Access Statistics for Susanne Goldlücke

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Assigning an unpleasant task without payment 0 0 0 5 0 1 8 50
Assigning an unpleasant task without payment 0 0 0 13 1 9 16 49
Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment 0 0 0 105 3 7 12 463
Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment 0 0 0 0 1 7 13 32
Hidden Overtime: Optimal Contracts with (Self-)Deceptive Effort Reports 0 2 4 22 0 6 12 60
In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers 0 0 1 27 1 4 11 152
Investments as Signals of Outside Options 0 0 0 76 2 6 11 274
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 11 1 8 9 38
Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments 0 0 0 31 0 5 8 69
Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations 0 0 0 27 6 10 13 72
Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments 0 0 0 63 1 6 8 209
Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation 1 1 1 141 4 9 11 439
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality 0 0 1 126 1 6 16 332
Signaling an Outside Option 0 0 0 28 0 11 16 148
Strategic Gaze: An Interactive Eye-Tracking Study 0 0 0 25 1 8 13 100
The Multiple-Volunteers Principle 0 0 0 15 1 2 7 42
The Multiple-Volunteers Principle for Assigning Unpleasant and Pleasant Tasks 0 0 0 15 0 5 7 38
The multiple-volunteers principle 0 0 0 10 0 1 4 17
Why agents need discretion: The business judgment rule as optimal standard of care 0 1 1 33 1 11 17 192
Total Working Papers 1 4 8 773 24 122 212 2,776

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts 0 0 0 14 3 8 10 104
Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers 0 0 0 4 1 4 10 38
Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment 1 1 1 28 1 6 12 211
Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers 0 0 2 59 2 11 26 184
Investments as signals of outside options 0 0 0 28 1 7 11 140
Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments 0 0 1 33 0 4 8 77
REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY 0 0 0 7 1 10 17 134
Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up: A Model of Repeated Negotiations 0 0 0 3 0 2 3 16
Renegotiation-proof relational contracts 0 0 0 14 4 19 24 89
Social Planning with Partial Knowledge of Social Interactions. Comment 0 0 0 26 1 3 5 109
Strategic gaze: an interactive eye-tracking study 0 0 0 6 1 9 22 53
Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies 0 0 0 2 0 4 8 40
Why Agents Need Discretion: The Business Judgment Rule as Optimal Standard of Care 0 0 0 22 0 4 7 140
Total Journal Articles 1 1 4 246 15 91 163 1,335

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Statistics updated 2026-04-09