| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
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3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Critical Review of the Common Ownership Literature |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
1 |
7 |
17 |
45 |
| A summary of: \"Do households benefit from financial deregulation and innovation? the case of mortgage market\" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
42 |
| Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
4 |
9 |
12 |
126 |
| Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
2 |
7 |
8 |
83 |
| Can Everyone Tap Into the Housing Piggy Bank? Racial Disparities in Access to Home Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
4 |
6 |
9 |
14 |
| Can Everyone Tap into the Housing Piggy Bank? Racial Disparities in Access to Home Equity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
14 |
19 |
| Can't Pay or Won't Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
4 |
7 |
8 |
154 |
| Can't Pay or Won't Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
1 |
9 |
15 |
295 |
| Can't pay or won't pay?: unemployment, negative equity, and strategic default |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
4 |
7 |
8 |
89 |
| Common Ownership Does Not Have Anti-Competitive Effects in the Airline Industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
3 |
14 |
21 |
324 |
| Consumer Heterogeneity and Markups over the Business Cycle: Evidence from the Airline Industry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
4 |
8 |
9 |
208 |
| Decomposing the foreclosure crisis: House price depreciation versus bad underwriting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
110 |
5 |
6 |
8 |
370 |
| Did Subprime Borrowers Drive the Housing Boom? |
0 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
5 |
9 |
14 |
53 |
| Do Borrower Rights Improve Borrower Outcomes? Evidence from the Foreclosure Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
9 |
11 |
73 |
| Do Households Benefit from Financial Deregulation and Innovation? The Case of the Mortgage Market |
0 |
1 |
1 |
91 |
7 |
12 |
15 |
485 |
| Do borrower rights improve borrower outcomes? Evidence from the foreclosure process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
14 |
14 |
14 |
72 |
| Do borrower rights improve borrower outcomes?: evidence from the foreclosure process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
69 |
| Do households benefit from financial deregulation and innovation?: the case of the mortgage market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
117 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
443 |
| Evaluating the Benefits of a Streamlined Refinance Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
6 |
10 |
11 |
36 |
| Evaluating the Benefits of a Streamlined Refinance Program |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
| Financial literacy and subprime mortgage delinquency: evidence from a survey matched to administrative data |
0 |
2 |
7 |
189 |
12 |
20 |
43 |
736 |
| Foreclosure Externalities and Vacant Property Registration Ordinances |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
33 |
| Foreclosure externalities: Some new evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
67 |
| Foreclosure externalities: Some new evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
4 |
15 |
85 |
| Foreclosure externalities: some new evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
6 |
12 |
16 |
74 |
| Foreclosures, house-price changes, and subprime mortgages in Massachusetts cities and towns |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
332 |
| Fracking and Mortgage Default |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
6 |
11 |
14 |
80 |
| Government Litigation Risk and the Decline in Low-Income Mortgage Lending |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
13 |
| Lessons Learned from Mortgage Borrower Policies and Outcomes during the COVID-19 Pandemic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
21 |
| Making sense of the subprime crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
1 |
6 |
13 |
300 |
| Making sense of the subprime crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
131 |
5 |
8 |
15 |
421 |
| Mortgage Lock-in, Lifecycle Migration, and the Welfare Effects of Housing Market Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
11 |
15 |
20 |
| Mortgage Prepayment, Race, and Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
6 |
8 |
10 |
52 |
| Mortgage Prepayment, Race, and Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
5 |
6 |
10 |
55 |
| Negative equity and foreclosure: theory and evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
248 |
4 |
7 |
16 |
972 |
| Price discrimination and business-cycle risk |
0 |
1 |
1 |
67 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
121 |
| Racial Differences in Mortgage Refinancing, Distress, and Housing Wealth Accumulation during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
18 |
| Racial Differences in Mortgage Refinancing, Distress, and Housing Wealth Accumulation during COVID-19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
4 |
8 |
16 |
44 |
| Reasonable people did disagree: optimism and pessimism about the U.S. housing market before the crash |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
4 |
7 |
9 |
222 |
| Reducing Foreclosures: No Easy Answers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
303 |
| Reducing foreclosures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
115 |
| Reducing foreclosures: no easy answers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
1 |
6 |
7 |
218 |
| Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
11 |
12 |
106 |
| Subprime facts: what (we think) we know about the subprime crisis and what we don’t |
0 |
0 |
0 |
547 |
7 |
10 |
11 |
1,059 |
| Subprime mortgages, foreclosures, and urban neighborhoods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
3 |
9 |
10 |
209 |
| Subprime mortgages, foreclosures, and urban neighborhoods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
120 |
4 |
7 |
7 |
411 |
| Subprime outcomes: risky mortgages, homeownership experiences, and foreclosures |
0 |
0 |
1 |
161 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
541 |
| Summary of \"subprime outcomes: risky mortgages, homeownership experiences, and foreclosures\" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
51 |
| The Effect of Large Investors on Asset Quality: Evidence from Subprime Mortgage Securities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
121 |
| The Failure of supervisory stress testing: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and OFHEO |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
195 |
| The Good, the Bad, and the Ordinary: Estimating Agent Value-Added Using Real Estate Transactions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
13 |
16 |
27 |
| The effect of social entitlement programs on private transfers: new evidence of crowding out |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
6 |
6 |
9 |
98 |
| The effects of competition on price dispersion in the airline industry: a panel analysis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
719 |
3 |
3 |
10 |
2,888 |
| The failure of supervisory stress testing: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and OFHEO |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
178 |
| Villains or Scapegoats? The Role of Subprime Borrowers in Driving the U.S. Housing Boom |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
90 |
| Villains or Scapegoats? The Role of Subprime Borrowers in Driving the U.S. Housing Boom |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
5 |
7 |
8 |
37 |
| What explains differences in foreclosure rates? a response to Piskorski, Seru, and Vig |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
84 |
| What explains differences in foreclosure rates?: a response to Piskorski, Seru, and Vig |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
127 |
| Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
11 |
16 |
22 |
222 |
| Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures and Securitization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
3 |
12 |
18 |
201 |
| Why did so many people make so many ex post bad decisions? the causes of the foreclosure crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
9 |
15 |
21 |
324 |
| Why did so many people make so many ex post bad decisions?: the causes of the foreclosure crisis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
6 |
11 |
15 |
221 |
| Why don't lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? redefaults, self-cures, and securitization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
3 |
5 |
7 |
261 |
| Why don't lenders renegotiate more home mortgages?: redefaults, self-cures, and securitization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
5 |
11 |
13 |
165 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
5 |
22 |
4,035 |
237 |
460 |
689 |
14,931 |
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