Access Statistics for Vitali Gretschko

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism with Covert Information Acquisition 0 0 0 6 3 10 30 41
An efficient dynamic mechanism with covert information acquisition 0 0 0 7 0 3 16 18
Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism 0 0 0 19 1 5 19 77
Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism 0 0 0 24 1 5 20 125
Auctions vs. negotiations: The role of communication in an experiment with procurement managers 0 0 7 7 1 4 11 11
Bargaining in Spectrum Auctions: A Review of the German Auction in 2015 0 0 0 7 0 6 12 45
CONTRACT DESIGN WITH LIMITED COMMITMENT 0 0 0 40 0 4 14 81
Common Values and the Coase Conjecture: Inefficiencies in Frictionless Contract (Re-)Negotiation 0 0 0 28 0 6 13 52
Contract (re-)negotiation with private and common values 0 0 0 25 0 3 14 63
Contract design with limited commitment 0 0 0 14 0 4 13 59
Das Verhandlungsgebot im Telekommunikationsmarkt: Analyse und Designempfehlungen 0 0 0 0 2 3 15 20
Das Verhandlungsgebot im Telekommunikationsmarkt: Analyse und Designempfehlungen 0 0 0 3 0 4 13 21
Ein flexibles Vergütungskonzept für Mediziner hilft, Herdenimmunität gegen COVID-19 zu erreichen 0 0 0 4 1 4 8 16
Empfehlungen für das Marktdesign zur Befüllung der Gasspeicher 0 0 0 7 2 4 9 17
Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions 0 0 0 15 0 5 13 46
Imitation Perfection - A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement 0 0 1 10 0 2 9 29
Imitation perfection - a simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement 0 0 0 11 1 9 27 98
Imitation perfection: A simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement 0 0 0 10 0 1 14 50
Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement 0 0 0 32 0 1 13 51
Sequential procurement with limited commitment 0 0 0 16 1 6 13 60
Social norms and market behavior: Evidence from a large population sample 1 1 1 60 1 6 15 53
Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 4
Strategic Complexities in the Combinatorial Clock Auction 0 0 0 85 0 6 9 271
Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions 0 0 0 12 0 4 11 25
Total Working Papers 1 1 9 442 14 106 335 1,333

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German auction in 2015 0 0 0 13 0 3 6 73
Beschaffungskonflikte: Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer 0 0 0 6 1 3 8 42
Empfehlungen für das Marktdesign zur Befüllung der Gasspeicher 0 0 0 0 0 3 11 12
Excess information acquisition in auctions 0 0 2 29 0 6 16 134
Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement 0 0 1 6 1 5 23 46
Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement 0 0 1 5 0 5 30 42
Information acquisition during a descending auction 0 0 0 9 0 0 9 80
Information design in sequential procurement 0 0 0 8 0 1 5 23
On the strictly descending multi-unit auction 0 0 0 21 0 4 17 106
Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 7
Pre-auction or post-auction qualification? 0 0 1 5 0 3 11 51
Procurement under public scrutiny: auctions versus negotiations 0 0 0 9 0 4 9 40
Social norms, sanctions, and conditional entry in markets with externalities: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment 0 0 0 7 0 1 15 39
Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions 0 0 0 0 0 3 17 25
Total Journal Articles 0 0 5 118 2 43 183 720

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Statistics updated 2026-06-04