Access Statistics for Dino Gerardi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 29 4 5 12 150
A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 23 2 3 5 179
A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing 0 0 0 55 1 6 16 261
A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing 0 0 0 21 2 4 8 88
A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing 0 0 1 19 0 3 9 77
A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 35 1 3 7 142
Aggregation of Expert Opinions 0 0 0 119 1 6 20 549
Aggregation of Expert Opinions 0 0 0 79 2 4 8 257
Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 51 3 7 12 220
Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 10 1 4 15 28
Bargaining over a divisible good in the market for lemons 0 0 0 1 2 3 16 30
Committee Design in the Presence of Communication 0 0 0 18 0 2 8 165
Committee Design in the Presence of Communication 0 0 0 104 1 1 7 351
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 30 4 5 9 104
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 37 2 3 11 135
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 76 3 6 12 591
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 31 2 2 13 157
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 35 1 2 5 163
Delegation with Endogenous States 0 0 0 3 0 6 14 19
Delegation with Endogenous States 0 0 0 4 2 4 21 24
Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Auditing, Disclosure, and Verification in Organizations 0 0 0 40 3 7 18 91
Do Actions Speak Louder than Words? 1 1 1 25 6 9 14 265
Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect 0 1 2 40 2 5 12 125
Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect 0 1 1 24 2 4 10 53
Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty 0 0 0 24 1 3 11 37
Efficiency in Decentralized Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty 0 0 0 21 3 6 18 80
Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication (joint with Roger Myerson) 0 1 1 51 0 3 8 119
Get Out the (Costly) Vote: Institutional Design for Greater Participation 0 0 0 60 2 3 8 324
Information Acquisition in Committees 0 0 1 93 1 2 10 256
Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication* 0 0 1 68 0 11 18 267
Putting Your Ballot Where you Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice 0 0 0 5 0 1 7 35
Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication 0 0 0 194 1 1 9 785
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 90 4 6 14 630
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 38 0 2 6 192
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 0 53 0 1 5 172
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 39 5 7 14 238
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 116 2 3 9 580
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 67 2 6 14 428
The Perils of Friendly Oversight 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 16
The Perils of Friendly Oversight 0 0 0 8 0 0 6 27
The Perils of Friendly Oversight 0 0 1 10 0 1 42 51
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 6 2 3 9 47
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 44 3 6 11 58
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 18 2 4 24 79
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 25 1 2 7 104
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 9 1 2 5 54
Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information 0 0 1 76 0 0 11 441
Total Working Papers 1 4 10 2,024 77 179 559 9,244

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A principal-agent model of sequential testing 0 0 1 19 0 1 17 130
A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games 0 0 0 16 1 2 8 107
Aggregation of expert opinions 0 0 0 29 3 6 15 145
Auditing, disclosure, and verification in decentralized decision problems 0 0 0 6 2 3 5 35
Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 9 6 8 16 67
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 30 1 3 14 173
Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information 0 0 0 69 6 9 13 275
Costly Expertise 0 0 0 54 1 3 13 156
Deliberative voting 0 0 2 177 1 1 8 409
Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect 0 0 0 4 2 4 9 40
Efficiency in Decentralised Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty 0 0 0 3 1 1 7 29
GET OUT THE (COSTLY) VOTE: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION 0 0 0 4 3 3 8 47
Information acquisition in committees 0 0 1 40 0 4 10 106
Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity 0 0 0 4 5 7 10 20
Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication 0 0 0 67 2 3 8 240
Social Memory, Evidence, and Conflict 0 0 0 77 3 5 8 476
The perils of friendly oversight 0 0 0 1 2 3 28 35
The role of commitment in bilateral trade 0 0 1 18 2 4 13 84
Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information 0 0 0 33 2 3 15 195
Total Journal Articles 0 0 5 660 43 73 225 2,769

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06