| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
254 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,363 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
219 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
289 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
693 |
| A THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE BASED ON THE SENIORITY OF CLAIMS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
304 |
| A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
634 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
0 |
0 |
1 |
760 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,931 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
593 |
| A Theory of Firm Scope |
1 |
1 |
3 |
304 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
682 |
| A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
574 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
1 |
1 |
1 |
187 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
706 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
209 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
348 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
1 |
2 |
2 |
172 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
458 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
3,951 |
| Banks Are Where The Liquidity Is |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
165 |
| Bargaining and Strikes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
240 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
298 |
| Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
381 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
2 |
349 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
949 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
387 |
| Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
352 |
| Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
102 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
282 |
| Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
321 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
564 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
273 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
1,696 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
705 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
691 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
1,964 |
| Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
924 |
| DEFAULT AND RENEGOTIATION: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF DEBT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
609 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
1 |
1 |
298 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
1,178 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
0 |
2 |
58 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
392 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
0 |
0 |
0 |
352 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
1,128 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1,198 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
1 |
789 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
1,985 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A DynamicModel of Debt - (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.113(1), February 1998, pp.1-41.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
261 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
523 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1,571 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
323 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
987 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
437 |
| Exit vs. Voice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
96 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
264 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
1 |
1 |
756 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
1,916 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
788 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,639 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,192 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.115-138.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
248 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
786 |
| Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
352 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
164 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
100 |
| How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
112 |
| Imperfect Competition in General Equilibrium: An Overview of Recent Work (Now published in Frontiers of Economics, edited by K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
581 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1,146 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
2,407 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
7 |
474 |
1 |
3 |
23 |
1,314 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
803 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiations (Now published in Econometrica, vol.56, No.4 (1988), pp.755-785.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
227 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
826 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
187 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
229 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
120 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
115 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
224 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: A General Model (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LII, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
809 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: Special Results (Now published in Economic Journal, 95, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
321 |
| More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
131 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
372 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
218 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
1 |
1 |
1 |
665 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1,600 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
242 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
445 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,145 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
163 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
490 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
2 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
157 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
464 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1,140 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
521 |
| One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
1,563 |
| One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1,127 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
3,022 |
| Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, (January 1983).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
174 |
| Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles |
0 |
0 |
1 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
111 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
105 |
| Private Sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
2 |
3 |
9 |
185 |
2 |
7 |
36 |
749 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
10 |
2,072 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (Now published in Journal of Political Economy, vol.98, No.6 (1990), pp.1119-1158.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
534 |
| Reasonable Conjectures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
205 |
| Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
2 |
166 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
350 |
| Short-term, Long-term, and Continuing Contracts |
0 |
1 |
2 |
108 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
230 |
| Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
274 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
965 |
| Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
0 |
1 |
3 |
553 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
1,834 |
| Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
91 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
197 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
189 |
| The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
3 |
5 |
7 |
2,183 |
5 |
15 |
47 |
6,735 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (August 1986)) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
782 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
2 |
3 |
13 |
216 |
2 |
8 |
41 |
973 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
20 |
3,239 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
1 |
760 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
2,075 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
207 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
593 |
| The New Corporate Governance |
0 |
0 |
4 |
47 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
124 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
1,235 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
1 |
873 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3,138 |
| The Theory of Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
60 |
7,093 |
| The public good is a public good: a theory of corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
494 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
1 |
1 |
48 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
378 |
| VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND MARKET FORECLOSURE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
1,334 |
| Total Working Papers |
12 |
22 |
78 |
19,620 |
46 |
163 |
672 |
93,029 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies |
0 |
2 |
2 |
267 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
669 |
| A new bankruptcy procedure that uses multiple auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
369 |
| A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption |
0 |
0 |
1 |
87 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
186 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
1 |
2 |
9 |
5,700 |
2 |
12 |
39 |
15,723 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
365 |
| Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
107 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
539 |
| Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition-Behavioral Effects of The Fundamental Transformation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
277 |
| Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications |
1 |
2 |
28 |
3,536 |
5 |
6 |
49 |
8,644 |
| Debt Enforcement around the World |
0 |
0 |
1 |
287 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
1,159 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
0 |
0 |
2 |
718 |
2 |
5 |
21 |
2,713 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
0 |
1 |
9 |
214 |
1 |
5 |
28 |
609 |
| Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
259 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
2 |
597 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1,734 |
| Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
195 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
464 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New thoughts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
116 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
417 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
342 |
1 |
2 |
23 |
1,043 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
15 |
2,017 |
2 |
2 |
39 |
5,661 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
982 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results |
0 |
0 |
1 |
99 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
255 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
185 |
| On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies |
0 |
1 |
1 |
100 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
298 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
1,000 |
| On the existence of equilibrium in a securities model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
219 |
| On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete |
0 |
3 |
15 |
1,116 |
0 |
4 |
26 |
1,785 |
| One share-one vote and the market for corporate control |
2 |
5 |
17 |
622 |
5 |
11 |
54 |
1,893 |
| Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation |
0 |
1 |
2 |
121 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
471 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
252 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
1,022 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
2 |
7 |
50 |
4,029 |
10 |
43 |
199 |
12,492 |
| Regulation and Sarbanes‐Oxley |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
120 |
| Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
| Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation |
7 |
12 |
70 |
5,157 |
12 |
31 |
159 |
15,054 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
1 |
1 |
2 |
63 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
158 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
3 |
10 |
55 |
7,855 |
13 |
45 |
317 |
22,379 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
940 |
| The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
868 |
| The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme |
1 |
2 |
11 |
914 |
2 |
6 |
35 |
3,514 |
| Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
118 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
477 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
270 |
| Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
153 |
| Total Journal Articles |
18 |
49 |
302 |
35,240 |
67 |
228 |
1,143 |
105,446 |
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