Access Statistics for Dino Gerardi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 23 0 2 3 177
A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 29 1 5 8 146
A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing 0 0 0 55 2 9 15 260
A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing 0 1 1 19 1 7 9 77
A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing 0 0 0 21 2 5 6 86
A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 35 2 3 6 141
Aggregation of Expert Opinions 0 0 0 79 1 3 7 255
Aggregation of Expert Opinions 0 0 0 119 1 8 19 548
Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 10 0 10 14 27
Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 51 1 4 9 217
Bargaining over a divisible good in the market for lemons 0 0 0 1 1 5 14 28
Committee Design in the Presence of Communication 0 0 0 18 1 4 8 165
Committee Design in the Presence of Communication 0 0 0 104 0 3 6 350
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 30 1 2 5 100
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 76 1 4 9 588
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 35 0 2 4 162
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 31 0 3 11 155
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 37 1 8 9 133
Delegation with Endogenous States 0 0 0 4 1 6 19 22
Delegation with Endogenous States 0 0 0 3 2 10 14 19
Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Auditing, Disclosure, and Verification in Organizations 0 0 1 40 1 8 16 88
Do Actions Speak Louder than Words? 0 0 0 24 1 3 10 259
Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect 1 1 2 40 3 4 10 123
Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect 0 1 1 24 1 3 8 51
Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty 0 0 0 21 2 11 15 77
Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty 0 0 0 24 0 8 10 36
Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication (joint with Roger Myerson) 1 1 1 51 3 4 9 119
Get Out the (Costly) Vote: Institutional Design for Greater Participation 0 0 0 60 0 4 6 322
Information Acquisition in Committees 0 0 1 93 1 4 9 255
Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication* 0 0 1 68 1 12 18 267
Putting Your Ballot Where you Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice 0 0 0 5 0 3 7 35
Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication 0 0 1 194 0 5 9 784
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 53 0 3 6 172
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 38 2 3 6 192
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 90 1 7 10 626
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 116 1 3 7 578
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 39 2 7 9 233
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 67 4 8 12 426
The Perils of Friendly Oversight 0 0 0 8 0 3 6 27
The Perils of Friendly Oversight 0 0 1 10 0 18 42 51
The Perils of Friendly Oversight 0 0 0 0 1 4 11 16
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 18 1 16 22 77
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 25 1 1 6 103
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 44 2 5 8 55
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 6 1 6 7 45
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 9 0 3 4 53
Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information 0 0 1 76 0 7 12 441
Total Working Papers 2 4 11 2,023 48 266 490 9,167

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A principal-agent model of sequential testing 0 1 1 19 0 7 18 130
A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games 0 0 0 16 1 3 7 106
Aggregation of expert opinions 0 0 0 29 1 4 13 142
Auditing, disclosure, and verification in decentralized decision problems 0 0 0 6 0 2 3 33
Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 9 1 2 10 61
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 30 2 7 14 172
Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information 0 0 0 69 1 3 7 269
Costly Expertise 0 0 0 54 0 6 12 155
Deliberative voting 0 0 2 177 0 2 7 408
Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect 0 0 0 4 2 4 7 38
Efficiency in Decentralised Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty 0 0 0 3 0 1 6 28
GET OUT THE (COSTLY) VOTE: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION 0 0 0 4 0 3 5 44
Information acquisition in committees 0 0 1 40 2 6 11 106
Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity 0 0 0 4 0 4 5 15
Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication 0 0 1 67 1 2 7 238
Social Memory, Evidence, and Conflict 0 0 0 77 1 3 6 473
The perils of friendly oversight 0 0 0 1 0 12 26 33
The role of commitment in bilateral trade 0 0 1 18 2 4 11 82
Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information 0 0 0 33 0 6 13 193
Total Journal Articles 0 1 6 660 14 81 188 2,726

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Statistics updated 2026-04-09