Access Statistics for Amihai Glazer

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting 0 0 0 18 2 5 10 75
A Signalling Explanation for Private Charity 0 0 0 1 1 4 7 517
A Theory of Compulsory Public Schooling 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 432
ACCESS Magazine, Fall 1994 0 0 0 2 0 2 4 14
AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES 0 0 0 0 3 3 12 489
Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining 0 0 0 4 4 4 11 37
Allies as Rivals: Internal and External Rent Seeking 0 0 0 0 1 4 13 339
Ameliorating Congestion by Income Redistribution 0 0 0 1 3 3 6 32
Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution 0 0 0 5 2 2 11 28
Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 26
An Information Explanation for the Flypaper Effect 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 696
Appropriation, Human Capital, and Mandatory Schooling 0 0 0 36 2 3 11 413
Bequests and Cost-Benefit Analysis 0 0 0 28 1 5 11 170
Bequests and Cost-Benefit Analysis 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 416
Bequests, Control Rights, and Cost-Benefit Analysis 0 0 0 31 2 3 9 247
Budgets under Delegation 0 0 1 16 1 2 9 44
Bureaucratic Creep 0 0 0 0 3 5 11 580
CANDIDATES SHOULD AVOID SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS IF VOTERS ARE IGNORANT 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 379
COMMITMENT PROBLEMS JUSTIFY SUBSIDIES FOR MEDICAL INSURANCE 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 373
Capital-Intensive Projects Induce More Effort Than Labor-Intensive Projects 0 0 0 85 2 10 18 672
Capital-intensive projects induce more effort than labor-intensive projects 0 0 0 26 2 4 11 191
Clean on Paper, Dirty on the Road: Troubles with California's Smog Check 0 0 0 5 1 2 5 28
Clean or a Day: Troubles with California's Smog Check 0 0 0 3 1 1 3 29
Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies 0 0 0 39 1 3 10 205
Competitive Proposals to Special Interests 0 0 0 15 6 8 15 130
Credibility May Require Discretion, not Rules 0 0 0 1 3 5 12 208
Credit Claiming 0 0 0 52 2 4 6 990
Crowding Out Wasteful Activities by Wasteful Activities 0 0 0 22 1 2 14 228
DELAY IN POLICY 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 169
Differential Pricing and Mistake Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 409
Direct Democracy and the Stability of State Policy 0 0 0 67 0 3 8 215
Earmarking: Bundling to Signal Quality 0 0 0 83 0 7 18 287
Election Surprises and Exchange rate Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 584
Electoral Incentives, Government Popularity, and Commitment of Policy 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 163
Evidence for the Irrationality of Governmental Policy 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 394
Externalities, Social Pressures, and Political Parties 0 0 0 81 3 4 13 327
Firms' Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling 0 0 0 83 0 3 10 319
Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling 0 0 0 53 3 3 11 303
Firms’ ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling 0 0 0 0 5 6 10 57
Forward Markets to Spur Innovation 0 0 0 40 2 4 14 87
Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs 0 0 0 197 4 4 8 1,276
Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 25
Governmental Provision of Public Goods Need Not Crowd Out Private Provision 0 0 0 36 1 12 20 226
Governmental Transfers Can Reduce a Moral Hazard Problem 0 0 0 31 3 10 28 173
Governmental Transfers and Altruistic Private Transfers 0 0 0 35 5 5 15 116
Handicaps on Timing to Improve Reputation 0 0 0 9 0 0 7 83
Help Not Needed? Optimal Host Country Regulation of Expatriate NGO Workers 0 0 0 3 2 4 7 32
High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect 0 0 0 160 6 9 13 985
How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose 0 0 0 24 2 3 8 68
How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose 0 0 0 32 2 5 11 190
How Regulations Can Succeed Where Taxes Do Not: An Examination of Automobile Fuel Efficiency 0 0 1 323 2 2 6 1,680
How To Avoid Awarding a Valuable Asset 0 0 0 20 2 6 11 169
How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy 0 0 0 13 3 4 9 83
How to Commit to a Future Price 1 1 1 192 3 5 11 481
IMPERFECT INFORMATION MY ALLEVIATE AGENCY PROBLEMS 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 289
Imperfect Competition, Clubs, and Two-Part Tariffs 0 0 0 11 2 3 9 89
Income Taxes, Property Values and Migration 0 0 0 76 1 1 17 395
Income Taxes, Property Values, and Migration 0 0 0 83 2 2 9 382
Income taxes, property values, and migration 0 0 0 0 2 3 11 50
Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes 0 0 0 1 2 2 4 13
Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 11
Inducing political action by workers 0 0 0 10 1 6 10 40
Inequality when People Produce Best what they Consume 0 0 0 0 3 4 14 303
Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements 0 0 0 102 2 5 13 1,105
Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements 0 0 0 25 1 3 9 184
Informational benefits of international environmental agreements 0 0 0 22 2 3 10 185
Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to Corporate Success and Failure 0 0 0 54 8 10 18 318
Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to Corporate Success and Failure 0 0 0 49 0 4 13 318
Innovation and Imitation Across Jurisdictions 0 0 0 41 2 3 9 150
Innovation of Network Goods: A Non-Innovating Firm Will Gain 0 0 0 74 1 1 7 284
Insufficient Experimentation Because Agents Herd 0 0 0 9 4 5 14 68
Integration, Segregation and Discrimination in Clubs 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 361
Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 259
Intertemporal commitment problems and voting on redistributive taxation 0 0 0 1 0 4 15 38
Investment in Human Capital, Appropriation, and Mandatory Schooling 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 521
Legislative turnover, fiscal policy, and economic growth: evidence from U.S. state legislatures 0 0 2 56 3 3 15 195
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 27 1 4 16 107
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 22 1 3 9 154
MYOPIA, MISPERCEPTIONS, AND SOCIAL SECURITY 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 454
Markets Can Solve the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 594
Markets and regulatory hold-up problems 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 41
Markets and regulatory hold-up problems 0 0 0 15 1 2 3 130
Migration in Search of Good Government 0 0 0 42 1 6 18 227
ON THE INCENTIVES TO ESTABLISH AND PLAY RENT-SEEKING GAMES 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 332
OPTIMAL SALES TO CONSUMERS WHO HOLD INVENTORY 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 398
Obtaining information by diversifying projects or why specialization is inefficient 0 0 0 18 2 3 12 94
Old Money, the Nouveau Riche and Brunhilde's Marriage Dilemma 0 0 0 2 6 9 18 82
Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde's Marriage Strategy 0 0 0 24 2 5 15 124
Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde’s Marriage Strategy 0 0 0 4 1 1 9 33
Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss 0 0 1 75 4 5 13 381
Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss 0 0 0 160 2 4 13 540
Optimal Promotion and Span of Control 0 0 0 1 1 4 9 2,626
Optimal Term Length when Misinformation Increases with Experience 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 116
POLICY PROPOSALS UNDER CONTESTABILITY 0 0 0 0 3 4 7 231
POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM UNDER GROUP IDENTIFICATION 0 0 0 0 3 3 6 342
Parking fees and congestion 0 0 0 47 4 6 13 130
Peer Group Effects, Sorting, and Fiscal Federalism 0 0 1 53 1 4 18 204
Political Biases Against Public Investment and Growth 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 341
Politicians Avoid Tax Increases Around Elections 0 0 0 29 3 6 14 100
Predicting Committee Action 0 0 0 44 2 3 8 253
Principal-Agent Problems When Principal Allocates a Budget 0 0 3 59 2 3 13 211
Reducing Current Taxes to Raise Future Revenue 0 0 0 50 2 3 11 158
Reducing Rent Seeking by Providing Wide Public Service 0 0 0 44 0 2 20 149
Reducing rent seeking by providing wide public service 0 0 0 13 0 3 8 83
Regulation by Price or by Command 0 0 0 10 1 2 6 69
Regulation by Prices and by Command 0 0 0 2 0 2 6 28
Regulation with Budget Constraints Can Dominate Regulation by Price and by Quantity 0 0 1 57 1 2 7 199
Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies 0 0 0 4 2 5 14 84
Reputation in Team Production 0 0 0 0 3 6 12 367
Reputation in Team Production 0 0 1 191 1 1 4 788
Signaling By Choice Of Evaluation 0 0 0 9 1 1 5 60
Signaling Commitment by Excessive Spending 0 0 0 40 2 4 12 285
Strategic Contributions to Induce Private Provision of the Public Good 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 550
Strategic Positioning and Campaining 0 0 0 0 2 3 11 1,202
Strategies of the Political Opposition 0 0 0 386 2 5 15 1,661
Subordinates as Threats to Leaders 0 0 0 0 3 4 11 270
Subordinates as Threats to Leaders 0 0 0 77 3 4 4 417
Subsidizing Consumption to Signal Quality of Workers 0 0 0 14 2 3 8 111
Subsidizing Enjoyable Education 0 0 0 74 0 0 14 337
Subsidizing Enjoyable Education 0 0 0 74 4 4 13 371
Subsidizing consumption to signal quality of workers 0 0 0 30 3 5 13 99
THE EVALUATION OF RISKY PROJECTS BY VOTERS 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 234
THE SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE UNDER MAJORITY VOTING 0 0 0 0 1 2 9 730
THEORY OF PARKING 0 0 0 1 0 3 7 926
TURNOUT AND THE RATIONAL VOTER MODEL 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 1,499
Tax Rage 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 444
Taxation When Consumers Value Freedom 0 0 0 1 1 3 5 299
Taxation of Emissions and Induce Investment 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 667
Taxation of Rent-Seeking Activities 0 0 0 0 1 2 8 687
Term Length and the Quality of Appointment 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 181
Term Length and the Quality of Appointments 0 0 0 19 6 7 9 170
Term Length and the Quality of Appointments 0 0 0 0 2 2 8 210
The CAFE Standards Worked 0 0 0 9 1 1 1 31
The Calculus of Stonewalling 0 0 0 0 3 3 8 196
The Desire for Impact 0 0 0 36 3 4 6 296
The Economics of the Brass Paradox 0 0 0 2 5 7 14 561
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects 0 0 0 0 3 3 8 216
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 190
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects 0 0 0 22 4 7 9 132
The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies 0 0 0 0 2 2 12 214
The Evaluation of Risky Projects by Voters 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 164
The Politics of Delay 0 0 0 0 2 5 5 90
The Politics of State Gasoline Taxes 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 719
The Preferences of Voters Over Road Tolls and Road Capacity 0 0 0 55 1 2 6 211
The Profit-maximizing Non-profit 0 0 0 59 1 3 11 236
Theories of Delegation in Political Science 0 0 3 242 3 5 22 1,106
Theories of Delegation in Political Science 0 0 0 4 1 3 11 1,281
Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 13
Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 14
Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 498
Urban Extremism 0 0 0 71 2 7 12 279
WHY REPRESENTATIVES ARE IDEOLOGISTS THOUGH VOTERS ARE NOT 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 301
WHY VOTERS MAY PREFER CONGESTED PUBLIC CLUBS 0 0 0 0 3 3 11 215
What Drives Gasoline Prices? 0 0 0 74 5 8 14 412
What drives gasoline taxes? 0 0 0 54 4 5 9 192
When Do Consumers Favor Price Increases: With Applications to Congestion and to Regulation 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 24
Which Consumers Benefit from Congestion Tolls? 0 0 0 71 3 3 13 293
Which consumers benefit from congestion tolls? 0 0 0 2 1 5 5 19
Which consumers benefit from congestion tolls? 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 18
Why Governments Commit to Unpopular Policies 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 210
Why High-level Executives Earn Less in the Government Than in the Private Sector 0 0 1 28 3 5 19 77
Why Voters May Prefer Congested Public Clubs 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 18
Why voters may prefer congested public clubs 0 0 0 0 3 3 7 18
Why voters may prefer congested public clubs 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 19
private Proposition of Public Goods, Limited Tax Deductibility, and Crowding Out 0 0 0 0 2 2 8 295
Total Working Papers 1 1 17 4,940 296 554 1,528 52,585

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals 0 0 1 43 0 1 4 97
A Neo-Downsian Model of Group-Oriented Voting and Racial Backlash 0 0 0 6 1 2 7 88
A Signaling Explanation for Charity 0 0 1 703 2 8 25 1,973
A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting 0 0 0 9 3 7 15 72
A positive correlation between turnout and plurality does not refute the rational voter model 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 17
A strategic model of job arrivals to a single machine with earliness and tardiness penalties 0 0 0 5 2 2 4 24
Advertising, Information, and Prices-A Case Study 0 0 0 0 2 2 9 260
Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining in Europe 11This paper presents results of the ACCHANGE consortium – SESAR project E02.31 – whose support we gratefully acknowledge. We thank the guest editor and two anonymous referees for their useful comments. We also thank Nicole Adler and Eef Delhaye, as well as seminar participants at EUROCONTROL, OPTION (Amsterdam), ITEA (Oslo), and the USA-Europe ATM conference (Lisbon) for comments on the previous versions 0 0 0 2 0 1 10 45
Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking 0 0 0 60 1 1 7 187
Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution 0 0 0 3 3 3 11 80
Amend the Old or Address the New: Broad-Based Legislation When Proposing Policies Is Costly 0 0 0 0 2 3 8 80
An Expressive Voting Theory of Strikes 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 162
Bargaining with Rent Seekers 0 0 0 29 2 3 7 108
Bargaining within the family can generate a political gender gap 0 0 0 7 1 1 9 46
Bequests, control rights, and cost-benefit analysis 0 0 0 7 0 1 4 79
Commitment Problems Justify Subsidies for Medical Insurance 0 0 0 7 3 4 7 71
Congestion Tolls and Consumer Welfare 0 0 0 1 4 4 10 147
Consumption variety and urban agglomeration 0 0 0 49 1 2 7 283
Credibility may require discretion, not rules 0 0 0 39 2 2 8 110
Credit claiming 0 0 1 20 4 5 7 188
Does Electoral Uncertainty Cause Economic Fluctuations? 0 0 0 52 1 2 7 193
Editorial 0 0 0 11 1 1 2 32
Editorial announcement 0 0 0 12 4 5 9 54
Editorial introduction 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 45
Editors' introduction 0 0 0 33 2 2 8 256
Efficiency, equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich 0 0 0 16 2 3 8 193
Election Surprises and Exchange Rate Uncertainty 0 0 1 56 2 3 10 280
Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates 0 0 0 19 1 2 11 110
Equilibrium Arrivals in Queues with Bulk Service at Scheduled Times 0 0 0 4 0 1 4 16
Esteem and ignorance 0 0 0 58 1 1 4 145
Federal grants and yardstick competition 0 0 0 70 3 3 11 182
Firms' ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling 1 1 2 40 4 7 20 166
Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism 0 0 0 3 1 3 9 31
Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs 0 0 0 8 5 6 14 71
Governmental failures in evaluating programs 0 0 0 4 0 0 5 62
Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers 0 0 0 4 5 6 10 62
Handicaps to improve reputation 0 0 0 3 5 5 9 48
Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers 0 0 0 1 2 4 12 32
High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect 0 0 0 61 3 4 8 334
How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy 0 0 0 2 1 1 8 72
How elections matter: A study of U.S. senators 0 0 0 0 1 2 10 18
How to avoid transferring a valuable asset 0 0 0 12 1 2 8 59
Ideological externalities, social pressures, and political parties 0 0 0 19 0 0 5 53
Income taxes, property values, and migration 0 0 0 32 3 3 9 171
Increased capacity may exacerbate rationing problems: with applications to medical care 0 0 0 9 2 2 8 52
Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes 0 0 0 3 2 2 4 27
Inducing search by periodic advertising 0 0 0 7 1 1 3 53
Informational Benefits of International Treaties 0 0 0 16 3 4 9 444
Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation 0 0 0 8 0 1 9 83
Introduction 0 0 0 14 2 2 6 90
Introduction 0 0 0 10 2 4 8 79
LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER, FISCAL POLICY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. STATE LEGISLATURES 0 0 0 3 1 3 11 80
Limitations of the spatial model 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 23
Local regulation may be excessively stringent 1 1 3 32 3 3 11 135
Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems 0 0 1 81 2 4 17 307
Measuring the benefits derived from a transportation investment -- a comment 0 0 0 9 0 0 4 50
Migration in search of good government 0 0 0 15 5 7 12 100
More monitoring can induce less effort 0 0 0 78 0 1 7 164
Motivating devoted workers 0 0 0 133 2 3 12 343
Must Liberals Always Vote for Liberals and Need the More Competent Candidate Always Be Preferred? 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 6
Old money, the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde’s marriage strategy 0 0 2 4 3 12 21 80
On the Incentives to Establish and Play Political Rent-Seeking Games 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 79
On the economics of subscriptions 0 0 0 37 0 1 3 95
On the uses of club theory: Preface to the club theory symposium 0 0 0 103 2 4 11 301
Optimal Contests 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 357
Optimal Contracts When a Worker Envies His Boss 0 1 3 48 0 4 13 246
Optimal allocation of quotas 0 0 0 5 3 3 7 69
Optimal sales to users who hold inventory 0 0 0 7 0 0 3 61
POLITICS WITH AND WITHOUT POLICY† 0 0 0 5 1 3 7 47
Parking fees and congestion 0 0 1 533 0 2 13 1,247
Performance when misinformation increases with experience 0 0 0 5 3 3 7 39
Politics and the Choice of Durability 0 0 3 92 1 3 15 253
Politics and the Choice of Durability: Reply 0 0 0 14 3 3 6 92
Preference heterogeneity, wage inequality, and trade 0 0 0 48 1 3 13 207
Pricing by the Firm Under Regulatory Threat 0 0 1 101 0 0 6 311
Public opinion and regulatory behavior 0 0 0 1 1 2 10 17
RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* 0 0 0 51 6 8 22 146
Rational Response to Irrational Attitudes: The Level of the Gasoline Tax in the United States 0 0 0 10 2 3 5 34
Regulation by Prices and by Command 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 97
Regulatory tune-ups 0 0 0 5 0 2 8 75
Rewarding Successes Discourages Experimentation 0 0 0 2 0 2 10 36
Rivalry among agents seeking large budgets 0 0 0 5 2 3 9 26
STRATEGIC LOBBYING BY POTENTIAL INDUSTRY ENTRANTS* 0 0 0 9 3 3 7 44
Sequential Rent Seeking 0 0 0 10 3 3 7 54
Setting the Agenda: Electoral Competition, Commitment of Policy, and Issue Salience 0 0 0 46 1 2 6 174
Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments 0 0 0 13 1 1 5 192
Signaling, network externalities, and subsidies 0 0 2 17 1 1 9 78
Ski-Lift Pricing with Applications to Labor and Other Markets: Comment 0 0 0 148 3 3 11 892
Social security and conflict within the family 0 0 0 24 3 4 8 124
Special Issue on Social Conflict – Preface 0 0 0 38 2 2 4 262
Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 10
Strategic Investment by a Regulated Firm 0 0 0 46 2 4 8 167
Subsidizing Enjoyable Education 0 0 0 21 3 4 15 129
Support and opposition to a Pigovian tax: Road pricing with reference-dependent preferences 0 0 2 28 1 1 15 120
THE ELECTORAL COSTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS WHEN VOTERS ARE IGNORANT* 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 17
Taxation and pricing when consumers value freedom 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 50
Taxation of rent-seeking activities 0 0 0 46 0 0 7 173
The Advantages of Being First 0 0 0 152 3 3 16 760
The Calculus of Stonewalling 0 0 0 1 2 3 5 18
The Client Relationship and a "Just" Price 0 0 0 10 0 1 4 78
The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies 0 0 0 29 0 0 5 228
The Social Discount Rate under Majority Voting 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 40
The Strategy of Candidate Ambiguity 0 0 1 4 2 2 5 24
The desire for impact 0 0 0 25 13 13 17 160
The evaluation of risky projects by voters 0 0 0 29 0 0 3 100
Trade protection to reduce redistribution 0 0 0 22 0 1 3 116
Up-or-out policies when a worker imitates another 0 0 0 14 2 2 6 70
Urban Extremism 0 0 1 16 2 4 13 168
Using corrective taxes to remedy consumer misperceptions 0 0 0 28 0 2 4 64
Voting and campaigning under incomplete information 0 0 0 13 1 5 9 60
Voting to anger and to please others 0 0 0 70 0 0 5 247
Wages and Employment in Public-Sector Unions 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 276
When a Loser Gains: Free Riding in the Innovation of Network Goods 0 0 0 34 4 8 13 117
When users of congested roads may view tolls as unjust 0 0 0 22 4 4 14 88
Why principals tolerate biases of inaccurate agents 0 0 0 1 3 3 7 32
Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 13
Why voters may prefer congested public clubs 0 0 0 10 2 3 5 70
Total Journal Articles 2 3 27 3,956 204 318 984 17,968

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Price Theory and Applications 0 0 0 0 4 10 29 407
Total Books 0 0 0 0 4 10 29 407

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Regulatory policy 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 12
Total Chapters 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 12

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage statistics for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Since October 2025, abstract view statistics are potentially heavily influenced by traffic from AI bots and tools that we could not eliminate despite our best efforts.

Statistics updated 2026-05-06