Access Statistics for Paul Heidhues

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
All Nash Equilibria of the Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction 1 1 1 250 3 5 11 882
Bargaining Power of a Coalition in Parallel Bargaining: Advantage of Multiple Cable System Operators 0 0 0 99 2 2 5 609
Behavioral Industrial Organization 2 3 6 219 11 17 45 415
Browsing versus Studying: A Pro-market Case for Regulation 0 0 0 0 2 5 19 44
Buyers’ Alliances for Bargaining Power 0 0 0 225 1 7 13 1,166
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 67 4 5 12 152
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 20 1 3 14 107
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 1 48 6 6 18 132
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 24 2 4 8 72
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 31 1 3 10 50
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 4 0 2 7 74
Defaults and donations: Evidence from a field experiment 0 1 1 50 2 3 8 90
Do social preferences matter in competitive markets? 0 0 0 64 1 1 11 217
Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines 0 0 0 17 1 8 32 99
Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines 0 0 0 55 5 6 14 161
Dynamic coordination via organizational routines 0 0 0 56 4 6 11 147
Employers’ Associations, Industry-wide Unions, and Competition 0 0 0 149 1 3 7 1,236
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects 0 0 0 48 1 7 17 282
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects 0 0 0 98 1 3 8 604
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The role of cohort effects 0 0 0 101 2 5 11 390
Exploitative Innovation 0 0 0 0 5 9 27 67
Hiding Information in Electoral Competition 0 0 0 164 0 1 4 706
Identifying Present-Bias from the Timing of Choices 0 0 0 30 2 3 13 65
Inferior Products and Profitable Deception 0 0 0 0 2 7 21 55
Merger Clusters during Economic Booms 0 0 0 100 0 0 4 395
Nash Bargaining Solution with Coalitions and The Joint Bargaining Paradox 0 0 0 244 5 7 14 1,092
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 0 0 0 177 1 1 9 770
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 0 0 0 242 1 2 8 771
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 0 0 0 101 2 2 9 460
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium 0 0 1 133 3 6 17 510
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium 0 0 0 4 3 6 10 80
Overconfidence and Prejudice 0 0 0 20 3 4 9 75
Private Monitoring in Auctions 0 0 0 83 5 8 12 530
Rational Multi-Agent Search 0 0 0 48 2 3 14 192
Regular prices and sales 0 0 2 109 3 3 18 235
Screening and Merger Activity 0 0 0 91 0 3 13 369
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs 0 0 0 16 1 3 9 106
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs 0 0 1 46 2 2 12 179
Study on methods to analyse the impact of state aid on competition 0 0 3 374 3 4 16 851
Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions 1 1 1 259 2 2 8 1,110
Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy 0 0 0 40 1 1 8 126
Technology Adoption, Socila Learning, and Economic Policy 0 0 0 5 1 2 5 60
Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy 0 0 0 22 0 2 6 84
The Effects of Downstream Distributor Chains on Upstream Producer Entry: A Bargaining Perspective 0 0 0 126 2 3 6 999
The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing 1 1 4 153 7 11 22 872
The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing 0 0 2 174 5 8 26 811
Total Working Papers 5 7 23 4,386 112 204 601 18,499

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A group bargaining solution 0 0 1 135 1 3 8 448
All equilibria of the Vickrey auction 0 0 2 208 2 3 11 458
All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction 0 0 0 63 0 1 4 202
Ambiguity Aversion in Models of Political Economy 0 0 0 6 1 4 10 24
Browsing versus Studying: A Pro-market Case for Regulation 0 0 3 7 2 5 28 80
Buyers' Alliances for Bargaining Power 0 0 1 140 0 10 25 807
Competition and Price Variation When Consumers Are Loss Averse 0 1 1 138 5 8 20 521
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 1 2 45 4 14 42 212
Dynamic coordination via organizational routines 0 0 1 2 0 5 15 28
Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects 0 0 0 56 2 3 10 195
Exclusionary Bundling and the Effects of a Competitive Fringe. Comment 0 0 0 19 3 4 9 73
Exploitative Innovation 0 0 1 27 6 9 22 160
Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the Credit Market 3 3 8 188 6 11 41 627
Fusionskontrolle und Anreize zum Lobbying 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 40
Futile Attempts at Self-Control 0 0 0 43 1 3 7 191
Hiding information in electoral competition 0 0 0 87 0 2 4 299
Identifying Present Bias from the Timing of Choices 0 0 2 13 1 3 19 107
Inferior Products and Profitable Deception* 1 3 6 46 10 19 39 234
Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions 0 0 0 127 2 7 25 343
Naïveté-Based Discrimination 0 0 5 102 1 5 32 509
On the Welfare Costs of Naiveté in the US Credit-Card Market 0 0 2 30 3 4 15 140
On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control 0 0 0 91 2 5 11 308
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium 0 0 1 108 4 8 23 367
Private monitoring in auctions 0 0 0 48 8 12 25 205
Rational exuberance 0 0 0 18 1 3 5 116
Regular prices and sales 0 0 0 64 5 12 20 545
SCREENING AND MERGER ACTIVITY 0 0 0 0 2 4 13 102
Strategic experimentation with private payoffs 0 0 1 25 4 6 18 155
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning 0 0 1 42 1 7 25 189
Total Journal Articles 4 8 38 1,879 77 180 534 7,685

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06