| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
254 |
0 |
7 |
8 |
1,371 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
0 |
8 |
13 |
232 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
289 |
1 |
5 |
5 |
698 |
| A THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE BASED ON THE SENIORITY OF CLAIMS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
306 |
| A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
5 |
12 |
15 |
648 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
0 |
1 |
3 |
762 |
2 |
20 |
30 |
1,958 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
19 |
607 |
| A Theory of Firm Scope |
0 |
0 |
3 |
304 |
5 |
15 |
34 |
705 |
| A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
12 |
583 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
1 |
2 |
188 |
2 |
12 |
17 |
719 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
1 |
7 |
12 |
359 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
5 |
6 |
214 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
10 |
27 |
3,968 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
0 |
1 |
3 |
173 |
5 |
79 |
102 |
542 |
| Banks Are Where The Liquidity Is |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
2 |
11 |
17 |
181 |
| Bargaining and Strikes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
8 |
248 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
305 |
| Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
16 |
395 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
1 |
12 |
19 |
402 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
2 |
349 |
2 |
15 |
25 |
967 |
| Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
3 |
17 |
21 |
373 |
| Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
2 |
103 |
1 |
6 |
14 |
293 |
| Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence |
0 |
1 |
1 |
62 |
2 |
18 |
24 |
344 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
273 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
1,704 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
7 |
11 |
715 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
691 |
3 |
5 |
11 |
1,970 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
13 |
576 |
| Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
7 |
15 |
935 |
| DEFAULT AND RENEGOTIATION: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF DEBT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
11 |
617 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
1 |
7 |
20 |
408 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
0 |
1 |
298 |
1 |
12 |
22 |
1,196 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
1 |
2 |
2 |
354 |
3 |
13 |
20 |
1,145 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
15 |
1,210 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
789 |
1 |
4 |
8 |
1,990 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A DynamicModel of Debt - (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.113(1), February 1998, pp.1-41.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
267 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
523 |
2 |
8 |
12 |
1,581 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
1 |
1 |
324 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
994 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
18 |
449 |
| Exit vs. Voice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
4 |
6 |
14 |
108 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
269 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
756 |
2 |
11 |
15 |
1,928 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
790 |
5 |
23 |
31 |
1,669 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
2 |
7 |
8 |
1,199 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.115-138.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
248 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
790 |
| Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
359 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
109 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
6 |
16 |
22 |
184 |
| How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
115 |
| Imperfect Competition in General Equilibrium: An Overview of Recent Work (Now published in Frontiers of Economics, edited by K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
21 |
597 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
3 |
5 |
1,150 |
2 |
10 |
16 |
2,421 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
20 |
821 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
2 |
8 |
478 |
1 |
13 |
32 |
1,335 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiations (Now published in Econometrica, vol.56, No.4 (1988), pp.755-785.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
231 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
834 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
2 |
9 |
11 |
198 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
2 |
11 |
15 |
243 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
115 |
2 |
7 |
12 |
233 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
2 |
7 |
9 |
127 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: A General Model (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LII, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
10 |
819 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: Special Results (Now published in Economic Journal, 95, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
328 |
| More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
132 |
1 |
11 |
19 |
388 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
225 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
665 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1,603 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
20 |
20 |
262 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
163 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
493 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
445 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
1,154 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
165 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
464 |
0 |
7 |
13 |
1,152 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
3 |
7 |
18 |
535 |
| One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
22 |
1,582 |
| One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control |
1 |
2 |
4 |
1,130 |
1 |
15 |
25 |
3,038 |
| Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, (January 1983).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
11 |
184 |
| Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
5 |
11 |
18 |
125 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
7 |
12 |
115 |
| Private Sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
8 |
10 |
32 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
42 |
2,107 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
0 |
1 |
11 |
188 |
3 |
17 |
51 |
780 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (Now published in Journal of Political Economy, vol.98, No.6 (1990), pp.1119-1158.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
542 |
| Reasonable Conjectures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
9 |
213 |
| Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
167 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
356 |
| Short-term, Long-term, and Continuing Contracts |
0 |
1 |
3 |
109 |
2 |
12 |
20 |
244 |
| Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
275 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
971 |
| Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
553 |
7 |
26 |
33 |
1,863 |
| Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine |
0 |
0 |
2 |
43 |
3 |
7 |
11 |
101 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
198 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
8 |
204 |
| The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
3 |
6 |
15 |
2,191 |
12 |
74 |
118 |
6,824 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (August 1986)) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
15 |
793 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
33 |
3,260 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
1 |
3 |
15 |
223 |
7 |
19 |
49 |
1,005 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
15 |
219 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
598 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
1 |
2 |
762 |
3 |
10 |
28 |
2,099 |
| The New Corporate Governance |
0 |
0 |
5 |
50 |
3 |
10 |
29 |
143 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
1,239 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
873 |
1 |
9 |
16 |
3,153 |
| The Theory of Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
42 |
7,107 |
| The public good is a public good: a theory of corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
501 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
9 |
9 |
32 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
385 |
| VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND MARKET FORECLOSURE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
40 |
45 |
1,376 |
| Total Working Papers |
6 |
26 |
106 |
19,673 |
195 |
1,044 |
1,792 |
94,458 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies |
0 |
1 |
4 |
269 |
1 |
7 |
16 |
679 |
| A new bankruptcy procedure that uses multiple auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
3 |
8 |
14 |
379 |
| A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption |
0 |
1 |
3 |
89 |
2 |
7 |
12 |
195 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
1 |
5 |
14 |
5,709 |
10 |
31 |
69 |
15,768 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
371 |
| Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
108 |
1 |
8 |
20 |
552 |
| Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition-Behavioral Effects of The Fundamental Transformation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
283 |
| Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications |
1 |
4 |
19 |
3,545 |
1 |
7 |
43 |
8,666 |
| Debt Enforcement around the World |
0 |
1 |
3 |
290 |
0 |
6 |
23 |
1,174 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
0 |
0 |
1 |
719 |
1 |
9 |
23 |
2,727 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
2 |
6 |
9 |
220 |
4 |
22 |
44 |
641 |
| Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
265 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
597 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
1,742 |
| Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment |
0 |
1 |
1 |
196 |
1 |
6 |
12 |
472 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New thoughts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
116 |
2 |
8 |
18 |
428 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
342 |
5 |
24 |
42 |
1,079 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
2 |
7 |
2,020 |
5 |
18 |
33 |
5,683 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
21 |
996 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
261 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
4 |
19 |
27 |
211 |
| On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
306 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
4 |
12 |
24 |
1,018 |
| On the existence of equilibrium in a securities model |
1 |
1 |
1 |
103 |
2 |
8 |
9 |
228 |
| On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete |
1 |
2 |
12 |
1,120 |
1 |
9 |
30 |
1,800 |
| One share-one vote and the market for corporate control |
1 |
7 |
18 |
630 |
2 |
15 |
55 |
1,921 |
| Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
121 |
0 |
5 |
11 |
479 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
252 |
0 |
6 |
16 |
1,032 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
6 |
18 |
51 |
4,056 |
28 |
98 |
237 |
12,627 |
| Regulation and Sarbanes‐Oxley |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
125 |
| Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
83 |
| Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation |
8 |
24 |
74 |
5,197 |
14 |
57 |
162 |
15,139 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
63 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
164 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
9 |
18 |
52 |
7,885 |
39 |
129 |
329 |
22,564 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
26 |
962 |
| The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
3 |
7 |
13 |
878 |
| The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme |
2 |
2 |
13 |
919 |
20 |
64 |
90 |
3,587 |
| Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
483 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
278 |
| Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
9 |
13 |
164 |
| Total Journal Articles |
32 |
93 |
293 |
35,393 |
166 |
667 |
1,530 |
106,410 |