Access Statistics for Ian Gale

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A MULTIPLE-OBJECT AUCTION WITH SUPERADDITIVE VALUES 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 177
A Simple Proof That Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Inefficient 0 0 0 248 1 1 9 512
Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result 0 0 0 44 0 0 12 360
Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 311
CAPACITY AUCTIONS 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 127
Caps on Political Lobbying 0 0 0 528 0 3 32 3,797
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply 0 0 0 16 0 1 6 96
Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions 0 0 1 117 0 0 10 422
Entry Fees vs. Reserve Prices in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 259
Exclusion in all-pay auctions 0 0 0 40 0 0 6 358
Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership 0 0 0 26 0 0 15 205
Optimal Design of Research Contests 0 0 0 221 0 1 13 718
PRICE COMPETITION IN A COMPETITIVELY RULED COTENANCY 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 102
Price Dispersion in a Market with Advance Purchases 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 195
Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types 0 0 0 4 0 0 11 83
Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types 0 0 0 17 0 0 10 117
Revenue Non-Equivalence of Auctions with Budget- Constrained Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 5 9 96
Sales to Budget-Constrained Buyers: Single-Payer Versus Multi-Payer 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 185
The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings 0 0 0 73 1 1 10 366
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 116
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 727
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 158
Total Working Papers 0 0 1 1,336 4 15 210 9,487

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A multiple-object auction with superadditive values 0 0 1 60 0 1 9 130
Airline deregulation: is it time to finish the job? 0 0 0 22 0 0 6 363
Allocating publicly owned assets: the case of personal communications services 0 0 0 4 0 0 9 80
Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition 0 0 0 18 0 0 8 195
Competition for scarce inputs: the case of airport takeoff and landing slots 0 0 0 90 0 0 5 363
Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions 0 0 1 94 0 1 8 217
Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints 0 0 0 153 0 1 9 397
Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case1 0 0 0 25 0 0 8 126
Optimal Design of Research Contests 0 0 0 144 2 4 23 566
Price competition in noncooperative joint ventures 0 0 0 18 0 0 4 61
Rebates, introductory sales and the Coase conjecture 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 37
Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained 0 0 0 61 0 1 7 193
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types 0 0 0 49 0 1 20 243
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer 0 0 0 78 1 2 9 240
Total Journal Articles 0 0 2 825 3 11 127 3,211

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Statistics updated 2026-10-11