| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A theory of the spoils system |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
46 |
| Agricultural Lending Decision: A Multiattribute Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
12 |
| An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons |
0 |
2 |
3 |
104 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
207 |
| Book reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
95 |
| Budget processes: Theory and experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
407 |
| Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work |
0 |
0 |
0 |
288 |
2 |
6 |
22 |
721 |
| Core and value for a public-goods economy: An example |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
427 |
| Corruption: Top Down or Bottom Up? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
12 |
743 |
| Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible |
1 |
2 |
11 |
190 |
7 |
12 |
39 |
533 |
| Financial Conditions and the Time Path of Equipment Expenditures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
45 |
| Governing a Groundwater Commons: A Strategic and Laboratory Analysis of Western Water Law |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
360 |
| Inequality, Cooperation and Environmental Sustainability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
77 |
| L. V. Kantorovich: The Price Implications of Optimal Planning |
0 |
2 |
5 |
57 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
198 |
| Liberal paradox, game equilibrium, and Gibbard optimum |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
5 |
24 |
57 |
| Michael Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. xxiii + 214 pages. USD 35.00 (cloth) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
194 |
| Power and Taxes in a One-Party State: The USSR, 1925-1929 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
106 |
| Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
155 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
454 |
| Problems of the commons: group behavior, cooperation and sanctioning in a two-harbor experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
53 |
| Regulation and Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
49 |
| Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence |
1 |
1 |
5 |
356 |
5 |
5 |
16 |
809 |
| Repressed inflation in the Soviet Union: A temporary equilibrium approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
135 |
| Rules and Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
302 |
| Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
80 |
| Some Finite Sample Properties of Spectral Estimators of a Linear Regression |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
186 |
| Spatial Strategies and Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
3 |
6 |
11 |
28 |
| Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game |
0 |
0 |
1 |
173 |
3 |
5 |
12 |
885 |
| The Arrow-Lind Theorem in a Continuum Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
441 |
| The Borda Game: A correction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
| The Borda game |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
28 |
| The Economic Prospects of the CIS: Sources of Long Term Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
78 |
| The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems |
1 |
7 |
25 |
146 |
5 |
21 |
69 |
344 |
| The Role of Information in Resolution Trust Corporation Auctions of Failed Thrifts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
169 |
| The Size of Nations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
59 |
| The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
242 |
| The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
24 |
| Variation of the electorate: Veto and purge |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
18 |
| Wealth and power in a collegial polity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
89 |
| Total Journal Articles |
3 |
14 |
52 |
2,159 |
54 |
129 |
396 |
8,713 |
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