Access Statistics for Ori Haimanko

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
APPROXIMATE ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIUM TO INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 83
BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE IN (ALMOST CONTINUOUS) CONTESTS 0 0 1 15 1 2 4 25
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types 0 0 1 13 0 1 4 12
COMMON-VALUE ALL-PAY AUCTIONS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 0 0 1 50 2 2 4 145
COMPOSITION INDEPENDENCE IN COMPOUND GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BANZHAF POWER INDEX AND THE BANZHAF VALUE 0 0 0 10 0 1 1 38
Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index Without the Efficiency Axiom 0 0 0 48 0 1 2 197
Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 62
Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps 0 0 0 15 2 2 4 35
Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps 0 0 0 27 0 0 1 75
Compound Voting and the Banzhaf Power Index 0 0 0 162 1 1 1 1,270
Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change 0 0 0 16 1 1 3 72
Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change 0 0 0 16 1 1 3 86
Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 220
EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE IN GAMES WITH A CONCAVE BAYESIAN POTENTIAL 0 0 0 5 1 1 3 13
EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE IN GAMES WITH A CONCAVE BAYESIAN POTENTIAL 0 0 0 15 0 0 5 24
Equilibrium Existence in Two-player Contests Without Absolute Continuity of Information 0 0 1 20 1 1 2 17
GENERALIZED COLEMAN-SHAPLEY INDICES AND TOTAL-POWER MONOTONICITY 0 1 1 12 0 1 2 11
INFORMATION IN TULLOCK CONTESTS 0 0 0 20 0 1 1 40
Information Advantage in Common-Value Classic Tullock Contests 0 0 1 22 0 0 5 81
Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly with Separable Information, or Nondifferentiable 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 177
Information advantage and dominant strategies in second-price auctions 0 0 0 32 0 1 4 416
Information advantage in common-value classic Tullock contests 0 0 0 19 1 2 2 48
Information in Tullock contest 0 1 1 27 0 3 6 103
On Continuity of Robust Equilibria 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 60
On efficiency and sustainability in a collective decision-making problem with heterogeneous agents 0 0 0 6 0 1 3 46
On subgame consistency of the Shapley-Shubik power index 1 11 11 11 2 14 14 14
On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium 0 0 0 12 1 1 1 94
On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 140
On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium 0 0 0 11 0 0 1 104
On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information 0 0 0 42 1 1 2 139
On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium 0 0 0 71 2 2 2 198
Optimal Scrutiny in Multi-Period Promotion Tournaments 0 0 0 82 0 0 0 379
PURE-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM IN BAYESIAN POTENTIAL GAMES WITH ABSOLUTELY CONTINUOUS INFORMATION 0 0 0 26 0 1 2 18
Price symmetry in a duopoly with congestion 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 233
Prizes Versus Wages with Envy and Pride 0 0 0 15 0 1 1 56
Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 36
Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride 0 0 1 7 1 1 3 46
Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride 0 0 1 21 0 1 2 109
Prizes versus Wages with Envy and Pride 0 0 0 69 0 0 1 275
STRONG ROBUSTNESS TO INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND THE UNIQUENESS OF A CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM 0 0 0 27 0 0 2 37
Strategic Substitutes and Potential Games 0 0 2 164 0 0 3 577
THE AXIOM OF EQUIVALENCE TO INDIVIDUAL POWER AND THE BANZHAF INDEX 0 0 0 15 0 0 4 41
THE BANZHAF VALUE AND GENERAL SEMIVALUES FOR DIFFERENTIABLE MIXED GAMES 0 0 0 14 1 1 3 30
TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 0 1 1 70 2 3 7 103
The Stability Threshold and Two Facets of Polarization 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 13
The Stability Threshold and Two Facets of Polarization 0 1 1 16 2 3 3 88
The Stability Threshold and Two Facts of Polarization 0 0 0 47 0 1 3 289
The stability threshold and two facets of polarization 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
The stability threshold and two facets of polarization 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 40
Transfers in a Polarized Country: Bridging the Gap between Efficiency and Stability 0 0 0 27 0 0 1 130
Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability 0 0 0 7 1 1 2 51
Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
Tullock Contests Reward Information Advantages 0 0 0 33 0 0 1 57
Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 59 0 0 2 95
Tullock contests with asymmetric information 0 1 1 31 1 2 4 214
Uniform Continuity of the Value of Zero-Sum Games with Differential Information 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 77
Uniform continuity of the value of zero-sum games with differential information 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 474
Unilateral Deviation with Perfect Information 0 0 1 61 0 1 50 2,314
Voluntary Formation of Communities for the Provision of Public Projects 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 75
Total Working Papers 1 17 27 1,773 26 59 179 9,931

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 34
Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence in (almost continuous) contests 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 26
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 7
Characterization of the Shapley–Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom 0 0 0 6 0 1 1 39
Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information 0 0 0 2 1 2 3 46
Composition independence in compound games: a characterization of the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 15
Compound voting and the Banzhaf index 0 0 0 13 1 1 1 66
Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 22
Cost sharing: the nondifferentiable case 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 38
Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 50
Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions 0 0 0 94 0 1 2 417
Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information 0 0 0 10 1 2 4 63
Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential 0 0 0 3 0 3 5 16
Equilibrium existence in two-player contests without absolute continuity of information 0 0 0 1 1 2 5 9
Generalized Coleman-Shapley indices and total-power monotonicity 0 1 1 3 0 2 3 13
Information in Tullock contests 0 0 0 4 1 6 8 43
Learning with perfect information 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 79
Marginal cost price rule for homogeneous cost functions 0 0 0 60 0 1 1 657
On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 56
On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium 0 0 0 53 0 1 1 176
Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments 0 0 0 18 0 1 1 79
PRIZES VERSUS WAGES WITH ENVY AND PRIDE 0 0 0 5 1 2 4 48
Payoffs in Non-Differentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 24
Payoffs in Nondifferentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 54
Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 9
Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games 0 0 1 167 0 0 3 456
Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 12
The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 59
The stability threshold and two facets of polarization 0 0 0 6 1 2 3 55
Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability 0 0 0 29 0 0 3 138
Tullock contests reward information advantages 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 23
Value theory without symmetry 0 0 0 39 0 1 2 190
Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects 0 0 0 38 0 1 1 149
Total Journal Articles 0 1 3 636 7 38 68 3,168
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Statistics updated 2025-09-05