| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
254 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1,364 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
289 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
693 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
224 |
| A THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE BASED ON THE SENIORITY OF CLAIMS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
306 |
| A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
636 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
1 |
1 |
2 |
761 |
7 |
7 |
10 |
1,938 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
595 |
| A Theory of Firm Scope |
0 |
1 |
3 |
304 |
7 |
10 |
20 |
690 |
| A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
575 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
1 |
1 |
187 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
707 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
209 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
352 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
6 |
7 |
20 |
3,958 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
0 |
1 |
2 |
172 |
4 |
6 |
26 |
463 |
| Banks Are Where The Liquidity Is |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
170 |
| Bargaining and Strikes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
241 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
299 |
| Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
384 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
2 |
349 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
952 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
390 |
| Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
356 |
| Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence |
1 |
1 |
2 |
103 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
287 |
| Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
326 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
691 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
1,965 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
273 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
1,698 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
566 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
708 |
| Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
928 |
| DEFAULT AND RENEGOTIATION: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF DEBT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
609 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
0 |
1 |
298 |
5 |
7 |
11 |
1,184 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
0 |
2 |
58 |
9 |
10 |
18 |
401 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
0 |
0 |
0 |
352 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
1,132 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
789 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
1,986 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
8 |
1,203 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A DynamicModel of Debt - (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.113(1), February 1998, pp.1-41.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
261 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
523 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
1,573 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
323 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
989 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
13 |
441 |
| Exit vs. Voice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
5 |
6 |
8 |
102 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
756 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1,917 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
1 |
1 |
62 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
267 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
2 |
2 |
2 |
790 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
1,646 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,192 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.115-138.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
248 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
788 |
| Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
353 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
4 |
4 |
7 |
168 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
103 |
| How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
113 |
| Imperfect Competition in General Equilibrium: An Overview of Recent Work (Now published in Frontiers of Economics, edited by K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
585 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1,147 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
2,411 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
12 |
809 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
1 |
2 |
8 |
476 |
4 |
9 |
25 |
1,322 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiations (Now published in Econometrica, vol.56, No.4 (1988), pp.755-785.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
227 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
829 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
189 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
232 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
120 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
115 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
226 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: A General Model (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LII, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
811 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: Special Results (Now published in Economic Journal, 95, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
323 |
| More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
1 |
2 |
132 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
377 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
219 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
242 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
1 |
1 |
665 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
1,602 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
163 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
492 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
160 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
445 |
5 |
6 |
8 |
1,151 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
464 |
4 |
5 |
8 |
1,145 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
5 |
9 |
12 |
528 |
| One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
8 |
12 |
1,571 |
| One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1,128 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
3,023 |
| Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, (January 1983).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
174 |
| Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles |
1 |
1 |
2 |
57 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
114 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
108 |
| Private Sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
24 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
24 |
34 |
2,096 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
2 |
4 |
11 |
187 |
12 |
16 |
41 |
763 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (Now published in Journal of Political Economy, vol.98, No.6 (1990), pp.1119-1158.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
537 |
| Reasonable Conjectures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
206 |
| Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
1 |
1 |
2 |
167 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
353 |
| Short-term, Long-term, and Continuing Contracts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
108 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
232 |
| Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
1 |
1 |
2 |
275 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
968 |
| Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
3 |
553 |
3 |
3 |
10 |
1,837 |
| Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine |
0 |
2 |
2 |
43 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
94 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
194 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
197 |
| The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
2 |
5 |
9 |
2,185 |
12 |
20 |
56 |
6,750 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (August 1986)) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
786 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
14 |
25 |
3,248 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
3 |
6 |
15 |
220 |
11 |
15 |
46 |
986 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
596 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
10 |
212 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
1 |
2 |
761 |
12 |
14 |
21 |
2,089 |
| The New Corporate Governance |
0 |
3 |
7 |
50 |
4 |
9 |
24 |
133 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
1,237 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
873 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
3,144 |
| The Theory of Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
47 |
7,098 |
| The public good is a public good: a theory of corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
497 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
380 |
| VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND MARKET FORECLOSURE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
1,336 |
| Total Working Papers |
16 |
39 |
97 |
19,647 |
273 |
431 |
933 |
93,414 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies |
0 |
1 |
3 |
268 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
672 |
| A new bankruptcy procedure that uses multiple auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
371 |
| A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption |
1 |
1 |
2 |
88 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
188 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
3 |
5 |
12 |
5,704 |
9 |
16 |
48 |
15,737 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
1 |
1 |
1 |
61 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
368 |
| Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence |
1 |
1 |
1 |
108 |
4 |
5 |
14 |
544 |
| Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition-Behavioral Effects of The Fundamental Transformation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
279 |
| Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications |
3 |
6 |
25 |
3,541 |
9 |
20 |
49 |
8,659 |
| Debt Enforcement around the World |
1 |
2 |
2 |
289 |
5 |
11 |
17 |
1,168 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
0 |
1 |
3 |
719 |
4 |
7 |
24 |
2,718 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
0 |
0 |
8 |
214 |
6 |
11 |
34 |
619 |
| Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
261 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
597 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
1,737 |
| Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
195 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
466 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New thoughts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
116 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
420 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
342 |
9 |
13 |
23 |
1,055 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
1 |
1 |
10 |
2,018 |
2 |
6 |
31 |
5,665 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
12 |
986 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
256 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
6 |
7 |
9 |
192 |
| On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
100 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
301 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
5 |
6 |
14 |
1,006 |
| On the existence of equilibrium in a securities model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
220 |
| On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete |
2 |
2 |
15 |
1,118 |
3 |
6 |
28 |
1,791 |
| One share-one vote and the market for corporate control |
0 |
3 |
14 |
623 |
5 |
18 |
59 |
1,906 |
| Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
121 |
3 |
3 |
6 |
474 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
252 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
1,026 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
5 |
11 |
50 |
4,038 |
21 |
47 |
200 |
12,529 |
| Regulation and Sarbanes‐Oxley |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
121 |
| Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
| Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation |
9 |
23 |
63 |
5,173 |
15 |
40 |
139 |
15,082 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
1 |
1 |
63 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
163 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
9 |
15 |
44 |
7,867 |
41 |
69 |
281 |
22,435 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
17 |
947 |
| The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
871 |
| The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme |
0 |
4 |
13 |
917 |
5 |
11 |
39 |
3,523 |
| Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
118 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
478 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
274 |
| Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
155 |
| Total Journal Articles |
36 |
78 |
277 |
35,300 |
188 |
364 |
1,172 |
105,743 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.