Access Statistics for Denis Gromb

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Agency conflicts in public and negotiated transfers of corporate control 0 0 0 0 3 8 11 28
Block Premia in Transfers of Corporate Control 0 0 1 180 1 4 5 479
Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral 0 0 6 56 7 30 60 341
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition 0 0 1 54 1 5 9 154
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition* 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 18
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition* 0 0 0 0 1 4 6 16
Cultural Inertia and Uniformity in Organizations 0 0 1 231 0 14 18 1,902
Culture in Organizations: Inertia and Uniformity 0 1 1 221 0 8 10 821
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation When Sellers Provide Expert Advice 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 19
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice 0 0 0 28 1 6 7 116
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice 0 0 0 26 0 4 8 15
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice 0 0 0 41 1 5 8 58
Drugs, Showrooms and Financial Products: Competition and Regulation when Sellers Provide Expert Advice 0 0 0 37 2 11 19 79
Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium 0 0 1 246 1 6 7 1,027
Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium 0 0 1 209 3 7 17 646
Equilibrium and Welfare in Markets with Financially Constrained Arbitrageurs 0 0 0 95 4 12 21 490
Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially constrained arbitrageurs 0 0 1 20 1 40 51 171
Financial Restructuring and Resolution of Banks 0 0 1 23 2 9 10 62
Financial Restructuring and Resolution of Banks 1 2 2 3 4 8 12 16
Financial Restructuring and Resolution of Banks 0 0 0 0 5 10 15 63
Financially constrained arbitrage and cross-market contagion 0 0 3 89 2 6 22 220
Financing capacity investment under demand uncertainty 0 0 0 35 1 8 11 91
Imperfect Competition in the Inter-Bank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking 0 0 0 183 1 6 12 593
Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers 0 0 0 24 0 6 8 112
Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers 0 0 1 32 2 3 8 107
Legal investor protection and takeovers 0 0 0 1 1 4 8 39
Limits of Arbitrage: The State of the Theory 1 1 5 265 5 24 52 751
Limits of Arbitrage: The State of the Theory 0 0 0 75 0 4 7 225
Limits of Arbitrage: The State of the Theory 0 0 0 72 6 15 18 232
Limits of arbitrage: the state of the theory 0 0 0 1 1 12 14 18
Minority Blocks And Takeover Premia 0 0 0 103 0 9 12 359
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia 0 0 1 87 7 11 17 304
Minority blocks and takeover premia 0 0 0 3 1 7 10 53
Minority blocks and takeover premia 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 25
Public Trading and Private Incentives 0 0 0 39 0 2 6 198
Public Trading and Private Incentives 0 0 0 52 2 5 9 194
The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage 0 0 1 7 1 6 8 152
The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage 0 0 0 9 1 9 11 140
The Organization of Delegated Expertise 0 0 0 70 1 6 7 223
The Organization of Delegated Expertise 0 0 0 73 2 4 6 213
The Paradox of Pledgeability 0 0 0 12 1 5 8 48
The Paradox of Pledgeability 0 0 0 0 1 6 9 46
The dynamics of financially constrained arbitrage 0 0 0 4 0 2 7 47
The dynamics of financially constrained arbitrage 0 0 0 1 0 3 5 11
The dynamics of financially constrained arbitrage 0 0 0 13 1 10 16 81
The dynamics of financially constrained arbitrage 0 0 0 1 2 9 11 15
Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders 0 0 0 6 0 4 7 72
Total Working Papers 2 4 27 2,728 77 380 612 11,090

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Model of Financial Market Liquidity Based on Intermediary Capital 0 0 0 57 2 9 12 226
Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control 0 1 2 85 2 8 14 281
Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise 0 0 0 75 2 5 10 247
Conflicting Priorities: A Theory of Covenants and Collateral 0 0 0 0 3 10 19 19
Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition 0 0 0 9 1 5 8 46
Corrigendum to "Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially constrained arbitrageurs" [J. Financial Economics 66 (2002) 361] 0 0 0 26 0 3 9 85
Cultural Inertia and Uniformity in Organizations 0 0 0 26 0 1 4 225
Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially constrained arbitrageurs 0 0 2 264 2 7 26 747
Financing Capacity with Stealing and Shirking 0 0 2 11 2 8 14 38
Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking 0 0 1 171 4 14 35 583
Is one share/one vote optimal?† 1 3 3 3 1 7 14 14
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm 2 4 12 170 6 13 36 2,000
Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers 0 0 0 12 0 11 16 119
Limits of Arbitrage 0 2 10 84 3 13 27 286
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia 0 0 0 63 1 6 12 275
On the strength of corporate cultures 0 0 0 78 1 4 9 269
Selection in Dynamic Entry Games 0 0 0 26 1 12 17 116
The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage 0 0 0 13 0 3 8 129
The paradox of pledgeability 0 0 0 25 0 2 7 121
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders 0 0 1 357 1 4 9 913
Total Journal Articles 3 10 33 1,555 32 145 306 6,739
1 registered items for which data could not be found
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Statistics updated 2026-03-04