Access Statistics for Ian Gale

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A MULTIPLE-OBJECT AUCTION WITH SUPERADDITIVE VALUES 0 0 0 0 0 5 9 170
A Simple Proof That Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Inefficient 0 0 0 248 0 1 5 505
Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result 0 0 1 44 0 5 12 358
Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 308
CAPACITY AUCTIONS 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 126
Caps on Political Lobbying 0 0 1 528 2 15 32 3,789
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply 0 0 0 16 1 3 6 95
Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions 0 1 1 117 0 5 10 421
Entry Fees vs. Reserve Prices in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions 0 0 0 2 0 3 4 258
Exclusion in all-pay auctions 0 0 0 40 1 3 4 356
Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership 0 0 0 26 0 6 13 200
Optimal Design of Research Contests 0 0 0 221 0 6 13 716
PRICE COMPETITION IN A COMPETITIVELY RULED COTENANCY 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 99
Price Dispersion in a Market with Advance Purchases 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 189
Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types 0 0 0 4 2 5 10 81
Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types 0 0 0 17 0 6 8 114
Revenue Non-Equivalence of Auctions with Budget- Constrained Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 89
Sales to Budget-Constrained Buyers: Single-Payer Versus Multi-Payer 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 183
The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings 0 0 0 73 0 3 8 363
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 114
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 158
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 1 4 11 726
Total Working Papers 0 1 3 1,336 8 85 170 9,418

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A multiple-object auction with superadditive values 0 1 1 60 3 6 8 127
Airline deregulation: is it time to finish the job? 0 0 0 22 0 3 4 361
Allocating publicly owned assets: the case of personal communications services 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 72
Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition 0 0 0 18 0 2 5 192
Competition for scarce inputs: the case of airport takeoff and landing slots 0 0 0 90 0 1 3 361
Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions 0 0 1 94 0 1 8 215
Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints 0 0 0 153 1 5 7 394
Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case1 0 0 0 25 1 5 9 125
Optimal Design of Research Contests 0 0 0 144 1 8 16 558
Price competition in noncooperative joint ventures 0 0 0 18 0 1 5 60
Rebates, introductory sales and the Coase conjecture 0 0 0 9 0 1 1 36
Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained 0 0 0 61 0 3 5 191
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types 0 0 0 49 4 7 13 236
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer 0 0 0 78 0 1 7 237
Total Journal Articles 0 1 2 825 10 45 92 3,165

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Statistics updated 2026-04-09