Access Statistics for Paul Heidhues

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
All Nash Equilibria of the Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction 0 0 0 249 0 5 7 877
Bargaining Power of a Coalition in Parallel Bargaining: Advantage of Multiple Cable System Operators 0 0 0 99 0 3 3 607
Behavioral Industrial Organization 0 1 7 216 3 22 37 401
Browsing versus Studying: A Pro-market Case for Regulation 0 0 0 0 3 12 17 42
Buyers’ Alliances for Bargaining Power 0 0 0 225 4 7 11 1,163
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 67 0 5 8 147
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 24 2 5 6 70
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 31 1 5 8 48
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 1 48 0 6 12 126
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 20 2 6 13 106
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 4 1 2 6 73
Defaults and donations: Evidence from a field experiment 1 1 1 50 1 4 7 88
Do social preferences matter in competitive markets? 0 0 0 64 0 3 11 216
Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines 0 0 0 55 0 6 8 155
Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines 0 0 0 17 3 25 27 94
Dynamic coordination via organizational routines 0 0 0 56 1 2 7 142
Employers’ Associations, Industry-wide Unions, and Competition 0 0 0 149 1 5 5 1,234
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects 0 0 0 98 1 5 6 602
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects 0 0 0 48 6 14 16 281
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The role of cohort effects 0 0 0 101 2 7 8 387
Exploitative Innovation 0 0 0 0 2 17 20 60
Hiding Information in Electoral Competition 0 0 0 164 1 2 5 706
Identifying Present-Bias from the Timing of Choices 0 0 0 30 0 8 10 62
Inferior Products and Profitable Deception 0 0 0 0 4 14 18 52
Merger Clusters during Economic Booms 0 0 0 100 0 3 4 395
Nash Bargaining Solution with Coalitions and The Joint Bargaining Paradox 0 0 0 244 1 5 8 1,086
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 0 0 0 101 0 4 7 458
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 0 0 0 242 0 3 6 769
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 0 0 0 177 0 4 9 769
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium 0 0 1 133 2 8 14 506
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium 0 0 0 4 2 5 6 76
Overconfidence and Prejudice 0 0 0 20 1 3 7 72
Private Monitoring in Auctions 0 0 0 83 2 4 6 524
Rational Multi-Agent Search 0 0 0 48 1 8 12 190
Regular prices and sales 0 0 2 109 0 5 15 232
Screening and Merger Activity 0 0 0 91 2 9 13 368
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs 0 0 0 16 1 5 7 104
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs 0 0 1 46 0 5 13 177
Study on methods to analyse the impact of state aid on competition 0 1 4 374 0 4 16 847
Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions 0 0 0 258 0 2 7 1,108
Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy 0 0 0 40 0 4 7 125
Technology Adoption, Socila Learning, and Economic Policy 0 0 0 5 1 4 4 59
Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy 0 0 0 22 1 5 5 83
The Effects of Downstream Distributor Chains on Upstream Producer Entry: A Bargaining Perspective 0 0 0 126 1 3 4 997
The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing 0 1 2 174 1 12 21 804
The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing 0 1 3 152 2 8 13 863
Total Working Papers 1 5 22 4,380 56 303 480 18,351

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A group bargaining solution 0 0 1 135 2 4 7 447
All equilibria of the Vickrey auction 0 0 2 208 1 4 9 456
All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction 0 0 0 63 0 1 4 201
Ambiguity Aversion in Models of Political Economy 0 0 0 6 3 8 9 23
Browsing versus Studying: A Pro-market Case for Regulation 0 2 3 7 2 11 28 77
Buyers' Alliances for Bargaining Power 0 0 1 140 10 21 25 807
Competition and Price Variation When Consumers Are Loss Averse 0 0 0 137 1 11 13 514
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 4 44 5 14 36 203
Dynamic coordination via organizational routines 0 0 2 2 2 7 13 25
Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects 0 0 0 56 0 7 7 192
Exclusionary Bundling and the Effects of a Competitive Fringe. Comment 0 0 0 19 0 3 5 69
Exploitative Innovation 0 0 1 27 2 12 15 153
Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the Credit Market 0 0 6 185 3 18 34 619
Fusionskontrolle und Anreize zum Lobbying 0 0 0 1 0 8 8 40
Futile Attempts at Self-Control 0 0 0 43 2 3 6 190
Hiding information in electoral competition 0 0 0 87 1 3 3 298
Identifying Present Bias from the Timing of Choices 0 0 2 13 1 7 17 105
Inferior Products and Profitable Deception* 1 2 5 44 4 15 27 219
Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions 0 0 0 127 5 15 23 341
Naïveté-Based Discrimination 0 1 5 102 4 14 34 508
On the Welfare Costs of Naiveté in the US Credit-Card Market 0 0 2 30 1 9 12 137
On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control 0 0 0 91 2 7 8 305
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium 0 1 1 108 1 11 17 360
Private monitoring in auctions 0 0 0 48 1 7 14 194
Rational exuberance 0 0 0 18 2 4 4 115
Regular prices and sales 0 0 0 64 3 8 12 536
SCREENING AND MERGER ACTIVITY 0 0 0 0 2 8 11 100
Strategic experimentation with private payoffs 0 0 1 25 0 9 13 149
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning 0 0 1 42 5 14 23 187
Total Journal Articles 1 6 37 1,872 65 263 437 7,570

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Statistics updated 2026-03-04