Access Statistics for John C. Harsanyi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A further note on Rawls's theory 0 1 1 108 3 4 11 69
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 2: Games in standard form 0 1 5 113 2 4 15 193
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 3: Consequence of desirable properties 0 0 3 57 4 5 12 90
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 5: The solution concept 0 1 1 48 0 3 9 56
A non-cooperative solution theory with cooperative applications. Chapter 1: Preliminary discussion 0 0 0 49 1 2 7 51
A non-cooperative solution theory with cooperative applications. Chapter 2: Consequences of desirable properties 0 0 2 50 0 3 11 96
Autobiography 0 1 1 38 2 7 9 120
Bargaining in Ignorance of the Opponents' Utility Function 0 0 1 220 1 1 10 456
Games with Incomplete Information 0 3 5 311 3 6 16 553
Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players 0 1 3 267 1 3 12 503
Nonlinear social welfare functions or, Do welfare economists have a special exemption from Bayesian rationality? 0 1 4 40 1 4 13 75
On Incentives to Forecasters and to Decision Makers Under Uncertainty 0 0 0 111 0 0 4 331
The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n-person noncooperative games. Part I 0 0 2 46 1 5 13 43
The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n-person noncooperative games. Part II 0 0 0 38 2 3 6 41
The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory 0 0 0 16 3 3 7 61
The work of John Nash in game theory 0 1 2 64 2 3 16 174
Utilities, Preferences and Substantive Goods 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 834
Utilities, Preferences and Substantive Goods 0 0 0 3 1 2 10 19
Utilities, Preferences and Substantive Goods 0 1 1 2 3 4 11 23
Total Working Papers 0 11 31 1,581 32 64 199 3,788

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 3 342 2 5 18 701
A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 211 3 4 14 435
A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information 0 0 2 146 4 8 23 398
An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition 0 0 1 73 1 1 18 195
Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function 0 1 2 39 2 5 15 95
Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics 0 0 4 439 1 5 15 1,490
Book reviews 0 0 0 3 3 4 8 38
Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory 2 4 12 129 5 12 35 354
Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking 2 5 17 882 5 10 52 2,146
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility 1 2 7 795 9 21 51 1,985
Comment---Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games: Comments on Kadane and Larkey's Paper 0 0 0 25 6 7 14 117
Comments on Roth's Paper, "Values for Games without Side Payments" 0 0 0 5 3 3 5 277
Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion 0 0 0 106 2 3 9 682
Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 25 0 3 16 1,536
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points 1 1 5 174 10 21 40 388
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model 3 8 25 599 16 38 120 1,704
Games with Incomplete Information Played by `Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game 2 2 8 181 5 14 29 454
Games with Incomplete Information Played by ÜBayesianÝ Players, I--III: Part I. The Basic Model& 0 0 0 47 1 1 6 144
In Defense of Game Theory 0 1 1 24 1 3 8 46
Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 297 pages 0 1 2 91 2 4 8 203
On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games 0 0 4 51 6 7 23 127
Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior. By Nigel Howard. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971. Pp. 248. $12.95.) 0 1 2 52 2 4 11 121
Rationality Postulates for Bargaining Solutions in Cooperative and in Non-Cooperative Games 0 0 0 28 2 3 8 79
Rejoinder to Professors Kadane and Larkey 0 0 0 22 1 2 6 81
Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part I: Theoretical preliminaries 0 0 0 46 0 1 4 144
Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part II: Analysis of specific bargaining games 0 0 0 65 0 1 2 175
THE EQUILIBRIUM LEVEL OF NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 0 0 0 10 0 0 3 50
THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ERRORS* 0 1 1 98 2 6 10 169
Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods 0 1 1 326 2 5 8 920
Welfare Economics of Variable Tastes 1 1 1 15 2 2 8 61
[no title] 0 0 0 4 2 2 4 22
Total Journal Articles 12 29 98 5,053 100 205 591 15,337

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games 0 0 0 0 29 64 324 31,033
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations 0 0 0 0 2 8 19 389
Total Books 0 0 0 0 31 72 343 31,422

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bayesian Decision Theory, Rule Utilitarianism, And Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 0 2 6 9 9
Game and decision theoretic models in ethics 0 2 2 352 1 6 14 1,010
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities, Risk Taking, and Welfare 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 23
Total Chapters 0 2 2 352 4 13 28 1,042

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06