| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
69 |
| A Signalling Explanation for Private Charity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
511 |
| A Theory of Compulsory Public Schooling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
428 |
| ACCESS Magazine, Fall 1994 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
481 |
| Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
28 |
| Allies as Rivals: Internal and External Rent Seeking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
328 |
| Ameliorating Congestion by Income Redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
28 |
| Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
| An Information Explanation for the Flypaper Effect |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
693 |
| Appropriation, Human Capital, and Mandatory Schooling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
406 |
| Bequests and Cost-Benefit Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
415 |
| Bequests and Cost-Benefit Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
161 |
| Bequests, Control Rights, and Cost-Benefit Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
239 |
| Budgets under Delegation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
42 |
| Bureaucratic Creep |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
573 |
| CANDIDATES SHOULD AVOID SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS IF VOTERS ARE IGNORANT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
375 |
| COMMITMENT PROBLEMS JUSTIFY SUBSIDIES FOR MEDICAL INSURANCE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
369 |
| Capital-Intensive Projects Induce More Effort Than Labor-Intensive Projects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
661 |
| Capital-intensive projects induce more effort than labor-intensive projects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
182 |
| Clean on Paper, Dirty on the Road: Troubles with California's Smog Check |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
| Clean or a Day: Troubles with California's Smog Check |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
28 |
| Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
197 |
| Competitive Proposals to Special Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
117 |
| Credibility May Require Discretion, not Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
7 |
202 |
| Credit Claiming |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
985 |
| Crowding Out Wasteful Activities by Wasteful Activities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
217 |
| DELAY IN POLICY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
165 |
| Differential Pricing and Mistake Avoidance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
406 |
| Direct Democracy and the Stability of State Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
208 |
| Earmarking: Bundling to Signal Quality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
272 |
| Election Surprises and Exchange rate Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
580 |
| Electoral Incentives, Government Popularity, and Commitment of Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
159 |
| Evidence for the Irrationality of Governmental Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
391 |
| Externalities, Social Pressures, and Political Parties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
320 |
| Firms' Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
313 |
| Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
296 |
| Firms’ ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
50 |
| Forward Markets to Spur Innovation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
76 |
| Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
197 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
1,272 |
| Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
| Governmental Provision of Public Goods Need Not Crowd Out Private Provision |
0 |
0 |
1 |
36 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
211 |
| Governmental Transfers Can Reduce a Moral Hazard Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
4 |
8 |
9 |
154 |
| Governmental Transfers and Altruistic Private Transfers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
3 |
7 |
10 |
110 |
| Handicaps on Timing to Improve Reputation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
78 |
| Help Not Needed? Optimal Host Country Regulation of Expatriate NGO Workers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
| High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect |
0 |
0 |
0 |
160 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
974 |
| How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
183 |
| How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
65 |
| How Regulations Can Succeed Where Taxes Do Not: An Examination of Automobile Fuel Efficiency |
0 |
1 |
1 |
323 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
1,677 |
| How To Avoid Awarding a Valuable Asset |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
162 |
| How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
78 |
| How to Commit to a Future Price |
0 |
0 |
0 |
191 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
475 |
| IMPERFECT INFORMATION MY ALLEVIATE AGENCY PROBLEMS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
287 |
| Imperfect Competition, Clubs, and Two-Part Tariffs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
80 |
| Income Taxes, Property Values and Migration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
4 |
6 |
10 |
387 |
| Income Taxes, Property Values, and Migration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
377 |
| Income taxes, property values, and migration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
42 |
| Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
| Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
| Inducing political action by workers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
32 |
| Inequality when People Produce Best what they Consume |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
292 |
| Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
178 |
| Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
1,099 |
| Informational benefits of international environmental agreements |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
179 |
| Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to Corporate Success and Failure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
305 |
| Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to Corporate Success and Failure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
311 |
| Innovation and Imitation Across Jurisdictions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
145 |
| Innovation of Network Goods: A Non-Innovating Firm Will Gain |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
283 |
| Insufficient Experimentation Because Agents Herd |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
57 |
| Integration, Segregation and Discrimination in Clubs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
359 |
| Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
255 |
| Intertemporal commitment problems and voting on redistributive taxation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
7 |
30 |
| Investment in Human Capital, Appropriation, and Mandatory Schooling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
517 |
| Legislative turnover, fiscal policy, and economic growth: evidence from U.S. state legislatures |
0 |
1 |
2 |
56 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
189 |
| Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
148 |
| Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
96 |
| MYOPIA, MISPERCEPTIONS, AND SOCIAL SECURITY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
452 |
| Markets Can Solve the Hold-Up Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
593 |
| Markets and regulatory hold-up problems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
37 |
| Markets and regulatory hold-up problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
128 |
| Migration in Search of Good Government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
217 |
| ON THE INCENTIVES TO ESTABLISH AND PLAY RENT-SEEKING GAMES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
325 |
| OPTIMAL SALES TO CONSUMERS WHO HOLD INVENTORY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
397 |
| Obtaining information by diversifying projects or why specialization is inefficient |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
86 |
| Old Money, the Nouveau Riche and Brunhilde's Marriage Dilemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
71 |
| Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde's Marriage Strategy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
113 |
| Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde’s Marriage Strategy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
28 |
| Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss |
1 |
1 |
1 |
75 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
371 |
| Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss |
0 |
0 |
0 |
160 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
531 |
| Optimal Promotion and Span of Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
2,621 |
| Optimal Term Length when Misinformation Increases with Experience |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
115 |
| POLICY PROPOSALS UNDER CONTESTABILITY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
225 |
| POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM UNDER GROUP IDENTIFICATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
338 |
| Parking fees and congestion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
5 |
5 |
6 |
123 |
| Peer Group Effects, Sorting, and Fiscal Federalism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
3 |
7 |
12 |
197 |
| Political Biases Against Public Investment and Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
339 |
| Politicians Avoid Tax Increases Around Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
90 |
| Predicting Committee Action |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
246 |
| Principal-Agent Problems When Principal Allocates a Budget |
1 |
2 |
3 |
59 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
207 |
| Reducing Current Taxes to Raise Future Revenue |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
150 |
| Reducing Rent Seeking by Providing Wide Public Service |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
10 |
13 |
13 |
142 |
| Reducing rent seeking by providing wide public service |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
78 |
| Regulation by Price or by Command |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
63 |
| Regulation by Prices and by Command |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
24 |
| Regulation with Budget Constraints Can Dominate Regulation by Price and by Quantity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
195 |
| Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
76 |
| Reputation in Team Production |
0 |
0 |
1 |
191 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
786 |
| Reputation in Team Production |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
357 |
| Signaling By Choice Of Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
56 |
| Signaling Commitment by Excessive Spending |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
4 |
6 |
7 |
280 |
| Strategic Contributions to Induce Private Provision of the Public Good |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
548 |
| Strategic Positioning and Campaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1,194 |
| Strategies of the Political Opposition |
0 |
0 |
2 |
386 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
1,651 |
| Subordinates as Threats to Leaders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
262 |
| Subordinates as Threats to Leaders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
413 |
| Subsidizing Consumption to Signal Quality of Workers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
107 |
| Subsidizing Enjoyable Education |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
328 |
| Subsidizing Enjoyable Education |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
363 |
| Subsidizing consumption to signal quality of workers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
89 |
| THE EVALUATION OF RISKY PROJECTS BY VOTERS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
232 |
| THE SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE UNDER MAJORITY VOTING |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
725 |
| THEORY OF PARKING |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
920 |
| TURNOUT AND THE RATIONAL VOTER MODEL |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1,493 |
| Tax Rage |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
442 |
| Taxation When Consumers Value Freedom |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
296 |
| Taxation of Emissions and Induce Investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
664 |
| Taxation of Rent-Seeking Activities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
681 |
| Term Length and the Quality of Appointment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
175 |
| Term Length and the Quality of Appointments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
161 |
| Term Length and the Quality of Appointments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
203 |
| The CAFE Standards Worked |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
| The Calculus of Stonewalling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
192 |
| The Desire for Impact |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
292 |
| The Economics of the Brass Paradox |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
549 |
| The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
125 |
| The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
187 |
| The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
210 |
| The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
208 |
| The Evaluation of Risky Projects by Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
160 |
| The Politics of Delay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
85 |
| The Politics of State Gasoline Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
717 |
| The Preferences of Voters Over Road Tolls and Road Capacity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
205 |
| The Profit-maximizing Non-profit |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
4 |
5 |
5 |
230 |
| Theories of Delegation in Political Science |
0 |
1 |
3 |
242 |
8 |
11 |
18 |
1,101 |
| Theories of Delegation in Political Science |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
1,277 |
| Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
496 |
| Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
| Urban Extremism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
269 |
| WHY REPRESENTATIVES ARE IDEOLOGISTS THOUGH VOTERS ARE NOT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
296 |
| WHY VOTERS MAY PREFER CONGESTED PUBLIC CLUBS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
206 |
| What Drives Gasoline Prices? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
400 |
| What drives gasoline taxes? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
187 |
| When Do Consumers Favor Price Increases: With Applications to Congestion and to Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
| Which Consumers Benefit from Congestion Tolls? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
286 |
| Which consumers benefit from congestion tolls? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
| Which consumers benefit from congestion tolls? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
| Why Governments Commit to Unpopular Policies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
206 |
| Why High-level Executives Earn Less in the Government Than in the Private Sector |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
0 |
7 |
11 |
67 |
| Why Voters May Prefer Congested Public Clubs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
| Why voters may prefer congested public clubs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
| Why voters may prefer congested public clubs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
| private Proposition of Public Goods, Limited Tax Deductibility, and Crowding Out |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
289 |
| Total Working Papers |
2 |
6 |
21 |
4,939 |
201 |
387 |
636 |
51,579 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| ?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals |
0 |
0 |
2 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
96 |
| A Neo-Downsian Model of Group-Oriented Voting and Racial Backlash |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
86 |
| A Signaling Explanation for Charity |
0 |
0 |
2 |
703 |
4 |
11 |
14 |
1,961 |
| A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
| A positive correlation between turnout and plurality does not refute the rational voter model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
16 |
| A strategic model of job arrivals to a single machine with earliness and tardiness penalties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
22 |
| Advertising, Information, and Prices-A Case Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
7 |
258 |
| Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining in Europe 11This paper presents results of the ACCHANGE consortium – SESAR project E02.31 – whose support we gratefully acknowledge. We thank the guest editor and two anonymous referees for their useful comments. We also thank Nicole Adler and Eef Delhaye, as well as seminar participants at EUROCONTROL, OPTION (Amsterdam), ITEA (Oslo), and the USA-Europe ATM conference (Lisbon) for comments on the previous versions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
42 |
| Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
184 |
| Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
75 |
| Amend the Old or Address the New: Broad-Based Legislation When Proposing Policies Is Costly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
73 |
| An Expressive Voting Theory of Strikes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
156 |
| Bargaining with Rent Seekers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
104 |
| Bargaining within the family can generate a political gender gap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
40 |
| Bequests, control rights, and cost-benefit analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
76 |
| Commitment Problems Justify Subsidies for Medical Insurance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
65 |
| Congestion Tolls and Consumer Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
143 |
| Consumption variety and urban agglomeration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
278 |
| Credibility may require discretion, not rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
107 |
| Credit claiming |
0 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
182 |
| Does Electoral Uncertainty Cause Economic Fluctuations? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
189 |
| Editorial |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
31 |
| Editorial announcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
48 |
| Editorial introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
44 |
| Editors' introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
249 |
| Efficiency, equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
188 |
| Election Surprises and Exchange Rate Uncertainty |
0 |
1 |
1 |
56 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
276 |
| Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
104 |
| Equilibrium Arrivals in Queues with Bulk Service at Scheduled Times |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
| Esteem and ignorance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
143 |
| Federal grants and yardstick competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
174 |
| Firms' ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
156 |
| Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
26 |
| Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
62 |
| Governmental failures in evaluating programs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
59 |
| Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
52 |
| Handicaps to improve reputation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
41 |
| Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
24 |
| High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
328 |
| How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
70 |
| How elections matter: A study of U.S. senators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
15 |
| How to avoid transferring a valuable asset |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
54 |
| Ideological externalities, social pressures, and political parties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
51 |
| Income taxes, property values, and migration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
165 |
| Increased capacity may exacerbate rationing problems: with applications to medical care |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
49 |
| Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
| Inducing search by periodic advertising |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
52 |
| Informational Benefits of International Treaties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
438 |
| Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
79 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
86 |
| Introduction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
73 |
| LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER, FISCAL POLICY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. STATE LEGISLATURES |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
75 |
| Limitations of the spatial model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
17 |
| Local regulation may be excessively stringent |
0 |
1 |
2 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
129 |
| Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
81 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
299 |
| Measuring the benefits derived from a transportation investment -- a comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
50 |
| Migration in search of good government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
91 |
| More monitoring can induce less effort |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
161 |
| Motivating devoted workers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
133 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
337 |
| Must Liberals Always Vote for Liberals and Need the More Competent Candidate Always Be Preferred? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
| Old money, the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde’s marriage strategy |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
64 |
| On the Incentives to Establish and Play Political Rent-Seeking Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
75 |
| On the economics of subscriptions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
93 |
| On the uses of club theory: Preface to the club theory symposium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
293 |
| Optimal Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
350 |
| Optimal Contracts When a Worker Envies His Boss |
1 |
1 |
1 |
46 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
236 |
| Optimal allocation of quotas |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
65 |
| Optimal sales to users who hold inventory |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
61 |
| POLITICS WITH AND WITHOUT POLICY† |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
42 |
| Parking fees and congestion |
0 |
1 |
1 |
533 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
1,240 |
| Performance when misinformation increases with experience |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
36 |
| Politics and the Choice of Durability |
0 |
0 |
4 |
92 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
245 |
| Politics and the Choice of Durability: Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
88 |
| Preference heterogeneity, wage inequality, and trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
3 |
5 |
6 |
200 |
| Pricing by the Firm Under Regulatory Threat |
1 |
1 |
1 |
101 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
308 |
| Public opinion and regulatory behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
12 |
| RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
1 |
5 |
11 |
132 |
| Rational Response to Irrational Attitudes: The Level of the Gasoline Tax in the United States |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
30 |
| Regulation by Prices and by Command |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
91 |
| Regulatory tune-ups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
71 |
| Rewarding Successes Discourages Experimentation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
30 |
| Rivalry among agents seeking large budgets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
21 |
| STRATEGIC LOBBYING BY POTENTIAL INDUSTRY ENTRANTS* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
39 |
| Sequential Rent Seeking |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
50 |
| Setting the Agenda: Electoral Competition, Commitment of Policy, and Issue Salience |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
170 |
| Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
188 |
| Signaling, network externalities, and subsidies |
0 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
74 |
| Ski-Lift Pricing with Applications to Labor and Other Markets: Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
148 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
888 |
| Social security and conflict within the family |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
119 |
| Special Issue on Social Conflict – Preface |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
259 |
| Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
| Strategic Investment by a Regulated Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
162 |
| Subsidizing Enjoyable Education |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
122 |
| Support and opposition to a Pigovian tax: Road pricing with reference-dependent preferences |
0 |
2 |
2 |
28 |
2 |
8 |
10 |
114 |
| THE ELECTORAL COSTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS WHEN VOTERS ARE IGNORANT* |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
| Taxation and pricing when consumers value freedom |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
50 |
| Taxation of rent-seeking activities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
171 |
| The Advantages of Being First |
0 |
0 |
0 |
152 |
6 |
10 |
13 |
755 |
| The Calculus of Stonewalling |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
| The Client Relationship and a "Just" Price |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
77 |
| The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
227 |
| The Social Discount Rate under Majority Voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
| The Strategy of Candidate Ambiguity |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
| The desire for impact |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
144 |
| The evaluation of risky projects by voters |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
99 |
| Trade protection to reduce redistribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
114 |
| Up-or-out policies when a worker imitates another |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
67 |
| Urban Extremism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
159 |
| Using corrective taxes to remedy consumer misperceptions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
62 |
| Voting and campaigning under incomplete information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
52 |
| Voting to anger and to please others |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
243 |
| Wages and Employment in Public-Sector Unions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
274 |
| When a Loser Gains: Free Riding in the Innovation of Network Goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
107 |
| When users of congested roads may view tolls as unjust |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
78 |
| Why principals tolerate biases of inaccurate agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
28 |
| Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
11 |
| Why voters may prefer congested public clubs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
| Total Journal Articles |
2 |
10 |
30 |
3,952 |
115 |
258 |
500 |
17,393 |
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