| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
254 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1,363 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
219 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
289 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
693 |
| A THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE BASED ON THE SENIORITY OF CLAIMS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
303 |
| A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
633 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
0 |
0 |
1 |
759 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1,928 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
588 |
| A Theory of Firm Scope |
0 |
0 |
0 |
301 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
671 |
| A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
571 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
347 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
186 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
702 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
208 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
0 |
0 |
1 |
170 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
440 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
3,941 |
| Banks Are Where The Liquidity Is |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
164 |
| Bargaining and Strikes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
240 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
298 |
| Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
379 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
2 |
172 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
383 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
2 |
347 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
942 |
| Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
352 |
| Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
101 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
279 |
| Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
320 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
1 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
704 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
563 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
2 |
690 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1,959 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
1 |
1 |
2 |
273 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
1,693 |
| Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
920 |
| DEFAULT AND RENEGOTIATION: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF DEBT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
606 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
297 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1,174 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
1 |
1 |
1 |
57 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
388 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
0 |
0 |
0 |
352 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
1,125 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
1 |
789 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
1,982 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,195 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A DynamicModel of Debt - (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.113(1), February 1998, pp.1-41.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
259 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
523 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,569 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
323 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
982 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
431 |
| Exit vs. Voice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
94 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
755 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
1,913 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
264 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1,191 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
788 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1,638 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.115-138.) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
248 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
785 |
| Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
351 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
162 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
100 |
| How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
112 |
| Imperfect Competition in General Equilibrium: An Overview of Recent Work (Now published in Frontiers of Economics, edited by K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
576 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,145 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
2,405 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
801 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
1 |
2 |
4 |
470 |
2 |
6 |
17 |
1,303 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiations (Now published in Econometrica, vol.56, No.4 (1988), pp.755-785.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
226 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
825 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
187 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
228 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
118 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
114 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
221 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: A General Model (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LII, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
809 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: Special Results (Now published in Economic Journal, 95, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
321 |
| More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
130 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
369 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
217 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
242 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
664 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,599 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
445 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,143 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
464 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1,139 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
163 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
487 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
155 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
517 |
| One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
1,560 |
| One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,126 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
3,013 |
| Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, (January 1983).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
173 |
| Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles |
0 |
1 |
2 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
107 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
103 |
| Private Sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
22 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
2,065 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
0 |
1 |
7 |
177 |
2 |
7 |
37 |
729 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (Now published in Journal of Political Economy, vol.98, No.6 (1990), pp.1119-1158.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
531 |
| Reasonable Conjectures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
204 |
| Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
1 |
2 |
166 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
349 |
| Short-term, Long-term, and Continuing Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
224 |
| Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
1 |
1 |
2 |
274 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
964 |
| Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
1 |
2 |
2 |
552 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
1,830 |
| Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
90 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
196 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
189 |
| The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2,176 |
7 |
12 |
35 |
6,706 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (August 1986)) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
778 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
2 |
3 |
12 |
208 |
6 |
16 |
43 |
956 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
3,227 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
592 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
1 |
1 |
2 |
760 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
2,071 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
204 |
| The New Corporate Governance |
1 |
2 |
7 |
45 |
2 |
5 |
28 |
114 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
1,231 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
2 |
873 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
3,137 |
| The Theory of Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
71 |
7,065 |
| The public good is a public good: a theory of corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
493 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
377 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
23 |
| VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND MARKET FORECLOSURE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1,331 |
| Total Working Papers |
10 |
17 |
71 |
19,567 |
89 |
185 |
641 |
92,666 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
265 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
663 |
| A new bankruptcy procedure that uses multiple auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
365 |
| A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption |
0 |
0 |
1 |
86 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
183 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
2 |
3 |
6 |
5,695 |
5 |
10 |
29 |
15,699 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
364 |
| Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
107 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
532 |
| Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition-Behavioral Effects of The Fundamental Transformation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
273 |
| Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications |
3 |
10 |
37 |
3,526 |
4 |
13 |
61 |
8,623 |
| Debt Enforcement around the World |
0 |
0 |
2 |
287 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1,151 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
0 |
2 |
8 |
718 |
2 |
10 |
33 |
2,704 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
1 |
5 |
15 |
211 |
4 |
12 |
30 |
597 |
| Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
257 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
596 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1,731 |
| Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
4 |
195 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
460 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New thoughts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
114 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
410 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
342 |
3 |
5 |
28 |
1,037 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
3 |
5 |
24 |
2,013 |
9 |
16 |
71 |
5,650 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
975 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results |
0 |
0 |
1 |
99 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
254 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
184 |
| On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
99 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
293 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
1 |
1 |
1 |
59 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
994 |
| On the existence of equilibrium in a securities model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
219 |
| On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete |
1 |
5 |
16 |
1,108 |
1 |
7 |
25 |
1,770 |
| One share-one vote and the market for corporate control |
1 |
3 |
30 |
612 |
6 |
19 |
91 |
1,866 |
| Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
119 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
468 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
252 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1,016 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
6 |
17 |
42 |
4,005 |
23 |
61 |
166 |
12,390 |
| Regulation and Sarbanes‐Oxley |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
118 |
| Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
80 |
| Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation |
4 |
13 |
74 |
5,123 |
13 |
34 |
191 |
14,977 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
153 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
1 |
10 |
72 |
7,833 |
24 |
81 |
341 |
22,235 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
14 |
936 |
| The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
865 |
| The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme |
1 |
2 |
15 |
906 |
5 |
13 |
51 |
3,497 |
| Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm |
0 |
1 |
2 |
118 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
473 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
267 |
| Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
| Total Journal Articles |
24 |
77 |
361 |
35,100 |
113 |
309 |
1,234 |
104,880 |
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