| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
57 |
| Committee design with endogenous participation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
8 |
12 |
48 |
| Committees and reciprocity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
278 |
| Committees, sequential voting and transparency |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
82 |
| Designing monetary policy committees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
6 |
6 |
12 |
99 |
| Discretionary policy and multiple equilibria in a new Keynesian model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
17 |
| FORWARD GUIDANCE CONTRACTS |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
23 |
| Fairness and voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
84 |
| Fairness and voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
121 |
| Implementing the commitment solution via discretionary policy-making |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Inflation forecast contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
84 |
| Information Content of Wages and Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
| Information Content of Wages and Monetary Policy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
73 |
| Information acquisition and transparency in committees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
81 |
| Monetary Policy Inclinations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
142 |
| Monetary Policy Inclinations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
| On the drawbacks of large committees |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
49 |
| Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, Editors, Handbook of Economic Growth 1 volumes A and B, North-Holland, Amsterdam (2005) 1998 pages, ISBN-13: 978-0-444-50837-9, USD 235 (set) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
114 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
561 |
| Price Dispersion and the Costs of Inflation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
33 |
| Price points and price dynamics |
0 |
0 |
3 |
26 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
94 |
| Reciprocity and voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
145 |
| SIGNALING AND COMMITMENT: MONETARY VERSUS INFLATION TARGETING |
0 |
1 |
1 |
134 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
426 |
| Search, unemployment, and age |
1 |
1 |
2 |
57 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
243 |
| Sequential aggregation of verifiable information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
91 |
| Should central banks remain silent about their private information on cost-push shocks? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
120 |
| Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
130 |
| TRANSPARENCY IN MONETARY POLICY, SIGNALING, AND HETEROGENEOUS INFORMATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
38 |
| Tax rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
57 |
| Transparency of Central Bank Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
6 |
25 |
| Transparency of Central Bank Preferences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
18 |
| VOTING TRANSPARENCY, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF CENTRAL BANKERS |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
11 |
| Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
| Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
121 |
| Total Journal Articles |
1 |
4 |
12 |
709 |
27 |
60 |
176 |
3,381 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.