Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Beyond trust: why American classical jurists and economists could not love the corporation |
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1 |
2 |
Book Review/Revue des livres Reviews/Comptes rendus Robert Leonard, Von Neumann, Morgenstern and the Creation of Game Theory Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 |
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0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
Book reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
COMPETITION VERSUS PROPERTY RIGHTS: AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW, THE FREIBURG SCHOOL, AND THE EARLY YEARS OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY |
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6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
Competitive balance in football leagues when teams have different goals |
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0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
160 |
Crossed destinies: law and economics meets the history of economic thought |
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0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
Daniel A. Crane and Herbert Hovenkamp, eds., The Making of Competition Policy. Legal and Economic Sources (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. viii + 499, $99. ISBN 978-0-199-78279-6 |
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0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
Defining Storia dell?economia. Is there a Storia dell?economia and what is it? An introduction |
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1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
Do Prudent Agents Play Lotteries? Von Neumann's Contribution to the Theory of Rational Behavior |
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0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
Elevating Competition: Classical Political Economy in Justice Peckham’s Jurisprudence |
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2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
Fixing the point: the contribution of early game theory to the tool-box of modern economics |
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0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
Free From What? Classical Competition and the Early Decades of American Antitrust |
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1 |
2 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
From Marketability to Flexibility: Pantaleoni’s ‘Impure’ Theory of Money and Banking |
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0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
Games judges don't play: predatory pricing and strategic reasoning in US antitrust |
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0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
63 |
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Opening of American Law: Neoclassical Legal Thought, 1870–1970 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 460, $53 (hardcover). ISBN 978-0-19933-130-7 |
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1 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
31 |
History of economics becomes a science for cyborgs |
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6 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives. The Principal – Agent Model, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2002, pp. xii+421 |
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5 |
111 |
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0 |
7 |
360 |
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Sixtieth-Anniversary Edition, Princeton University Press, 2004, pp. xxxii+741 |
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0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
55 |
John von Neumann’s panmathematical view |
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0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
Lee McGowan, The Antitrust Revolution in Europe. Exploring the European Commission’s Cartel Policy, Cheltenham (uk) and Northampton (ma, usa), Edward Elgar, 2010, pp. viii+228 |
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1 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
43 |
MODELING RATIONAL AGENTS THE CONSISTENCY VIEW OF RATIONALITY AND THE CHANGING IMAGE OF NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS |
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1 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
76 |
Nash Equilibrium |
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0 |
2 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
104 |
Network efficiency and the banking system |
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13 |
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1 |
1 |
65 |
Old lady charm: explaining the persistent appeal of Chicago antitrust |
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2 |
12 |
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1 |
3 |
41 |
REJECTED! ANTITRUST ECONOMISTS AS EXPERT WITNESSES IN THE POST-DAUBERT WORLD |
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0 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
38 |
Structural change and 'new facts' in Pantaleoni's non-equilibrium dynamics |
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0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
83 |
The classical limits to police power and the economic foundations of the Slaughterhouse dissents |
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0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
19 |
The escape from conjectural variations: the consistency condition in duopoly theory from Bowley to Fellner |
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2 |
8 |
166 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
513 |
The hesitant hand. Taming self-interest in the history of economic ideas |
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0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
33 |
Timothy P. Roth, Economists and the State: What Went Wrong (Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), pp. xi + 179, $99.95. ISBN 978-1-78195-192-7 |
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0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
Truth or precision? Some reflections on the economists’ failure to predict the financial crisis |
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0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
76 |
When low is no good: Predatory pricing and U.S. antitrust law (1950--1980) |
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0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
Who Invented the Lerner Index? Luigi Amoroso, the Dominant Firm Model, and the Measurement of Market Power |
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0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
109 |
“Conjecturizing†Cournot: The Conjectural Variations Approach to Duopoly Theory |
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0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
‘VALUE IS NOT A FACT’: REPRODUCTION COST AND THE TRANSITION FROM CLASSICAL TO NEOCLASSICAL REGULATION IN GILDED AGE AMERICA |
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0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
Total Journal Articles |
1 |
4 |
25 |
660 |
12 |
21 |
92 |
2,330 |