| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
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3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A summary of: \\"Do households benefit from financial deregulation and innovation? the case of mortgage market\\" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
28 |
| Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
3 |
31 |
3 |
3 |
20 |
50 |
| Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
70 |
| Can't Pay or Won't Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default |
1 |
2 |
2 |
33 |
4 |
10 |
26 |
105 |
| Can't Pay or Won't Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default |
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2 |
2 |
66 |
3 |
6 |
22 |
268 |
| Can't pay or won't pay?: unemployment, negative equity, and strategic default |
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1 |
1 |
17 |
4 |
7 |
16 |
68 |
| Common Ownership Does Not Have Anti-Competitive Effects in the Airline Industry |
0 |
1 |
27 |
63 |
3 |
14 |
142 |
217 |
| Consumer Heterogeneity and Markups over the Business Cycle: Evidence from the Airline Industry |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
189 |
| Decomposing the foreclosure crisis: House price depreciation versus bad underwriting |
1 |
1 |
1 |
107 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
355 |
| Did Subprime Borrowers Drive the Housing Boom? |
1 |
1 |
13 |
13 |
3 |
5 |
20 |
20 |
| Do Borrower Rights Improve Borrower Outcomes? Evidence from the Foreclosure Process |
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0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
46 |
| Do Households Benefit from Financial Deregulation and Innovation? The Case of the Mortgage Market |
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1 |
1 |
89 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
464 |
| Do Households Benefit from Financial Deregulation and Innovation? The Case of the Mortgage Market |
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0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
82 |
102 |
| Do borrower rights improve borrower outcomes? Evidence from the foreclosure process |
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0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
47 |
| Do borrower rights improve borrower outcomes?: evidence from the foreclosure process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
52 |
| Do households benefit from financial deregulation and innovation?: the case of the mortgage market |
0 |
0 |
2 |
114 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
415 |
| Evaluating the Benefits of a Streamlined Refinance Program |
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0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Evaluating the Benefits of a Streamlined Refinance Program |
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1 |
4 |
4 |
10 |
13 |
17 |
17 |
| Evaluating the Benefits of a Streamlined Refinance Program |
1 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
5 |
| Financial literacy and subprime mortgage delinquency: evidence from a survey matched to administrative data |
2 |
5 |
10 |
161 |
7 |
18 |
50 |
569 |
| Foreclosure Externalities and Vacant Property Registration Ordinances |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
| Foreclosure externalities: Some new evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
64 |
| Foreclosure externalities: Some new evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
51 |
| Foreclosure externalities: some new evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
5 |
6 |
45 |
| Fracking and Mortgage Default |
1 |
1 |
2 |
48 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
52 |
| Making sense of the subprime crisis |
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0 |
0 |
140 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
270 |
| Making sense of the subprime crisis |
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0 |
1 |
129 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
396 |
| Mortgage Prepayment, Race, and Monetary Policy |
1 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
| Negative equity and foreclosure: theory and evidence |
1 |
1 |
6 |
236 |
7 |
10 |
39 |
912 |
| Price discrimination and business-cycle risk |
0 |
0 |
1 |
65 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
110 |
| Reasonable people did disagree: optimism and pessimism about the U.S. housing market before the crash |
0 |
1 |
3 |
80 |
2 |
6 |
26 |
179 |
| Reducing Foreclosures: No Easy Answers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
285 |
| Reducing foreclosures |
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0 |
0 |
32 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
95 |
| Reducing foreclosures: no easy answers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
207 |
| Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
81 |
| Subprime facts: what (we think) we know about the subprime crisis and what we don’t |
0 |
0 |
0 |
546 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
1,033 |
| Subprime mortgages, foreclosures, and urban neighborhoods |
0 |
0 |
1 |
49 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
189 |
| Subprime mortgages, foreclosures, and urban neighborhoods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
392 |
| Subprime outcomes: risky mortgages, homeownership experiences, and foreclosures |
0 |
1 |
4 |
153 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
483 |
| Summary of "subprime outcomes: risky mortgages, homeownership experiences, and foreclosures" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
40 |
| The Effect of Large Investors on Asset Quality: Evidence from Subprime Mortgage Securities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
102 |
| The Failure of supervisory stress testing: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and OFHEO |
0 |
1 |
3 |
27 |
5 |
11 |
33 |
136 |
| The effect of social entitlement programs on private transfers: new evidence of crowding out |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
83 |
| The effects of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry: a panel analysis |
7 |
17 |
34 |
663 |
12 |
40 |
114 |
2,691 |
| The failure of supervisory stress testing: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and OFHEO |
1 |
1 |
3 |
44 |
4 |
5 |
14 |
152 |
| Villains or Scapegoats? The Role of Subprime Borrowers in Driving the U.S. Housing Boom |
0 |
1 |
3 |
44 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
78 |
| Villains or Scapegoats? The Role of Subprime Borrowers in Driving the U.S. Housing Boom |
0 |
0 |
7 |
7 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
15 |
| What explains differences in foreclosure rates? a response to Piskorski, Seru, and Vig |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
74 |
| What explains differences in foreclosure rates?: a response to Piskorski, Seru, and Vig |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
120 |
| Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
5 |
9 |
28 |
163 |
| Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures and Securitization |
0 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
1 |
7 |
23 |
175 |
| Why did so many people make so many ex post bad decisions? the causes of the foreclosure crisis |
0 |
0 |
2 |
66 |
1 |
6 |
26 |
252 |
| Why did so many people make so many ex post bad decisions?: the causes of the foreclosure crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
135 |
| Why don't lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? redefaults, self-cures, and securitization |
0 |
0 |
2 |
55 |
2 |
5 |
23 |
239 |
| Why don't lenders renegotiate more home mortgages?: redefaults, self-cures, and securitization |
0 |
1 |
2 |
30 |
1 |
2 |
13 |
138 |
| Total Working Papers |
17 |
45 |
153 |
3,691 |
119 |
264 |
1,034 |
12,541 |
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