Access Statistics for Tibor Heumann

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Unified Approach to Second and Third Degree Price Discrimination 0 0 2 2 0 1 14 14
A Unified Approach to Second and Third Degree Price Discrimination 0 1 1 8 0 2 16 29
Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions 0 1 1 11 0 2 23 35
Bidder-Optimal Information Structures in Auctions 0 1 1 13 1 2 11 16
Consumer-Optimal Segmentation in Multi-Product Markets 0 1 1 10 0 3 24 32
Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing 0 0 0 0 0 2 12 14
Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing 0 1 1 13 0 2 15 27
Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework 1 3 17 17 2 4 6 6
Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework 0 0 18 18 0 2 11 11
Information and Market Power 0 0 0 6 0 2 11 49
Information and Market Power 0 0 0 49 1 3 11 61
Information and Market Power 0 0 0 96 0 0 3 129
Information and Market Power 0 0 0 30 0 1 11 90
Information and Market Power 0 0 0 23 1 1 14 70
Information and Volatility 0 0 0 36 0 0 21 71
Information and Volatility 0 0 0 56 0 0 29 96
Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come From" 0 0 0 39 0 2 11 88
Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come from? 0 0 0 13 0 1 10 74
Information, Market Power and Price Volatility 0 0 0 4 1 1 15 30
Information, Market Power and Price Volatility 0 0 0 52 0 1 12 69
Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions 0 0 0 18 0 0 5 41
Procurement without Priors: A Simple Mechanism and its Notable Performance 0 0 13 13 2 4 15 15
Procurement without Priors: A Simple Mechanism and its Notable Performance 1 2 11 11 1 4 9 9
Screening and Segmenting: A Consumer Surplus Perspective 0 0 0 24 0 2 16 31
Screening and Segmenting: A Consumer Surplus Perspective 0 1 1 1 0 2 3 3
Screening with Persuasion 0 0 1 24 2 3 18 55
Screening with Persuasion 0 0 3 3 1 5 16 21
Screening with Persuasion 0 1 1 16 1 2 11 28
Screening with Persuasion 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 11
Screening with Persuasion 0 1 3 14 0 3 25 31
Screening with Persuasion 0 0 0 19 0 1 21 42
Screening with Persuasion 0 0 0 1 1 2 21 28
Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition 0 0 1 21 1 2 8 45
Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition 0 0 0 3 0 1 13 23
Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition 0 0 0 12 0 0 11 33
Selling Impressions: Efficiency vs. Competition 0 0 0 2 0 1 13 22
The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing 0 1 1 19 1 4 10 23
The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 11
The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing 0 0 0 14 1 1 10 41
Total Working Papers 2 14 77 716 17 69 516 1,524

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals 0 0 0 1 1 2 16 48
Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals 0 0 0 10 0 0 5 39
Information and volatility 0 0 1 34 0 0 6 147
Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint 0 0 0 3 1 2 7 45
Information, market power, and price volatility 0 0 0 13 1 3 15 57
On the cardinality of the message space in sender–receiver games 0 1 3 3 1 3 8 16
Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions 0 0 0 2 0 0 15 35
Screening with Persuasion 1 2 4 4 1 6 14 14
Total Journal Articles 1 3 8 70 5 16 86 401

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Statistics updated 2026-08-07