| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
28 |
| A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
40 |
| A Spatial Model of U.S. Senate Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
233 |
| A comparison of aggregation methods for measures of economic freedom |
0 |
0 |
0 |
54 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
174 |
| A note on majority rule and neutrality with an application to state votes at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
| AID, ECONOMIC FREEDOM, AND GROWTH |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
166 |
| Aid and Democratization in the Transition Economies |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
77 |
| An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
104 |
| And a Hockey Game Broke Out: Crime and Punishment in the NHL |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
570 |
| Are we there yet? On the convergence of financial reforms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
73 |
| Characterizing plurality using the majoritarian condition: a new proof and implications for other scoring rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
21 |
| Consistent Estimates of the Impact of Special Interest Groups on Economic Growth |
0 |
0 |
1 |
55 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
253 |
| Corruption and the Institutional Environment for Growth |
0 |
0 |
1 |
243 |
4 |
9 |
20 |
716 |
| Crossing the threshold: A positive analysis of IBRD graduation policy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
145 |
| Cross–country convergence of financial reforms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
147 |
| Determinants of interest group formation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
176 |
| Economic Freedom and Economic Growth: A Short-Run Causal Investigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
| Economic Freedom and Economic Growth: A Short-run Causal Investigation |
0 |
0 |
3 |
686 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
2,064 |
| Electoral Uncertainty and the Macroeconomy: The Evidence from Canada |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
97 |
| Empirical Evidence Regarding Regional Political Convergence in the United States |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
23 |
| Employment and Gubernatorial Elections during the Gilded Age |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
328 |
| Explaining the Rain: The Rise and Decline of Nations after 25 Years |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
| Financing divided and unified partisan governments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
82 |
| Foreign Aid and Market‐Liberalizing Reform |
0 |
0 |
1 |
92 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
300 |
| Fractionalization Effect and Government Financing |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
309 |
| Fractionalization and Economic Freedom |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
31 |
| Guest editor’s introduction to the symposium on the 50th anniversary of Olson’s Logic of Collective Action |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
| Has Assistance from USAID been Successful for Democratization? Evidence from the Transition Economies of Eastern Europe and Eurasia |
0 |
1 |
3 |
38 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
126 |
| How Global is Globalization? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
6 |
| INTEREST GROUPS, DEMOCRACY, AND POLICY VOLATILITY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
5 |
7 |
9 |
44 |
| Income convergence among U.S. states: crosssectional and time series evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
65 |
| Income convergence among U.S. states: cross‐sectional and time series evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
15 |
| Incumbency preservation through electoral legislation: The case of the secret ballot |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
112 |
| Institutions, Lobbying, and Economic Performance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
85 |
| Interest Groups and Investment: A Further Test of the Olson Hypothesis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
367 |
| Interest Groups and the “Rise and Decline” of Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
36 |
| Joint Determination of Regulations by the Regulator and the Regulated: Commercial Bank Reserve Requirements, 1875–1979 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
81 |
| Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
74 |
| Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
| On the Measurement of Comparative Economic Freedom across Nations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
61 |
| Opening the West: Federal Internal Improvements Before 1860. By Laurence J. Malone. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. Pp. xvi, 155. $59.95 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
41 |
| POLITICAL MONETARY CYCLES UNDER ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS: THE INDEPENDENT TREASURY AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE |
1 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
5 |
6 |
6 |
137 |
| Partisan Business Cycles under Variable Election Dates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
75 |
| Personalty interests at the Constitutional Convention: new tests of the Beard thesis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
195 |
| Political Business Cycles and Endogenous Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
| Political business cycles before the Great Depression |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
172 |
| Probabilistic Borda rule voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
134 |
| Proxies for Economic Freedom: A Critique of the Hanson Critique |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
| Public Choice Economics: Where is there Consensus? |
0 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
2 |
6 |
7 |
24 |
| Railroads and Property Taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
118 |
| Randall G. Holcombe, From Liberty to Democracy: The Transformation of American Government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
142 |
| Relationships among democratic freedoms in the former Soviet Republics: a causality analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
53 |
| Rent-setting in multiple winner rent-seeking contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
117 |
| Reply to a comment on sequential elections and overlapping terms: voting for US senate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
58 |
| SIZE OF THE MILITARY SECTOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS OF AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA |
0 |
0 |
2 |
458 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
1,745 |
| SYMMETRIC SCORING RULES AND A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BORDA COUNT |
1 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
31 |
| Senate Elections With Independent Candidates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
23 |
| Sequential elections and overlapping terms: voting for US Senate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
159 |
| Size of the Military Sector and Economic Growth: A Panel Data Analysis of Africa and Latin America |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
13 |
| Special-Interest Groups and Volatility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
38 |
| Special-interest groups and growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
272 |
| State bloc versus individual delegate voting at the constitutional convention: Did it make a difference? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
6 |
8 |
41 |
| Strategy Proof Scoring Rule Lotteries for Multiple Winners |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
23 |
| Support for Repealing Prohibition: An Analysis of State-Wide Referenda on Ratifying the 21st Amendment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
33 |
| Symposium: Marking the 25th Anniversary of Mancur Olson's The Rise and Decline of Nations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
9 |
| Targeting inflation targeting: the influence of interest groups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
2 |
5 |
8 |
86 |
| The Connection between Democratic Freedoms and Growth in Transition Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
152 |
| The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
11 |
284 |
| The anti-tobacco movement in the Progressive Era: A case study of direct democracy in Oregon |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
3 |
7 |
10 |
471 |
| The growth-maximizing level of regulation: Evidence from a panel of international data |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
33 |
| The political economy of investment: Sclerotic effects from interest groups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
3 |
4 |
10 |
213 |
| The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
6 |
34 |
| To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution. By Robert A. McGuire. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xii, 395. $19.95 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
106 |
| Tullock on the organization of scientific inquiry |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
38 |
| Variable Rational Partisan Business Cycles: theory and some evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
301 |
| Variable Rational Partisan Business Cycles: theory and some evidence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
233 |
| Voting on voting with the feet: a cross-county analysis of the Tennessee popular referenda to secede from the union |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
94 |
| Whcich Economic Freedoms Contribute to Growth? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
22 |
| When ties are possible: Weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
16 |
| Which Economic Freedoms Contribute to Growth? Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
| Winning probabilities in a pairwise lottery system with three alternatives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
458 |
| Total Journal Articles |
2 |
5 |
24 |
2,720 |
111 |
231 |
418 |
13,518 |
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