Access Statistics for Daniel F. Garrett

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts 0 0 0 5 0 1 10 12
A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts 0 0 0 17 1 1 13 42
Competitive Credit and Present Bias: A Stochastic Discounting Approach 0 0 6 6 0 0 2 2
Competitive Screening under Heterogeneous Information 0 0 1 42 1 1 10 91
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 3 1 1 12 67
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes 0 0 0 45 1 1 7 79
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 11 0 0 11 83
Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 21 1 1 14 126
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values 0 0 0 33 0 1 8 59
Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective 0 0 0 26 0 1 3 36
Intertemporal price discrimination: dynamic arrivals and changing values 0 0 0 56 0 1 10 90
Labour Force Participation and GDP in New Zealand 0 0 0 269 0 0 11 1,870
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World 0 0 0 33 0 0 10 148
Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination 0 0 0 21 0 0 14 37
Oligopoly under incomplete information: on the welfare effects of price discrimination 0 0 1 23 0 0 6 16
Oligopoly under incomplete information: on the welfare effects of price discrimination 0 0 0 20 1 1 22 81
Optimal technology design 0 0 0 5 1 1 29 30
Optimal technology design 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 9
Overbooking 0 0 2 48 0 2 20 169
Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting 0 0 0 14 0 1 7 33
Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting 0 0 0 14 0 2 10 29
Regulating investments when both costs and need are private 0 0 0 19 1 1 20 31
Relational Contracts: Public Versus Private Savings 0 0 0 8 1 1 17 52
Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings 0 0 0 9 1 1 11 31
Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings 0 0 1 12 9 9 29 41
Residual Deterrence 0 0 0 32 0 1 13 39
Residual Deterrence 0 0 0 31 1 3 14 84
Total Working Papers 0 0 11 823 20 33 341 3,387
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bidding in a possibly common-value auction 0 0 0 11 2 2 7 92
Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information 0 0 1 14 1 1 16 114
Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach 0 0 1 10 0 1 9 64
Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values 0 0 0 8 1 2 14 65
Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective 0 0 0 1 0 1 17 35
Fake Sales: A Dynamic Pricing Perspective 0 0 0 6 0 1 5 37
Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values 0 0 3 60 2 3 29 279
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World 0 0 0 57 0 1 15 431
Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination 0 0 0 16 0 1 12 44
Optimal technology design 0 0 0 1 0 0 11 20
Overbooking 0 0 2 8 1 2 9 81
Payoff implications of incentive contracting 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 9
Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 14
Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings 0 0 0 2 1 1 24 39
Residual Deterrence 0 0 0 13 0 0 11 51
Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement 0 0 3 20 1 1 14 114
Total Journal Articles 0 0 10 227 9 18 207 1,489

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Statistics updated 2026-09-10