Access Statistics for John C. Harsanyi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A further note on Rawls's theory 0 0 1 108 1 2 12 71
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 2: Games in standard form 1 1 4 115 1 3 14 197
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 3: Consequence of desirable properties 0 0 1 57 0 2 12 92
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 5: The solution concept 0 0 1 48 0 1 9 57
A non-cooperative solution theory with cooperative applications. Chapter 1: Preliminary discussion 0 0 0 49 0 1 8 52
A non-cooperative solution theory with cooperative applications. Chapter 2: Consequences of desirable properties 0 0 1 51 0 0 9 97
Autobiography 0 0 1 38 0 0 10 121
Bargaining in Ignorance of the Opponents' Utility Function 0 0 0 220 0 0 10 457
Games with Incomplete Information 0 1 5 312 0 7 21 561
Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players 0 1 2 268 1 4 13 508
Nonlinear social welfare functions or, Do welfare economists have a special exemption from Bayesian rationality? 0 1 5 41 0 1 14 76
On Incentives to Forecasters and to Decision Makers Under Uncertainty 0 0 0 111 0 0 3 331
The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n-person noncooperative games. Part I 0 0 1 46 0 0 12 43
The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n-person noncooperative games. Part II 0 0 0 38 1 1 6 42
The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory 0 0 0 16 0 0 7 61
The work of John Nash in game theory 0 1 2 65 0 1 14 176
Utilities, Preferences and Substantive Goods 0 0 0 3 0 0 12 21
Utilities, Preferences and Substantive Goods 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 834
Utilities, Preferences and Substantive Goods 1 1 2 3 1 3 14 27
Total Working Papers 2 6 26 1,589 5 26 207 3,824

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information 2 2 6 347 3 4 26 711
A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 211 0 1 15 438
A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information 0 0 1 146 1 2 24 402
An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition 0 0 0 73 0 1 16 198
Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function 0 0 2 39 1 1 14 96
Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics 0 0 3 440 0 1 15 1,493
Book reviews 0 0 0 3 0 0 9 40
Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory 4 6 17 138 10 16 51 375
Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking 1 5 18 887 6 14 55 2,164
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility 5 9 13 804 12 20 66 2,011
Comment---Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games: Comments on Kadane and Larkey's Paper 0 1 1 26 1 3 16 121
Comments on Roth's Paper, "Values for Games without Side Payments" 0 0 0 5 0 1 6 278
Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion 0 0 0 106 1 2 11 685
Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 25 0 10 25 1,549
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points 2 4 7 179 3 10 57 413
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model 5 12 33 618 10 38 156 1,779
Games with Incomplete Information Played by `Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game 0 2 11 186 0 8 45 473
Games with Incomplete Information Played by ÜBayesianÝ Players, I--III: Part I. The Basic Model& 0 0 0 47 0 0 6 144
In Defense of Game Theory 0 0 1 24 0 1 7 47
Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 297 pages 0 0 2 91 0 0 7 203
On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games 0 0 2 51 0 2 19 129
Rationality Postulates for Bargaining Solutions in Cooperative and in Non-Cooperative Games 0 0 1 29 0 0 10 81
Rejoinder to Professors Kadane and Larkey 0 0 0 22 0 0 5 81
Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part I: Theoretical preliminaries 0 0 0 46 0 2 7 147
Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part II: Analysis of specific bargaining games 0 0 0 65 0 0 4 177
THE EQUILIBRIUM LEVEL OF NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 0 0 0 10 0 2 5 53
THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ERRORS* 0 0 1 98 1 1 11 170
Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods 0 0 1 326 1 1 14 927
Welfare Economics of Variable Tastes 0 0 1 15 0 2 9 63
Total Journal Articles 19 41 121 5,057 50 143 711 15,448
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games 0 0 0 0 17 46 263 31,102
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations 0 0 0 0 1 3 22 393
Total Books 0 0 0 0 18 49 285 31,495

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bayesian Decision Theory, Rule Utilitarianism, And Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 12
Game and decision theoretic models in ethics 0 1 3 353 1 3 16 1,014
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities, Risk Taking, and Welfare 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 25
Total Chapters 0 1 3 353 1 4 34 1,051

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Statistics updated 2026-10-11