Access Statistics for Pär Holmberg

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Asymmetric Supply Function Equilibrium with Constant Marginal Costs 0 0 0 162 0 0 0 670
Capacity Mechanisms and the Technology Mix in Competitive Electricity Markets 1 1 1 40 1 2 4 40
Capacity mechanisms and the technology mix in competitive electricity markets 0 0 1 38 0 0 1 51
Capacity mechanisms and the technology mix in competitive electricity markets 1 1 1 11 1 1 3 30
Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets 0 0 0 63 0 0 1 223
Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets 0 2 12 93 2 10 47 741
Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets 0 0 3 51 0 1 7 99
Comparing Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid and Uniform-Price Auctions 0 1 1 114 0 1 1 368
Congestion Management in Electricity Networks: Nodal, Zonal and Discriminatory Pricing 0 0 1 96 3 4 5 294
Congestion management in electricity networks: Nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 25
Congestion management in electricity networks: Nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing 0 0 1 106 0 1 4 245
Electricity Markets: Designing Auctions Where Suppliers Have Uncertain Costs 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 60
Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 16
Electricity markets: Designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 60
Game-theoretical, Strategic forward Contracting in the Electricity Market 0 1 1 123 0 1 1 216
Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets Part I: Concept Analysis 0 0 0 28 0 0 1 81
Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets Part II: Solution Algorithm 0 0 1 40 0 0 4 37
Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets – Part I: Concept Analysis 0 0 0 15 0 1 2 36
Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets – Part II: Solution Algorithm 0 0 1 10 0 0 3 19
Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets –​ Part I: Concept Analysis 0 0 1 16 0 3 4 44
Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets –​ Part II: Solution Algorithm 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 29
Mixed Strategies in Discriminatory Divisible-good Auctions 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 119
Mixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good auctions 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 23
Multi-Unit Auctions with Uncertain Supply and Single-Unit Demand 0 0 0 14 0 0 2 10
Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 7
Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand 0 0 1 9 0 1 5 6
Numerical Calculation of an Asymmetric Supply Function Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints 0 0 0 187 0 0 0 785
Price Instability in Multi-Unit Auctions 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 11
Price Instability in Multi-Unit Auctions 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 42
Price Instability in Multi-Unit Auctions 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 34
Pro-Competitive Rationing in Multi-Unit Auctions 0 0 0 44 0 0 1 33
Pro-competitive rationing in multi-unit auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12
Pro-competitive rationing in multi-unit auctions 0 0 0 22 0 1 2 46
Production Efficiency of Nodal and Zonal Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Electricity Markets 0 0 0 49 1 1 2 82
Production efficiency of nodal and zonal pricing in imperfectly competitive electricity markets 0 0 0 40 0 0 1 45
Production efficiency of nodal and zonal pricing in imperfectly competitive electricity markets 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 39
Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 56
Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 39
Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 32
Relaxing Competition through Speculation: Committing to a Negative Supply Slope 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 6
Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 35
Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 82
Simulation and Evaluation of Zonal Electricity Market Design 0 0 1 30 0 0 2 34
Simulation and Evaluation of Zonal Electricity Market Designs 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 50
Simulation and Evaluation of Zonal Electricity Market Designs 0 0 0 55 0 0 2 81
Some Inequalities related to the analysis of electricity auctions 0 0 0 73 0 0 0 287
Strategic Reserves versus Market-wide Capacity Mechanisms 0 0 3 25 0 0 5 45
Strategic Reserves versus Market-wide Capacity Mechanisms 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 23
Strategic Reserves versus Market-wide Capacity Mechanisms 0 0 4 12 0 0 7 20
Supply Function Equilibria in Networks with Transport Constraints 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 70
Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions 1 2 2 123 1 2 4 256
Supply Function Equilibria: Step Functions and Continuous Representations 0 0 0 118 0 0 2 1,159
Supply Function Equilibria: Step Functions and Continuous Representations 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 295
Supply Function Equilibria: Step functions and continuous representations 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 22
Supply function equilibria in transportation networks 0 0 0 56 0 1 1 109
Supply function equilibria in transportation networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17
Sweden's Energy Investment Challenge 0 0 1 29 0 0 2 46
The Supply Function Equilibrium and Its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 169
The Supply Function Equilibrium and its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions 0 0 0 169 0 0 1 362
The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 22
Unique Supply Function Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints 0 0 0 242 0 0 0 793
Total Working Papers 3 8 37 2,767 10 33 149 8,793

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Survey of Capacity Mechanisms: Lessons for the Swedish Electricity Market 1 3 8 8 1 3 18 19
Comparing auction designs where suppliers have uncertain costs and uncertain pivotal status 0 0 1 10 0 0 3 38
Comparison of congestion management techniques: Nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing 0 4 7 162 0 6 22 413
Mixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good auctions 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 60
Numerical calculation of an asymmetric supply function equilibrium with capacity constraints 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 145
On supply-function equilibria in radial transmission networks 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 11
Optimal Capacity Mechanisms for Competitive Electricity Markets 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Optimal Capacity Mechanisms for Competitive Electricity Markets 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Optimal Capacity Mechanisms for Competitive Electricity Markets 0 0 3 9 0 0 4 25
Price instability in multi-unit auctions 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 44
Pro‐competitive Rationing in Multi‐unit Auctions 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 17
Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 53
Strategic Forward Contracting in the Wholesale Electricity Market 0 2 2 37 0 3 4 120
Supply Function Equilibrium with Asymmetric Capacities and Constant Marginal Costs 0 0 0 20 0 0 1 140
Supply function equilibria of pay-as-bid auctions 0 1 1 42 0 2 5 131
Supply function equilibria: Step functions and continuous representations 0 0 0 44 0 1 2 303
The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions 0 1 2 65 0 2 5 201
Unique supply function equilibrium with capacity constraints 0 0 1 60 0 1 3 172
Total Journal Articles 3 13 28 501 3 20 75 1,895

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Statistics updated 2025-07-04