Access Statistics for Paul Heidhues

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
All Nash Equilibria of the Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction 0 0 0 249 0 0 1 870
Bargaining Power of a Coalition in Parallel Bargaining: Advantage of Multiple Cable System Operators 0 0 0 99 0 1 1 604
Behavioral Industrial Organization 2 3 12 209 3 8 39 364
Browsing versus Studying: A Pro-market Case for Regulation 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 25
Buyers’ Alliances for Bargaining Power 0 1 1 225 1 3 5 1,152
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 1 67 0 0 4 139
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 64
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 20 0 2 3 93
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 40
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 47 0 1 5 114
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 67
Defaults and donations: Evidence from a field experiment 0 0 1 49 1 1 4 81
Do social preferences matter in competitive markets? 0 0 0 64 0 0 0 205
Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines 0 0 0 17 0 1 1 67
Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines 0 0 0 55 0 1 17 147
Dynamic coordination via organizational routines 0 0 0 56 0 1 1 135
Employers’ Associations, Industry-wide Unions, and Competition 0 0 0 149 0 1 2 1,229
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects 0 0 1 48 0 0 1 265
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects 0 0 1 98 0 0 1 596
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The role of cohort effects 0 0 1 101 0 1 3 379
Exploitative Innovation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 40
Hiding Information in Electoral Competition 0 0 0 164 1 2 2 701
Identifying Present-Bias from the Timing of Choices 0 0 1 30 0 0 4 52
Inferior Products and Profitable Deception 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 34
Merger Clusters during Economic Booms 1 1 2 100 3 4 5 391
Nash Bargaining Solution with Coalitions and The Joint Bargaining Paradox 0 0 0 244 0 1 2 1,078
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 0 0 1 242 0 0 2 763
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 0 0 0 177 0 1 1 760
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 0 0 0 101 0 0 2 451
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium 0 0 1 132 1 1 3 492
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 70
Overconfidence and Prejudice 0 0 5 20 0 1 16 65
Private Monitoring in Auctions 0 0 0 83 1 1 3 518
Rational Multi-Agent Search 0 0 0 48 0 1 1 178
Regular prices and sales 0 0 0 107 1 1 2 217
Screening and Merger Activity 0 0 0 91 0 1 2 355
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs 0 0 1 16 0 0 3 97
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 164
Study on methods to analyse the impact of state aid on competition 1 2 5 370 3 5 12 831
Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions 0 0 0 258 0 2 2 1,101
Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy 0 0 0 40 0 1 2 118
Technology Adoption, Socila Learning, and Economic Policy 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 55
Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 78
The Effects of Downstream Distributor Chains on Upstream Producer Entry: A Bargaining Perspective 0 0 0 126 0 0 0 993
The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing 0 0 0 149 0 1 1 850
The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing 1 1 1 172 3 4 8 783
Total Working Papers 6 9 37 4,358 19 49 175 17,871

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A group bargaining solution 0 0 0 134 0 0 1 440
All equilibria of the Vickrey auction 0 1 3 206 0 1 3 447
All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction 0 0 2 63 0 2 5 197
Ambiguity Aversion in Models of Political Economy 0 0 0 6 1 2 2 14
Browsing versus Studying: A Pro-market Case for Regulation 0 1 2 4 2 3 10 49
Buyers' Alliances for Bargaining Power 0 0 1 139 0 2 4 782
Competition and Price Variation When Consumers Are Loss Averse 0 2 2 137 1 3 5 501
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 1 5 12 40 2 10 25 167
Dynamic coordination via organizational routines 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 12
Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects 0 0 1 56 1 2 3 185
Exclusionary Bundling and the Effects of a Competitive Fringe. Comment 0 0 0 19 0 1 1 64
Exploitative Innovation 0 0 4 26 0 0 9 138
Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the Credit Market 0 2 4 179 1 5 9 585
Fusionskontrolle und Anreize zum Lobbying 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 32
Futile Attempts at Self-Control 0 0 0 43 0 3 4 184
Hiding information in electoral competition 0 1 2 87 0 3 7 295
Identifying Present Bias from the Timing of Choices 0 0 2 11 0 1 8 88
Inferior Products and Profitable Deception* 0 0 6 39 0 2 20 192
Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions 0 0 1 127 1 2 3 318
Naïveté-Based Discrimination 0 2 16 97 1 5 44 474
On the Welfare Costs of Naiveté in the US Credit-Card Market 0 0 0 28 1 2 8 125
On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control 0 1 3 91 0 1 3 297
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium 0 0 4 107 1 4 17 343
Private monitoring in auctions 0 0 1 48 1 2 3 180
Rational exuberance 0 0 0 18 1 2 2 111
Regular prices and sales 0 0 0 64 0 0 4 524
SCREENING AND MERGER ACTIVITY 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 89
Strategic experimentation with private payoffs 0 1 4 24 0 1 10 136
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning 0 0 5 41 2 5 28 164
Total Journal Articles 1 16 75 1,835 18 69 244 7,133

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03