up? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
737 |
| Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible |
0 |
2 |
12 |
188 |
3 |
13 |
34 |
521 |
| Financial Conditions and the Time Path of Equipment Expenditures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
| Governing a Groundwater Commons: A Strategic and Laboratory Analysis of Western Water Law |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
10 |
356 |
| Inequality, Cooperation and Environmental Sustainability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
| L. V. Kantorovich: The Price Implications of Optimal Planning |
0 |
1 |
3 |
55 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
194 |
| Liberal paradox, game equilibrium, and Gibbard optimum |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
15 |
18 |
21 |
52 |
| Michael Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. xxiii + 214 pages. USD 35.00 (cloth) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
191 |
| Power and Taxes in a One-Party State: The USSR, 1925-1929 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
104 |
| Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
155 |
3 |
7 |
12 |
453 |
| Problems of the commons: group behavior, cooperation and sanctioning in a two-harbor experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
49 |
| Regulation and Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
48 |
| Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence |
0 |
2 |
5 |
355 |
2 |
6 |
13 |
804 |
| Repressed inflation in the Soviet Union: A temporary equilibrium approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
131 |
| Rules and Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
300 |
| Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
78 |
| Some Finite Sample Properties of Spectral Estimators of a Linear Regression |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
182 |
| Spatial Strategies and Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
22 |
| Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game |
0 |
1 |
1 |
173 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
880 |
| The Arrow-Lind Theorem in a Continuum Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
3 |
7 |
9 |
437 |
| The Borda Game: A correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
11 |
| The Borda game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
26 |
| The Economic Prospects of the CIS: Sources of Long Term Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
77 |
| The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems |
1 |
9 |
23 |
139 |
8 |
26 |
56 |
323 |
| The Role of Information in Resolution Trust Corporation Auctions of Failed Thrifts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
167 |
| The Size of Nations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
58 |
| The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
242 |
| The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
20 |
| Variation of the electorate: Veto and purge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
18 |
| Wealth and power in a collegial polity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
89 |
| Total Journal Articles |
1 |
15 |
54 |
2,145 |
98 |
187 |
309 |
8,584 |
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