| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
254 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
1,366 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
3 |
8 |
8 |
227 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
289 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
695 |
| A THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE BASED ON THE SENIORITY OF CLAIMS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
306 |
| A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
636 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
10 |
17 |
603 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
0 |
1 |
2 |
761 |
4 |
11 |
14 |
1,942 |
| A Theory of Firm Scope |
0 |
0 |
3 |
304 |
2 |
10 |
22 |
692 |
| A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
576 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
1 |
1 |
2 |
188 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
708 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
3 |
7 |
8 |
355 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
211 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
1 |
1 |
3 |
173 |
68 |
73 |
93 |
531 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
3 |
10 |
23 |
3,961 |
| Banks Are Where The Liquidity Is |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
2 |
7 |
10 |
172 |
| Bargaining and Strikes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
241 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
300 |
| Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
11 |
389 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
3 |
6 |
13 |
393 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
2 |
349 |
4 |
7 |
16 |
956 |
| Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
3 |
7 |
7 |
359 |
| Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
1 |
2 |
103 |
1 |
6 |
9 |
288 |
| Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence |
1 |
1 |
1 |
62 |
3 |
8 |
9 |
329 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
273 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
1,699 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
569 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
691 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1,965 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
709 |
| Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
6 |
12 |
930 |
| DEFAULT AND RENEGOTIATION: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF DEBT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
8 |
613 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
0 |
1 |
298 |
9 |
15 |
20 |
1,193 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
0 |
2 |
58 |
3 |
12 |
20 |
404 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
0 |
0 |
0 |
352 |
4 |
8 |
13 |
1,136 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
789 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
1,988 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
12 |
1,207 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A DynamicModel of Debt - (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.113(1), February 1998, pp.1-41.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
261 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
1 |
1 |
1 |
324 |
3 |
5 |
10 |
992 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
523 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
1,575 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
13 |
443 |
| Exit vs. Voice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
102 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
1 |
1 |
62 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
267 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
756 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
1,918 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
2 |
2 |
790 |
1 |
8 |
9 |
1,647 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
7 |
1,197 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.115-138.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
248 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
790 |
| Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
355 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
2 |
6 |
9 |
170 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
4 |
7 |
8 |
107 |
| How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
115 |
| Imperfect Competition in General Equilibrium: An Overview of Recent Work (Now published in Frontiers of Economics, edited by K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
15 |
590 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1,147 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
2,412 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
1 |
3 |
9 |
477 |
7 |
15 |
30 |
1,329 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
12 |
17 |
815 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiations (Now published in Econometrica, vol.56, No.4 (1988), pp.755-785.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
229 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
830 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
189 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
234 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
115 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
228 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
121 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: A General Model (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LII, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
812 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: Special Results (Now published in Economic Journal, 95, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
324 |
| More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
1 |
2 |
132 |
8 |
13 |
17 |
385 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
222 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
665 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
1,603 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
243 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
464 |
0 |
5 |
8 |
1,145 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
445 |
0 |
6 |
8 |
1,151 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
163 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
492 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
4 |
7 |
9 |
164 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
4 |
11 |
16 |
532 |
| One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
16 |
1,575 |
| One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1,129 |
5 |
6 |
17 |
3,028 |
| Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, (January 1983).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
6 |
179 |
| Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles |
0 |
1 |
1 |
57 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
116 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
111 |
| Private Sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
4 |
6 |
6 |
28 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
29 |
39 |
2,101 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
1 |
3 |
12 |
188 |
4 |
18 |
44 |
767 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (Now published in Journal of Political Economy, vol.98, No.6 (1990), pp.1119-1158.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
10 |
539 |
| Reasonable Conjectures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
206 |
| Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
1 |
1 |
167 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
355 |
| Short-term, Long-term, and Continuing Contracts |
1 |
1 |
3 |
109 |
6 |
8 |
16 |
238 |
| Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
0 |
1 |
2 |
275 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
968 |
| Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
3 |
553 |
3 |
6 |
13 |
1,840 |
| Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine |
0 |
2 |
2 |
43 |
3 |
6 |
8 |
97 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
200 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
194 |
| The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
2 |
4 |
11 |
2,187 |
12 |
27 |
64 |
6,762 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (August 1986)) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
786 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
25 |
3,250 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
2 |
6 |
16 |
222 |
8 |
21 |
49 |
994 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
596 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
1 |
2 |
3 |
762 |
4 |
18 |
25 |
2,093 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
12 |
214 |
| The New Corporate Governance |
0 |
3 |
7 |
50 |
3 |
12 |
25 |
136 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
873 |
4 |
10 |
11 |
3,148 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
1,238 |
| The Theory of Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
44 |
7,101 |
| The public good is a public good: a theory of corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
497 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
382 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
25 |
| VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND MARKET FORECLOSURE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
1,337 |
| Total Working Papers |
13 |
40 |
107 |
19,660 |
325 |
710 |
1,215 |
93,739 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies |
0 |
1 |
3 |
268 |
2 |
5 |
12 |
674 |
| A new bankruptcy procedure that uses multiple auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
372 |
| A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption |
0 |
1 |
2 |
88 |
3 |
5 |
8 |
191 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
1 |
5 |
13 |
5,705 |
10 |
24 |
56 |
15,747 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
1 |
1 |
61 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
368 |
| Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence |
0 |
1 |
1 |
108 |
3 |
8 |
16 |
547 |
| Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition-Behavioral Effects of The Fundamental Transformation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
280 |
| Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications |
1 |
6 |
24 |
3,542 |
3 |
18 |
48 |
8,662 |
| Debt Enforcement around the World |
1 |
3 |
3 |
290 |
2 |
11 |
19 |
1,170 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
0 |
1 |
2 |
719 |
3 |
8 |
21 |
2,721 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
1 |
1 |
5 |
215 |
4 |
14 |
30 |
623 |
| Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
261 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
597 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
1,739 |
| Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment |
1 |
1 |
1 |
196 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
467 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New thoughts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
116 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
421 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
342 |
10 |
22 |
32 |
1,065 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
1 |
9 |
2,018 |
7 |
11 |
37 |
5,672 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
14 |
988 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
256 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
8 |
10 |
193 |
| On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
302 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
1 |
7 |
15 |
1,007 |
| On the existence of equilibrium in a securities model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
220 |
| On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete |
0 |
2 |
15 |
1,118 |
1 |
7 |
28 |
1,792 |
| One share-one vote and the market for corporate control |
3 |
4 |
16 |
626 |
8 |
21 |
62 |
1,914 |
| Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
121 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
476 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
252 |
3 |
7 |
13 |
1,029 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
7 |
16 |
54 |
4,045 |
38 |
75 |
219 |
12,567 |
| Regulation and Sarbanes‐Oxley |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
121 |
| Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
| Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation |
6 |
22 |
63 |
5,179 |
16 |
44 |
144 |
15,098 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
63 |
0 |
5 |
10 |
163 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
6 |
18 |
45 |
7,873 |
48 |
104 |
300 |
22,483 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
20 |
951 |
| The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
873 |
| The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme |
0 |
3 |
12 |
917 |
9 |
18 |
46 |
3,532 |
| Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
479 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
276 |
| Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
155 |
| Total Journal Articles |
27 |
87 |
279 |
35,327 |
192 |
489 |
1,267 |
105,935 |
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