| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
254 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
1,373 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
289 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
704 |
| A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
234 |
| A THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE BASED ON THE SENIORITY OF CLAIMS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
309 |
| A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims |
0 |
0 |
0 |
240 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
650 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
0 |
0 |
2 |
762 |
0 |
16 |
44 |
1,975 |
| A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
32 |
623 |
| A Theory of Firm Scope |
0 |
1 |
2 |
305 |
0 |
6 |
33 |
712 |
| A theory of competitive equilibrium in stock market economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
584 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
216 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
2 |
188 |
1 |
3 |
20 |
722 |
| Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
361 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
0 |
1 |
4 |
174 |
1 |
10 |
98 |
553 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
11 |
30 |
3,980 |
| Banks Are Where The Liquidity Is |
0 |
0 |
0 |
97 |
2 |
2 |
20 |
184 |
| Bargaining and Strikes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
249 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
308 |
| Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
396 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
349 |
2 |
3 |
25 |
972 |
| Contracts as Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
172 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
409 |
| Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
1 |
2 |
25 |
377 |
| Contracts as Reference Points: Experimental Evidence |
0 |
1 |
2 |
104 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
296 |
| Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
1 |
4 |
29 |
350 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
579 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
5 |
17 |
721 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
691 |
1 |
7 |
17 |
1,978 |
| Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
273 |
0 |
3 |
16 |
1,709 |
| Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
936 |
| DEFAULT AND RENEGOTIATION: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF DEBT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
21 |
627 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
1 |
5 |
25 |
415 |
| Debt Enforcement Around the World |
0 |
0 |
1 |
298 |
1 |
8 |
31 |
1,205 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
0 |
0 |
2 |
354 |
0 |
1 |
20 |
1,147 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
789 |
2 |
11 |
20 |
2,004 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
5 |
19 |
1,216 |
| Default and Renegotiation: A DynamicModel of Debt - (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.113(1), February 1998, pp.1-41.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
272 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
523 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
1,584 |
| Different Approaches to Bankruptcy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
324 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
998 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
17 |
452 |
| Exit vs. Voice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
6 |
20 |
116 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
2 |
5 |
12 |
276 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
756 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
1,933 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
5 |
14 |
1,205 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
1 |
3 |
791 |
1 |
12 |
45 |
1,684 |
| Foundations of Incomplete Contracts - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.115-138.) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
249 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
795 |
| Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
146 |
1 |
6 |
15 |
366 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
0 |
3 |
24 |
188 |
| How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
112 |
| How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
118 |
| Imperfect Competition in General Equilibrium: An Overview of Recent Work (Now published in Frontiers of Economics, edited by K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
20 |
600 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1,151 |
0 |
3 |
22 |
2,428 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
35 |
838 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
0 |
2 |
7 |
481 |
0 |
16 |
43 |
1,354 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiations (Now published in Econometrica, vol.56, No.4 (1988), pp.755-785.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
235 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
836 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
199 |
| Inefficient Provision of Liquidity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
1 |
4 |
20 |
248 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
130 |
| Liquidity and Inefficient Investment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
237 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: A General Model (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LII, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
820 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlain: Special Results (Now published in Economic Journal, 95, (1985).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
330 |
| More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts |
1 |
1 |
2 |
133 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
393 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
229 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
665 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
1,605 |
| Norms and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
3 |
23 |
265 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
163 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
498 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
464 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
1,154 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
10 |
19 |
176 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
445 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
1,156 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
3 |
21 |
538 |
| One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
27 |
1,589 |
| One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1,131 |
2 |
10 |
35 |
3,053 |
| Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, (January 1983).) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
185 |
| Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
1 |
4 |
24 |
134 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
118 |
| Private Sanctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
34 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
55 |
2,121 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
4 |
7 |
14 |
196 |
6 |
24 |
68 |
810 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (Now published in Journal of Political Economy, vol.98, No.6 (1990), pp.1119-1158.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
6 |
15 |
548 |
| Reasonable Conjectures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
217 |
| Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
2 |
168 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
360 |
| Short-term, Long-term, and Continuing Contracts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
109 |
0 |
5 |
23 |
250 |
| Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
275 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
976 |
| Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control |
0 |
0 |
1 |
553 |
0 |
9 |
42 |
1,875 |
| Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine |
0 |
0 |
2 |
43 |
0 |
4 |
15 |
106 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
200 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
205 |
| The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
1 |
3 |
18 |
2,196 |
5 |
20 |
134 |
6,854 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (August 1986)) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
9 |
23 |
803 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
44 |
3,273 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
2 |
3 |
15 |
228 |
7 |
21 |
71 |
1,036 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
11 |
603 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
2 |
4 |
764 |
0 |
9 |
35 |
2,109 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
16 |
222 |
| The New Corporate Governance |
2 |
4 |
7 |
54 |
3 |
10 |
33 |
153 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
13 |
19 |
1,252 |
| The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
873 |
0 |
7 |
23 |
3,161 |
| The Theory of Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
41 |
7,122 |
| The public good is a public good: a theory of corporations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
504 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
35 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
390 |
| VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND MARKET FORECLOSURE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
57 |
1,389 |
| Total Working Papers |
10 |
27 |
111 |
19,709 |
84 |
524 |
2,263 |
95,129 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies |
0 |
0 |
4 |
269 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
680 |
| A new bankruptcy procedure that uses multiple auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
382 |
| A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption |
1 |
1 |
3 |
90 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
199 |
| An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem |
0 |
0 |
12 |
5,710 |
6 |
21 |
85 |
15,796 |
| Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
376 |
| Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence |
0 |
0 |
1 |
108 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
553 |
| Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition-Behavioral Effects of The Fundamental Transformation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
284 |
| Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications |
0 |
3 |
15 |
3,549 |
1 |
12 |
42 |
8,680 |
| Debt Enforcement around the World |
0 |
0 |
3 |
290 |
2 |
5 |
27 |
1,180 |
| Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management |
1 |
1 |
2 |
720 |
1 |
6 |
26 |
2,734 |
| Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids |
1 |
4 |
12 |
225 |
4 |
12 |
50 |
654 |
| Economica Coase Lecture: Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
272 |
| Financial Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
597 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
1,745 |
| Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
196 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
473 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New thoughts |
1 |
1 |
1 |
117 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
432 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships |
0 |
0 |
0 |
342 |
2 |
8 |
56 |
1,097 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation |
1 |
3 |
7 |
2,024 |
10 |
28 |
55 |
5,714 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
999 |
| Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin: Special Results |
0 |
0 |
0 |
99 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
262 |
| Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
1 |
6 |
33 |
217 |
| On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
100 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
309 |
| On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination versus Specialization |
2 |
2 |
2 |
62 |
3 |
5 |
26 |
1,023 |
| On the existence of equilibrium in a securities model |
0 |
0 |
1 |
103 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
229 |
| On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete |
0 |
3 |
10 |
1,123 |
3 |
7 |
27 |
1,808 |
| One share-one vote and the market for corporate control |
2 |
5 |
20 |
637 |
4 |
17 |
62 |
1,944 |
| Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
121 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
483 |
| Price Destabilizing Speculation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
253 |
0 |
3 |
19 |
1,037 |
| Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm |
5 |
13 |
51 |
4,073 |
35 |
85 |
308 |
12,757 |
| Regulation and Sarbanes‐Oxley |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
128 |
| Take-over bids and stock market equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
84 |
| Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation |
10 |
27 |
89 |
5,234 |
21 |
119 |
333 |
15,356 |
| The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
63 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
167 |
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration |
6 |
14 |
60 |
7,905 |
34 |
95 |
379 |
22,713 |
| The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
966 |
| The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Cooperatives versus Outside Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
883 |
| The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme |
1 |
3 |
11 |
923 |
6 |
22 |
122 |
3,630 |
| Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
486 |
| Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
281 |
| Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
169 |
| Total Journal Articles |
31 |
81 |
311 |
35,502 |
145 |
495 |
1,964 |
107,182 |