Access Statistics for Ian Gale

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A MULTIPLE-OBJECT AUCTION WITH SUPERADDITIVE VALUES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 161
A Simple Proof That Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Inefficient 0 0 2 248 0 1 7 503
Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result 0 0 1 44 0 1 3 348
Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 304
CAPACITY AUCTIONS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 124
Caps on Political Lobbying 0 0 5 528 3 3 20 3,768
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 90
Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions 0 0 0 116 1 1 2 413
Entry Fees vs. Reserve Prices in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 255
Exclusion in all-pay auctions 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 352
Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership 0 0 0 26 0 1 3 190
Optimal Design of Research Contests 0 0 0 221 2 3 5 707
PRICE COMPETITION IN A COMPETITIVELY RULED COTENANCY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 98
Price Dispersion in a Market with Advance Purchases 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 185
Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 72
Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types 0 0 0 17 0 1 1 107
Revenue Non-Equivalence of Auctions with Budget- Constrained Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 87
Sales to Budget-Constrained Buyers: Single-Payer Versus Multi-Payer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 182
The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings 0 0 0 73 0 0 2 356
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 154
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 717
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 111
Total Working Papers 0 0 8 1,335 7 12 57 9,284

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A multiple-object auction with superadditive values 0 0 0 59 0 0 4 121
Airline deregulation: is it time to finish the job? 0 0 0 22 1 1 1 358
Allocating publicly owned assets: the case of personal communications services 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 71
Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition 0 0 0 18 1 1 2 188
Competition for scarce inputs: the case of airport takeoff and landing slots 0 0 0 90 1 1 1 359
Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions 0 0 0 93 2 2 7 211
Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints 0 0 0 153 0 0 2 388
Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case1 0 0 0 25 1 1 6 119
Optimal Design of Research Contests 0 0 0 144 2 2 7 545
Price competition in noncooperative joint ventures 0 0 0 18 0 0 2 57
Rebates, introductory sales and the Coase conjecture 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 35
Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained 0 0 0 61 1 1 3 187
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types 0 0 0 49 2 2 5 225
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer 0 0 1 78 0 0 5 231
Total Journal Articles 0 0 1 823 11 11 47 3,095

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Statistics updated 2025-11-08