Access Statistics for Amihai Glazer

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting 0 0 0 18 1 3 4 68
A Signalling Explanation for Private Charity 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 511
A Theory of Compulsory Public Schooling 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 427
ACCESS Magazine, Fall 1994 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 10
AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 481
Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 27
Allies as Rivals: Internal and External Rent Seeking 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 328
Ameliorating Congestion by Income Redistribution 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 26
Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 18
Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 23
An Information Explanation for the Flypaper Effect 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 692
Appropriation, Human Capital, and Mandatory Schooling 0 0 0 36 0 1 4 405
Bequests and Cost-Benefit Analysis 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 159
Bequests and Cost-Benefit Analysis 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 415
Bequests, Control Rights, and Cost-Benefit Analysis 0 0 0 31 0 1 1 239
Budgets under Delegation 0 1 1 16 3 4 7 41
Bureaucratic Creep 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 572
CANDIDATES SHOULD AVOID SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS IF VOTERS ARE IGNORANT 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 375
COMMITMENT PROBLEMS JUSTIFY SUBSIDIES FOR MEDICAL INSURANCE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 369
Capital-Intensive Projects Induce More Effort Than Labor-Intensive Projects 0 0 0 85 1 2 6 660
Capital-intensive projects induce more effort than labor-intensive projects 0 0 0 26 2 2 2 182
Clean on Paper, Dirty on the Road: Troubles with California's Smog Check 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 23
Clean or a Day: Troubles with California's Smog Check 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 26
Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies 0 0 0 39 1 2 4 197
Competitive Proposals to Special Interests 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 115
Credibility May Require Discretion, not Rules 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 199
Credit Claiming 0 0 0 52 0 0 2 984
Crowding Out Wasteful Activities by Wasteful Activities 0 0 0 22 1 1 2 215
DELAY IN POLICY 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 164
Differential Pricing and Mistake Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 406
Direct Democracy and the Stability of State Policy 0 0 0 67 1 1 1 208
Earmarking: Bundling to Signal Quality 0 0 0 83 2 2 3 272
Election Surprises and Exchange rate Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 579
Electoral Incentives, Government Popularity, and Commitment of Policy 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 159
Evidence for the Irrationality of Governmental Policy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 391
Externalities, Social Pressures, and Political Parties 0 0 0 81 0 2 6 318
Firms' Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling 0 0 0 83 0 2 5 312
Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling 0 0 0 53 2 2 4 295
Firms’ ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 48
Forward Markets to Spur Innovation 0 0 1 40 0 1 3 74
Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 21
Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs 0 0 0 197 1 2 6 1,272
Governmental Provision of Public Goods Need Not Crowd Out Private Provision 0 0 1 36 0 2 5 208
Governmental Transfers Can Reduce a Moral Hazard Problem 0 0 0 31 3 4 5 150
Governmental Transfers and Altruistic Private Transfers 0 0 0 35 2 4 7 107
Handicaps on Timing to Improve Reputation 0 0 0 9 1 2 2 78
Help Not Needed? Optimal Host Country Regulation of Expatriate NGO Workers 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 25
High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect 0 0 0 160 0 0 2 972
How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose 0 0 0 24 4 4 5 64
How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose 0 0 0 32 2 2 4 182
How Regulations Can Succeed Where Taxes Do Not: An Examination of Automobile Fuel Efficiency 0 1 1 323 1 2 3 1,676
How To Avoid Awarding a Valuable Asset 0 0 0 20 1 1 2 159
How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy 0 0 0 13 0 3 4 77
How to Commit to a Future Price 0 0 0 191 0 2 2 472
IMPERFECT INFORMATION MY ALLEVIATE AGENCY PROBLEMS 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 285
Imperfect Competition, Clubs, and Two-Part Tariffs 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 80
Income Taxes, Property Values and Migration 0 0 0 76 2 2 6 383
Income Taxes, Property Values, and Migration 0 0 0 83 0 2 5 376
Income taxes, property values, and migration 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 41
Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9
Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9
Inducing political action by workers 0 0 0 10 1 1 2 32
Inequality when People Produce Best what they Consume 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 290
Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements 0 0 0 102 2 4 9 1,098
Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements 0 0 0 25 0 1 1 176
Informational benefits of international environmental agreements 0 0 0 22 1 2 2 177
Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to Corporate Success and Failure 0 0 0 49 2 2 6 309
Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to Corporate Success and Failure 0 0 0 54 2 2 5 303
Innovation and Imitation Across Jurisdictions 0 0 0 41 3 3 4 145
Innovation of Network Goods: A Non-Innovating Firm Will Gain 0 0 0 74 1 2 3 280
Insufficient Experimentation Because Agents Herd 0 0 0 9 1 1 2 56
Integration, Segregation and Discrimination in Clubs 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 359
Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 253
Intertemporal commitment problems and voting on redistributive taxation 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 27
Investment in Human Capital, Appropriation, and Mandatory Schooling 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 515
Legislative turnover, fiscal policy, and economic growth: evidence from U.S. state legislatures 0 1 2 56 1 4 10 188
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 27 2 3 4 95
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 22 1 1 1 146
MYOPIA, MISPERCEPTIONS, AND SOCIAL SECURITY 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 452
Markets Can Solve the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 592
Markets and regulatory hold-up problems 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 37
Markets and regulatory hold-up problems 0 0 0 15 0 0 4 128
Migration in Search of Good Government 0 0 0 42 1 2 6 215
ON THE INCENTIVES TO ESTABLISH AND PLAY RENT-SEEKING GAMES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 324
OPTIMAL SALES TO CONSUMERS WHO HOLD INVENTORY 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 397
Obtaining information by diversifying projects or why specialization is inefficient 0 0 0 18 1 2 2 84
Old Money, the Nouveau Riche and Brunhilde's Marriage Dilemma 0 0 0 2 2 4 9 69
Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde's Marriage Strategy 0 0 1 24 0 1 5 112
Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde’s Marriage Strategy 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 25
Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss 0 0 0 74 0 0 2 370
Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss 0 0 0 160 0 0 1 528
Optimal Promotion and Span of Control 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2,619
Optimal Term Length when Misinformation Increases with Experience 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 115
POLICY PROPOSALS UNDER CONTESTABILITY 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 225
POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM UNDER GROUP IDENTIFICATION 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 337
Parking fees and congestion 0 0 0 47 0 0 1 118
Peer Group Effects, Sorting, and Fiscal Federalism 0 0 1 53 3 5 9 194
Political Biases Against Public Investment and Growth 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 339
Politicians Avoid Tax Increases Around Elections 0 0 0 29 2 3 4 89
Predicting Committee Action 0 0 0 44 0 0 2 246
Principal-Agent Problems When Principal Allocates a Budget 1 1 2 58 4 5 8 205
Reducing Current Taxes to Raise Future Revenue 0 0 0 50 0 1 2 148
Reducing Rent Seeking by Providing Wide Public Service 0 0 0 44 1 3 3 132
Reducing rent seeking by providing wide public service 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 75
Regulation by Price or by Command 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 63
Regulation by Prices and by Command 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 22
Regulation with Budget Constraints Can Dominate Regulation by Price and by Quantity 0 0 1 57 0 0 1 193
Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies 0 0 0 4 1 2 5 75
Reputation in Team Production 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 357
Reputation in Team Production 0 0 1 191 0 0 1 785
Signaling By Choice Of Evaluation 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 55
Signaling Commitment by Excessive Spending 0 0 0 40 1 2 3 276
Strategic Contributions to Induce Private Provision of the Public Good 0 0 0 0 2 5 10 548
Strategic Positioning and Campaining 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1,193
Strategies of the Political Opposition 0 0 2 386 2 2 8 1,649
Subordinates as Threats to Leaders 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 260
Subordinates as Threats to Leaders 0 0 0 77 0 0 1 413
Subsidizing Consumption to Signal Quality of Workers 0 0 0 14 2 3 4 107
Subsidizing Enjoyable Education 0 0 0 74 2 3 6 361
Subsidizing Enjoyable Education 0 0 0 74 1 2 2 325
Subsidizing consumption to signal quality of workers 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 86
THE EVALUATION OF RISKY PROJECTS BY VOTERS 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 232
THE SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE UNDER MAJORITY VOTING 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 725
THEORY OF PARKING 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 920
TURNOUT AND THE RATIONAL VOTER MODEL 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1,493
Tax Rage 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 440
Taxation When Consumers Value Freedom 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 295
Taxation of Emissions and Induce Investment 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 662
Taxation of Rent-Seeking Activities 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 680
Term Length and the Quality of Appointment 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 174
Term Length and the Quality of Appointments 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 161
Term Length and the Quality of Appointments 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 202
The CAFE Standards Worked 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 30
The Calculus of Stonewalling 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 191
The Desire for Impact 0 0 0 36 1 1 1 291
The Economics of the Brass Paradox 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 549
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects 0 0 0 22 1 1 1 124
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 186
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 209
The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 205
The Evaluation of Risky Projects by Voters 0 0 0 0 3 3 5 158
The Politics of Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85
The Politics of State Gasoline Taxes 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 717
The Preferences of Voters Over Road Tolls and Road Capacity 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 205
The Profit-maximizing Non-profit 0 0 1 59 1 1 3 226
Theories of Delegation in Political Science 0 0 0 4 1 3 8 1,276
Theories of Delegation in Political Science 0 1 4 242 2 4 11 1,093
Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 10
Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 495
Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Urban Extremism 0 0 0 71 0 1 2 269
WHY REPRESENTATIVES ARE IDEOLOGISTS THOUGH VOTERS ARE NOT 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 294
WHY VOTERS MAY PREFER CONGESTED PUBLIC CLUBS 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 205
What Drives Gasoline Prices? 0 0 0 74 2 2 5 400
What drives gasoline taxes? 0 0 0 54 1 1 5 187
When Do Consumers Favor Price Increases: With Applications to Congestion and to Regulation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19
Which Consumers Benefit from Congestion Tolls? 0 0 0 71 5 5 7 285
Which consumers benefit from congestion tolls? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Which consumers benefit from congestion tolls? 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 14
Why Governments Commit to Unpopular Policies 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 204
Why High-level Executives Earn Less in the Government Than in the Private Sector 0 1 1 28 5 8 12 67
Why Voters May Prefer Congested Public Clubs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Why voters may prefer congested public clubs 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12
Why voters may prefer congested public clubs 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 14
private Proposition of Public Goods, Limited Tax Deductibility, and Crowding Out 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 287
Total Working Papers 1 6 21 4,937 118 213 454 51,378

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals 0 1 2 43 0 1 6 96
A Neo-Downsian Model of Group-Oriented Voting and Racial Backlash 0 0 0 6 1 1 6 86
A Signaling Explanation for Charity 0 0 2 703 7 7 10 1,957
A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 58
A positive correlation between turnout and plurality does not refute the rational voter model 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 13
A strategic model of job arrivals to a single machine with earliness and tardiness penalties 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 20
Advertising, Information, and Prices-A Case Study 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 255
Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining in Europe 11This paper presents results of the ACCHANGE consortium – SESAR project E02.31 – whose support we gratefully acknowledge. We thank the guest editor and two anonymous referees for their useful comments. We also thank Nicole Adler and Eef Delhaye, as well as seminar participants at EUROCONTROL, OPTION (Amsterdam), ITEA (Oslo), and the USA-Europe ATM conference (Lisbon) for comments on the previous versions 0 0 0 2 0 1 6 39
Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking 0 0 1 60 0 0 4 182
Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution 0 0 0 3 1 2 5 73
Amend the Old or Address the New: Broad-Based Legislation When Proposing Policies Is Costly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72
An Expressive Voting Theory of Strikes 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 156
Bargaining with Rent Seekers 0 0 0 29 1 2 2 103
Bargaining within the family can generate a political gender gap 0 0 0 7 1 2 3 39
Bequests, control rights, and cost-benefit analysis 0 0 0 7 0 0 3 76
Commitment Problems Justify Subsidies for Medical Insurance 0 0 0 7 1 1 2 65
Congestion Tolls and Consumer Welfare 0 0 0 1 1 2 7 142
Consumption variety and urban agglomeration 0 0 0 49 0 1 2 277
Credibility may require discretion, not rules 0 0 0 39 4 4 5 107
Credit claiming 0 0 1 20 0 0 1 182
Does Electoral Uncertainty Cause Economic Fluctuations? 0 0 0 52 0 1 4 188
Editorial 0 0 0 11 1 1 1 31
Editorial announcement 0 0 0 12 2 3 3 48
Editorial introduction 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 43
Editors' introduction 0 0 0 33 1 1 1 249
Efficiency, equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich 0 0 0 16 0 2 5 188
Election Surprises and Exchange Rate Uncertainty 0 1 1 56 0 2 3 273
Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates 0 0 0 19 1 2 3 102
Equilibrium Arrivals in Queues with Bulk Service at Scheduled Times 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 13
Esteem and ignorance 0 0 0 58 1 1 1 142
Federal grants and yardstick competition 0 0 0 70 1 1 4 173
Firms' ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling 0 0 2 39 3 4 10 154
Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism 0 0 0 3 1 2 6 26
Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs 0 0 0 8 1 4 6 62
Governmental failures in evaluating programs 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 59
Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 52
Handicaps to improve reputation 0 0 0 3 0 1 3 40
Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 22
High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect 0 0 0 61 0 0 4 328
How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy 0 0 0 2 0 1 4 68
How elections matter: A study of U.S. senators 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 14
How to avoid transferring a valuable asset 0 0 0 12 0 0 2 53
Ideological externalities, social pressures, and political parties 0 0 0 19 0 1 2 50
Income taxes, property values, and migration 0 0 0 32 0 0 5 165
Increased capacity may exacerbate rationing problems: with applications to medical care 0 0 0 9 2 2 4 48
Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 24
Inducing search by periodic advertising 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 50
Informational Benefits of International Treaties 0 0 1 16 1 2 5 438
Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation 0 0 0 8 0 2 4 78
Introduction 0 0 0 14 2 2 3 86
Introduction 0 0 0 10 0 1 2 73
LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER, FISCAL POLICY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. STATE LEGISLATURES 0 0 0 3 1 5 5 74
Limitations of the spatial model 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 17
Local regulation may be excessively stringent 0 1 2 31 0 1 8 129
Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems 0 0 1 81 2 2 12 297
Measuring the benefits derived from a transportation investment -- a comment 0 0 0 9 2 3 4 49
Migration in search of good government 0 0 0 15 1 1 1 89
More monitoring can induce less effort 0 0 0 78 1 2 5 161
Motivating devoted workers 0 0 0 133 1 1 3 333
Must Liberals Always Vote for Liberals and Need the More Competent Candidate Always Be Preferred? 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
Old money, the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde’s marriage strategy 1 1 2 4 1 1 6 64
On the Incentives to Establish and Play Political Rent-Seeking Games 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 74
On the economics of subscriptions 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 92
On the uses of club theory: Preface to the club theory symposium 0 0 0 103 1 2 3 292
Optimal Contests 0 0 0 0 1 2 6 350
Optimal Contracts When a Worker Envies His Boss 0 0 0 45 0 1 2 235
Optimal allocation of quotas 0 0 0 5 2 2 5 64
Optimal sales to users who hold inventory 0 0 0 7 1 1 3 60
POLITICS WITH AND WITHOUT POLICY† 0 0 0 5 0 1 2 41
Parking fees and congestion 1 1 1 533 2 2 6 1,238
Performance when misinformation increases with experience 0 0 0 5 2 2 2 34
Politics and the Choice of Durability 0 1 4 92 1 2 10 245
Politics and the Choice of Durability: Reply 0 0 0 14 0 0 2 88
Preference heterogeneity, wage inequality, and trade 0 0 0 48 2 3 3 197
Pricing by the Firm Under Regulatory Threat 0 0 0 100 0 0 3 307
Public opinion and regulatory behavior 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 10
RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* 0 0 0 51 2 5 12 131
Rational Response to Irrational Attitudes: The Level of the Gasoline Tax in the United States 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 29
Regulation by Prices and by Command 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 91
Regulatory tune-ups 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 68
Rewarding Successes Discourages Experimentation 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 27
Rivalry among agents seeking large budgets 0 0 0 5 0 2 3 20
STRATEGIC LOBBYING BY POTENTIAL INDUSTRY ENTRANTS* 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 38
Sequential Rent Seeking 0 0 0 10 1 1 3 50
Setting the Agenda: Electoral Competition, Commitment of Policy, and Issue Salience 0 0 0 46 0 0 1 168
Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 187
Signaling, network externalities, and subsidies 1 2 2 17 2 4 5 74
Ski-Lift Pricing with Applications to Labor and Other Markets: Comment 0 0 0 148 0 0 7 887
Social security and conflict within the family 0 0 1 24 1 1 2 117
Special Issue on Social Conflict – Preface 0 0 0 38 1 1 3 259
Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 5
Strategic Investment by a Regulated Firm 0 0 0 46 1 1 2 161
Subsidizing Enjoyable Education 0 0 0 21 1 2 8 120
Support and opposition to a Pigovian tax: Road pricing with reference-dependent preferences 1 2 2 28 2 6 8 112
THE ELECTORAL COSTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS WHEN VOTERS ARE IGNORANT* 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 16
Taxation and pricing when consumers value freedom 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 50
Taxation of rent-seeking activities 0 0 0 46 1 2 6 169
The Advantages of Being First 0 0 0 152 3 4 7 749
The Calculus of Stonewalling 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 14
The Client Relationship and a "Just" Price 0 0 0 10 0 2 5 77
The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies 0 0 0 29 1 1 3 225
The Social Discount Rate under Majority Voting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38
The Strategy of Candidate Ambiguity 0 1 1 4 0 1 2 20
The desire for impact 0 0 1 25 0 1 2 144
The evaluation of risky projects by voters 0 0 1 29 1 1 3 99
Trade protection to reduce redistribution 0 0 0 22 0 1 3 114
Up-or-out policies when a worker imitates another 0 0 0 14 1 1 2 65
Urban Extremism 0 0 1 16 1 1 5 159
Using corrective taxes to remedy consumer misperceptions 0 0 0 28 0 0 2 61
Voting and campaigning under incomplete information 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 51
Voting to anger and to please others 0 0 0 70 0 0 1 243
Wages and Employment in Public-Sector Unions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 273
When a Loser Gains: Free Riding in the Innovation of Network Goods 0 0 0 34 0 0 5 106
When users of congested roads may view tolls as unjust 0 0 0 22 1 3 4 77
Why principals tolerate biases of inaccurate agents 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 28
Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 9
Why voters may prefer congested public clubs 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 66
Total Journal Articles 4 11 30 3,950 85 159 401 17,278

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Total Books 0 0 0 0 1 3 17 386

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Regulatory policy 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 11
Total Chapters 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 11

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Statistics updated 2025-12-06