Access Statistics for Paul Heidhues

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
All Nash Equilibria of the Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction 0 0 0 249 1 1 3 873
Bargaining Power of a Coalition in Parallel Bargaining: Advantage of Multiple Cable System Operators 0 0 0 99 2 2 3 606
Behavioral Industrial Organization 1 2 10 216 4 9 24 383
Browsing versus Studying: A Pro-market Case for Regulation 0 0 0 0 3 5 8 33
Buyers’ Alliances for Bargaining Power 0 0 0 225 0 1 5 1,156
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 1 48 1 4 7 121
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 31 1 2 4 44
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 4 0 1 4 71
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 24 2 3 3 67
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 67 1 2 4 143
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 0 20 1 6 9 101
Defaults and donations: Evidence from a field experiment 0 0 0 49 0 1 4 84
Do social preferences matter in competitive markets? 0 0 0 64 1 6 9 214
Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines 0 0 0 55 1 3 4 150
Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines 0 0 0 17 15 17 18 84
Dynamic coordination via organizational routines 0 0 0 56 0 3 6 140
Employers’ Associations, Industry-wide Unions, and Competition 0 0 0 149 0 0 1 1,229
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects 0 0 0 98 1 2 2 598
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects 0 0 0 48 4 6 6 271
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The role of cohort effects 0 0 0 101 1 2 3 381
Exploitative Innovation 0 0 0 0 2 4 5 45
Hiding Information in Electoral Competition 0 0 0 164 0 1 5 704
Identifying Present-Bias from the Timing of Choices 0 0 0 30 3 4 5 57
Inferior Products and Profitable Deception 0 0 0 0 5 9 9 43
Merger Clusters during Economic Booms 0 0 1 100 1 2 6 393
Nash Bargaining Solution with Coalitions and The Joint Bargaining Paradox 0 0 0 244 0 0 4 1,081
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 0 0 0 242 2 3 5 768
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 0 0 0 101 2 5 5 456
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control 0 0 0 177 1 1 6 766
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium 0 0 1 133 1 3 8 499
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium 0 0 1 4 2 3 4 73
Overconfidence and Prejudice 0 0 0 20 1 4 5 70
Private Monitoring in Auctions 0 0 0 83 0 1 3 520
Rational Multi-Agent Search 0 0 0 48 4 8 9 186
Regular prices and sales 0 1 2 109 1 6 12 228
Screening and Merger Activity 0 0 0 91 1 2 5 360
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs 0 0 0 16 1 1 3 100
Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs 0 0 1 46 3 5 11 175
Study on methods to analyse the impact of state aid on competition 1 2 6 374 4 8 21 847
Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions 0 0 0 258 1 2 8 1,107
Technology Adoption, Social Learning, and Economic Policy 0 0 0 40 0 2 4 121
Technology Adoption, Socila Learning, and Economic Policy 0 0 0 5 1 1 1 56
Technology adoption, social learning, and economic policy 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 78
The Effects of Downstream Distributor Chains on Upstream Producer Entry: A Bargaining Perspective 0 0 0 126 0 1 1 994
The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing 1 2 3 174 5 10 18 797
The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing 1 1 3 152 1 3 7 856
Total Working Papers 4 8 29 4,379 81 165 297 18,129

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A group bargaining solution 0 0 1 135 1 2 4 444
All equilibria of the Vickrey auction 0 1 3 208 1 5 7 453
All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction 0 0 0 63 0 1 5 200
Ambiguity Aversion in Models of Political Economy 0 0 0 6 0 1 3 15
Browsing versus Studying: A Pro-market Case for Regulation 1 1 2 6 4 8 23 70
Buyers' Alliances for Bargaining Power 0 0 1 140 3 6 8 789
Competition and Price Variation When Consumers Are Loss Averse 0 0 1 137 2 3 6 505
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment 0 0 9 44 2 8 32 191
Dynamic coordination via organizational routines 0 0 2 2 2 4 11 20
Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects 0 0 0 56 4 4 6 189
Exclusionary Bundling and the Effects of a Competitive Fringe. Comment 0 0 0 19 1 3 4 67
Exploitative Innovation 0 0 1 27 2 3 5 143
Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the Credit Market 0 1 7 185 4 9 24 605
Fusionskontrolle und Anreize zum Lobbying 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 32
Futile Attempts at Self-Control 0 0 0 43 1 4 7 188
Hiding information in electoral competition 0 0 1 87 0 0 1 295
Identifying Present Bias from the Timing of Choices 0 2 2 13 1 6 12 99
Inferior Products and Profitable Deception* 1 2 4 43 3 6 17 207
Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions 0 0 0 127 1 4 11 327
Naïveté-Based Discrimination 1 2 6 102 4 8 27 498
On the Welfare Costs of Naiveté in the US Credit-Card Market 0 0 2 30 1 1 5 129
On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control 0 0 1 91 2 3 4 300
Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium 0 0 0 107 3 4 11 352
Private monitoring in auctions 0 0 0 48 2 8 11 189
Rational exuberance 0 0 0 18 0 0 1 111
Regular prices and sales 0 0 0 64 3 5 7 531
SCREENING AND MERGER ACTIVITY 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 94
Strategic experimentation with private payoffs 0 0 1 25 4 6 8 144
Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning 0 0 1 42 1 5 14 174
Total Journal Articles 3 9 45 1,869 54 120 281 7,361

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Statistics updated 2026-01-09