| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
253 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
1,345 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
98 |
2 |
5 |
15 |
195 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
288 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
667 |
| A THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE BASED ON THE SENIORITY OF CLAIMS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
23 |
287 |
| A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims |
0 |
0 |
0 |
234 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
613 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
30 |
538 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
1 |
2 |
14 |
748 |
4 |
10 |
55 |
1,846 |
| A Theory of Firm Scope |
0 |
1 |
7 |
294 |
0 |
5 |
22 |
628 |
| A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
542 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
1 |
1 |
36 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
203 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
1 |
1 |
1 |
178 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
666 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
86 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
336 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
5 |
35 |
3,843 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
1 |
1 |
11 |
140 |
2 |
5 |
39 |
335 |
| Banks Are Where The Liquidity Is |
0 |
2 |
5 |
87 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
132 |
| Bargaining and Strikes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
232 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
292 |
| Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
362 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
1 |
168 |
2 |
3 |
17 |
361 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
1 |
1 |
4 |
335 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
900 |
| Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
141 |
2 |
5 |
17 |
341 |
| Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence |
1 |
1 |
2 |
99 |
2 |
3 |
29 |
261 |
| Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
298 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
552 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
2 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
5 |
5 |
20 |
670 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
685 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
1,941 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
1 |
2 |
2 |
269 |
4 |
7 |
11 |
1,670 |
| Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
870 |
| DEFAULT AND RENEGOTIATION: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF DEBT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
34 |
547 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
1 |
1 |
289 |
1 |
9 |
33 |
1,089 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
2 |
5 |
51 |
5 |
17 |
49 |
253 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
0 |
0 |
7 |
343 |
0 |
3 |
30 |
1,064 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
780 |
0 |
5 |
59 |
1,889 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
23 |
1,171 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A DynamicModel of Debt - (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.113(1), February 1998, pp.1-41.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
241 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
520 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
1,525 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
322 |
1 |
7 |
20 |
943 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
381 |
| Exit vs. Voice |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
9 |
9 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
1 |
2 |
749 |
1 |
4 |
24 |
1,838 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
3 |
5 |
23 |
224 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
781 |
3 |
5 |
12 |
1,605 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
1,173 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.115-138.) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
242 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
772 |
| Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
2 |
144 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
342 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
75 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
91 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
152 |
| How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
106 |
| Imperfect Competition in General Equilibrium: An Overview of Recent Work (Now published in Frontiers of Economics, edited by K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
29 |
494 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
14 |
1,136 |
4 |
7 |
31 |
2,347 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
1 |
8 |
447 |
2 |
10 |
44 |
1,209 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
22 |
729 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiations (Now published in Econometrica, vol.56, No.4 (1988), pp.755-785.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
217 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
799 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
1 |
1 |
88 |
1 |
6 |
16 |
210 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
180 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
104 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
2 |
5 |
108 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
203 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: A General Model (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LII, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
800 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: Special Results (Now published in Economic Journal, 95, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
10 |
309 |
| More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
1 |
5 |
121 |
3 |
7 |
20 |
307 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
1 |
3 |
84 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
202 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
220 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
663 |
2 |
6 |
16 |
1,588 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
461 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1,125 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
442 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1,134 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
1 |
2 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
145 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
163 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
471 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
486 |
| One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
1,510 |
| One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,114 |
3 |
11 |
33 |
2,888 |
| Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, (January 1983).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
161 |
| Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles |
0 |
0 |
10 |
34 |
5 |
8 |
33 |
47 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
85 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
45 |
2,012 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
2 |
4 |
15 |
147 |
3 |
22 |
93 |
592 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (Now published in Journal of Political Economy, vol.98, No.6 (1990), pp.1119-1158.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
502 |
| Reasonable Conjectures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
196 |
| Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
4 |
161 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
329 |
| Short-term, Long-term, and Continuing Contracts |
0 |
2 |
11 |
96 |
2 |
4 |
23 |
182 |
| Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
2 |
268 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
912 |
| Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
1 |
1 |
1 |
549 |
2 |
2 |
14 |
1,793 |
| Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
81 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
183 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
187 |
| The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
0 |
1 |
5 |
2,152 |
7 |
18 |
91 |
6,555 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (August 1986)) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
728 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
27 |
98 |
2,999 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
1 |
3 |
23 |
169 |
8 |
17 |
194 |
800 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
1 |
3 |
747 |
3 |
9 |
59 |
1,916 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
181 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
16 |
569 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
865 |
1 |
5 |
28 |
3,075 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
30 |
1,188 |
| The Theory of Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
53 |
215 |
6,525 |
| The public good is a public good: a theory of corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
20 |
483 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
367 |
| VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND MARKET FORECLOSURE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
21 |
1,278 |
| Total Working Papers |
13 |
38 |
200 |
19,076 |
183 |
506 |
2,307 |
87,962 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies |
0 |
0 |
2 |
257 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
637 |
| A new bankruptcy procedure that uses multiple auctions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
59 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
344 |
| A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption |
0 |
1 |
2 |
79 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
168 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
1 |
5 |
85 |
5,607 |
8 |
32 |
250 |
15,378 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
344 |
| Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence |
1 |
1 |
7 |
95 |
4 |
13 |
45 |
446 |
| Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition-Behavioral Effects of The Fundamental Transformation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
252 |
| Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications |
21 |
50 |
114 |
3,268 |
35 |
85 |
237 |
8,005 |
| Debt Enforcement around the World |
0 |
0 |
5 |
273 |
5 |
11 |
64 |
1,003 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
2 |
10 |
40 |
653 |
7 |
36 |
156 |
2,378 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
1 |
1 |
4 |
146 |
4 |
6 |
24 |
454 |
| Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
243 |
| Financial Contracting |
1 |
1 |
7 |
590 |
4 |
11 |
67 |
1,658 |
| Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
5 |
185 |
1 |
3 |
21 |
432 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New thoughts |
1 |
1 |
2 |
110 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
384 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
3 |
5 |
342 |
3 |
7 |
20 |
964 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
8 |
11 |
62 |
1,895 |
26 |
46 |
176 |
5,269 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
922 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
235 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
1 |
3 |
35 |
3 |
7 |
21 |
166 |
| On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies |
0 |
0 |
7 |
76 |
3 |
3 |
10 |
231 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
52 |
2 |
5 |
17 |
936 |
| On the existence of equilibrium in a securities model |
0 |
0 |
3 |
96 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
201 |
| On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete |
1 |
3 |
21 |
1,027 |
2 |
6 |
38 |
1,633 |
| One share-one vote and the market for corporate control |
1 |
1 |
18 |
475 |
14 |
40 |
154 |
1,336 |
| Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
111 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
453 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
1 |
4 |
249 |
2 |
4 |
22 |
959 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
6 |
3,899 |
6 |
15 |
73 |
11,724 |
| Regulation and Sarbanes‐Oxley |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
107 |
| Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium |
0 |
1 |
2 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
74 |
| Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation |
5 |
17 |
129 |
4,864 |
16 |
61 |
464 |
14,051 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
56 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
133 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
3 |
6 |
46 |
7,668 |
25 |
62 |
326 |
21,078 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
40 |
855 |
| The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
3 |
8 |
28 |
809 |
| The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme |
3 |
5 |
39 |
811 |
13 |
32 |
130 |
3,165 |
| Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm |
1 |
1 |
3 |
106 |
2 |
5 |
23 |
418 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
2 |
2 |
10 |
248 |
| Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
141 |
| Total Journal Articles |
50 |
120 |
628 |
33,512 |
200 |
525 |
2,520 |
98,234 |
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