Access Statistics for Oliver Gürtler

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A General Framework for Studying Contests 0 0 0 13 0 4 6 41
A General Framework for Studying Contests 0 0 0 20 1 5 5 49
A Note on Sabotage in Collective Tournaments 0 0 0 107 3 5 7 259
A general framework for studying contests 0 0 0 18 1 1 4 25
A general framework for studying contests 0 0 0 39 5 8 16 61
A rationale for the coexistence of central and decentral marketing in team sports 0 0 0 165 2 6 7 403
An Empirical Study on Risk Taking in Tournaments 0 0 0 282 4 9 10 717
Are 18 holes enough for Tiger Woods? 0 0 0 37 1 1 3 266
Behaving kindly, talking about it, and being rewarded for it?! 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 45
Competition and Risk-Taking 0 0 3 30 2 3 17 53
Competition for Promotion Can Induce Household Specialization Between Equally Competitive Spouses 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 22
Competition for Promotion Can Induce Household Specialization between Equally Competitive Spouses 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 21
Do Workers Benefit from Wage Transparency Rules? 0 0 1 19 0 3 6 53
Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation 0 0 0 76 0 2 3 480
Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation 0 0 0 47 0 0 1 217
Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: The-ory and Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 11 5 6 6 146
Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Theory and Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 46 3 3 6 184
Haggling for Rents, Relational Contracts, and the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 93 1 3 4 423
Household specialization and competition for promotion 0 1 1 16 4 5 10 28
Household specialization and competition for promotion 0 0 0 6 1 1 3 10
Inequality aversion and externalities 0 0 0 37 2 3 4 105
Mergers, Litigation and Efficiency 0 0 0 2 1 5 13 42
Mergers, Litigation and Efficiency 0 0 0 72 2 3 4 282
On Delegation under Relational Contracts 0 0 0 75 1 3 5 309
On Delegation under Relational Contracts 0 0 0 68 2 6 7 237
On the Release of Players to National Teams 0 0 0 47 3 5 5 200
On the Release of Players to National Teams 0 0 0 45 2 5 5 153
On the Release of Players to National Teams 0 0 0 11 2 3 4 110
On the Release of Players to National Teams 0 0 0 28 1 4 6 100
On the Release of Players to National Teams 0 0 0 31 1 2 2 133
Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors 0 0 0 42 1 6 6 225
Optimal Tournament Contracts for Heterogeneous Workers 0 0 0 124 3 4 7 378
Overconfidence and Gender Equality in the Labor Market 0 0 0 16 4 7 14 45
Overconfidence and Gender Equality in the Labor Market 0 0 0 19 1 6 7 24
Overconfidence and Gender Gaps in Career Outcomes: Insights from a Promotion-Signaling Model 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3
Overconfidence and gender gaps in career outcomes: insights from a promotion signaling model 0 1 12 12 20 25 44 48
Player Strength and Effort in Contests 0 0 1 18 2 5 9 23
Player strength and effort in contests 0 0 0 11 0 1 2 13
Promotion signaling, discrimination, and positive discrimination policies 0 0 0 22 1 2 3 77
Sabotage in Contests: A Survey 0 0 1 48 2 4 7 187
Sabotage in dynamic tournaments 0 0 0 54 4 4 7 180
Sabotage in dynamic tournaments 0 0 0 15 4 4 6 103
Shaping Interfirm Relationships in Intermediary Markets: Evidence from a Field Experiment 1 2 9 22 3 9 26 61
Short-term or long-term contracts? - A rent-seeking perspective 0 0 0 86 1 4 5 672
The Effect of Reputation on Selling Prices in Auctions 0 0 0 1,156 1 6 9 4,229
The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach 0 0 0 30 3 6 6 127
The optimality of heterogeneous tournaments 0 0 0 56 0 3 3 108
Total Working Papers 1 4 28 3,189 104 205 338 11,677

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Rationale for the Coexistence of Central and Decentral Marketing in Team Sports 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
A Rationale for the Coexistence of Central and Decentral Marketing in Team Sports 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 8
A Strategic Rationale for the Use of Sell–On Fees in European Sports 0 0 0 9 3 6 11 66
Advertising and Labor Market Matching: A Tour through the Times 0 0 0 15 0 1 2 101
An empirical study on risk-taking in tournaments 0 0 0 91 1 7 9 353
Anreize in Turnieren mit heterogenen Teilnehmern — Eine empirische Untersuchung mit Daten aus der Fußball-Bundesliga 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 11
Are 18 Holes Enough for Tiger Woods? 0 0 0 19 1 1 2 173
Big Fish in Small (and Big) Ponds: A Study of Careers 0 0 2 8 0 2 5 16
Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments 0 0 0 22 1 3 4 85
Communication and commitment in contests 0 0 0 8 0 1 7 73
Competition and risk-taking 0 0 2 5 1 6 23 48
DO WORKERS BENEFIT FROM WAGE TRANSPARENCY RULES? 1 2 2 2 3 6 6 6
Dismissal Tournaments 0 0 0 18 0 2 4 54
Do good and talk about it! Disclosure and reward of discretionary kindness 0 0 0 3 0 4 6 35
Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 6 0 2 5 52
Firm choice and career success - theory and evidence 0 0 0 8 1 4 6 49
Haggling for Rents, Relational Contracts, and the Theory of the Firm 0 0 0 9 2 2 2 104
Hostile takeover and costly merger control 0 0 0 25 1 4 8 146
Household specialization and competition for promotion 0 0 0 0 2 5 16 16
Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent 0 0 0 13 2 4 6 81
Incentive Effects in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Competitors – an Analysis of the Olympic Rowing Regatta in Sydney 2000 0 0 0 94 2 2 3 295
Incentive Effects in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Competitors – an Analysis of the Olympic Rowing Regatta in Sydney 2000 0 0 0 9 1 3 5 40
Inequality aversion and externalities 0 0 0 9 1 5 6 75
Information Policy in Tournaments with Sabotage 0 0 0 13 0 2 2 67
MONITORING OF WORKERS AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION: THE ROLE OF WORKS COUNCILS 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 45
MORAL HAZARD, RISK AVERSION AND EFFICIENCY 0 0 0 10 1 2 3 54
Market-based tournaments: An experimental investigation 0 0 0 6 1 6 7 46
On pricing and protection of complementary products 0 0 0 19 1 2 2 62
On the Release of Players to National Teams 0 0 0 1 1 3 4 21
On the Virtues of Hiring Lemons 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 35
On the inefficiency of merger control 0 0 0 17 2 6 9 86
Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors 0 0 0 19 1 4 6 124
Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers 0 0 0 53 0 1 5 141
Performance Measurement Technologies and the Trade-off of Risk and Incentives 0 0 0 8 2 3 3 49
Promotion signaling, discrimination, and positive discrimination policies 0 0 0 10 3 7 13 60
Rational self-sabotage 0 0 0 10 1 5 7 65
STRATEGIC SHIRKING: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTITASKING AND SPECIALIZATION 0 0 0 2 1 2 7 26
Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Empirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch 0 0 0 25 0 2 5 93
Sabotage in contests: a survey 0 1 2 19 1 6 10 112
Sabotage in dynamic tournaments 0 0 2 39 1 5 11 146
Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests 0 0 0 5 3 7 7 36
Simple equilibria in general contests 0 0 0 3 5 10 12 24
Strategic Shirking in Promotion Tournaments 0 0 0 8 0 3 10 61
Strategic shirking in competitive labor markets: A general model of multi‐task promotion tournaments with employer learning 0 0 0 0 4 7 11 30
THE PAYOFF TO CONSISTENCY IN PERFORMANCE 0 0 0 6 0 3 6 124
The Effect of Reputation on Selling Prices in Auctions 0 0 0 65 0 2 4 280
The Optimality of Heterogeneous Tournaments 0 0 1 11 2 4 11 113
The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments 0 0 0 16 1 3 3 62
The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach 0 0 0 5 2 6 14 72
Who is declared dead lives longer 0 0 0 19 0 2 3 126
Total Journal Articles 2 4 12 764 58 182 322 4,050

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Statistics updated 2026-01-09