Access Statistics for Amihai Glazer

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting 0 0 0 18 1 3 5 70
A Signalling Explanation for Private Charity 0 0 0 1 2 2 5 513
A Theory of Compulsory Public Schooling 0 0 0 0 1 3 4 429
ACCESS Magazine, Fall 1994 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 12
AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES 0 0 0 0 5 6 9 486
Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining 0 0 0 4 5 6 7 33
Allies as Rivals: Internal and External Rent Seeking 0 0 0 0 7 7 10 335
Ameliorating Congestion by Income Redistribution 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 29
Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution 0 0 0 1 2 2 3 25
Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution 0 0 0 5 7 8 9 26
An Information Explanation for the Flypaper Effect 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 693
Appropriation, Human Capital, and Mandatory Schooling 0 0 0 36 4 5 9 410
Bequests and Cost-Benefit Analysis 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 415
Bequests and Cost-Benefit Analysis 0 0 0 28 4 6 6 165
Bequests, Control Rights, and Cost-Benefit Analysis 0 0 0 31 5 5 6 244
Budgets under Delegation 0 0 1 16 0 4 8 42
Bureaucratic Creep 0 0 0 0 2 3 8 575
CANDIDATES SHOULD AVOID SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS IF VOTERS ARE IGNORANT 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 377
COMMITMENT PROBLEMS JUSTIFY SUBSIDIES FOR MEDICAL INSURANCE 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 371
Capital-Intensive Projects Induce More Effort Than Labor-Intensive Projects 0 0 0 85 1 3 8 662
Capital-intensive projects induce more effort than labor-intensive projects 0 0 0 26 5 7 7 187
Clean on Paper, Dirty on the Road: Troubles with California's Smog Check 0 0 0 5 3 3 3 26
Clean or a Day: Troubles with California's Smog Check 0 0 0 3 0 2 3 28
Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies 0 0 0 39 5 6 9 202
Competitive Proposals to Special Interests 0 0 0 15 5 7 7 122
Credibility May Require Discretion, not Rules 0 0 0 1 1 6 8 203
Credit Claiming 0 0 0 52 1 2 4 986
Crowding Out Wasteful Activities by Wasteful Activities 0 0 0 22 9 12 13 226
DELAY IN POLICY 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 167
Differential Pricing and Mistake Avoidance 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 408
Direct Democracy and the Stability of State Policy 0 0 0 67 4 5 5 212
Earmarking: Bundling to Signal Quality 0 0 0 83 8 10 11 280
Election Surprises and Exchange rate Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 2 3 7 582
Electoral Incentives, Government Popularity, and Commitment of Policy 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 160
Evidence for the Irrationality of Governmental Policy 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 393
Externalities, Social Pressures, and Political Parties 0 0 0 81 3 5 11 323
Firms' Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling 0 0 0 83 3 4 8 316
Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling 0 0 0 53 4 7 9 300
Firms’ ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 51
Forward Markets to Spur Innovation 0 0 0 40 7 9 11 83
Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs 0 0 0 197 0 1 5 1,272
Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs 0 0 0 1 3 3 4 24
Governmental Provision of Public Goods Need Not Crowd Out Private Provision 0 0 1 36 3 6 9 214
Governmental Transfers Can Reduce a Moral Hazard Problem 0 0 0 31 9 16 18 163
Governmental Transfers and Altruistic Private Transfers 0 0 0 35 1 6 11 111
Handicaps on Timing to Improve Reputation 0 0 0 9 5 6 7 83
Help Not Needed? Optimal Host Country Regulation of Expatriate NGO Workers 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 28
High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect 0 0 0 160 2 4 6 976
How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose 0 0 0 32 2 5 6 185
How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose 0 0 0 24 0 5 5 65
How Regulations Can Succeed Where Taxes Do Not: An Examination of Automobile Fuel Efficiency 0 0 1 323 1 3 4 1,678
How To Avoid Awarding a Valuable Asset 0 0 0 20 1 5 5 163
How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy 0 0 0 13 1 2 5 79
How to Commit to a Future Price 0 0 0 191 1 4 6 476
IMPERFECT INFORMATION MY ALLEVIATE AGENCY PROBLEMS 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 287
Imperfect Competition, Clubs, and Two-Part Tariffs 0 0 0 11 6 6 7 86
Income Taxes, Property Values and Migration 0 0 0 76 7 13 17 394
Income Taxes, Property Values, and Migration 0 0 0 83 3 4 8 380
Income taxes, property values, and migration 0 0 0 0 5 7 10 47
Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 11
Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 10
Inducing political action by workers 0 0 0 10 2 3 4 34
Inequality when People Produce Best what they Consume 0 0 0 0 7 10 10 299
Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements 0 0 0 102 1 4 9 1,100
Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements 0 0 0 25 3 5 6 181
Informational benefits of international environmental agreements 0 0 0 22 3 6 7 182
Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to Corporate Success and Failure 0 0 0 54 3 7 9 308
Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to Corporate Success and Failure 0 0 0 49 3 7 11 314
Innovation and Imitation Across Jurisdictions 0 0 0 41 2 5 6 147
Innovation of Network Goods: A Non-Innovating Firm Will Gain 0 0 0 74 0 4 6 283
Insufficient Experimentation Because Agents Herd 0 0 0 9 6 8 9 63
Integration, Segregation and Discrimination in Clubs 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 360
Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation 0 0 0 0 2 4 4 257
Intertemporal commitment problems and voting on redistributive taxation 0 0 0 1 4 7 11 34
Investment in Human Capital, Appropriation, and Mandatory Schooling 0 0 0 0 2 4 4 519
Legislative turnover, fiscal policy, and economic growth: evidence from U.S. state legislatures 0 0 2 56 3 5 13 192
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 27 7 10 12 103
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 22 3 6 6 151
MYOPIA, MISPERCEPTIONS, AND SOCIAL SECURITY 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 454
Markets Can Solve the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 593
Markets and regulatory hold-up problems 0 0 0 15 0 0 4 128
Markets and regulatory hold-up problems 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 37
Migration in Search of Good Government 0 0 0 42 4 7 12 221
ON THE INCENTIVES TO ESTABLISH AND PLAY RENT-SEEKING GAMES 0 0 0 0 5 6 6 330
OPTIMAL SALES TO CONSUMERS WHO HOLD INVENTORY 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 397
Obtaining information by diversifying projects or why specialization is inefficient 0 0 0 18 5 8 9 91
Old Money, the Nouveau Riche and Brunhilde's Marriage Dilemma 0 0 0 2 2 6 10 73
Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde's Marriage Strategy 0 0 1 24 6 7 11 119
Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde’s Marriage Strategy 0 0 0 4 4 8 9 32
Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss 0 1 1 75 5 6 8 376
Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss 0 0 0 160 5 8 9 536
Optimal Promotion and Span of Control 0 0 0 1 1 4 5 2,622
Optimal Term Length when Misinformation Increases with Experience 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 115
POLICY PROPOSALS UNDER CONTESTABILITY 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 227
POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM UNDER GROUP IDENTIFICATION 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 339
Parking fees and congestion 0 0 0 47 1 6 7 124
Peer Group Effects, Sorting, and Fiscal Federalism 0 0 1 53 3 9 14 200
Political Biases Against Public Investment and Growth 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 340
Politicians Avoid Tax Increases Around Elections 0 0 0 29 4 7 9 94
Predicting Committee Action 0 0 0 44 4 4 6 250
Principal-Agent Problems When Principal Allocates a Budget 0 2 3 59 1 7 11 208
Reducing Current Taxes to Raise Future Revenue 0 0 0 50 5 7 9 155
Reducing Rent Seeking by Providing Wide Public Service 0 0 0 44 5 16 18 147
Reducing rent seeking by providing wide public service 0 0 0 13 2 5 5 80
Regulation by Price or by Command 0 0 0 10 4 4 4 67
Regulation by Prices and by Command 0 0 0 2 2 4 4 26
Regulation with Budget Constraints Can Dominate Regulation by Price and by Quantity 0 0 1 57 2 4 5 197
Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies 0 0 0 4 3 5 9 79
Reputation in Team Production 0 0 1 191 1 2 3 787
Reputation in Team Production 0 0 0 0 4 4 7 361
Signaling By Choice Of Evaluation 0 0 0 9 3 4 4 59
Signaling Commitment by Excessive Spending 0 0 0 40 1 6 8 281
Strategic Contributions to Induce Private Provision of the Public Good 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 548
Strategic Positioning and Campaining 0 0 0 0 5 7 8 1,199
Strategies of the Political Opposition 0 0 2 386 5 9 15 1,656
Subordinates as Threats to Leaders 0 0 0 0 4 7 8 266
Subordinates as Threats to Leaders 0 0 0 77 0 0 0 413
Subsidizing Consumption to Signal Quality of Workers 0 0 0 14 1 3 5 108
Subsidizing Enjoyable Education 0 0 0 74 9 13 14 337
Subsidizing Enjoyable Education 0 0 0 74 4 8 11 367
Subsidizing consumption to signal quality of workers 0 0 0 30 5 8 8 94
THE EVALUATION OF RISKY PROJECTS BY VOTERS 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 232
THE SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE UNDER MAJORITY VOTING 0 0 0 0 3 4 7 728
THEORY OF PARKING 0 0 0 1 3 3 4 923
TURNOUT AND THE RATIONAL VOTER MODEL 0 0 0 0 4 4 5 1,497
Tax Rage 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 442
Taxation When Consumers Value Freedom 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 296
Taxation of Emissions and Induce Investment 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 666
Taxation of Rent-Seeking Activities 0 0 0 0 4 6 6 685
Term Length and the Quality of Appointment 0 0 0 0 4 5 7 179
Term Length and the Quality of Appointments 0 0 0 0 5 6 7 208
Term Length and the Quality of Appointments 0 0 0 19 2 2 2 163
The CAFE Standards Worked 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 30
The Calculus of Stonewalling 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 193
The Desire for Impact 0 0 0 36 0 2 2 292
The Economics of the Brass Paradox 0 0 0 2 5 5 7 554
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects 0 0 0 22 0 2 2 125
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects 0 0 0 0 3 4 8 213
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects 0 0 0 0 2 3 7 189
The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies 0 0 0 0 4 9 10 212
The Evaluation of Risky Projects by Voters 0 0 0 0 2 7 9 162
The Politics of Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85
The Politics of State Gasoline Taxes 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 718
The Preferences of Voters Over Road Tolls and Road Capacity 0 0 0 55 4 4 4 209
The Profit-maximizing Non-profit 0 0 0 59 3 8 8 233
Theories of Delegation in Political Science 0 0 3 242 0 10 18 1,101
Theories of Delegation in Political Science 0 0 0 4 1 3 9 1,278
Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 10
Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 497
Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 11
Urban Extremism 0 0 0 71 3 3 5 272
WHY REPRESENTATIVES ARE IDEOLOGISTS THOUGH VOTERS ARE NOT 0 0 0 0 3 5 5 299
WHY VOTERS MAY PREFER CONGESTED PUBLIC CLUBS 0 0 0 0 6 7 8 212
What Drives Gasoline Prices? 0 0 0 74 4 6 8 404
What drives gasoline taxes? 0 0 0 54 0 1 5 187
When Do Consumers Favor Price Increases: With Applications to Congestion and to Regulation 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 23
Which Consumers Benefit from Congestion Tolls? 0 0 0 71 4 10 12 290
Which consumers benefit from congestion tolls? 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 14
Which consumers benefit from congestion tolls? 0 0 0 0 3 4 4 17
Why Governments Commit to Unpopular Policies 0 0 0 0 3 6 9 209
Why High-level Executives Earn Less in the Government Than in the Private Sector 0 0 1 28 5 10 16 72
Why Voters May Prefer Congested Public Clubs 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 16
Why voters may prefer congested public clubs 0 0 0 1 3 4 4 18
Why voters may prefer congested public clubs 0 0 0 0 3 3 4 15
private Proposition of Public Goods, Limited Tax Deductibility, and Crowding Out 0 0 0 0 4 6 6 293
Total Working Papers 0 3 20 4,939 452 771 1,061 52,031

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals 0 0 2 43 0 0 6 96
A Neo-Downsian Model of Group-Oriented Voting and Racial Backlash 0 0 0 6 0 1 6 86
A Signaling Explanation for Charity 0 0 1 703 4 15 17 1,965
A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting 0 0 0 9 7 7 8 65
A positive correlation between turnout and plurality does not refute the rational voter model 0 0 1 1 0 3 6 16
A strategic model of job arrivals to a single machine with earliness and tardiness penalties 0 0 0 5 0 2 4 22
Advertising, Information, and Prices-A Case Study 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 258
Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining in Europe 11This paper presents results of the ACCHANGE consortium – SESAR project E02.31 – whose support we gratefully acknowledge. We thank the guest editor and two anonymous referees for their useful comments. We also thank Nicole Adler and Eef Delhaye, as well as seminar participants at EUROCONTROL, OPTION (Amsterdam), ITEA (Oslo), and the USA-Europe ATM conference (Lisbon) for comments on the previous versions 0 0 0 2 2 5 10 44
Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking 0 0 1 60 2 4 7 186
Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution 0 0 0 3 2 5 9 77
Amend the Old or Address the New: Broad-Based Legislation When Proposing Policies Is Costly 0 0 0 0 4 5 5 77
An Expressive Voting Theory of Strikes 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 158
Bargaining with Rent Seekers 0 0 0 29 1 3 4 105
Bargaining within the family can generate a political gender gap 0 0 0 7 5 7 8 45
Bequests, control rights, and cost-benefit analysis 0 0 0 7 2 2 4 78
Commitment Problems Justify Subsidies for Medical Insurance 0 0 0 7 2 3 4 67
Congestion Tolls and Consumer Welfare 0 0 0 1 0 2 8 143
Consumption variety and urban agglomeration 0 0 0 49 3 4 5 281
Credibility may require discretion, not rules 0 0 0 39 1 5 6 108
Credit claiming 0 0 1 20 1 1 2 183
Does Electoral Uncertainty Cause Economic Fluctuations? 0 0 0 52 2 3 6 191
Editorial 0 0 0 11 0 1 1 31
Editorial announcement 0 0 0 12 1 3 4 49
Editorial introduction 0 0 0 10 0 1 1 44
Editors' introduction 0 0 0 33 5 6 6 254
Efficiency, equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich 0 0 0 16 2 2 6 190
Election Surprises and Exchange Rate Uncertainty 0 0 1 56 1 4 7 277
Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates 0 0 0 19 4 7 9 108
Equilibrium Arrivals in Queues with Bulk Service at Scheduled Times 0 0 0 4 2 3 3 15
Esteem and ignorance 0 0 0 58 1 3 3 144
Federal grants and yardstick competition 0 0 0 70 5 7 9 179
Firms' ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling 0 0 1 39 3 8 14 159
Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism 0 0 0 3 2 3 7 28
Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs 0 0 0 8 3 4 9 65
Governmental failures in evaluating programs 0 0 0 4 3 4 5 62
Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 56
Handicaps to improve reputation 0 0 0 3 2 3 5 43
Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers 0 0 0 1 4 6 8 28
High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect 0 0 0 61 2 2 6 330
How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy 0 0 0 2 1 3 7 71
How elections matter: A study of U.S. senators 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 16
How to avoid transferring a valuable asset 0 0 0 12 3 4 6 57
Ideological externalities, social pressures, and political parties 0 0 0 19 2 3 5 53
Income taxes, property values, and migration 0 0 0 32 3 3 7 168
Increased capacity may exacerbate rationing problems: with applications to medical care 0 0 0 9 1 4 6 50
Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 25
Inducing search by periodic advertising 0 0 0 7 0 2 3 52
Informational Benefits of International Treaties 0 0 0 16 2 3 6 440
Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation 0 0 0 8 3 4 8 82
Introduction 0 0 0 14 2 4 5 88
Introduction 0 0 0 10 2 2 4 75
LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER, FISCAL POLICY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. STATE LEGISLATURES 0 0 0 3 2 4 8 77
Limitations of the spatial model 0 0 0 0 5 5 8 22
Local regulation may be excessively stringent 0 0 2 31 3 3 10 132
Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems 0 0 1 81 4 8 16 303
Measuring the benefits derived from a transportation investment -- a comment 0 0 0 9 0 3 5 50
Migration in search of good government 0 0 0 15 2 5 5 93
More monitoring can induce less effort 0 0 0 78 2 3 7 163
Motivating devoted workers 0 0 0 133 3 8 10 340
Must Liberals Always Vote for Liberals and Need the More Competent Candidate Always Be Preferred? 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 5
Old money, the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde’s marriage strategy 0 1 2 4 4 5 10 68
On the Incentives to Establish and Play Political Rent-Seeking Games 0 0 0 0 3 5 9 78
On the economics of subscriptions 0 0 0 37 1 2 2 94
On the uses of club theory: Preface to the club theory symposium 0 0 0 103 4 6 7 297
Optimal Contests 0 0 0 0 5 6 11 355
Optimal Contracts When a Worker Envies His Boss 1 2 2 47 6 7 9 242
Optimal allocation of quotas 0 0 0 5 1 4 6 66
Optimal sales to users who hold inventory 0 0 0 7 0 2 4 61
POLITICS WITH AND WITHOUT POLICY† 0 0 0 5 2 3 5 44
Parking fees and congestion 0 1 1 533 5 9 12 1,245
Performance when misinformation increases with experience 0 0 0 5 0 4 4 36
Politics and the Choice of Durability 0 0 4 92 5 6 14 250
Politics and the Choice of Durability: Reply 0 0 0 14 1 1 3 89
Preference heterogeneity, wage inequality, and trade 0 0 0 48 4 9 10 204
Pricing by the Firm Under Regulatory Threat 0 1 1 101 3 4 6 311
Public opinion and regulatory behavior 0 0 0 1 3 6 8 15
RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* 0 0 0 51 6 9 17 138
Rational Response to Irrational Attitudes: The Level of the Gasoline Tax in the United States 0 0 0 10 1 2 2 31
Regulation by Prices and by Command 0 0 0 0 4 4 5 95
Regulatory tune-ups 0 0 0 5 2 5 6 73
Rewarding Successes Discourages Experimentation 0 0 0 2 4 7 8 34
Rivalry among agents seeking large budgets 0 0 0 5 2 3 6 23
STRATEGIC LOBBYING BY POTENTIAL INDUSTRY ENTRANTS* 0 0 0 9 2 3 4 41
Sequential Rent Seeking 0 0 0 10 1 2 4 51
Setting the Agenda: Electoral Competition, Commitment of Policy, and Issue Salience 0 0 0 46 2 4 4 172
Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments 0 0 0 13 3 4 4 191
Signaling, network externalities, and subsidies 0 1 2 17 3 5 8 77
Ski-Lift Pricing with Applications to Labor and Other Markets: Comment 0 0 0 148 1 2 8 889
Social security and conflict within the family 0 0 1 24 1 4 5 120
Special Issue on Social Conflict – Preface 0 0 0 38 1 2 3 260
Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 7
Strategic Investment by a Regulated Firm 0 0 0 46 1 3 4 163
Subsidizing Enjoyable Education 0 0 0 21 3 6 13 125
Support and opposition to a Pigovian tax: Road pricing with reference-dependent preferences 0 1 2 28 5 9 15 119
THE ELECTORAL COSTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS WHEN VOTERS ARE IGNORANT* 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 16
Taxation and pricing when consumers value freedom 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 50
Taxation of rent-seeking activities 0 0 0 46 2 5 7 173
The Advantages of Being First 0 0 0 152 2 11 15 757
The Calculus of Stonewalling 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 15
The Client Relationship and a "Just" Price 0 0 0 10 0 0 5 77
The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies 0 0 0 29 1 4 5 228
The Social Discount Rate under Majority Voting 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 39
The Strategy of Candidate Ambiguity 0 0 1 4 2 2 4 22
The desire for impact 0 0 1 25 3 3 5 147
The evaluation of risky projects by voters 0 0 1 29 1 2 4 100
Trade protection to reduce redistribution 0 0 0 22 1 1 4 115
Up-or-out policies when a worker imitates another 0 0 0 14 1 4 5 68
Urban Extremism 0 0 1 16 5 6 10 164
Using corrective taxes to remedy consumer misperceptions 0 0 0 28 0 1 2 62
Voting and campaigning under incomplete information 0 0 0 13 3 4 5 55
Voting to anger and to please others 0 0 0 70 4 4 5 247
Wages and Employment in Public-Sector Unions 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 275
When a Loser Gains: Free Riding in the Innovation of Network Goods 0 0 0 34 2 3 7 109
When users of congested roads may view tolls as unjust 0 0 0 22 6 8 11 84
Why principals tolerate biases of inaccurate agents 0 0 0 1 1 2 5 29
Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not 0 0 0 0 1 4 7 12
Why voters may prefer congested public clubs 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 67
Total Journal Articles 1 7 30 3,953 257 457 737 17,650

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Regulatory policy 0 0 0 5 1 1 1 12
Total Chapters 0 0 0 5 1 1 1 12

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