Access Statistics for Miguel González-Maestre

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
- DELEGATION AND ENDOGENOUS MERGERS IN OLIGOPOLY 0 0 0 29 0 1 2 101
- DELEGATION AND MERGERS IN OLIGOPOLY 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 126
Artistic Creation and Intellectual Property 0 0 0 58 0 1 2 331
Artistic Creation and Intellectual Property 0 0 0 123 0 1 2 510
Artistic Creation and Intellectual Property: A Professional Career Approach 0 0 0 21 0 0 2 150
Artistic Creation and Intellectual Property: A Professional Career Approach 0 0 0 20 2 2 2 107
Artistic creation and intellectual property 0 0 0 60 1 1 2 450
Copying, Superstars, and Artistic Creation 0 0 0 132 2 3 4 513
Copying, superstars and artistic creation 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 189
DIVISIONALIZATION IN MARKETS WITH HETERGENEOUS GOODS 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 56
Divisionalization and Delegation in Oligopoly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 775
Industrial Loans and Market Structure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 798
Information and Quality in Expanding Markets 0 0 0 31 0 0 1 134
On the competitive effects of divisionalization 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 59
Quality choice and advertising regulation in broadcasting markets 0 0 1 94 0 1 3 235
The importance of fixed costs in the design of trade policies: An exercise in the theory of second best 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 45
The role of program quality and publicly-owned platforms in the free to air broadcasting industry 0 0 1 26 0 2 3 107
UNION STRUCTURE AND THE INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION IN OLIGOPOLY 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 92
Total Working Papers 0 0 2 727 5 13 25 4,778

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Anticompetitive traps and voting 0 0 0 3 1 1 3 23
Artistic Creation and Intellectual Property: A Professional Career Approach 0 0 0 19 0 1 3 102
BASIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN VERTICAL MARKETS 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 43
COORDINATION INCENTIVES UNDER COMPLEMENTARY COST‐REDUCING TECHNOLOGIES* 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 66
Competition with targeted product design: Price, variety, and welfare 0 0 0 8 1 1 3 43
Cooperation versus competition in product innovation 0 0 0 83 0 0 0 298
Copying, superstars, and artistic creation 0 0 0 47 1 1 1 202
Delegation and mergers in oligopoly 0 0 0 65 0 0 1 224
Divisionalization and Delegation in Oligopoly 0 0 1 33 1 1 2 140
Divisionalization with spatial differentiation 0 0 0 26 1 1 3 121
Excessive vs. insufficient entry in spatial models: When product design and market size matter 0 0 0 8 2 2 5 47
Firm size distortions under duopoly 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 36
Industrial loans and market structure 0 0 0 66 0 0 1 217
Information and quality with an increasing number of brands 0 0 1 31 2 4 5 200
Innovation, merger policy and technology transfer 0 0 0 184 0 0 1 556
Merger policy in innovative industries 1 1 1 11 1 1 2 60
On the competitive effects of divisionalization 0 0 0 38 1 1 1 137
Quality choice and advertising regulation in broadcasting markets 0 0 2 19 0 0 3 78
Second-best trade policies in Cournot oligopoly 0 0 0 113 0 0 1 782
Sequential licensing with several competing technologies 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
The role of platform quality and publicly owned platforms in the free-to-air broadcasting industry 0 0 0 9 0 2 4 69
Union structure and incentives for innovation 0 0 0 58 0 0 1 181
Total Journal Articles 1 1 5 852 11 16 43 3,627

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Intellectual property 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 48
Total Chapters 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 48

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Statistics updated 2025-08-05