Access Statistics for Francesc Llerena Garrés

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game 0 0 0 11 0 0 17 87
A simple procedure for computing strong constrained egalitarian allocations 0 0 0 14 0 1 12 56
An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution 0 0 0 12 0 0 7 37
An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game 0 0 0 120 1 2 10 150
Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems 0 0 0 21 0 0 7 21
Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games 0 0 0 64 0 1 21 294
Monotonicity and weighted prenucleoli: A characterization without consistency 0 0 0 32 0 1 30 85
On reasonable outcomes and the core in cooperative TU games 0 0 0 17 1 2 17 75
Sequential decisions in allocation problems 0 0 0 53 2 3 16 237
The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games 0 0 0 28 0 1 10 89
The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core 0 0 0 24 1 1 3 32
The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach 0 0 0 33 0 0 5 171
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games 0 0 0 25 0 1 10 89
Welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems and convex games 0 0 0 15 0 0 3 67
Total Working Papers 0 0 0 469 5 13 168 1,490

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A geometric characterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game 0 0 1 32 2 2 14 122
An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution 0 0 1 14 0 0 10 75
An axiomatization of the core of games with restricted cooperation 0 0 1 11 1 2 14 56
An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets 0 0 0 9 2 2 15 50
Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core 0 0 2 23 0 2 9 169
Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices 0 0 1 8 0 0 13 53
On the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the imputation set 0 0 2 20 0 1 14 74
Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions 0 0 0 2 0 0 9 29
Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results 0 0 0 3 1 2 11 62
Reduced games and egalitarian solutions 0 0 0 7 1 2 8 42
Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games 0 0 0 6 0 0 35 71
Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU games 0 0 0 3 0 0 13 42
The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core 0 0 0 2 0 1 16 34
The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games 0 0 0 24 1 1 8 102
Una nota sobre valoración de opciones americanas y arbitraje 0 0 0 85 0 1 5 349
Total Journal Articles 0 0 8 249 8 16 194 1,330
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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Statistics updated 2026-08-07