Access Statistics for John C. Harsanyi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A further note on Rawls's theory 0 0 0 107 3 6 8 65
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 2: Games in standard form 0 1 5 112 1 6 12 189
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 3: Consequence of desirable properties 0 1 3 57 2 4 7 85
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 5: The solution concept 0 0 0 47 3 5 6 53
A non-cooperative solution theory with cooperative applications. Chapter 1: Preliminary discussion 0 0 0 49 4 5 5 49
A non-cooperative solution theory with cooperative applications. Chapter 2: Consequences of desirable properties 0 0 5 50 3 5 13 93
Autobiography 0 0 0 37 1 2 2 113
Bargaining in Ignorance of the Opponents' Utility Function 0 0 2 220 5 7 12 455
Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 3 308 3 6 13 547
Games with incomplete information played by "bayesian" players 0 0 2 266 2 5 11 500
Nonlinear social welfare functions or, Do welfare economists have a special exemption from Bayesian rationality? 1 3 4 39 4 9 10 71
On Incentives to Forecasters and to Decision Makers Under Uncertainty 0 0 0 111 2 3 4 331
The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n-person noncooperative games. Part I 0 1 3 46 3 5 9 38
The tracing procedure: a Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n-person noncooperative games. Part II 0 0 0 38 0 2 4 38
The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory 0 0 0 16 2 3 5 58
The work of John Nash in game theory 0 0 2 63 5 9 15 171
Utilities, Preferences and Substantive Goods 0 0 0 0 1 5 6 832
Utilities, Preferences and Substantive Goods 0 0 0 3 4 8 8 17
Utilities, Preferences and Substantive Goods 0 0 0 1 5 6 8 19
Total Working Papers 1 6 29 1,570 53 101 158 3,724

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information 0 1 6 342 2 9 16 696
A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 211 6 8 11 431
A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information 0 1 2 146 4 10 18 390
An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition 0 0 1 73 3 10 18 194
Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent's utility function 0 1 2 38 3 7 12 90
Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics 1 1 4 439 3 5 11 1,485
Book reviews 0 0 0 3 2 3 4 34
Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory 0 3 13 125 5 15 33 342
Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking 0 5 15 877 3 20 48 2,136
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility 1 2 5 793 6 17 39 1,964
Comment---Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games: Comments on Kadane and Larkey's Paper 0 0 1 25 2 3 9 110
Comments on Roth's Paper, "Values for Games without Side Payments" 0 0 0 5 2 2 4 274
Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion 0 0 0 106 3 5 7 679
Games with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 25 5 7 14 1,533
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points 0 1 4 173 2 10 19 367
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model 2 5 22 591 17 38 97 1,666
Games with Incomplete Information Played by `Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game 1 4 10 179 4 10 20 440
Games with Incomplete Information Played by ÜBayesianÝ Players, I--III: Part I. The Basic Model& 0 0 0 47 1 4 5 143
In Defense of Game Theory 0 0 0 23 1 2 5 43
Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 297 pages 1 1 1 90 3 3 5 199
On the rationality postulates underlying the theory of cooperative games 0 1 4 51 2 8 17 120
Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior. By Nigel Howard. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971. Pp. 248. $12.95.) 0 0 1 51 1 5 8 117
Rationality Postulates for Bargaining Solutions in Cooperative and in Non-Cooperative Games 0 0 0 28 5 5 5 76
Rejoinder to Professors Kadane and Larkey 0 0 0 22 2 3 4 79
Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part I: Theoretical preliminaries 0 0 0 46 2 3 4 143
Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part II: Analysis of specific bargaining games 0 0 0 65 1 1 1 174
THE EQUILIBRIUM LEVEL OF NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 0 0 0 10 1 2 3 50
THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ERRORS* 0 0 1 97 3 3 6 163
Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods 0 0 0 325 1 2 3 915
Welfare Economics of Variable Tastes 0 0 0 14 3 5 8 59
[no title] 0 0 0 4 1 2 2 20
Total Journal Articles 6 26 92 5,024 99 227 456 15,132

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games 0 0 0 0 29 98 331 30,969
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations 0 0 0 0 3 5 20 381
Total Books 0 0 0 0 32 103 351 31,350

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Bayesian Decision Theory, Rule Utilitarianism, And Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3
Game and decision theoretic models in ethics 0 0 1 350 3 5 9 1,004
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities, Risk Taking, and Welfare 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 22
Total Chapters 0 0 1 350 4 10 17 1,029

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Statistics updated 2026-02-12